PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 22, 2019

368 NLRB No. 41 (N.L.R.B. 2019)

368 NLRB No. 41
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
and The Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w
Communications Workers of America, AFL–
CIO, CLC, and its Local 38061
PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
and Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M-22, a/w
The Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers
Sector of The Communications Workers of
America, AFL–CIO, and its Local 14842
PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
and Pittsburgh Typographical Union No. 7, a/w
The Communications Workers of America,
AFL–CIO, and its Local 14827
PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
and Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and Film
Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers, a/w
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and its Local Union No. 211 of Allegheny Coun-
ty
PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
and Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Press-
men’s/Paper Handlers Local Union No. 9N, a/w
The Graphic Communications Confer-
ence/International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and its Local 24M/9N
PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
and International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL–CIO, Local 95. Cases 06–CA–
212627, 06–CA–217525, 06–CA–217527, 06–CA–
217529, 06–CA–217980, 06–CA–218637, 06–CA–
220480
August 22, 2019
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN RING AND MEMBERS KAPLAN AND
EMANUEL
On October 16, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Da-
vid I. Goldman issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel and the Charging Party each filed an
answering brief, and the Respondent filed reply briefs.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.
Background
The relevant facts, set forth more fully in the judge’s
decision, are as follows. The Respondent has longstand-
ing collective-bargaining relationships with each of the
seven Charging Party Unions representing the following
separate units of its employees: Editorial, Mailing Room,
Advertising, Finance, Delivery, Pressmen, and Operating
Engineers. Prior to 2015, the Respondent provided
healthcare insurance coverage for its employees through
its own self-insured plan. It paid the entire cost of the
insurance premiums, although in 2006 it successfully
bargained for wage reductions to offset some of the cost.
In late 2014, the Respondent signed new and essential-
ly identical collective-bargaining agreements with each
Union. The agreements made a significant change in
healthcare insurance: effective January 1, 2015, employ-
ees would receive coverage through the Western Penn-
sylvania Teamsters and Employers’ Welfare Fund (the
Fund) instead of the Respondent’s self-insured plan.
Each agreement included a summary of benefits listing
the various deductibles, copays, and out-of-pocket max-
imums under the new plan. The agreements stated that
the initial “required PG contributions for the calendar
year 2015 will be $1,229 per month” for each employee,
and “the PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will
not exceed a 5.0% annual increase above the $1,229 per
month . . . for calendar year 2015.” It was employees’
responsibility to compensate the Fund for any premium
increases above the Respondent’s 5 percent limit.

1 The General Counsel argues that the Respondent’s exceptions and
supporting brief are procedurally deficient because the exceptions do
not include record citations or grounds and the brief does not specifical-
ly reference each exception. Because the Respondent’s exceptions and
brief are substantially compliant with the requirements of Sec. 102.46
of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, and the General Counsel has not
shown any resulting prejudice, we reject this argument. See, e.g., St.
George Warehouse, Inc., 341 NLRB 904, 904 fn. 1 (2004), enfd. 420
F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
The Respondent paid the required $1229 per month for
each employee in 2015. For 2016, the Fund requested a
5.9 percent increase, but the Respondent limited its in-
crease to 5 percent ($1290.45 per employee per month)
in accordance with the agreements; and the Fund reduced
employees’ benefits by increasing deductibles to cover
the shortfall. For 2017, the Fund requested, and the Re-
spondent granted, a 5 percent increase, to $1354.97 per
employee per month.
Before the agreements expired in March 2017, the Re-
spondent and the Unions began bargaining, separately,
for new collective-bargaining agreements. The Re-
spondent and two of the Unions agreed to extend two of
the seven 2014–2017 agreements beyond March 2017:
those covering the Operating Engineers–represented unit
and the Guild-represented Editorial unit. The other five
agreements expired in March 2017.
In the fall of 2017, the Fund requested another 5 per-
cent increase from the Respondent. The Unions main-
tained that the Respondent had to pay increases neces-
sary to maintain benefits because the expired agreements
did not include a cap on contributions after 2017. The
Respondent refused, asserting that its sole obligation
under both the expired and extended agreements was to
continue contributions at the 2017 level. Negotiations
between the parties stalled, and the Respondent contin-
ued making contributions to the Fund at the 2017 level of
$1354.97 per month for each employee. It did not in-
crease its contributions. In April 2018, the Fund further
reduced employees’ benefits by increasing employee
deductibles to cover the shortfall.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s 2014-
2017 collective-bargaining agreements established a sta-
tus quo of up to 5 percent annual increases in the Re-
spondent’s contributions as requested by the Fund, and
that the Respondent’s 2018 refusal to increase its contri-
butions in line with the Fund’s request was a unilateral
change that violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The Judge’s Decision
The judge found that the Respondent unlawfully failed
to maintain the status quo by discontinuing contribution
increases and causing a reduction in employee benefits.
He rejected the Respondent’s argument that it had a duty
only to maintain contributions at the 2017 level because
it did not agree to additional annual increases beyond
2017. According to the judge, the issue was “not wheth-
er the General Counsel can point to language in the 2014
[a]greements showing that the Respondent agreed to pay
annual increases in 2018 and thereafter,” but “whether
the Respondent can point to language showing that the
parties intended to preclude the Respondent from contin-
uing the status quo of contribution increases in 2018 and
thereafter.” The judge found no such preclusive lan-
guage in the seven agreements, and accordingly he con-
cluded that the Respondent was therefore obligated to
pay all contribution increases requested by the Fund ex-
cept in 2016 and 2017, when the increases were contrac-
tually limited to 5 percent.3 In the judge’s words, that
contribution limit was a “shield” that could not be
“turned into a sword that alchemically bars the Respond-
ent from paying any increase to maintain the status quo
after 2017.”
On this basis, the judge determined that the Respond-
ent “violated its statutory—not its contractual—duty to
continue the status quo of funding the increase in contri-
bution rates[.]” He found his interpretation “forcefully
buttressed by the fact that the health care coverage
schedule of benefits attached to each 2014 [a]greement
could only be maintained with contribution rate increas-
es.” While recognizing that two of the seven agree-
ments—those of the Editorial and Operating Engineers
units—remained in force, the judge viewed that as only a
nominal difference that did not require a different analy-
sis. He also found that the Union did not clearly and
unmistakably waive its statutory right to the increases,
and he rejected various contractual and waiver defenses
raised by the Respondent.
Analysis
The issue presented here is whether the Respondent
changed a term or condition of employment when it
maintained its contributions to the Fund at the 2017 rate
rather than increasing its contributions after 2017. See
Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB 1236, 1237-1238
(1994), enfd. 73 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied
519 U.S. 1090 (1997); Wilkes-Barre General Hospital,
362 NLRB 1212, 1216 (2015), enfd. 857 F.3d 364 (D.C.
Cir. 2017). On exception, the Respondent argues that it
did not change a term or condition of employment but
rather maintained the status quo. It contends that its con-
tractual obligation to increase contributions to the Fund
for 2016 and 2017 did not create a mandate to continue
increasing its contributions to the Fund after 2017. We
find merit in the Respondent’s exception.4
Preliminarily, it is necessary to distinguish between the
Respondent’s contractual and statutory duties. See Litton
Financial Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207
(1991). An employer has a contractual duty to adhere to
the terms of an agreement as long it remains in force.

3 However, in accordance with the General Counsel’s theory of the
case, the judge ordered the Respondent to reinstate contribution in-
creases only up to 5 percent.
4 The Respondent also excepts to the judge’s rejection of its other
defenses, including waiver. In light of our finding, it is unnecessary to
pass on them.
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 3
See, e.g., Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 339
NLRB 1035, 1036–1037 (2003), rev. denied sub nom.
Des Moines Mailers Union, Teamsters Local No. 358 v.
NLRB, 381 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2004). Contractual obliga-
tions generally end once the agreement expires, see Lit-
ton, supra at 206, but an employer still has a statutory
duty to maintain the status quo on mandatory subjects of
bargaining until the parties reach a new agreement or a
valid impasse. See Triple A Fire Protection, 315 NLRB
409, 414 (1994), enfd. 136 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied 525 U.S. 1067 (1999). Contractual and stat-
utory obligations are not necessarily coextensive. See,
e.g., Wilkes-Barre Hospital Co. v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364,
376–377 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Initially, the judge erred by applying the same analysis
to the Respondent’s obligations under the continuing
agreements with the Editorial and Operating Engineers
units as he did to its obligations to the other five units
after their agreements expired. Because the Editorial and
Operating Engineers agreements remained in force, the
Respondent’s obligations to employees in those units
were entirely contractual. Nonetheless, the judge consid-
ered only whether the Respondent “violated [a] statuto-
ry—not [a] contractual—duty” to continue increasing its
contributions to the Fund for employees in all seven
units. Unlike the judge, we analyze the continuing and
expired agreements separately.
We first find that the Respondent did not abrogate any
contractual duty to increase Fund contributions for Edito-
rial and Operating Engineers unit employees after 2017.
The continuing agreements covering these units estab-
lished a baseline contribution level for 2015 and required
the Respondent to pay contribution increases for 2016
and 2017 only. They made no provision for any addi-
tional increases in subsequent years. Thus, the Respond-
ent was not obligated to comply with the Fund’s contri-
bution-increase request for 2018. See, e.g., Hempstead
Lincoln Mercury Motors Corp., 351 NLRB 1149, 1149
fn. 1 (2007). The fact that the agreements were original-
ly slated to expire in March 2017 does not affect our
analysis. The two unions chose to extend the 2014–2017
agreements, and those agreements did not provide for
future contribution increases by the Respondent.
We also find that the Respondent did not abrogate its
statutory duty to maintain the status quo of healthcare
insurance contributions for the other five units’ employ-
ees after their agreements expired. It is well established
that “the status quo is . . . defined by reference to the
substantive terms of the expired contract.” Hinson v.
NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 139 (8th Cir. 1970). In finding the
violation, the judge interpreted the healthcare insurance
provisions in the expired agreements to create a postcon-
tract status quo of paying annual contribution increases.
However, that interpretation does not reflect the actual
terms of the agreements. As stated above, the Respond-
ent contractually agreed to a contribution amount for
2015 ($1229 per employee per month), followed by con-
tribution increases in 2016 and 2017 limited to 5 percent.
It did not agree to pay the entire cost of requested contri-
bution increases, and the express contractual limitation of
increases to two specific years contradicts any finding of
a postcontract status quo of “automatic increases to
which the employer has already committed [itself].” See
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 746 (1962); see also House
of the Good Samaritan, 268 NLRB 236, 237 (1983) (sta-
tus quo did not require healthcare contribution increases
by employer because policy manual set a maximum dol-
lar amount for contributions and employer did not have a
“consistent and inflexible” practice of covering the in-
creases). Cases in which the Board has held that em-
ployers unlawfully discontinued, postcontract, a status
quo of providing wage or benefit increases, including
those relied on by the judge, are distinguishable. In those
cases, the expired agreements included language provid-
ing for increases not limited to specified years.5 Here, in
contrast, the expired agreements explicitly limited in-
creases to 2016 and 2017. Thus, when the agreements
expired in March 2017, the status quo was the contribu-
tion rate for 2017, to which the Respondent lawfully ad-
hered.6

