Pincus Bros., Inc.--Maxwell

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 9, 1979

241 N.L.R.B. 805 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

PINCUS BROTHERS. INC.-MAXWELL
Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell and Jane Uptegrove
Richardson. Case 4 CA-8513
April 9, 1979
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDALE
On December 29, 1978, Administrative Law Judge
Josephine H. Klein issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding.' Thereafter, Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel
filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Pincus Brothers, Inc.-
Maxwell, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
i 237 NLRB 1063 (1978).
: Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). we have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing her findings.
The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently stated that December 5,
1977, instead of December 5, 1975, was the date on which Jane Uptegrove
Richardson began work in the sleeve department of Respondent's plant.
DECISION
JOSEPHINE H. KLEIN, Administrative Law Judge: Pursu-
ant to a charge filed by Jane U. Richardson on February
24, 1977, a complaint was issued on June 30, 1977, against
Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell, Respondent, alleging that
on February 19, 1977, Richardson was discharged for en-
gaging in protected concerted activities, in contravention of
Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.' The hearing began before me in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on November 30, 1977. Re-
spondent's principal defense to the complaint was that
Richardson's discharge had been sustained by an arbitrator
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. 29 U.S.C. I151. et seq.
pursuant to the grievance provision in the collective-bar-
gaining agreement between Respondent and the Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers of America.2 Respondent main-
tained that the Board should defer to the arbitral award
under the Spielberg doctrine.' The parties agreed that the
arbitration proceeding had been fair and regular. The Gen-
eral Counsel, however, maintained that the arbitral award
was repugnant to the purposes of the Act and that, there-
fore. deferral was inappropriate. The parties agreed "that
for the purpose of determining whether the Board should
defer to the arbitrator's award, his factual findings should
be accepted as accurate."' Upon these agreements, the par-
ties waived decision by the Administrative Law Judge, and
the record was transmitted to the Board for direct decision.
On August 25, 1978, the Board issued its Decision, 237
NLRB 1063, holding that the arbitrator's decision was re-
pugnant to the purposes of the Act. However, the Board
further held that, since deferral to the arbitrator's award
was improper, the subsidiary findings of fact contained
therein were not conclusive or binding in the unfair labor
practice proceeding. Accordingly, the case was remanded to
the Administrative Law Judge for hearing de novo of the
allegation in the complaint that Richardson was discharged
for engaging in protected concerted activities, in contraven-
tion of Section 8(aX 1) of the Act.
The hearing on remand was held before me in Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, on October 30, 1978. The General
Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel, and
Richardson, the Charging Party, appeared pro se. All par-
ties were afforded full opportunity to present written and
oral evidence and argument. Post-trial briefs have been
filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent.
Upon the entire record, together with careful observation
of the witnesses and consideration of the briefs, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. PRELIMINARY FINDIN(;
Respondent, a Pennsylvania corporation, is engaged in
the manufacture and wholesale distribution of men's cloth-
ing at its Independence Mall, Philadelphia, facility. During
the past year, a representative period, Respondent sold and
shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to cus-
tomers located outside Pennsylvania. Respondent is, and
has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issue
The only issue now presented is whether Richardson was
discharged, in whole or in part, because of distribution of a
2 Actually it was the Men's Clothing Manufacturers Agreement between
the Philadelphia Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
and Philadelphia Clothing Manufacturers Association.
Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
4 This language is quoted from the Board's Decision. 237 NLRB 1063, fn.
2 (1978).
241 NLRB No. 129
805
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
leaflet, which the Board has already held was protected ac-
tivity, or whether, on the other hand, she was discharged
solely for cause, i.e.. in Respondent's words, for "abuse of
working time."5
B. The Facts
Richardson commenced work in the sleeve department of
Respondent's plant on December 5, 1977. So far as the rec-
ord discloses, the first bit of trouble she experienced came
sometime in May 1976, when she attempted to intercede on
behalf of another employee who was protesting an assign-
ment. Plant Manager Peter Matozzo objected to Richard-
son's becoming involved; according to Matozzo, such mat-
ters were to be handled by designated union
representatives, and Richardson was an unwarranted inter-
meddler. Apparently, Matozzo informed Respondent's
president, Irwin Nat Pincus, of this incident. Pincus testified
that the Union's shop chairman resented being "upstaged"
by Richardson.