5 See Prime Healthcare Services-Encino, LLC d/b/a Encino Hospi-
tal Medical Center, 364 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 9–10 (2016) (“Em-
ployees who are at or below the scale on the anniversary date of their
most recent date of hire shall advance to the next step on the wage scale
on that anniversary date[.]”), enfd. 890 F.3d 286 (D.C. Cir. 2018);
Wilkes-Barre General Hospital, 362 NLRB at 1216-1218 (“Scale in-
creases according to longevity shall become due only upon January
27th of the year following the employee’s anniversary date.”); Finley
Hospital, 362 NLRB 915, 915–916 (2015) (“For the duration of this
Agreement, the Hospital will adjust the pay of Nurses on his/her anni-
versary date.”), enf. denied in relevant part 827 F.3d 720 (8th Cir.
2016); Southwest Ambulance, 360 NLRB 835, 843 (2014) (“Longevity
Pay” raises “[e]very December 1st and June 1st of each year of this
Agreement”), enf. denied on other grounds 796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Intermountain Rural Electric Assn., 305 NLRB 783, 784 (1991)
(employer’s “maximum contribution to any of the medical insurance
plans in effect for its employees covered by this Agreement ‘shall not
exceed’ one hundred percent of . . . premiums,” and employer would
“pay one hundred percent . . . of the [dental] premiums for the employ-
ees covered”), enfd. 984 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1993); General Tire &
Rubber Co., 274 NLRB 591, 592–593 (1985) (employer provided
fringe benefits throughout term of agreement and during 90-day exten-
sion period), enfd. 795 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1986). We express no view
as to whether all these cases were correctly decided.
6 The judge found it unnecessary to address the General Counsel’s
alternative argument that the Respondent had a past practice of paying
for all increases in employees’ health insurance premiums. Because the
General Counsel did not relevantly except, we likewise do not address
that argument.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
The judge attempted to fortify his interpretation by cit-
ing the summary of healthcare insurance benefits at-
tached to each agreement as proof of the Respondent’s
commitment to maintain those benefits through future
contribution increases. These summaries provided de-
tails of the insurance coverage—including deductibles,
copays, and out-of-pocket maximums—to be offered by
a third-party insurer at a price to be set by it. However,
the summaries in no way addressed the level of the Re-
spondent’s present or future contributions. Further, the
agreements made the maintenance of existing benefits
contingent on employees’ willingness to shoulder part of
the burden of premium increases. The summaries are
therefore not relevant to the question before us.
Ultimately, the fundamental flaw in the judge’s analy-
sis was his allocation of the burden of proof. In finding
that the status quo included annual contribution increas-
es, the judge disregarded the General Counsel’s lack of
affirmative evidence of any commitment by the Re-
spondent to continue increasing contributions as part of
the status quo. Instead, having assumed that the increas-
es would necessarily continue, he focused on whether
“the Respondent can point to language showing that the
parties intended to preclude the Respondent from contin-
uing the status quo of contribution increases in 2018 and
thereafter.” In essence, the judge required the Respond-
ent to show that its maintenance of contributions at the
2017 rate was not a violation of the Act. However,
“[t]he General Counsel bears the burden of establishing
that the Respondent altered the status quo.” CPL (Lin-
wood) d/b/a Linwood Care Center and its Successor 201
New Road Care Center Operations, LLC d/b/a Linwood,
367 NLRB No. 14, slip op. at 2 (2018). Applying the
correct standard, we find that the General Counsel failed
to show that the Respondent changed the status quo by
refusing to increase its contributions above the 2017 rate
after the agreements expired.
Having found the Respondent did not have either a
contractual or statutory duty to continue to increase
healthcare insurance contributions after 2017, we accord-
ingly dismiss the complaint.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 22, 2019
______________________________________
John F. Ring, Chairman
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member
________________________________________
William J. Emanuel Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Zachary A. Hebert, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Howard M. Kastrinsky, Esq., Richard C. Lowe, Esq., and Mi-
chael D. Oesterle, Esq. (King & Ballow), of Nashville,
Tennessee, for the Respondent.
Joseph J. Pass, Esq. (Jubelirer, Pass & Intrieri, P.C., and Ma-
rianne Oliver, Esq. (Gilardi, Oliver & Lomupo, P.A.), of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Richard Rosenblatt, Esq. (Rosen-
blatt & Gosch, PLLC), of Greenwood Village, Colorado,
for the Charging Parties.
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. These
cases consider an employer’s obligation under federal labor law
to maintain the status quo in employment terms and conditions
while it negotiates with its employees’ unions for new labor
agreements to replace expired (or temporarily extended) collec-
tive-bargaining agreements.
As established under each of the seven collective-bargaining
agreements between the employer and its employees’ unions,
beginning January 1, 2015, the employees’ health care cover-
age was to be provided through a plan sponsored by a Taft-
Hartley health and welfare fund, paid for by the employer’s
monthly contributions to the fund of $1229 for each participat-
ing employee. A schedule of the benefits purchased by these
contributions was attached to and part of each labor agreement.
The labor agreements provided that for calendar year 2016, and
again in 2017, the employer would increase the monthly per
employee contributions as established by the fund, with the
only limitation being that the employer would not be responsi-
ble for any portion of an annual increase in excess of 5.0 per-
cent. The employer paid the annual increases in 2016 and
2017, as required under the labor agreements. It continued to
pay the 2017 monthly contribution rate after the March 31,
2017 expiration and/or temporary extension of the labor agree-
ments while the parties negotiated for new agreements.
The problem that became these cases arose in the fall of
2017, when the fund announced its annual contribution rate
increase for January 2018. The employer refused to pay the
increase. As a result, the fund reduced the health care benefits
for the employees beginning April 2018.
The National Labor Relations Act (Act) requires that (until
impasse or agreement) an employer must continue the status
quo in the terms and conditions of employment while the par-
ties negotiate for a new labor agreement. Here, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) con-
tends that this statutory obligation required the employer to
continue providing the annual increases in fund contributions,
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 5
as it did in 2016 and 2017 under the labor agreements. The
General Counsel contends that the employer’s 2018 discontinu-
ance of the annual increases up to 5 percent—which resulted in
a reduction of the existing level of health care benefits for em-
ployees—constitutes an unlawful unilateral change in terms and
conditions in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
As discussed herein, I find that the employer’s refusal in
2018 to continue to pay the fund annual contribution was a
violation of the Act, as alleged. As discussed herein, Board
precedent amply supports this result, and does not support the
employer’s claim that its refusal to continue the annual increas-
es—but simply to maintain the 2017 rate—satisfies its obliga-
tion under the Act. I find the employer’s various defenses—
whether rooted in the terms of the labor agreements, in the
unions’ response to the employer’s plans to discontinue the
increases, or the claim that increased funding would violate
Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act—to be without merit.
In reaching this result I do not reach the General Counsel’s
alternative argument (GC Br. at 23–25) that the duty to contin-
ue the annual increases in contributions became a term and
condition of employment through a “traditional past practice
analysis.” I also do not reach the unions’ argument—not ad-
vanced by the General Counsel, and not posed, to date, by the
facts—that should there be future annual contribution increases
above 5 percent, the employer’s statutory duty to maintain the
status quo will not be limited by the 5 percent cap that limited
its contractual obligations in 2016 and 2017.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 5, 2018, the Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its
Local 38061 (the Guild) filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging violations of the Act by the PG Publishing Co., Inc.
d/b/a/ Pittsburgh Post–Gazette (Employer or PG), docketed by
Region 6 of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) as
Case 06–CA–212627. The charge was amended by the Guild
on April 25, 2018.
Based on an investigation into this case, on April 26, 2018,
the Board’s General Counsel, by the Regional Director for
Region 6 of the Board, issued a complaint and notice of hearing
alleging that the PG had violated the Act. The PG filed an
answer to the complaint on May 8, 2018, denying all alleged
violations of the Act.
On March 30, 2018, the Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M–22,
a/w the Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers Sector of the
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local
14842 (the Mailers Union) filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging violations of the Act by the PG, docketed by Region 6
of the Board as Case 06–CA–217525. The charge was amend-
ed by the Mailers Union on May 3, 2018.
On March 30, 2018, the Pittsburgh Typographical Union No.
7, a/w the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO,
and its Local 14827 (the Typographical Union) filed two unfair
labor practice charges alleging violations of the Act by the PG,
docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Cases 06–CA–217527
and 06–CA–217529. The charges were amended by the Typo-
graphical Union on May 2, 2018.
On April 6, 2018, the Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and
Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers, a/w the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No. 211
of Allegheny County (the Delivery Union) filed an unfair labor
practice charge alleging violations of the Act by the PG, dock-
eted by Region 6 of the Board as Case 06–CA–217980. The
charge was amended by the Delivery Union on May 2, 2018.
On April 18, 2018, the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing
Pressmen’s/Paper Handlers Local Union No. 9N, a/w the
Graphic Communications Conference/International Brother-
hood of Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Un-
ion) filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of
the Act by the PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Case
06–CA–218637. The charge was amended by the Pressman’s
Union on May 2, 2018
On May 18, 2018, the International Union of Operating En-
gineers, AFL–CIO, Local 95 (the Operating Engineers) filed an
unfair labor practice charge alleging violations of the Act by
the PG, docketed by Region 6 of the Board as Case 06–CA–
2200480. The charge was amended by the Operating Engineers
on May 24, 2018.
Based on an investigation into these cases, on June 28, 2018,
the Board’s General Counsel, by the Regional Director for
Region 6, issued an order consolidating cases 06–CA–212627,
06–CA–217525, 06–CA–217527, 06–CA–217529, 06–CA–
217980, 06–CA–218637, and 06–CA–220480, and issuing a
consolidated amended complaint and notice of hearing in all of
the foregoing cases alleging that the PG had violated the Act.
The PG filed an answer to the amended consolidated complaint
on July 9, 2018, denying all alleged violations of the Act.
A trial in this case was conducted on August 21, 2018, in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At the commencement of the trial,
counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the PG moved
to amend the complaint and answer to conform to certain stipu-
lations reached between the parties. The motions were granted
and the stipulations reached by the parties were admitted into
evidence as Joint Exhibits 1–16.
Counsel for the General Counsel, the Union,1 and the Re-
spondent filed posttrial briefs in support of their positions by
September 25, 2018.
On the entire record, I make the following findings, conclu-
sions of law, and recommendations.
JURISDICTION
At all material times, the PG has been a Pennsylvania corpo-
ration with an office and place of business in Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, and has been engaged in publishing the The Pitts-
burgh Post–Gazette, a newspaper. Annually, in conducting its
operations, the PG derives gross revenues in excess of
$200,000 and publishes various nationally syndicated features,
advertises various nationally sold products, and holds member-
ship in and subscribes to various interstate news services, in-
cluding the Associated Press. Annually, the PG purchases and
receives at its Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania facility products, goods,
and materials valued in excess of $5000 directly from points

1 Throughout this decision, references to “the Unions” are to the
Charging Parties in the consolidated amended complaint, collectively.
References to “each Union” are to each of the Charging Parties.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It is alleged, ad-
mitted, and I find, that at all material times, the PG has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It is alleged, admitted, and I find,
that at all material times, the Guild, the Mailers Union, the
Typographical Union, the Delivery Union, the Pressman’s Un-
ion, and the Operating Engineers, have each been a labor or-
ganization with the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects com-
merce and that the Board has jurisdiction of these cases, pursu-
ant to Section 10(a) of the Act.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
FINDINGS OF FACT
Background
The PG publishes The Pittsburgh Post–Gazette, a daily
newspaper. For many years the PG has recognized the Guild as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of a bargain-
ing unit of editorial employees,2 the Mailers Union as the ex-
clusive representative of a bargaining unit of mail room em-
ployees,3 the Typographical Union as the exclusive representa-
tive of a bargaining unit of advertising employees4 and of a unit

2 This “Editorial Unit” is composed of:
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-divisions of
the Editorial Department, excluding those employees provided for in
other existing Union Agreements and all Publishers and Associate
Publishers, Publisher and Editor-in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of
the Editorial Page, Managing Editor, Deputy Managing Editor, Senior
Assistant Managing Editor, Assistant Managing Editor, City Editor,
Sports Editor, Sunday Editor, Technology Systems Editor, Business
Editor, Night Operations Manager, Seen Editor, Associate Editor of
Opinion Pages, Editorial Cartoonist, and Confidential Secretaries.
3 The “Mailing Room Unit” is composed of full-time employees de-
scribed in the most recent collective-bargaining agreement (Jt. Exh.
1(b)) between the Mailers Union and the PG as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words “employee”
and “employees” when used in this Contract apply to journeymen and
apprentices. It is recognized and agreed that the terms and conditions
of employment covering Part-Time mailer employees shall be as set
forth in a separate agreement covering such employees.
4 The “Advertising Unit” is composed of:
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the Advertis-
ing Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employ-
ees, guards, professional and supervisors as defined in the Act, and
those specifically excluded.”
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Division,
including supervision, managerial, confidential, and all other employ-
ees, as well as such employees added in the future, are excluded from
the Advertising Unit. In addition, the following positions are specifi-
cally excluded from the Advertising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer
Advertising Director
Classified Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager
Retail Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev.
Database Marketing Manager
of finance employees,5 the Delivery Union as the exclusive
representative of a unit of delivery employees,6 the Pressmen’s
Union as the exclusive representative of a unit of pressroom
employees,7 and the Operating Engineers as the exclusive rep-
resentative of a unit of operating engineers.8

Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr.
Classified Call Center Manager
Online Sales Manager
Production Services Manager
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Online
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Classified
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—National
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director
Preprint Distribution Manager
Retail Territory Sales Manager
Classified Automotive Sales Manager
Quality Control Specialist
Secretary to Classified Managers
Display Advertising Manager
Advertising Operations Manager
Market Research Manager
Classified Recruitment Manager
Classified Operations Manager
Production Services Supervisor
Product Design Manager
Research Analyst
Sales Manager—Automotive
Sales Manager—Real Estate
Sales Manager—Retail (Territories)
Sales Manager—New Business Dev.
Sales Manager—Recruitment
Sales Manager—Major/National
Sales Supervisor—Major/National
Sales Manager—Digital/Direct
Production Services Manager
5 The “Finance Unit” is composed of:
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the Financial
Department; excluding all other employees, confidential employees,
guards, professional and supervisors as defined in the Act. The follow-
ing are recognized as being confidential or supervisory employees ex-
cluded from the coverage of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant
Controller, Office Manager and their confidential secretaries, Ac-
counting Manager, Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager, Circu-
lation Accounting Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor,
and Payroll Supervisor.
6 The “Delivery Unit” is composed of all employees performing the
delivery-related work described in more detail in Sect. 2 (Jurisdiction)
of the most recent collective-bargaining agreement between the Deliv-
ery Union and the PG. See, Sect. 2 of Jt. Exh. 1(e).
7 The “Pressmen’s Unit” is composed of:
All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling pressmen,
and apprentice pressmen who work in the Company’s pressroom and
paperhandling departments.
8 The “Operating Engineers Unit” is composed of”
all employees employed by [the Respondent] at its facility located at
2201 Sweeney Drive, Clinton, P A; but excluding guards, office cleri-
cals, managerial personnel, confidential personnel, supervisors as de-
fined in the National Labor Relations Act, and all other personnel.
The parties stipulated that on March 9, 2017, the PG and the Operating
Engineers tentatively agreed to change the facility address listed in the
above-unit description and the change will be incorporated into any
successor labor agreement entered into by the PG and the Operating
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 7
The recognition of these unions as the representative of the
various bargaining units has been embodied in successive col-
lective-bargaining agreements between the PG and each Union,
with a separate collective-bargaining agreement covering the
terms and conditions of each of the seven bargaining units de-
scribed above.
On September 11, 2014, the Unions, negotiating together as
the “Unity Council,” reached a settlement agreement with the
PG for new labor agreements covering these seven units.9
Each of these successor agreements, one covering each bar-
gaining unit, became effective on various dates in October or
November 2014, and continued by their terms to at least March
31, 2017 (the 2014 Agreements).
Employee health care coverage under the 2014
Agreements
In recent years, before 2015, the collectively-bargained
health care coverage for employees had been provided through
a self-insured plan sponsored by the PG. The PG paid for the
health care coverage (Tr. 31), although beginning in 2006, the
PG bargained for a wage “diversion” which offset some of the
health care costs with a reduction from wages.
In the 2014 Agreements, a significant change was made to
the health care coverage, one that set the stage for the instant
dispute. Pursuant to each of the 2014 Agreements, beginning
January 1, 2015, health care coverage for participating employ-
ees was no longer provided through an employer-sponsored
plan but, instead, through participation in a multi-employer
Taft-Hartley health and welfare fund. The 2014 Agreements
provided that beginning January 1, 2015, bargaining unit em-
ployees would be able to participate in the Western Pennsylva-
nia Teamsters and Employers’ Welfare Fund (the Fund). The
parties stipulate that on January 1, 2015, the PG began partici-
pating in the Fund.
The schedule of benefits that the PG employees would re-
ceive from the Fund’s plan 9PG was attached to or made an
exhibit to each of the 2014 Agreements. The schedule of bene-
fits summarized the deductibles, out-of-pocket maximum, and
coverage for various procedures and care under the plan. The
schedule of benefits also compared the 9PG benefits to the
benefits offered by the existing PG health care plan that re-
mained in effect under the 2014 Agreements until January 1,
2015.
Under the terms of each of the 2014 Agreements, beginning
January 1, 2015, the PG would pay the Fund a per-employee
monthly rate. In addition, under the terms of the 2014 Agree-
ments, the wage “diversion” continued, with a percentage of

Engineers.
9 For some years, going back to the 1990s, the various Unions nego-
tiated together with the PG (and until it ceased printing, with another
Pittsburgh newspaper, the Pittsburgh Press) in a multi-union bargaining
organization composed of all the union-represented units at the PG.
This multi-union bargaining group was called the Unity Council, and
from its inception was represented in bargaining by Attorney Joseph
Pass.
employee wages being held back.10 However, the employees
contributed nothing to the Fund for their health care—the PG
paid the full contribution rate set by the Fund.
The 2014 Agreements provided a set rate for the PG’s 2015
contributions to the Fund, which was $1229 per month for each
participating employee. The 2014 Agreements also recognized
the prospect of annual increases to the Fund’s contribution rate,
but expressly limited the amount of increase that the PG would
be required to pay in 2016 and 2017, to a 5.0 percent annual
increase. More precisely, the 2014 Agreements read in perti-
nent part:
(1) Effective January 1, 2015, all eligible bargaining unit em-
ployees will participate in the Western Pennsylvania Team-
sters and Employers Welfare Fund (the “Fund”). Participation
in the plan is limited to employees averaging annually more
than 30 hours per week.
(2) The required PG contributions for the calendar year 2015
will be $1,229 per month for each participating full-time bar-
gaining unit employee (regardless of family size) and regard-
less of the option chosen.
(3) The PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will not ex-
ceed a 5.0% annual increase above the $1,229 per month set
forth above for calendar year 2015. Any such increases must
be based upon the plan design effective January 1, 2015. The
PG will receive from the Fund at least 60-days notice of any
such annual contribution increase prior to January 1.
Under the terms of the Agreements, any increase in the
Fund’s contribution rate in 2016 and 2017 beyond the 5.0 per-
cent cap would be the financial responsibility of the employees.
The PG agreed to perform the withholding of these additional
amounts from employee pay under limited and prescribed cir-
cumstances. Paragraph 3, above, continues:
Increases in excess of 5% will be the responsibility of the bar-
gaining unit members via direct billings from the Fund. If di-
rect billing is not available, the PG will only assume responsi-
bility for any withholding of any additional amounts after re-
ceiving the expressed written consent of each member and
will not assume any other responsibility for collection of any
other amounts, or be liable for any other payment to the Fund,
other than as stated above.11
After the September 2014 settlement agreement, questions
arose between the parties over how the 5 percent cap would
operate. On October 13, 2014, PG Human Resources Vice-
President Stephen Spolar sent Union Attorney Pass a document
that Spolar described to Pass in a cover memo as “our explana-

10 Under the different 2014 agreements, there was some variation
among the bargaining units in the amount and ceiling of the diversion.
The differences are not material to the issues at hand.
11 I have reproduced and quoted (in pertinent part) the language
from Exhibit A of the September 11, 2014 PG-Unity Council Settle-
ment Agreement. This language on health care was part of each unit’s
collective-bargaining agreement. (Any minor variations in the labor
agreement’s active employee health care language are nonmaterial).
Each of the 2014 agreements included this language, along with a
schedule of benefits of the Fund’s plan 9PG, included by exhibit or
attachment, which was the plan covering employees.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
tion of the 5% cap.”
The document was an Excel spreadsheet prepared by the
PG’s outside benefits consultant, Elliot Dinkin, and reviewed
internally by PG representatives before being provided to the
Unions. The spreadsheet provided hypothetical examples for a
variety of future Fund contribution rate increases to show how
the cap would affect annual increases paid by the PG. The
spreadsheet was titled “PG Determination of share of benefit
costs–2015–2017,” and projected hypothetical annual Fund
contribution rates and increases to be paid by the PG for the
years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018.
Employer contributions to the Fund in 2015, 2016, and 2017
As set forth in the labor agreements, for the calendar year
2015, the PG contributed $1229 per month for each bargaining
unit employee participating in the Fund.
In the fall of 2015, the Fund notified the parties that for the
calendar year 2016, the contribution rate was going to increase
by 5.9—0.9 percent more than the contractual cap on the PGs’
annual contributions increase. As a result, the PG increased its
contribution rate by 5 percent for 2016, or $1290.45 per em-
ployee per month. However, as to the shortfall of 0.9 percent,
instead of employees making up the difference as originally
envisioned under the contracts, the Fund, with the agreement of
the Unions and the PG, reduced the health care benefits to em-
ployees, increasing the deductible applicable to participating
PG employees and their families. In a conversation with Team-
sters Union President Joe Molinaro, PG Human Resources
Vice-President Stephen Spolar agreed to this change in the
deductibles as a resolution of the issue.
In the fall of 2016, the Fund notified the PG that the contri-
bution rate would increase by 5 percent for the calendar year
2017. Accordingly, in calendar year 2017, the PG increased its
monthly contributions to the Fund by 5 percent, to $1354.97 for
each participating employee.
As discussed below, the 2014 Agreements expired (or in two
cases were extended) as of March 31, 2017. The PG continued
paying into the Fund (at the 2017 contribution rate) for all units
after March 31, 2017, as the parties negotiated for new agree-
ments.
Negotiations for successor agreements to replace the 2014
Agreements
The 2014 Agreements were scheduled to expire on March
31, 2017. In January 2017, the PG notified the Unions of its
intention to negotiate a successor labor agreement separately
with each Union and not through the multiunion Unity Council
bargaining as had been done in past years. Pursuant to the PG’s
demand, bargaining commenced with each unit bargaining
separately. Since then, and to date, the PG has met with each
of the Unions for bargaining and has exchanged bargaining
proposals. The PG’s proposal for health care coverage under
the successor agreements provides that employee health care
coverage will no longer be provided through the Fund.
However, to date, no successor collective-bargaining agree-
ments have been reached between the PG and any of the Un-
ions.
For these negotiations for successor agreements to the 2014
Agreements, Attorney Pass specifically represents all of the
Unions for purposes of the health care coverage issues, for
which common proposals are being made by the parties. More
generally, Pass represents the Guild and the Teamsters, alt-
hough he has also appeared at meetings for some of the other
unions.
Expiration and/or extension of 2014 agreements
As of March 31, 2017, the agreements expired for the mail-
ing room unit, the advertising unit, the finance unit, the delivery
unit, and the pressmen’s unit. Since March 31, 2017, the em-
ployees in these units have been working without an agreement
while their Union and the PG attempt to bargain a successor
agreement.
The situation is nominally different for two of the units, the
Guild-represented Editorial Unit, and the Operating Engineers-
represented unit of operating engineers. On March 29, 2017,
before expiration of their Agreement, the Operating Engineers
and the PG entered into an agreement extending the 2014
Agreement while the parties negotiate a new agreement. Under
this extension agreement, either party has the right to terminate
the contract upon ten days written notice. As to the Guild unit,
the 2014 Agreement between the Guild and the PG contains a
clause that provides that “the terms and conditions of this
Agreement shall remain in effect as long as negotiations con-
tinue” for a successor agreement. Thus, the Guild’s agreement
remains in effect on this basis.
The PG’s refusal to pay the Fund contribution rate increase
for 2018
In the fall of 2017, the Fund sent a memo to Employer par-
ticipants in the health and welfare fund notifying them of the
new monthly contribution rate to be effective January 2018,
and that would appear on the December 2017 invoice from the
Fund. For the PG’s Fund plan, the new announced rate was
$1422.49 per month per employee, an increase of $67.52 per
month, just under a 5 percent increase from the monthly rate
the PG was paying in calendar year 2017.
On October 25 and 26, 2017, the PG, by Human Resources
Manager Linda Guest, sent letters to the Fund, and to each Un-
ion representing a PG bargaining unit, regarding the “Annual
Rate Adjustment,” and stating that the PG was not obligated to
pay the increased contribution rate.
A separate letter was sent to the Fund regarding each Union,
and a corresponding letter sent to each Union, but notwith-
standing any individual differences, in each letter the PG main-
tained that under the applicable labor agreement “there is no
provision for any increase in its contribution to the Fund, after
December 31, 2017.”
Each letter to the Fund concluded by stating: “We will be
discussing this matter with the Union. If, and when, a different
contribution rate is agreed to with the Union, the Fund will be
informed.”
Each letter to a Union with which the 2014 Agreement had
expired asserted that under the expired agreement, “it appears
that the Company is not contractually obligated to pay the
Fund’s increased contribution rate for 2018,” and asserted that
“Our obligation under the law is to maintain the dynamic status
quo conditions created by the expired CBA, that is, to continue
to pay the current contribution rate.” The letter to the Guild
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 9
and the Operating Engineers—the two agreements that re-
mained in effect due to extension—asserted that “Our obliga-
tion under law is to continue to pay the current contribution
rate, which is the status quo.”
The letters to each Union then stated, “Therefore we think it
is important to meet with the Union to discuss how to address
this development” and requested that the Union contact Guest
“to arrange a date and time for that meeting.”
By letter dated November 6, 2017, Attorney Pass responded
to Guest (on behalf of all the unions), contending that,
As I am sure you have been advised, if there is no new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in effect dealing with healthcare
for 2018, and thereafter, the terms and conditions of the exist-
ing agreement must continue. You also are aware that the
provisions of those agreements clearly provide that the
“Company will provide a health insurance and prescription
drug plan . . .” and that the Company’s obligation for any in-
crease is capped for the years 2016 and 2017 at 5% each year.
There is nothing in the agreement that provides for caps for
any years thereafter. As a result consistent with the Compa-
ny’s commitment it must pay for any increase needed in 2018
and thereafter to maintain the agreed upon insurance program.
. . .
. . . . Fortunately for the PG, it appears that the increase for
2018 is going to be 5%. However, regardless of the amount
of the increase, that obligation rests squarely with the Post-
Gazette.
Any unilateral change to the contractual terms obviously
would be an issue which we will deal with in an appropriate
manner. If you have questions please don’t hesitate to contact
me. [Emphasis in original.]
The PG’s Manager Guest responded to Attorney Pass in a
letter dated November 15, 2017. In the letter, Guest stated that
the “Welfare Fund is reserving the right to continue to provide
health insurance coverage under a reduced benefit structure if
the Company does not pay the requested 5% increased contri-
bution rate . . . beginning January, 2018.” Guest then noted
that “Unfortunately, under the expired collective-bargaining
agreements, any proposed increase by the Welfare Fund must
be based upon the plan design effective January 1, 2015, unless
the parties agree otherwise.” Guest then told Pass:
We respectfully disagree with your assertion that the Compa-
ny must pay for any increases assessed by the Welfare Fund
for 2018 and thereafter. The Company does not believe the
expired collective-bargaining agreements for the Unions you
represent address Welfare Fund contributions for 2018 or
thereafter.
We recognize our obligations under law to continue to pay the
current contribution rate, which is the status quo. However,
because of the positions taken by the Welfare Fund, we again
request to meet to address these developments. Time is of the
essence because the Welfare Fund will impact our employees’
insurance coverage in 2018.
Please contact me to arrange a date and time to meet separate-
ly with each Union
Pass responded to Guest by letter dated November 20, 2017.
In his letter he asserted that “the law is quite clear and unequiv-
ocal that the maintenance of the status quo requires the Em-
ployer to continue what they promised, and that is to provide
the health insurance program they currently have.” In response
to Guest’s request to meet over the health insurance contribu-
tions, Pass responded that
“[a]s always, all of the named Unions are more than willing to
meet with you at any mutually agreeable time. Please under-
stand however that none of the Unions are interested in bar-
gaining over one particular subject. A new agreement entails
more than the health insurance program. As you know, the
Employer has put on the table a new health insurance pro-
gram [in] which the Unions have little interest. Nevertheless,
we are always willing to discuss any issue that is a mandatory
subject of bargaining. . . .
. . . . As you know, there are additional meetings being
scheduled between your team and the various Unions, and
they will be able to discuss these issues, including the health
insurance, at each of the negotiating sessions they participate
in. . . .
. . . . Finally, so there is no ambiguity of positions, please ad-
vise, absent mutual agreement to do otherwise, will the Em-
ployer pay the necessary premiums to maintain the current
health insurance program through the Western Pennsylvania
Health and Welfare Fund beginning January 2018? [Empha-
sis in original.]
Attorney Pass, along with the Guild representatives met with
the PG’s Attorneys, Michael Oesterle and Richard Lowe (and
perhaps Guest), for a regularly scheduled meeting on Novem-
ber 22. As Pass testified, at that meeting there was a “vigorous
discussion about the fact that they were not going to be paying
any increase to our health insurance that we have under the
[Fund] contract to keep it in place.” The Union position, as
articulated by Pass was “that we had agreed to a schedule [of]
benefits and our position was that those scheduled benefits are
your obligations to maintain.” Indeed, Pass told the PG that
“[y]our caps [on increases] were for only ‘16 and ‘17. There
were no caps thereafter. That was our position and . . . there
was a schedule of benefits that had to be and we said that in the
agreement.” The union position and proposal was that the PG
“maintain those benefits.” Attorney Lowe, for the PG, made it
clear that he did not agree. Pass proposed that the Union would
pay the 5 percent increase if the PG granted the employees a
7.5 percent “wage increase right now.” According to Pass, the
PG did not respond—and did not agree—to this. Lowe told
Pass that “he would have another discussion with the [F]und to
see what could be done and he would let us know his answer by
December 12.”
On December 12, Pass met again with Attorney Lowe, and
other PG representatives, this time at a meeting with the Team-
sters Union, although, as noted above, Pass represented all the
Unions with regard to health care coverage issues. At this
meeting Pass reiterated his view that the PG had to pay the
health insurance increase. Lowe told him “We’re not interested
in paying.” Pass reiterated his proposal that the Union would
pay the 5 percent increase if the employees received an imme-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
diate 7.5 percent wage increase.” Lowe indicated he would
continue talking to the Fund.
The PG did not pay the increased Fund contribution for or
after January 1, 2018. It continued to contribute at the 2017
monthly level. In January 2018, the Fund notified the employ-
ees that it had it had “modified the medical benefit plan appli-
cable to Post-Gazette participants” by increasing the annual
deductible beginning April 1, 2018, for single and family par-
ticipants “in order to correspond the plan coverage to the con-
tribution level provided under the Post-Gazette.” The Fund
stated that these actions
were necessitated when the Post-Gazette did not pay the pre-
mium increase for 2018. Effective January 1, 2018, the Trus-
tees approved a 5% increase in the premium cost in order to
maintain the 2017 level of benefits for Plan PG. The 2017
premium rate was $1,354.97 per month, the 2018 rate needed
to maintain the benefit level is $1422.49 per month, an in-
crease of $67.52 per month per member.
Pass attended subsequent bargaining sessions in January and
February. No resolution of the dispute between the Unions and
the PG over the health care coverage was reached. The PG’s
position was that the Unions should accept the new health care
proposal that the PG proposed as part of a successor labor
agreement. There was no agreement reached. The Fund in-
creased employee deductibles under the plan effective April 1,
2018, from $850 to $1100 for single coverage, and from $1700
to $2200 for family coverage.12
ANALYSIS
1. The statutory duty to maintain the status quo requires the
PG to continue to pay the annual increase in the Fund
contribution rate
The General Counsel alleges that the PG’s failure to pay the
annual increase in Fund contribution rates for employee health
care coverage on January 1, 2018, as it had under the terms of
the 2014 agreements in 2016 and 2017, and which resulted in a
reduction of employee health care benefits in April 2018, con-
stituted an unlawful unilateral change in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1).13
It is settled that—with exceptions not relevant here—while
parties negotiate a successor collective-bargaining agreement
the employer must maintain the status quo in terms and condi-
tions of employment until the parties reach agreement or a valid
bargaining impasse. Marina Del Rey Hospital, 363 NLRB No.
22, slip op. at 3 (2015); Bottom Line Enterprises, 302 NLRB
373, 374 (1991) (footnote omitted), enfd. mem. 15 F.3d 1087