The second incident of alleged misconduct by Richard-
son occurred in September 1976. According to Matozzo,
Richardson was seen sitting on a table, talking to another
employee, in another department during working time. He
spoke to Richardson and she returned to her work station.
Matozzo apparently did not speak to the other employee
involved. He testified that he informed Pincus of this inci-
dent.
The third incident mentioned by Matozzo was around
November 1976, when Matozzo saw Richardson talking to
another employee during working time. However, at that
time he had no occasion to speak to Richardson because,
upon seeing him, Richardson immediately returned to her
work station. Matozzo did not mention this incident to Pin-
cus.
There is no dispute that employees do converse about
nonwork matters during working time. However, according
to employee Thomas Buonanno, Richardson "ambulated"
through the plant a great deal and spoke to more employees
and at greater length than did other employees. Buonanno's
observation, however, can be given no weight in the present
proceeding because, as Respondent maintains, his testi-
mony was evidence newly discovered after the arbitration
hearing, and thus could not have contributed to Richard-
son's discharge.
Matozzo testified that Manlio F. Manzi, assistant fore-
man, complained that Richardson was "wasting time; she's
always out of the machine." When asked if Manzi had said
how often Richardson was guilty, Matozzo replied:
A. Sometimes as far as an hour.
Q. And how often-how many times a week or a
month or a day?
A. Well it was a period of time. Sometimes she
don't waste no time at all and sometimes it was practi-
cally every other day or every other week.
Manzi's testimony was so confused and internally incon-
As stated by Respondent's counsel at the hearing on remand: "The nar-
row issue in this case [is] why was Jane Richardson discharged? Was it for
abuse of working time or ... was it because of the subject matter of the
pamphlet? The Board has already stated that if it was the subject matter of
the pamphlet, in part or in whole, that the discharge was illegal."
sistent as to approach incomprehensibility. However, he
testified that for some time Richardson had been guilty of
leaving her work station and conversing with employees,
frequently at some length.6 He maintained that at some
time he spoke to Matozzo about the problem. It appears
that Matozzo took no action, telling Manzi to continue to
handle the problem by himself.
Richardson conceded that she did engage in conversa-
tions during working time. She also admitted that, while
most of her conversations were short, some were "wordy."
There was some evidence that when Richardson was spo-
ken to about being away from her work station she replied,
in effect, that since she was paid at piece-rate rates, she
could take time off when she wanted to. In this connection,
Respondent complained about Richardson's unsatisfactory
production. For example, on direct examination Pincus tes-
tified that he had checked Richardson's production records
and: "It was our belief that she should have been able to
make twenty-five coats an hour instead of which she was
making eighteen to twenty coats an hour and we [at]trib-
uted that to the fact that she was not applying herself, she
was not working, she was spending varying times, perhaps
up to an hour a day, doing something else which she wasn't
hired for." Pincus also testified: "We were hoping she
would be more productive than she was" and that "she was
told repeatedly that we expected better production from
her." Manzi indicated that Richardson's piece-work earn-
ings did not suffer because the alleged lost time could be
"recuperated."' In its brief, however, Respondent says:
"Richardson was not discharged for poor production."'
There was no evidence of any occasion on which Richard-
son's alleged unwarranted absence from her work impeded
the progress of what Pincus referred to as the "sequential"
nature of production.
6 Early in his testimony. Manzi testified: "Q. When she wasn't at work
during work-time, where was she? A. Well, as I was- was told that she
was around with flyers-papers." There is no other evidence indicating that
Richardson had ever distributed literature in the plant or on working time
before February 18, 1977.