12 The PG attacks Pass’ credibility as to his testimony regarding the
parties’ discussions at the November-February meetings. I note that
Pass’ testimony is unrebutted, even though two of the Respondent’s
attorneys who were identified as being in meetings with Pass were
present throughout the hearing in these cases. The Respondent did not
call them or any other witness to testify about these November-
February meetings. I credit Pass’ unrebutted testimony.
13 An employer’s violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act is also a deriv-
ative violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. ABF Freight System, 325
NLRB 546 fn. 3 (1998); Tennessee Coach Co., 115 NLRB 677, 679
(1956), enfd. 237 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1956).
(9th Cir. 1994). Accord RBE Electronics of S.D., Inc., 320
NLRB 80, 81 (1995); Intermountain Rural Electronics, Inc.,
305 NLRB 783, 786 (1991), enfd. 984 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir.
1993).
The genesis for this rule is the Supreme Court’s recognition
that a fundamental corollary of the statutory duty to bargain is
that—as much as a flat refusal to negotiate—”an employer’s
unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotia-
tion is similarly a violation of § 8(a)(5), for it is a circumven-
tion of the duty negotiate which frustrates the objectives of §
8(a)(5) as much as does a flat refusal.” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 743 (1962). Such “[u]nilateral action by an employer . . .
must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congres-
sional policy.” Katz, supra at 747.
Under Section 8(a)(5) “most terms and conditions of em-
ployment are not subject to unilateral change.” Litton Finan-
cial Printing v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991). After the
expiration of contractual obligations, these terms and condi-
tions are “no longer agreed-upon terms; they are terms imposed
by law, at least so far as there is not unilateral right to change
them.” Id. This statutory requirement exists as to any employ-
er action on a mandatory subject of bargaining that is “an estab-
lished practice and a term and condition of employment.” Dai-
ly News of Los Angeles, 315 NLRB 1236, 1237–1238 (1994),
enfd. 73 F.3d 406, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1996). It is undisputed that
employer contributions to employee fringe benefit funds are a
mandatory bargaining subject. See N.D. Peters & Co., 321
NLRB 927, 928 (1996); Southwestern Steel & Supply, Inc. v.
NLRB, 806 F.2d 1111, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
The unfair labor practice inquiry is focused on whether there
is a change in existing employment conditions, as “‘[t]he vice
involved in [a unilateral change] is that the employer has
changed the existing conditions of employment. It is this
change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the
unfair labor practice charge.”‘ Daily News of Los Angeles, 315
NLRB at 1237 (bracketing added) (quoting NLRB v. Dothan
Eagle, Inc., 434 F.2d 93, 98 (5th Cir. 1970) (court’s emphasis)),
enfd. 73 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that discontinuance
of discretionary merit raises constituted unlawful unilateral
change).
However, it is important to note that a prohibited “change”
can take many forms. The duty to maintain the status quo is in
force whether the employer’s challenged action was a “contin-
uance or a discontinuance, or an increase or a decrease . . . of a
condition of employment.” Daily News of Los Angeles, 315
NLRB at 1237. In the Daily News of Los Angeles, the Board
endorsed and quoted from the Fifth Circuit’s decision in NLRB
v. Dothan Eagle, 434 F.2d 93, 98 (1970):
The cases make it crystal clear that the vice involved in both
the unlawful increase situation and the unlawful refusal to in-
crease situation is that the employer has changed the existing
conditions of employment. It is this change which is prohibit-
ed and which forms the basis of the unfair labor practice
charge.
. . . .
In other words, whenever the employer by promises or by a
course of conduct has made a particular benefit part of the es-
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 11
tablished wage or compensation system, then he is not at lib-
erty unilaterally to change this benefit either for better or
worse during . . . the period of collective bargaining. . . .
In our view, the standard set forth in Dothan Eagle, which
looks to whether a change has been implemented in condi-
tions of employment, captures best what lies at the heart of the
Katz doctrine. It neither distinguishes among the various
terms and conditions of employment on which an employer
takes unilateral action nor does it discriminate on the basis of
the nature of a particular unilateral act. It simply determines
whether a change in any term and condition of employment
has been effectuated, without first bargaining to impasse or
agreement, and condemns the conduct if it has.
Daily News, 315 NLRB 1237–1238 (quoting, Dothan Eagle,
434 F.2d at 98 (emphasis in original)).
As the Court of Appeals explained, enforcing the Board’s
decision in Daily News of Los Angeles:
it makes absolutely no difference under Katz whether the
change at issue adds to or subtracts from employees’ wages,
or whether it institutes a new employment policy or with-
draws one that already exists. Thus, in some circumstances it
will be an unfair labor practice to grant unilaterally a wage in-
crease, and . . . . in other circumstances it will be an unfair la-
bor practice to deny unilaterally a wage increase. The Act is
violated by a unilateral change in the existing wage structure
whether that change be an increase or the denial of a sched-
uled increase. . . . It cannot be doubted that, under the prevail-
ing case law from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts, and
the Board, the relevant inquiry here is whether any established
employment term on a mandatory subject of bargaining has
been unilaterally changed.
Daily News of Los Angeles v. NLRB, 73 F.3d 406, 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (first ellipses by court; internal quotation omitted).
In this case, the decisive issue is whether the Fund’s annual
contribution rate increases, which were required to be paid
under the terms of the 2014 Agreement, were themselves terms
and conditions of employment that must be continued during
bargaining for a successor agreement. The General Counsel
and the Unions say yes, the PG says no. The PG contends that
by continuing to pay the 2017 Fund contribution rate in effect
when the agreements expired (or were temporarily extended) it
was maintaining the status quo. It contends that it was free to
ignore the Fund’s 2018 annual contribution rate increase.
The problem with this defense is that it is at odds with settled
precedent that holds that the status quo is not determined, as the
Respondent would have it, by reproducing a snapshot of the
employer’s obligations at the expiration of the labor agreement,
but by continuing the employees’ employment terms and condi-
tions. These are not always the same thing.
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out in re-
sponse to an argument much like that mounted by the PG here,
an employer cannot “define the status quo by taking a snapshot
. . . at the moment the [2014] CBA expired.” Rather “the terms
of the expired agreement define the post-expiration status quo .
. . not . . .[t]he . . . circumstances at the time of expiration.”
Wilkes-Barre Hospital v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 374 (D.C. Cir.
2017) enforcing Wilkes-Barre Hospital, 362 NLRB No. 148
(2015) (finding violation after labor contract expired and em-
ployer refused to continue to increase employee wages based
on longevity-based wage increases that were set forth in the
contract). Accord, Intermountain Rural Electric Ass’n, 305
NLRB 783, 784–785 (1991) (Board finds failure to pay in-
creased medical and dental insurance premium rates was un-
lawful alteration of employee terms and conditions of employ-
ment and Board rejects judge’s approach that “focuses narrow-
ly upon the Respondent’s preexisting financial obligations” at
contract expiration); enfd. 984 F.2d 1562, 1567 (10th Cir.
1993) (“preserving the status quo required [employer] to pay
100% of the increased health and dental insurance premiums
upon expiration of the Agreement”); Finley Hospital, 362
NLRB 915 (2015) (finding violation in employer’s refusal to
continue anniversary wage increases after expiration of one-
year collective-bargaining agreement that provided for annual
wage increase for each employee his/her anniversary date for
the duration of agreement); enft. denied in relevant part, 827
F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2016).
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, there is nothing foreign
to the statutory status quo obligations under the Act to requiring
an employer to continue to provide increases that had been
required under a now expired agreement, precisely in order to
avoid being found to have changed the terms and conditions of
employment. The issue is never whether an employer action is
a “continuance or a discontinuance, or an increase or a de-
crease.” As far as the duty to bargain is concerned, this is “a
distinction without a difference.” Finley Hospital, 362 NLRB
915, 919. The issue is always whether “the employer has
changed the existing conditions of employment. It is this
change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of the
unfair labor practice charge.”‘ Daily News of Los Angeles, 315
NLRB at 1237.
In this case, the conclusion that the increase in contribution
rates was a term and condition of the contracts that must be
continued under the Act is clear from a review of the terms and
operation of the 2014 Agreements.
The 2014 Agreements establish the Fund’s plan as the em-
ployee health care coverage effective January 1, 2015.14 The
Fund’s schedule of benefits that employees are to receive under
the new plan was attached to and entered into evidence as part
of the agreements. The 2014 Agreements set a precise dollar
amount for the PG’s funding obligation for calendar year
2015.15 The 2014 Agreements do not specify a set predeter-
mined amount for the contribution rate for the remaining years
of the contract. Rather, the Agreements provide for the Re-