'Manzi's testimony in part was:
Q. ... After Jane started to waste time talking to other people did her
earnings fall down, did she make less money?
A. It used to happen if this happen, she would try to recuperate by
doing more work but that work of recuperating wasn't well done as
before...
Q. Does she get paid for rejected work when she is working at piece-
work?
A. They always pay-it's piece-work.
Q. So even if it's rejected, each job is paid?
A. No, the rejection doesn't mean not acceptable at all. It's put back
on the table to be re-done.
Q. By the same person.
A. Yes.
Q. I then ask you if her earnings went down?
A. Usually the work is paid at the same level because she does the
work again....
Q. So that the payroll record would show if her production went
down when you say she started wandering around?
A. As I was telling you, if somebody can work quickly, with dedica-
tion, can even recuperate, so it's not sure that the level goes down.
That statement is made presumably to explain Respondent's failure to
submit relevant production records. Although Respondent's brief indicates
that the question of production records was raised in "a colloquy between
Judge Klein [and] Nat Pincus," the portions of testimony by Manzi and
Pincus here quoted preceded the "colloquy" between Pincus and the Admin-
istrative Law Judge.
806
PINCUS BROTHERS, INC.-MAXWELL
Pincus testified that in October 1976 other employees in
the sleeve department and the union business agent re-
quested that Richardson, the least senior member of the
department, be laid off because there was not sufficient
work to keep all department employees working a full 40-
hour week. On direct examination by Respondent's coun-
sel, Pincus testified that he regretted not having laid Rich-
ardson off at that time. He then said that at that time he
knew Richardson was "ambulatory," whereupon his testi-
mony continued:
Q. Were you aware of what-had it been reported
to you what she had been talking about with the em-
ployees as she was ambulatory?
A. Not really.
Q. Okay.
JUDGE KLEIN: What do you mean by "Not really"?
THE WITNESS: Well, there are all kinds of rumors
that come up in a situation like this and we have-this
industry is an industry which was organized about
forty years ago and for a long time it was an industry
involving a strong union and in the last couple of years
there have been certain dissident groups that have
tried to attack the union and tried to suggest to the
people that they are better off not to deal with the
union and when I heard of her cruising around, I
frankly believed she was part of one of the dissident
groups.
Q. (By Mr. Wachs) ... [A]t the time you interceded
for her, did you either know or have-believe that she
was engaged in some dissident activity?
A. I probably suspected it, but I did not know.
On February 15, 1977, Respondent held an employee
meeting, with the Union's business agent and shop chair-
man present. At that time Pincus said that the employees
would have to be more "flexible" in applying the provisions
of the collective-bargaining agreement so as to prevent un-
due costs and resultant price increases on new styles. There-
after, Richardson prepared a strongly worded, if not com-
pletely strident, leaflet in response to her understanding of
Pincus' statements.
Before the 8 a.m. start of business on February 18, Rich-
ardson brought a stack of copies of her leaflet to the plant
for distribution among the employees. She placed copies in
the ladies' restroom and locker room. In addition, she gave
a stack to fellow employee Joe Ferraro, with the request
that he place them in the men's restroom.
The only supervisory person who claimed personal
knowledge of Richardson's alleged delinquency on Febru-
ary 18 was Foreman Manzi. On this matter, as in others, his
testimony was confused and inconsistent. He first testified
that he saw Richardson distributing leaflets to three peo-
ple-"Dominick, Joe and Dornato." However, he later in-
dicated that he had not actually seen any distribution until
after the 8 a.m. starting bell, when Richardson came into
the department and, apparently, placed a leaflet on each
operating machine as she passed. Joe Ferraro was, at that
time, tearing up a few pamphlets that he had previously
obtained from Richardson. Manzi spoke to Ferraro, but not
to Richardson. Testifying to this, Manzi said:
I talked to a young man who was distributing these
flyers, this literature .... And I called attention to this
young man, too-"You shouldn't distribute during
work hours mostly9 because it speaks badly about the
boss."
When asked at what time he had seen the distribution,
Manzi replied: "Before five, maybe ten minutes after the
bell rang; I wasn't checking it with a watch." Manzi re-
ported the incident to Matozzo. Since Matozzo said that
Manzi reported to him and gave him a copy of the leaflet at
8:05, and Manzi testified that before he left his department
Richardson had stopped distributing and had commenced
working, it is very clear that the distribution could not have
continued for more than a very short time after the opening
bell. At about 8:15 a.m., Matozzo passed the information
on to President Pincus. Pincus said he would handle the
matter.
Pincus testified that at about 1:40 p.m. that day he de-
cided that Richardson should be fired and directed Ma-
tozzo to carry out the discharge. Matozzo testified that he
called Richardson and the union shop chairman into the
office. He asked Richardson "if she distributed literature."
At first she denied having done so. Eventually, however, she
admitted it, and at that point she was discharged. On this
sequence Matozzo's testimony was unequivocal:
A.... [The shop chairman] asked her a question,
"Did you give out this literature?" And again she de-
nied it. But then she admit-said, "yes, I did." Then I
told her, "Well you're fired."
Q. Was there any discussion with her whether that
took place during working hours?
A. No.
Pincus testified that while he was extremely upset by the
contents of Richardson's literature, that was not the reason
for the discharge. He said that he "was just tired of hearing
complaints about Jane Richardson and that's why she was
fired." So far as the record discloses, the last previous com-
plaint he had received concerning Richardson was around
September 1976, some 4 or 5 months before the distribution
incident.
In its brief, Respondent says that "at the time Pincus
made the decision to fire her, Pincus thought that the distri-
bution ended at 8:15 a.m., 15 minutes after the starting
time." (Emphasis supplied.) However, the testimony cited
by counsel does not support his conclusion; it clearly states
only that, so far as Pincus knew, the distribution had ended
by 8:15 a.m. His testimony reads in part as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Cialino) Mr. Pincus, you said that you
first learned of the events of February 18th at about
8:15 in the morning, is that right?
A. That's right.
'Later in his testimony, Manzi dropped the qualifying "mostly." He testi-
fied that he said to Ferraro: "You should not distribute that because it
speaks badly of the boss."
807
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. But you didn't do anything to stop the distribu-
tion of this leaflet, did you?
A. So far as I understood, the distribution had been
completed at that time except there were supposed to
be some that were left in the ladies' room, locker room
downstairs, and the ladies' bathroom upstairs, but I
understand they disappeared.
Q. You're testifying then that the distribution
stopped at 8:15 that morning?
A. More or less.
Pincus' real motivation is most clearly disclosed in his
further examination as to the timing. On direct examination
Pincus testified that when Matozzo reported the incident he
did not tell Pincus "whether or not the distribution had
taken place during working time." On cross-examination he
was asked if he had made any check to find out that the
distribution was over at 8:15. His testimony continued:
A. I asked, yes. Yes, I asked our maintenance peo-
ple if there was any sign of any of them being distrib-
uted and they said there were not so I assumed that
they had stopped. At any rate, the damage had been
done by that time as far as her success.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, she [Richardson] had succeeded in getting
this distributed. I was told that she had started before
the start of work and it continued through after 8
o'clock and by that time I assumed that there were
copies all over the place.
And, as if to insure that he would not be misunderstood,
Pincus volunteered the following unresponsive addendum:
I may say, by the way, since you are asking me this
question, that a group of which she's a part has fre-
quently papered our sidewalk out front and papered
the inside of the building with documents, Garment
Workers, and so forth. She has been seen giving them
out and they get a very good distribution.
Q. It bothers you, doesn't it?
A. Sure it bothers me.
C. Discussion and Conclusion
In his concluding argument at the hearing, Respondent's
counsel maintained that Richardson's alleged "abuse of
working time" was "the one and only reason for which
[Richardson] was discharged. It was a coincidence and a
fortuitous one for us, perhaps, that the last straw involved a
leaflet that contained as lot of stuff that was very upsetting
to the company."