14 “(1)Effective January 1, 2015, all eligible bargaining unit em-
ployees will participate in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and
Employers Welfare Fund (the “Fund”). Participation in the plan is
limited to employees averaging annually more than 30 hours per
week.”
15 “(2) The required PG contributions for the calendar year 2015
will be $1,229 per month for each participating full-time bargaining
unit employee (regardless of family size) and regardless of the option
chosen.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
spondent to meet the Fund’s annual contribution increases in
2016 and 2017, capped at 5 percent each year. There was no
discretion for the Respondent—up to 5 percent it had to pay the
annual increases denoted by the Fund.16 The Respondent ad-
mits this.17 There is also no dispute that the Respondent met
these contractual obligations. The increases had to be based on
the Fund maintaining the same plan design as in 2015. The
sole limitation on the Respondent’s obligation to pay the
Fund’s rate increases was that for 2016 and 2017 the portion of
the contribution increase the PG was required to pay was not to
exceed a 5 percent annual increase.
Thus, the language and operation of the agreement prescribes
as a term and condition of employment under the contract that
during the term of the contract the Respondent was required to
pay the annual Fund increases (up to 5 percent). Accordingly,
by failing to meet the funding increase (up to 5 percent) pre-
scribed by the Fund in 2018, the PG violated its statutory—not
its contractual—duty to continue the status quo of funding the
increase in contribution rates to pay for the Fund’s health care
for employees. By refusing to continue the increase the PG did
not continue—but rather, altered—the status quo in terms and
conditions.
This conclusion stands by itself, based solely on the terms
and operation of the 2014 agreements regarding the contribu-
tion rate increases and the admitted contractual obligation of
the Respondent to pay these contribution rate increases during
the term of the agreement. In addition, the conclusion is force-
fully buttressed by the fact that the health care coverage sched-
ule of benefits attached to each 2014 agreement could only be
maintained with contribution rate increases. These benefits
were amended by the parties beginning in calendar year 2016,
to accommodate a Fund contribution rate increase that exceed-
ed the cap, but the schedule of benefits—as amended—was part
of the terms and conditions of employment when the 2014
agreements expired (or were temporarily extended) at the end
of March 2017.
The statutory duty to maintain and not unilaterally change
the status quo in employee health care coverage while negotiat-
ing for a new agreement is axiomatic. In this case, that statuto-
ry duty would be meaningless if the Respondent’s duty to con-
tinue the contribution rate increases—contractually mandated
in 2016 and 2017—was not a term and condition of employ-
ment and could be unilaterally altered.
Finally, it is notable that this case is very much like that of
Intermountain Rural Electric Assn., 305 NLRB 783 (1991).
There, the labor agreement, which was in effect from December
1, 1987, through November 30, 1988, provided for employee

16 “(3) The PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will not ex-
ceed a 5.0% annual increase above the $1,229 per month set forth
above for calendar year 2015. Any such increases must be based upon
the plan design effective January 1, 2015. The PG will receive from
the Fund at least 60 days notice of any such annual contribution in-
crease prior to January 1.”
17 R. Br. at 6 (“For 2016, the bargaining agreements required Re-
spondent to pay up to a 5% increase over the 2015 contribution rate”;
“For 2017, the Expired Contracts required that any contribution in-
crease up to 5% would be paid by Respondent”).
medical and dental insurance coverage under a variety of avail-
able plans, with the employer’s “maximum contribution to any
of the medical insurance plans in effect for its employees cov-
ered by this Agreement” capped at “one hundred percent
(100%) of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Insurance Company
premiums.’’ The agreement stated that the employer’s contri-
bution “shall not exceed” the BC/BS premium. When the con-
tract expired on November 30, and the health care insurers
raised their premiums on December 1, the employer refused to
increase the amount it had been paying for premiums under the
old plans and forced employees to make up the difference.
The administrative law judge dismissed the complaint, rea-
soning, as to the status quo issue, “that because the Respondent
did not change the amount of its medical premium contribu-
tions and continued to pay the same amount it had paid prior to
the contract’s expiration, there was no change in the status quo
as to that premium.” The judge interpreted the contract’s refer-
ence to a “maximum contribution” with respect to premiums
and the limiting words “shall not exceed” as limiting “the Re-
spondent’s obligation of no more than the exact dollar amount
of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield rates in effect from December
1987 through November 1988.” The judge found that
“[b]ecause the Respondent continued to provide the same dollar
amount toward medical insurance premiums in December, he
found that the Respondent made no change with respect to such
insurance contributions.”
The Board reversed, in reasoning worth repeating here:
There is no question that contractually provided health
plans survive contract expiration and cannot be altered
without bargaining. Here the contractual medical . . .
plans were provided at no cost to employees, but with a
limitation upon the Respondent’s maximum financial lia-
bility on medical premiums. The judge’s approach focus-
es narrowly upon the Respondent’s preexisting financial
obligations, i.e., the amount of money it paid for the expir-
ing medical and dental plans, but completely disregards
employees’ expectations, i.e., medical and dental coverage
under noncontributory insurance plans, and the absence of
any limit on the Respondent’s liability that would preclude
any possible increase. Although the contract language re-
lating to medical insurance clearly refers to a maximum,
no particular dollar figure is identified. Instead, the Re-
spondent’s maximum liability is described as not to ex-
ceed 100 percent of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield rates.
Thus, when the dollar amount of those rates increases, so
too does the Respondent’s maximum dollar obligation. . . .
Accordingly, by paying only the premium rates which had
been in effect under the previous medical and dental plans
and by making [employees] cover the higher costs, the Re-
spondent unlawfully altered employees’ terms and condi-
tions of employment.
Id. at 784–785.
Here, the PG is engaged in precisely the conduct condemned
by the Board in Intermountain Rural Electric. It “focuses nar-
rowly” on its financial obligations when the contract expired
and ignores that its obligation is not “a particular dollar figure”
but a rate set by an outside source of health care. “[W]hen the
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 13
dollar amount of those rates increases, so too does the Re-
spondent’s maximum dollar obligation.” That is the way it
worked under the terms of the contract, and that is the Re-
spondent’s statutory obligation thereafter while the parties ne-
gotiate a successor agreement. As in Intermountain Rural
Electric, the Respondent’s refusal to increase what it pays,
“unlawfully altered employees’ terms and conditions of em-
ployment.”
As to its arguments, the Respondent is quite clear as to the
source of its objection to continuing the contribution increases
in 2018. But its position flows from a basic error as to what it
means to maintain the statutory status quo. It is an error ex-
pressed over and over again throughout its brief.
The Respondent repeatedly stresses that it never agreed to
pay the post-contract contribution increases, in the 2014
Agreements or elsewhere.18
But this is beside the point. The Respondent confuses this
case, which is premised on its statutory obligation to maintain
the status quo, with one based on a contractual duty that sur-
vives contract expiration. As the Supreme Court has explained,
The difference is as elemental as that between Nolde Bros.
and Katz. Under Katz, terms and conditions continue in effect
by operation of the NLRA. They are no longer agreed-upon
terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there is
no unilateral right to change them.”
Litton, 501 U.S. at 207, referencing Nolde Brothers v. Bakery
Workers, 430 U.S. 243 (1977) (contractual duty to arbitrate
severance pay may survive contract termination when dispute is
over an obligation arguably created by expired contract).
The issue here is not whether the General Counsel can point
to language in the 2014 Agreements showing that the Respond-
ent agreed to pay annual increases in 2018 and thereafter. Ra-
ther, the issue is whether the Respondent can point to language
showing that the parties intended to preclude the Respondent
from continuing the status quo of contribution increases in 2018
and thereafter. Unless it can show that the parties intended for
it to be free of the statutory duty to maintain this status quo
obligation, the Respondent is required to continue paying the
contribution rate increases (until impasse or agreement). “Ab-
sent language specifically limiting the applicability of the pro-

18 See, R. Br. at 11 (“The clear and unambiguous terms of the Ex-
pired Contracts do not require Respondent to pay any 2018 Fund con-
tribution rate increase. Therefore, Respondent was not obligated under
the terms of the Expired Contracts to pay that rate increase”); R. Br. at
12 (“Here, none of the Expired Contracts are ambiguous. . . . There is
no reference to any obligation to pay for increases in that rate for 2018,
or for any period of time after the last increase took effect on January 1,
2017”); R. Br. at 15 (“Given that there was no written agreement allow-
ing for unilateral Fund contribution rate increases after 2017, Respond-
ent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by continuing to make contributions
at the 2017 Fund rate”); R. Br. at 20–21 (“Here, the dispute is solely
one of contract interpretation. . . . Respondent is relying on the clear
and unambiguous terms of the Guild and Operating Engineers’ Expired
Contracts as the basis for its argument that those contracts do not re-
quire it to pay the 2018 Fund contribution rate increase”). R. Br. at 33
(“None of the terms of any of the Expired Contracts require Respond-
ent to pay the 2018 Fund contribution rate increase”).
vision [for increases] to the term of the contract, that provision
continues in effect.” Wilkes-Barre Hospital, 362 NLRB 1212,
1217.
In fact, the Respondent concedes that the 2014 Agreements
are absolutely silent as to what happens with contribution levels
after 2017. (R. Br. at 5) (“The agreed-to provision did not ad-
dress health insurance contributions for 2018 or any period
after the expiration of the bargaining agreements”). As it ad-
mits, there is no language at all in the agreements limiting the
amount the Respondent must pay in 2018, and thereafter, to
what it paid in 2017.
Moreover, the Respondent agrees that it must continue to
pay the 2017-level of contributions, thus recognizing that noth-
ing in the 2014 Agreements prohibits post-expiration contribu-
tions to the Fund.19 But more pertinently, and just as surely, no
reading of the 2014 Agreement can support the view that by its
terms it precludes continuation after 2017 of the annual contri-
bution rate increases. There is no basis on which the Respond-
ent can claim that terms of the 2014 Agreement—or anything
else—reflect an agreement that the Respondent does not have
to continue the status quo of paying the annual increase set by
the Fund.
Notably, the durational clause of the 2014 Agreements does
not do it. As a matter of law, standard “durational” contract
language does not serve as evidence of an intent by the parties
to alter the status quo after contract expiration. Wilkes-Barre
Hospital v. NLRB, 857 F.3d at 375, citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc.
v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 125, 128, 132–133 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Under
Katz and Litton, however, an expiration date in a standard con-
tract duration clause without more, cannot defeat the unilateral
change doctrine”); Finley Hospital, supra at 3–4.
The 5 percent contractual cap that protects the PG from un-
duly large annual increases for the specific years of 2016 and
2017, does not do it. That cap is a shield for the years 2016 and
2017; it cannot be turned into a sword that alchemically bars
the Respondent from paying any increase to maintain the status
quo after 2017.
The Respondent’s reliance on Hempstead Lincoln Mercury
Motors Corp., 351 NLRB 1149 (2007), is misplaced—although
instructive. In Hempstead the employer’s refusal to increase
pension fund contributions was based on a contract (as re-
newed) that prescribed a predetermined precise dollar amount
per employee that the employer was required to pay to the pen-
sion fund each year. One year it was $175 per employee per
month. The next, $0.00. The year after that a $50 monthly
increase from the year before last was prescribed requiring
payments of $225 per employee. When the agreement expired
the employer continued paying $225, and refused some months
later to make an increase in contributions. The Board agreed
that the employer was not required to meet (or set aside in an
escrow fund) the increased contributions. But here, unlike in
Hempstead, the contract provides for an undetermined annual
increase in the base amount—capped at 5%--in each successive

19 R. Br. at 13 (“Respondent remains obligated to pay the 2017 con-
tribution rate which was in effect on March 31, 2017, when the Con-
tracts expired and which became the status quo”). See also, Tr. 15; Jt.
Exhs. 5(b), 6(b), 7(b), 8(b), and 9(b), 10(b), and 13.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
year of the contract, based on the outside Fund’s establishment
of a new contribution rate. By contrast, in Hempstead the em-
ployer’s dollar amount of contributions was set by contract and
predetermined for each year. In our case, the increase is the
agreement (up to 5 percent for 2016 and 2017). The increase is
the status quo. Hempstead shows only that the PG has the
wrong contractual language to underlie the statutory status quo
argument it pursues.
The only language in the 2014 Agreements advanced by the
PG as language allowing it to unilaterally cancel its obligation
to continue the status quo in 2018 (or any time after the labor
agreements expired) is the language stating that it is not “liable
for any other payment to the Fund, other than as stated above.”
But any surface appeal of that argument evaporates when the
language is read in the context in which it appears in the
agreements:
(3) The PG contributions for years 2016 and 2017 will not ex-
ceed a 5.0% annual increase above the $1,229 per month set
forth above for calendar year 2015. Any such increases must
be based upon the plan design effective January 1, 2015. The
PG will receive from the Fund at least 60 days notice of any
such annual contribution increase prior to January 1. Increases
in excess of 5% will be the responsibility of the bargaining
unit members via direct billings from the Fund. If direct bill-
ing is not available, the PG will only assume responsibility for
any withholding of any additional amounts after receiving the
expressed written consent of each member and will not as-
sume any other responsibility for collection of any other
amounts, or be liable for any other payment to the Fund, other
than as stated above. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the PG’s “[non]liability” “for any other payment to the
Fund” is part of two sentences devoted to limiting the PG’s
liability for handling employee portions of the contributions to
the Fund “in excess of the 5%.” This no-additional-liability
language simply is not addressed to the issue of post-2017 con-
tributions.
Accordingly, absent impasse or agreement, and as a matter
of statute, not contract, the Respondent must pay the Fund an-
nual contribution rate increases just as it did in each successive
year of the contract. When it failed to do so in January 2018, it
altered the status quo of the employment conditions.
Finally, I note that in concluding that the 2014 Agreements
establish terms and conditions that make the annual increases
part of the status quo, I do not reach the General Counsel’s
alternative argument (GC Br. at 23–25) that the duty to contin-
ue the annual increases in contributions became a term and
condition of employment through a “traditional past practice
analysis.” In my view, this argument is superfluous. The Re-
spondent admits that it was contractually required during the
term of the 2014 Agreements to pay up to a 5 percent annual
increase to the Fund. R. Br. at 6 (“For 2016, the bargaining
agreements required Respondent to pay up to a 5% increase
over the 2015 contribution rate”; “For 2017, the Expired Con-
tracts required that any contribution increase up to 5% would
be paid by Respondent”). As set forth, above, on that basis the
annual increases were terms and condition of employment,
there is no need to consider a “traditional past practice” analy-
sis.
2. Various contractual defenses (contract coverage, waiver,
sound arguable basis) and 2014 bargaining
The Respondent also asserts a defense based on the “contract
coverage” analysis that some courts of appeals have adopted to
analyze contractual defenses to refusal to bargain allegations.
Of course, as the Respondent recognizes, the Board does not
apply the “contract coverage” standard, but rather, the long-
established “clear and unmistakable waiver” standard for
claims involving the waiver of statutory rights. Provena St.
Joseph Medical Center, 350 NLRB 808, 811 (2007). The
Respondent—reasonably—does not even mount that argument,
as it is a non-starter on the facts here. As the Board explained
in Graymont Pa, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 37, slip op. at 2–3
(2016):
This [clear and unmistakable waiver] standard--endorsed by
the Supreme Court in NLRB v. C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. 421
(1967)—”requires bargaining partners to unequivocally and
specifically express their mutual intention to permit unilateral
employer action with respect to a particular employment term,
notwithstanding the statutory duty to bargain that would oth-
erwise apply.” Provena, supra at 811. In order to find a
waiver based on contractual language, that language must be
“sufficiently specific.” Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 NLRB
180, 189 (1989). Further, while “[w]aiver of a statutory right
may be evidenced by bargaining history, [ ] the Board re-
quires the matter at issue to have been fully discussed and
consciously explored during negotiations and the union to
have consciously yielded or clearly and unmistakably waived
its interest in the matter.” Id. at 185. As the Board explained
in Provena, supra:
The waiver standard . . . effectively requires the parties to fo-
cus on particular subjects over which the employer seeks the
right to act unilaterally. Such a narrow focus has two clear
benefits. First, it encourages the parties to bargain only over
subjects of importance at the time and to leave other subjects
to future bargaining. Second, if a waiver is won--in clear and
unmistakable Language--the employer’s right to take future
unilateral action should be apparent to all concerned. [Id at
813.]

In this case, nothing in the 2014 agreements approaches this
standard. As discussed above, no language in the 2014 agree-
ments evidences an intent of the parties to not pay rate increas-
es after contract expiration, or after 2017.
However, the Respondent’s argument would fail even if the
Board applied the PG’s preferred “contractual coverage” analy-
sis. As discussed, supra, there is simply is no language in the
agreement limiting the Unions’ statutory rights, no language
covering the subject of the Respondent’s right to cease main-
taining the status quo in 2018 or beyond. The 2014 agreements
are silent as to what happens postexpiration. As the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held in Honeywell Int’l v. NLRB, 253
F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2001), applying the “contractual coverage”
analysis the “standard durational clause . . . without more, can-
not cover and thereby vitiate the Union’s statutory claim to
continued” contribution increases. Wilkes-Barre, supra at 377
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 15
(original emphasis, omitting internal quotations and bracket-
ing), quoting, Honeywell Int’l v. NLRB, 253 F.3d at 128, 132–
133. Here, the Respondent’s “contract coverage” defense will
fail before a court just as certainly as the employer’s similar
defense failed before the D.C. Circuit in Wilkes-Barre Hospital,
supra at 376–377. It can point to no language covering the
topic. Silence does not defeat the Unions’ statutory claims.
The Respondent is also wrong in its claim that, as to the
Guild and Operating Engineers’ agreements that were extended
and remain in effect, it may rely on the “sound arguable basis”
standard to justify its unilateral change of the status quo. The
Respondent misconceives the General Counsel’s claim.
The Board applies the “sound arguable basis” defense in
8(a)(5) cases alleging a “midterm modification claim, i.e., a
failure to abide by a collective-bargaining agreement in viola-
tion of section 8(d) of the Act. Cases alleging a violation of
Section 8(d) of the Act are focused on allegations that the em-
ployer has modified and failed to abide by the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement. In 8(d) cases, “[w]here an
employer has a ‘sound arguable basis’ for its interpretation of a
contract and is not ‘motivated by union animus or … acting in
bad faith,’ the Board ordinarily will not find a violation. In
such cases, there is, at most, a contract breach, rather than a
contract modification.” Bath Iron Works Corp., 345 NLRB
499, 502 (2005) (footnotes, internal quotations, and citations,
omitted), enfd. 475 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2007). Essentially, these
cases are best understood as instances in which the Board effec-
tively defers to another forum to determine the meaning of the
contract.
However, at least since the Board’s decision in Bath Iron
Works Corp., 345 NLRB 499 (2005), it is pellucid that the
“sound arguable basis” standard does not apply, where, as here,
the General Counsel alleges an unlawful unilateral change in
the status quo and not an 8(d) mid-term modification viola-
tion.20
I note that the Respondent appears to recognize and endorse
the distinction—See R. Br. at 10—citing cases for the proposi-
tion that an 8(d) contract modification violation may not be
found where only an unlawful unilateral change theory was
litigated, and vice-a-versa. This is very much the point. It is
well-settled that the General Counsel is the master of the com-

20 Bath Iron Works, supra at 501 (“In ‘unilateral change’ cases,
where all that is alleged is that a union had a statutory right to bargain
before an employer’s proposed change, the Board has considered
whether the union has clearly and unmistakably waived its right to
bargain over the change,” but that “is not the correct standard for an
allegation of an 8(d) contract modification”); Baptist Hospital of East
Tennessee, 351 NLRB 71, 72 fn. 5 (2007) (applying clear and unmis-
takable waiver standard to find unilateral change lawful, and finding
that while “[a]t various times during the litigation of this case, the Gen-
eral Counsel appeared to make the argument that the Respondent’s
actions ‘modified’ the contract, in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5)—Sec. 8(d)
. . . the General Counsel [is] master of the complaint” and “did not
clearly pursue an 8(d) contract modification theory in this case”); Fin-
ley Hospital, supra at slip op. 5 fn. 8 (“under current Board law, the
‘sound arguable basis’ standard invoked by the Respondent applies
only where the issue is whether the employer made a mid-term unilat-
eral modification of the collective-bargaining agreement”) (Board’s
emphasis).
plaint. Here, he has not pursued an 8(d) midterm modification
claim, and the “sound arguable basis” defense is not relevant.21
Finally, beyond the contracts, the PG does not offer any oth-
er noncontractual waiver evidence supporting a claim that dur-
ing bargaining “the matter at issue . . . [had] . . . been fully dis-
cussed and consciously explored during negotiations” and that
“the union [had] consciously yielded or clearly and unmistaka-
bly waived its interest in the matter.” Johnson-Bateman Co.,
295 NLRB at 185. To the contrary, the evidence precludes a
finding of waiver on such grounds.
Thus, in October 2014, when questions arose between the
parties over how the health care coverage cap would operate,
the PG provided the Unions with an Excel spreadsheet—titled
“PG Determination of share of benefit costs–2015-2017”—
showing hypothetical projected contribution rate increases not
only for the years of the contract—2015, 2016, and 2017, but
also for 2018. This spreadsheet was created by the PG’s bene-
fit consultant, and vetted internally by PG representatives be-
fore being provided to the Union as an explanation for how the
cap would affect future contribution rates. At a minimum, this
spreadsheet necessarily precludes any claim that there was a
conscious or clear and unmistakable waiver of the Unions’
statutory right to have the increases continue past 2017, while
the parties bargained new agreements.22
3. The waiver by inaction defense in fall 2017 and early 2018
The Respondent contends (R. Br. at 28–29) that the Unions’
waived the right to bargain over the PG’s failure to pay the
2018 contribution increase by failing to adequately respond
when the PG announced its intentions.

21 The ramifications of the decision to prove a unilateral change
case, and not a contract modification case, include a more favorable
standard for the General Counsel, but also limitations in terms of reme-
dy. “The remedy for a [an 8(d)] contract modification is the more sub-
stantial one of ordering adherence to the contract for its terms; the
remedy for a unilateral change permits the restoration of the change
after bargaining to an impasse.” Bath Iron Works, supra.
22 At the hearing, the parties expended a significant bit of effort
highlighting the inclusion of 2018 on the spreadsheet (in the case of the
General Counsel) and attempting to explain its insignificance (in the
case of the Respondent). The intensity over this spreadsheet continued
into the PG’s posttrial brief (R. Br. at 23–25 & 33 fn. 20) where coun-
sel for the PG launched a calumnious attack on opposing counsel, ac-
cusing them of ethical violations relating to the introduction into evi-
dence of a copy of this spreadsheet that omitted the title. The PG
moves for costs, attorneys’ fees, or other sanctions. Counsel for the
General Counsel moves to strike the portions of the PG’s brief contain-
ing the accusations. I deny both motions. The PG’s accusations are
entirely baseless and the outburst suggests a veritable panic over this
spreadsheet and the admission within it that contribution rate increases
in 2018 were contemplated by the parties. Putting aside that the omis-
sion of the title appears to be an inadvertent copying error, and putting
aside that the PG is as likely the source of the error as is the Union
counsel or counsel for the General Counsel, the most salient point is
that no one would commit this crime because this crime could not pay.
Contrary to the PG’s claim, the omission of the title has no impact on
whether the PG is obligated to pay the 2018 Fund contribution rate
increases. I note that the omission of the title was corrected at the
hearing by the PG when it introduced the version of the spreadsheet
with the title, which I have relied upon in the text.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
This defense is a non-starter, for multiple reasons. For one,
given that it was in the midst of bargaining for a new collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, the Respondent was not privileged
to make a discrete unilateral change. See, Intermountain Rural
Electric Association 305 NLRB 783, 786 (1991) (distinguish-
ing a union’s duty to request bargaining in response to an-
nounced intentions to make a change in periods of non-
negotiations from the situation where parties are already en-
gaged in negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement).
As the Board explained in Intermountain Rural Electric:
When parties are engaged in negotiations for a collective-
bargaining agreement, however, their obligations are some-
what different. Because the parties are in fact bargaining on
various proposals, there is no need for additional requests for
bargaining on those proposals. During negotiations, a union
must clearly intend, express, and manifest a conscious relin-
quishment of its right to bargain before it will be deemed to
have waived its bargaining rights. Absent such manifestation
by the union, an employer must not only give notice and an
opportunity to bargain, but also must refrain from implemen-
tation unless and until impasse is reached on negotiations as a
whole. [footnotes omitted.]
More specifically, an increase in health care premiums or
contributions does not justify a unilateral change. Oak Hill
School, 360 NLRB 359, 403 (2014). There is no exception for
routine increases in health care costs to the requirement that an
overall impasse must be reached before changes in employment
conditions can be implemented. Oak Hill, supra at 403 (absent
specified exceptions, “During negotiations for a collective-
bargaining agreement, an employer may not unilaterally change
any terms or conditions of employment without having bar-
gained to impasse for the agreement as a whole”). Here, there
is no claim of overall impasse, or valid claim of an applicable
exception to the requirement of an overall impasse before im-
plementation.23
Second, there is no evidence that a continuation of 2017 con-
tribution-rates and refusal to provide increases was part of the
Respondent’s bargaining proposal for a new agreement. Were
there an overall impasse or other exception justifying imple-
mentation, only changes reasonably comprehended within the