But the evidence establishes that at the time of the dis-
charge Respondent's representatives had absolutely no con-
cern about the fact that the distribution may have gone on
in some degree for a few minutes after 8 a.m. Foreman
Manzi testified that he told employee Ferraro that he
should not distribute the pamphlet because it was deroga-
tory of Pincus. Manzi did not tell Matozzo that the distribu-
tion continued after 8 a.m. Similarly, Matozzo did not im-
part any such information to Pincus. Finally, when
Matozzo executed Pincus' order to discharge Richardson,
the only question he asked was whether she had distributed
the pamphlet. When she admitted that she had, she was
summarily discharged.
Respondent's claim that Richardson habitually "abused
working time" is largely unsupported. The course of the
arbitration and the present litigation belies any contention
that Richardson was a continual source of irritation be-
cause she "abused working time." In seeking the present
remand, Respondent argued that it wanted to present evi-
dence "newly discovered" after the arbitration. If Richard-
son's absences from her work station were a fraction as
aggravated as Respondent maintains, relevant evidence
would have been very easy to obtain, particularly since, as
previously noted, her fellow employees had sought her lay-
off. Her opposition to the Amalgamated must undoubtedly
have displeased many employees, as it obviously upset Pin-
cus.
If Respondent's evidence is all assumed to be true and
accurate, it appears that, during the approximately 14
months Richardson worked for Respondent, only twice was
Pincus informed of any delinquency on her part. The first
incident, occurring around April 1976, involved her inter-
jecting herself into another employee's dispute with a super-
visor. At that time she was criticized, not for "abusing
working time," but rather because, in Pincus' words, she
"upstaged" the union shop chairman by intervening in a
matter which he claimed was in his sole domain. The sec-
ond time any criticism of Richardson came to Pincus' atten-
tion was around September 1976, some 5 months before her
discharge. It is difficult to understand why she was not dis-
charged at that time, when she allegedly was spending con-
siderable time away from her station, but was discharged in
February for being, at most, a few minutes late in com-
mencing work.
Pincus' testimony by itself conclusively establishes that
Richardson's "politicking" alone accounted for her dis-
charge. It bears repeating that when Matozzo reported to
Pincus concerning Richardson's distribution of leaflets on
February 18, nothing was said about whether she had done
so on working time. Manzi had told Ferraro he should not
distribute the literature because it was derogatory of Pincus.
And in testifying as to the reason for the discharge, Pincus
himself referred to Richardson's previous dissident activi-
ties, which were apparently all protected.
Although counsel maintains that Richardson's "abuse of
working time" on February 18, 1977, was "fortuitous," or a
bit of serendipity for Respondent, the evidence establishes
that Richardson's few minutes' tardiness was the flimsiest of
pretexts for discharging her, the real reason being activities
which the Board has held were protected under the Act.
Indeed, even this flimsy pretext was apparently raised only
in the course of litigation; at the time of the discharge itself
Matozzo put it solely on the grounds that Richardson had
distributed the offensive leaflet.
Accordingly, on all the evidence, I find and conclude
that, as alleged, Richardson was discharged in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) for engaging in protected concerted activi-
ties.
808
PINCUS BROTHERS, INC.-MAXWELL
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Pincus Brothers, Inc., is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
2. By discharging employee Jane Uptegrove Richardson
on February 18, 1977, for engaging in protected concerted
activity, namely, distribution of a leaflet concerning terms
and conditions of employment, and by thereafter failing
and refusing to offer her reinstatement, Respondent has en-
gaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has committed and is
committing unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that
it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act. Since Respondent's unfair labor practices
go to the heart of the Act, I shall recommend a broad cease-
and-desist order.