23 Citing Stone Container Corp., 313 NLRB 336 (1993), the Re-
spondent suggests that the “Stone Container” exception privileges it to
unilaterally change the practice of contribution funding increases with-
out bargaining to an overall impasse. R. Br. at 32 fn. 19. However, the
Stone Container “analysis is applicable only to first contract situations,
where the parties have not yet established their own practices through
contract that they can rely upon in the future.” Oak Hill School, 360
NLRB 359, 409 (2014). It does not apply to “negotiations for succes-
sor contracts, as here.” Id. In this case, the payment of annual contri-
bution increases was established as a term and condition of employ-
ment through the 2014 Agreements. It is a part of the status quo and
subject to the rule on overall impasse. Contrary to the suggestion of the
Respondent (R. Br. at 32 fn. 19), the requirement that parties maintain
the status quo until overall impasse is not something the General Coun-
sel is required to plead, it is governing precedent. Indeed, a claim of
impasse justifying a unilateral change is an affirmative defense, though
not one pled by the Respondent.
Respondent’s bargaining proposal could be implemented.
Peerless Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 734, 735 (9th Cir.
1981).
Third, even as to the piecemeal issue of the Respondent’s
continued funding of the Fund’s 9PG health care plan, there is
no evidence of waiver on this record. To the contrary, Attorney
Pass’ unrebutted testimony is that he made a proposal to permit
the Respondent to avoid the contribution increases if the Re-
spondent provided employees with a pay raise. Pass received
no definitive answer from the Respondent’s representatives on
this proposal until long after January 2018 when the increased
payments were due to the Fund. This is the opposite of a waiv-
er of bargaining by a union.
4. The Section 302 defense
The Respondent contends throughout its brief that Section
302 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29
U.S.C. § 186, prohibits it from paying the increased contribu-
tion rate to the Fund, and, therefore, that it should not be re-
quired to do so under the Act.
Section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA requires, inter alia, that the
basis for payments to an employee benefit trust fund be “speci-
fied in a written agreement with the employer.” The PG con-
tends that there is no written agreement.
However, the applicability of the Board’s status quo doctrine
to employee trust funds governed by Section 302 has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court. Laborers Health & Welfare
Trust Fund for Northern California v. Advanced Lightweight
Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 fn. 6 (1988). “Consequently,
any unilateral change by the employer in the pension fund ar-
rangements provided by an expired agreement is an unfair labor
practice.’” Id.
Numerous courts have held that the Section 302 “written
agreement” requirement is satisfied by a collective-bargaining
agreement, including an expired one. See, e.g., Cibao Meat
Prods. v. NLRB, 547 F.3d 336 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Today, we join
several of our sister circuits in holding that an expired collec-
tive-bargaining agreement satisfies the written-agreement re-
quirement of § 302(c)(5)(B). This follows from both the re-
quirement that an employer maintain the status quo following
expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement, and that such
continued payments under an expired collective-bargaining
agreement do not implicate the purpose of § 302”) (citations
omitted); Dugan v. R.J. Corman Railroad, 344 F.3d 662, 668
(7th Cir. 2003) (“the cases hold that an expired agreement—
one that has no contractual force—nevertheless can satisfy the
statutory requirements [of Section 302], in part because even
after expiration of such an agreement, an employer has a duty
to bargain in good faith and maintain the status quo as to wages
and working conditions until a new agreement or an impasse is
reached”) (internal quotations omitted); Alaska Trowel Trades
Pension Fund v. Lopshire, 103 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir.1996)
(“The requirement of a written agreement may be satisfied by a
collective-bargaining agreement even after it has expired. . . .
An expired § 9(a) agreement satisfies the § 302(c)(5)(B) writ-
ing requirement in part because even after expiration of such an
agreement, an employer has a duty to bargain in good faith and
maintain the status quo as to wages and working conditions
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 17
until a new agreement or an impasse is reached”); Peerless
Roofing, 641 F.2d at 736 (rejecting employer’s argument and
noting that “the collective-bargaining agreement itself survives
its expiration date for some purposes. During negotiations, the
employer is required by section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), to maintain the
status quo as to wages and working conditions, even following
the expiration date of the agreement. If the employer’s obliga-
tion to make trust fund payments were terminated by the expi-
ration of the agreement, the union would never have an oppor-
tunity to bargain over those contributions. This result would not
advance national labor policy as articulated in the National
Labor Relations Act”).
Notably, the Respondent agrees that it lawfully made contri-
butions to the Fund based on the 2014 Agreements during the
term of the 2014 Agreements—and after the expiration of the
2014 Agreements (at 2017 rates). In other words, the Respond-
ent recognizes that the 2014 Agreements satisfy Section 302’s
requirements even after expiration. Thus, the Respondent’s
Section 302 dispute is simply with the Board’s application of
the status quo doctrine. But the point of the doctrine is that
based on the written terms and conditions of the 2014 Agree-
ments, annual increases are the required status quo employment
condition. Thus, this case—including the Respondent’s Section
302 defense—rises or falls on the determination of the amount
of the Respondent’s status quo obligations under Section
8(a)(5). If the status quo is correctly applied to find that the
contribution increase is an employment condition under the
terms of the expired agreement, then the Respondent’s Section
302 argument disappears.
Section 302’s “purposefully rigid structure . . . is design[ed]
to insure that employer contributions are made only for proper
purposes and that fund benefits reach only proper parties.”
Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union, Local
15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir.
1975). “Strict compliance . . . is not an end in itself but a
means of ensuring” that there is no corruption in the form of
companies making payoffs to unions through trust fund pay-
ments, or that union officials misuse these funds. National
Stabilization Agreement of Sheet Metal Industry Trust Fund v.
Commercial Roofing & Sheet Metal Trust Fund, 655 F.2d
1218, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Courts recognize that employers
“cannot invoke section 302 of the LMRA as a loophole through
which to escape obligations to the Funds.” Bricklayers Local
21 of Illinois Apprenticeship and Training Program v. Banner
Restoration, Inc., 385 F.3d 761, 772 (7th Cir. 2004).
Here, the Respondent’s status quo obligations are based on
written terms of the expired collective-bargaining agreements.
The Respondent’s status quo-determined contribution obliga-
tions under the Act satisfies Section 302.
5. The Unions’ contention that the PG’s status quo
obligation requires it to fund the existing health care
coverage and benefits (without a cap)
The Unions contend that the status quo in increased contribu-
tion funding that the Respondent is required to maintain is not
limited by the 5 percent cap.
There is much to recommend in this argument. The 5 per-
cent cap in the 2014 agreements are—arguably—expressly
stated for the specific years of 2016 and 2017, not as a general
term of the agreements. As discussed above, nothing in the
agreement limits increases in contribution funding post-
expiration, but the cap is expressly for 2016 and 2017. And as
the Unions point out, the status quo in employment conditions
for unit employees includes maintenance of the schedule of
benefits (as amended in 2016) attached to each of the 2014
Agreements and entered into evidence as part of the 2014
Agreements.
However, the case litigated by the General Counsel is a more
limited one. In both the complaint and in his brief, the General
Counsel contends that “[i]n order to preserve the status quo as
required by extant Board law, the Respondent was required to
continu[e] paying up to a 5% increase in contribution rates
annually to the Fund for employee health insurance.” (GC Br.
at 20); see also complaint at ¶9(a)-(g) (“Respondent discontin-
ued its practice of paying up to the 5% increase in contributions
for [the unit’s] health insurance benefits to the [Fund] as set
forth under [the relevant article] of the collective-bargaining
agreement”).
Thus, the violation of the Act alleged by the General Counsel
in this case is the failure to pay up to a 5% increase. It is well-
settled that the General Counsel is the “master of the complaint
and controls the theory of the case.” Fineberg Packing Co.,
349 NLRB 294, 296 (2007), enfd. 546 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, “A charging party may not expand the scope of
the complaint without the consent of the General Counsel.”
Planned Building Services, 330 NLRB 791, 793 fn. 13 (2000).
Thus, the Unions’ theory is not one I reach in this litigation.
While the scope of the unfair labor practice alleged is within
the control of the General Counsel, it is well settled that a
charging party may argue for, and the Board may adopt, a rem-
edy for an unfair labor practice whether or not the General
Counsel pursues that remedy. Kaumagraph Corp., 313 NLRB
624, 625 (1994).
In their brief, the Unions attempt to frame their argument
that Respondent must pay increases necessary to maintain the
current schedule of health care benefits, without regard to the
cap, as a as a request for a remedial relief. However, this relief
does not follow from the scope of the violation alleged by the
General Counsel. As Judge Clifford Anderson explained, in
reasoning adopted by the Board, “if a particular violation of the
Act is not alleged by the General Counsel and such a violation
is necessary for a particular remedy to be invoked then the
General Counsel has, by refusing to allege such a violation,
precluded the Board from directing such a remedy.” New
Breed Leasing, 317 NLRB 1011, 1019 (1995), enfd. 111 F.3d
1460 (9th Cir. 1997); ATS Acquisition Corp., 321 NLRB 712,
712 fn. 3 (1995), enfd. mem. 127 F3d. 1105 (9th Cir. 1997) (“a
charging party is not free to seek remedies contingent on an
amendment to the complaint or a theory of the case different
from that of the General Counsel”).
Accordingly, I reject the Unions’ effort to expand the reme-
dy beyond the scope of the unfair labor practice alleged.24

24 Notably, because, as of the close of the record in this case in Au-
gust 2018, there as yet to be a post-expiration request for an annual
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD18
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh
Post–Gazette is an employer within the meaning of Sections
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its
Local 38061 (the Guild) is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following
appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees (the Editorial
Unit):
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-
divisions of the Editorial Department, excluding those em-
ployees provided for in other existing Union Agreements and
all Publishers and Associate Publishers, Publisher and Editor-
in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page, Man-
aging Editor, Deputy Managing Editor, Senior Assistant
Managing Editor, Assistant Managing Editor, City Editor,
Sports Editor, Sunday Editor, Technology Systems Editor,
Business Editor, Night Operations Manager, Seen Editor, As-
sociate Editor of Opinion Pages, Editorial Cartoonist, and
Confidential Secretaries.
3. The Charging Party Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M-22,
a/w the Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers Sector of the
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local
14842 (the Mailers Union) is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following
appropriate unit of the Respondent’s employees (the Mailing
Room Unit):
full-time employees described in the most recent collective-
bargaining agreement [Jt. Exh. 1(b)] between the Mailers Un-
ion and the Newspaper as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words “em-
ployee” and “employees” when used in this Contract apply to
journeymen and apprentices. It is recognized and agreed that
the terms and conditions of employment covering Part-Time
mailer employees shall be as set forth in a separate agreement
covering such employees.
4. The Charging Party Pittsburgh Typographical Union No.
7, a/w the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO,
and its Local 14827 (the Typographical Union) is a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at
all times material the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s

Fund contribution increase of more than 5 percent, the General Coun-
sel’s more limited case is sufficient—to date—to remedy the existing
violations, even under the Charging Parties’ view. I do not reach the
issue of whether, in the event there are subsequent annual Fund contri-
bution rate increases beyond 5 percent necessary to maintain the exist-
ing health care coverage, and the Respondent fails to pay the amount
necessary to maintain the existing health care coverage, the Unions
could allege and the General Counsel could litigate in a future unfair
labor practice case, that the Respondent has violated the Act anew.
advertising employees (the Advertising Unit):
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the
Advertising Department; excluding all other employees, con-
fidential employees, guards, professional and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and those specifically excluded.
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Di-
vision, including supervision, managerial, confidential, and all
other employees, as well as such employees added in the fu-
ture, are excluded from the Advertising Unit. In addition, the
following positions are specifically excluded from the Adver-
tising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer
Secretary to Classified Managers
Advertising Director
Display Advertising Manager
Classified Manager
Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager
Market Research Manager
Retail Manager
Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev.
Classified Operations Manager
Database Marketing Manager
Production Services Supervisor
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr.
Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager
Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager
Sales Manager—Automotive
Production Services Manager
Sales Manager—Real Estate
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr. - Online
Sales Manager—Retail (Territories)
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Classified
Sales Manager—New Business Dev.
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—National
Sales Manager—Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director
Sales Manager—Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager
Sales Supervisor—Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager
Sales Manager—Digital/Direct
Classified Automotive Sales Manager
Production Services Manager
Quality Control Specialist
5. The Charging Party Typographical Union is and at all
times material has been the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the following appropriate unit of the Re-
spondent’s finance employees (the Finance Unit):
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the
Financial Department; excluding all other employees, confi-
dential employees, guards, professional and supervisors as de-
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 19
fined in the Act. The following are recognized as being confi-
dential or supervisory employees excluded from the coverage
of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller, Office
Manager and their confidential secretaries, Accounting Man-
ager, Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager, Circulation
Accounting Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor,
and Payroll Supervisor.
6. The Charging Party Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine
and Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers, a/w the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No.
211 of Allegheny County (the Delivery Union) is a labor organ-
ization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all
times material the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the following appropriate unit of the Respondent’s em-
ployees (the Delivery Unit):
all employees performing the delivery-related work described
in more detail in Section 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent
collective-bargaining agreement between the Delivery Union
and the Newspaper. [See, Section 2 of Joint Exh. 1(e).]
7. The Charging Party the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing
Pressmen’s/Paper Handlers Local Union No. 9N, a/w the
Graphic Communications Conference/International Brother-
hood of Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Un-
ion) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act, and at all times material the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the following appropriate unit of
the Respondent’s employees (the Pressmen’s Unit):

All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling
pressmen, and apprentice pressmen who work in the Compa-
ny’s pressroom and paperhandling departments.
8. The Charging Party Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO, Lo-
cal 95 (Operating Engineers), is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and at all times material the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following
appropriate unit of the Respondent’s operating engineer em-
ployees (the Operating Engineers Unit):
all employees employed by [the Respondent] at its facility lo-
cated at 2201 Sweeney Drive, Clinton, P A; but excluding
guards, office clericals, managerial personnel, confidential
personnel, supervisors as defined in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, and all other personnel.25
9. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act, beginning on or about January 1, 2018, by unilaterally
discontinuing to pay up to a 5 percent annual increase in contri-
bution rates to the Western Pennsylvania Western Pennsylvania
Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund, for health care cover-
age for employees in the above-referenced bargaining units,
resulting in a reduction in health care coverage for employees
commencing April 1, 2018.

25 The parties stipulated that on March 9, 2017, the PG and the Op-
erating Engineers tentatively agreed to change the facility address listed
in the above-unit description and the change will be incorporated into
any successor labor agreement entered into by the PG and the Operat-
ing Engineers.
10. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent af-
fect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent, having unlawfully unilaterally discontinued
paying annual increases up to 5 percent in Fund annual contri-
bution rates shall rescind the unilateral change, and before im-
plementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions of unit employees, notify and on request bargain
with the Unions to a lawful impasse.
Having found that the Respondent unlawfully discontinued
increased annual contributions to the Fund, the Respondent
shall be ordered to reinstitute payments of annual increases to
the Fund and make the Fund and employees whole by making
all delinquent Fund contributions on behalf of those employees,
including any additional amounts due the fund in accordance
with Merryweather Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 fn. 7
(1979).26 Further, the Respondent shall be required to reim-
burse its unit employees for any expenses ensuing from its
failure to continue to pay the increased annual contributions to
the Fund, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB
891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. mem. 661 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981),
including all medical expenses that were not covered by the
Fund’s health care plan as a result of the Fund’s reduction in
benefits attributable to the Respondent’s failure to pay the re-
quired contributions. Such amounts should be computed in the
manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682
(1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest as
prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), com-
pounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center,
356 NLRB 6 (2010). To the extent that an employee has made
personal contributions to a fund that are accepted by the fund in
lieu of the employer’s delinquent contributions during the peri-
od of the delinquency, the Respondent will reimburse the em-
ployee, but the amount of such reimbursement will constitute a
setoff to the amount that the Respondent otherwise owes the
fund.27
The Respondent shall post an appropriate informational no-
tice, as described in the attached appendix. This notice shall be
posted at the Respondent’s facility wherever the notices to em-
ployees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything cov-
ering it up or defacing its contents. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily

26 The question of whether the Respondent must pay any additional
amounts into the Fund in order to satisfy the “make whole” remedy is
appropriately left to the compliance stage. Merryweather Optical Co.,
supra.
27 I note that the record suggests that employees were not permitted
to directly contribute to the Fund. However, the issue was not directly
litigated. Therefore, as a precaution, I include the standard direction
regarding reimbursement of employee personal contributions.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD20
communicates with its employees by such means. In the event
that during the pendency of these proceedings the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since January 1, 2018. When the notice is issued to the Re-
spondent, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 6 of the
Board what action it will take with respect to this decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended28
ORDER
The Respondent PG Publishing Co., Inc. d/b/a Pittsburgh
Post–Gazette, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of its unit employees by discontinuing to pay up to a
5 percent annual increase in contribution rates to the Western
Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund (Fund),
for health care coverage for unit employees, without providing
the employees’ collective-bargaining representative notice and
an opportunity to bargain to a lawful impasse.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its
Local 38061 (the Guild) Union to a lawful impasse as the ex-
clusive collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the following bargaining unit:
The Editorial Unit:
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-
divisions of the Editorial Department, excluding those em-
ployees provided for in other existing Union Agreements and
all Publishers and Associate Publishers, Publisher and Editor-
in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page, Man-
aging Editor, Deputy Managing Editor, Senior Assistant
Managing Editor, Assistant Managing Editor, City Editor,
Sports Editor, Sunday Editor, Technology Systems Editor,
Business Editor, Night Operations Manager, Seen Editor, As-
sociate Editor of Opinion Pages, Editorial Cartoonist, and
Confidential Secretaries.
(b) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on

28 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M–22,
a/w the Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers Sector of the
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its Local
14842 (the Mailers Union) to a lawful impasse as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
following bargaining unit:
The Mailing Room Unit:
full-time employees described in the most recent collective-
bargaining agreement between the Mailers Union and the
Newspaper as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words “em-
ployee” and “employees” when used in this Contract apply to
journeymen and apprentices. It is recognized and agreed that
the terms and conditions of employment covering Part-Time
mailer employees shall be as set forth in a separate agreement
covering such employees.
(c) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Typographical Union No.
7, a/w the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO,
and its Local 14827 (the Typographical Union) to a lawful
impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the following bargaining units:
The Advertising Employees Unit:
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the
Advertising Department; excluding all other employees, con-
fidential employees, guards, professional and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and those specifically excluded.
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Di-
vision, including supervision, managerial, confidential, and all
other employees, as well as such employees added in the fu-
ture, are excluded from the Advertising Unit. In addition, the
following positions are specifically excluded from the Adver-
tising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer
Secretary to Classified Managers
Advertising Director
Display Advertising Manager
Classified Manager
Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager
Market Research Manager
Retail Manager
Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev.
Classified Operations Manager
Database Marketing Manager
Production Services Supervisor
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr.
Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager
Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 21
Sales Manager—Automotive
Production Services Manager
Sales Manager—Real Estate
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Online
Sales Manager—Retail (Territories)
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Classified
Sales Manager—New Business Dev.
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—National
Sales Manager—Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director
Sales Manager—Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager
Sales Supervisor—Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager
Sales Manager—Digital/Direct
Classified Automotive Sales Manager
Production Services Manager
Quality Control Specialist
The Finance Employees Unit:
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the
Financial Department; excluding all other employees, confi-
dential employees, guards, professional and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act. The following are recognized as being confi-
dential or supervisory employees excluded from the coverage
of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller, Office
Manager and their confidential secretaries, Accounting Man-
ager, Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager, Circulation
Accounting Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor,
and Payroll Supervisor.
(d) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and
Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers a/w the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No. 211
of Allegheny County (the Delivery Union) to a lawful impasse
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees in the following bargaining unit:
The Delivery Unit:
all employees performing the delivery-related work described
in more detail in Section 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent
collective-bargaining agreement between the Delivery Union
and the Newspaper.
(e) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Press-
men’s/Paper Handlers Local Union No. 9N, a/w the Graphic
Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Union) to a
lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the following bargaining unit:
The Pressmen’s Unit:
All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling
pressmen, and apprentice pressmen who work in the Compa-
ny’s pressroom and paperhandling departments.
(f) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the International Union of Operating En-
gineers, AFL–CIO, Local 95 (the Operating Engineers) to a
lawful impasse as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the following bargaining unit:
The Operating Engineers Unit:
all employees employed by [the Respondent] at its facility lo-
cated at 2201 Sweeney Drive, Clinton, P A; but excluding
guards, office clericals, managerial personnel, confidential
personnel, supervisors as defined in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, and all other personnel.29
(g) Rescind the change in terms and conditions of employ-
ment for its unit employees that was unilaterally implemented
on January 1, 2018, when it discontinued paying up to a 5%
annual increase in contribution rates to the Fund for health care
coverage for employees in the above-described units.
(h) Make all annual increases in contributions to the Fund
that it failed to make, including any additional amounts due to
the Fund on behalf of unit employees in the manner set forth in
the remedy section of this decision, and continue to make the
annual increase in contributions until the Respondent bargains
with the Unions in good faith to an impasse or to an agreement.
(i) Reimburse unit employees for any expenses resulting
from the failure to pay the annual increases in Fund contribu-
tions up to 5% in the manner set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(j) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.” 30 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices in each language deemed appropriate
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if
the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice in each appropriate language, to all current

29 The parties stipulated that on March 9, 2017, the PG and the Op-
erating Engineers tentatively agreed to change the facility address listed
in the above-unit description and the change will be incorporated into
any successor labor agreement entered into by the PG and the Operat-
ing Engineers.
30 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD22
employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since January 1, 2018.
(k) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 6 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 16, 2018
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change the terms and conditions of
employment of unit employees by discontinuing to pay up to a
5 percent annual increase in contribution rates to the Western
Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund (Fund),
for health care coverage without providing the employees’
collective-bargaining representative notice and an opportunity
to bargain to a lawful impasse.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Newspaper Guild of Pittsburgh a/w
Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, CLC, and its
Local 38061 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of employees in the following unit:
The Editorial Unit:
All employees in the Editorial Department and in all sub-
divisions of the Editorial Department, excluding those em-
ployees provided for in other existing Union Agreements and
all Publishers and Associate Publishers, Publisher and Editor-
in-Chief, Executive Editor, Editor of the Editorial Page, Man-
aging Editor, Deputy Managing Editor, Senior Assistant
Managing Editor, Assistant Managing Editor, City Editor,
Sports Editor, Sunday Editor, Technology Systems Editor,
Business Editor, Night Operations Manager, Seen Editor, As-
sociate Editor of Opinion Pages, Editorial Cartoonist, and
Confidential Secretaries.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and,
on request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Mailers Union No. M-
22, a/w the Printing, Publishing, and Media Workers Sector of
the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO, and its
Local 14842 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of employees in the following unit:
The Mailing Room Unit:
full-time employees described in the most recent collective-
bargaining agreement between the Mailers Union and the
Newspaper as:
All employees covered by this Agreement. The words “em-
ployee” and “employees” when used in this Contract apply to
journeymen and apprentices. It is recognized and agreed that
the terms and conditions of employment covering Part-Time
mailer employees shall be as set forth in a separate agreement
covering such employees.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Typographical Union No.
7, a/w the Communications Workers of America, AFL–CIO,
and its Local 14827 as the exclusive collective-bargaining rep-
resentative of employees in the following units:
The Advertising Employees Unit:
All regular full time and regular part-time employees of the
Advertising Department; excluding all other employees, con-
fidential employees, guards, professional and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and those specifically excluded.
Specifically excluded from the Advertising Unit is:
All employees in the Marketing, Research and Promotion Di-
vision, including supervision, managerial, confidential, and all
other employees, as well as such employees added in the fu-
ture, are excluded from the Advertising Unit. In addition, the
following positions are specifically excluded from the Adver-
tising Unit:
Chief Revenue Officer
Secretary to Classified Managers
Advertising Director
Display Advertising Manager
Classified Manager
Advertising Operations Manager
Classified Real Estate Manager
Market Research Manager
Retail Manager
Classified Recruitment Manager
Mgr. of Training and Sales Dev.
Classified Operations Manager
Database Marketing Manager
Production Services Supervisor
Co-Op and Special Sections Mgr.
Product Design Manager
Classified Call Center Manager
Research Analyst
Online Sales Manager
Sales Manager—Automotive
Production Services Manager
Sales Manager—Real Estate
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Online
PG PUBLISHING CO., INC. D/B/A PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 23
Sales Manager—Retail (Territories)
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—Classified
Sales Manager—New Business Dev.
New Media Bus. Dev. Mgr.—National
Sales Manager—Recruitment
Executive Assistant to Adv, Director
Sales Manager—Major/National
Preprint Distribution Manager
Sales Supervisor—Major/National
Retail Territory Sales Manager
Sales Manager—Digital/Direct
Classified Automotive Sales Manager
Production Services Manager
Quality Control Specialist
The Finance Employees Unit:
All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the
Financial Department; excluding all other employees, confi-
dential employees, guards, professional and supervisors as de-
fined in the Act. The following are recognized as being confi-
dential or supervisory employees excluded from the coverage
of this Agreement: Controller, Assistant Controller, Office
Manager and their confidential secretaries, Accounting Man-
ager, Auditor, Credit Manager, Cashier Manager, Circulation
Accounting Supervisor, Advertising Accounting Supervisor,
and Payroll Supervisor.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Newspaper, Newsprint, Magazine and
Film Delivery Drivers, Helpers and Handlers, a/w the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters and its Local Union No. 211
of Allegheny County as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the following unit:
The Delivery Unit:
all employees performing the delivery-related work described
in more detail in Section 2 (Jurisdiction) of the most recent
collective-bargaining agreement between the Delivery Union
and the Newspaper.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Pittsburgh Newspaper Printing Press-
men’s/Paper Handlers Local Union No. 9N, a/w the Graphic
Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and its Local 24M/9N (the Pressmen’s Union), as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
in the following unit:
The Pressmen’s Unit:
All journeymen pressmen, paperhandlers, paperhandling
pressmen, and apprentice pressmen who work in the Compa-
ny’s pressroom and paperhandling departments
WE WILL, before implementing any changes in wages, hours,
or other terms and conditions of unit employees, notify and, on
request, bargain with the Operating Engineers, AFL–CIO,
Local 95 (the Operating Engineers) as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of employees in the following unit:
The Operating Engineers Unit:
all employees employed by Pittsburgh Post-Gazette at its fa-
cility located at 2201 Sweeney Drive, Clinton, PA; but ex-
cluding guards, office clericals, managerial personnel, confi-
dential personnel, supervisors as defined in the National La-
bor Relations Act, and all other personnel.
WE WILL rescind the unlawful change in terms and condi-
tions of unit employees that was unilaterally implemented on
January 1, 2018, when we discontinued paying up to a 5% an-
nual increase in contributions to the Fund for health care cover-
age for employees in the above-described units.
WE WILL make all annual increases in contributions to the
Fund that we have failed to make, including any additional
amounts due to the Fund on behalf of unit employees in the
manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision and WE
WILL continue to pay the annual increase in contributions until
we bargain with the Unions in good faith to an impasse or to an
agreement.
WE WILL reimburse you for any expenses resulting from our
failure to pay the annual increases in Fund contributions up to 5
percent, including losses incurred as a result of the Fund’s re-
duction in benefits caused by our failure to pay increased annu-
al contributions.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/06–CA–212627 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273–1940.