Although Respondent does not advance this argument in
its post-trial brief, and thus may be said to have abandoned
or waived it, a short comment is perhaps in order concern-
ing Respondent's previous argument that postdischarge
misconduct renders Richardson unqualified for reinstate-
ment. The alleged postdischarge misconduct consists of
Richardson's having written or having supplied the infor-
mation for two articles appearing in the spring 1977 issue of
a publication called "The Garment Worker," which is pub-
lished by the "dissident" group to which Richardson ad-
heres. One article, headlined "Pincus Worker Stands Up to
Firing," is a report of the Richardson discharge involved in
the present case. As would be expected in a political publi-
cation like The Garment Worker, the news story presents
Richardson's version of the affair in the somewhat flamboy-
ant language of the "class war." Its major thrust was the
position that when, at the employee meeting on February
15, Pincus said the employees would have to be "flexible,"
he really was calling for wage cuts and attempting "to turn
around the anger that many departments already felt at
having their wages cut by these changes." Though some-
what longer, The Garment Worker news story carries about
the same message as did the leaflet written by Richardson
and distributed at the plant on February 18. Since the
Board has held that distribution in the plant to have been
protected, it would appear, afortiori, that Richardson can-
not be held to have engaged in egregious misconduct by
providing information for use in a publication of an organi-
zation unrelated to Respondent. Much the same consider-
ations apply to the second item in the Spring 1977 issue of
The Garment Worker, which allegedly is based on material
supplied by Richardson concerning Respondent. That item,
headed "WHO RIPS OFF WHO?", basically complains of
Respondent's retaining "a Pinkerton security guard [who]
checks [employees'] bags and purses." With a rhetorical
flourish, the short item ends: "We've had it with this 'show
and tell.' Who's the real crook anyway? Who walks off with
the $$$ every day? Our paychecks never lie; we know we
ain't the thieves!" Whatever one's opinion of the esthetic
and/or political value of the items, they certainly are not so
scandalous as to place the author and/or publisher beyond
the pale and unprotected by the free speech guaranty of the
Constitution. See Springfield Library and Museum Associ-
ation, 238 NLRB 1673 (1978), and M Restaurants, Incorpo-
rated, dib/a The Mandarin, 228 NLRB 930, 932 (1977), and
authorities there cited.
Accordingly, having found that Jane Uptegrove Richard-
son was discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(I) of the
Act. I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to offer
her reinstatement to her former job or, if such job no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to her seniority and other rights and privileges, and to
make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suf-
fered by reason of her discharge by paying to her a sum of
money equal to that which she normally would have earned
absent the discharge, less net earnings during such period,
with interest thereon, to be computed in the manner pre-
scribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).10
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record, and in accordance with
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Pincus Brothers, Inc.-Maxwell, Phila-
delphia. Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise disciplining or taking any
adverse action against any employees because they engage
in protected concerted activities.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
to them under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Jane Uptegrove Richardson immediate and full
reinstatement to her former position at Respondent's plant
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (or, if such position no longer
exists, to a substantially equivalent job), without prejudice
to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her
whole for any loss of earnings in the manner set forth in the
section herein entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and make available to the Board or any of
its agents, upon request, all records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due Jane Uptegrove Richardson under
the terms herein.
(c) Post at its plant at Independence Mall, Philadelphia,
10See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
809
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 4, after being duly signed by an authorized
agent of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writ-
ing, within 20 days, from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had the chance to give
evidence, it has been decided that we, Pincus Brothers,
Inc.-Maxwell, have violated the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and we have been ordered to post this
notice. We assure you that we will abide by the following
commitments:
WE WILL NOT discharge or take any other action
against employees for writing and/or distributing or
circulating leaflets or other material critical of our con-
duct concerning wages or other terms and conditions
of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce any employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act to act
together for mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL offer Jane Uptegrove Richardson full and
immediate reinstatement to her former position, with-
out prejudice to her seniority and other rights and
privileges, and WE WILL make her whole, with interest,
for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by rea-
son of our discharging her on February 18, 1977.
PINCUS BROTHERS, INC.-MAXWELL
810