PAYPAL, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 9, 2020

2020003713 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/256,844 04/18/2014 Max Edward Metral 70481.1285 (P2429US1) 4053
132906 7590 11/09/2020
Haynes & Boone, LLP (70481)
2323 Victory Ave. #700
Dallas, TX 75219
EXAMINER
KERITSIS, DENNIS G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/09/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocketing@haynesboone.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MAX EDWARD METRAL
____________

Appeal 2020-0037131
Application 14/256,844
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, AMEE A. SHAH, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–20, which constitute all the claims pending in
this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed August 30, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed
April 16, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed February 19,
2020) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed May 30, 2019).
Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “PAYPAL, INC.” Appeal
Br. 1.
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We AFFIRM, designating the affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF
REJECTION, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claims relate generally “to online and/or mobile payments
and more particularly to a reputation system for distributed crypto currencies
that may be used in online and/or mobile payments.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 7, and 14 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 7,
reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
7. A method for providing a distributed crypto currency reputation,
comprising:
[a] monitoring, by one or more system provider devices
over a network, a distributed crypto currency blockchain;
[b] detecting, by the one or more system provider devices
over the network, a confirmation of a current crypto currency
transaction in the distributed crypto currency blockchain;
[c] creating, by the one or more system provider devices
based on the detecting of the confirmation of the current crypto
currency transaction, a first amount of reputation markers in a
distributed reputation marker blockchain that is a separate
blockchain from the distributed crypto currency blockchain;
[d] allocating, by the one or more system provider devices
on the distributed reputation marker blockchain to a first payer
reputation marker public address controlled by a payer that is
involved in the current crypto currency transaction with a payee,
the first amount of reputation markers;
[e] monitoring, by the one or more system provider
devices, the distributed reputation market blockchain and
detecting a transfer of at least one of the first amount of
reputation markers from the first payer reputation marker public
address to a first payee reputation marker public address
controlled by the payee;
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[f] receiving, by the one or more system provider devices
over the network, a first request for reputation information for
the payee; and
[g] providing, by the one or more system provider devices
over the network based on receiving the first request, payee
reputation information over the network for the payee that
includes first reputation marker transfer information associated
with the transfer of the at least one of the first amount of
reputation markers on the distributed reputation marker
blockchain from the first payer reputation marker public address
to the first payee reputation marker public address.

REJECTIONS2
1. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.
2. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as failing to
comply with the written description requirement.
3. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as indefinite.
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1–20 as a group. Appeal Br. 9–13; Reply Br.
5–6. We select independent claim 7 as representative. The remaining
claims stand or fall with claim 7. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

2 The Examiner withdrew the rejections of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103. Ans. 3. We acknowledge that the Examiner only indicates that the
rejection of claims 1–17, 19, and 20 is withdrawn (id.), however, we
understand the Examiner’s omission of any reference to the additional
ground addressing dependent claim 18 (see, e.g., Final Act. 20–21) to be
inadvertent, and, as such, harmless error.
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A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and Step
2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54, the
Examiner determines that exemplary independent claim 7 broadly “recite[s]:
‘monitoring ... [a] blockchain [...] detecting a ... transaction [...] creating ...
reputation markers [and] allocating ... reputation marker[s],’” as well as
“‘monitoring ... a transfer [...] receiving ... information [...] providing ...
reputation information.’” Final Act. 7. Under the 2019 Revised Guidelines,
the Examiner appears to characterize claim 7 as falling under the category of
“[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” and more specifically
“fundamental economic principles or practices . . . commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; . . . sales activities or behaviors; business relations).” 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The Examiner also determines that
the claims do not include additional elements, considered individually and as
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an ordered combination, sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
abstract idea itself. Final Act. 7–9; see also Ans. 7–8.
In response, Appellant asserts that independent claim 7 is not directed
to an abstract idea. Appeal Br. 9–10; Reply Br. 5. Instead, Appellant argues
“that characterizing the tracking of the reputation of payers and payees
performing crypto currency transactions on a distributed crypto currency
blockchain via the use of a separate distributed reputation marker blockchain
as a fundamental economic practice is clear error based on current USPTO
guidance.” Reply Br. 5.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that
independent claim 7 is directed to an abstract idea. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks
whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant
technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it
is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that the claims
focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or
a technical field.
In making this determination, we note that the Specification is entitled
“DISTRIBUTED CRYPTO CURRENCY REPUTATION SYSTEM,” and
states that the disclosure “relates to online and/or mobile payments and more
particularly to a reputation system for distributed crypto currencies that may
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be used in online and/or mobile payments.” Spec. ¶ 1. According to the
Specification, in conventional payment transactions “transaction risk
associated with the transaction is typically borne by the payee in the form of
‘chargebacks’ by the account provider or payment service provider (i.e., a
reversal of a fund transfer from the payer account to the payee account).”
Id. ¶ 3. In distributed crypto currency transactions, however, “once a
transfer has been made from a payer to a payee, there is no way to reverse
that transfer unless the payee decides to transfer the crypto currency back to
the payer in a new transaction,” and as such, the transaction risk is placed on
the payer. Id. ¶ 4. In this scenario, “if the payee does not deliver on a
promise of goods or services, or such goods or services are deficient, the
payer may have no recourse if the payee will not agree to provide a refund.”
Id.
The claimed invention is intended to improve distributed crypto
currency systems by “allow[ing] the payer and/or payee to quantify their
experience with the other in the crypto currency transaction” by allocating
reputation markers which are received as a part of the crypto currency
transaction. Id. ¶ 18. Subsequently,
[w]hen another user of the distributed crypto currency system is
then considering a transaction with the payer or the payee, that
user may request reputation information for the payer or payee,
and the system may provide information that is associated with
the transfer of reputation markers between the payer and the
payee based on the detected crypto currency transaction (as well
as other transfers of reputation markers to that payer or payee as
a result of previous transactions).
Id.
Consistent with this disclosure, independent claim 7 recites “[a]
method for providing a distributed crypto currency reputation” including
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steps for: (1) monitoring information, i.e., “monitoring . . . a distributed
crypto currency blockchain” (step [a]); (2) detecting information, i.e.,
“detecting . . . a current crypto currency transaction in the distributed crypto
currency blockchain” (step [b]); (3) upon detecting some information,
creating “a first amount of reputation markers,” i.e., after detecting the
transaction, “creating . . . a first amount of reputation markers . . . that is a
separate blockchain from the distributed crypto currency blockchain” (step
[c]); (4) allocating the reputation markers to a payer, i.e., “allocating . . . to a
first payer reputation marker public address controlled by a payer . . . in the
current crypto currency transaction with a payee, the first amount of
reputation markers” (step [d]); (5) monitoring and detecting a transfer of the
reputation markers from the payer to the payee, i.e., “monitoring . . . the
distributed reputation market blockchain and detecting a transfer of at least
one of the first amount of reputation markers from the first payer reputation
marker public address to a first payee reputation marker public address
controlled by the payee” (step [e]); (6) receiving a request for information,
i.e., “receiving . . . a first request for reputation information for the payee”
(step [f]); and (7) providing information, i.e., “providing . . . payee
reputation information . . . for the payee” (step [g]). In other words, claim 7
recites (1) monitoring and detecting information (i.e., a distributed crypto
currency blockchain and confirmation of a current crypto currency
transaction); (2) based on detecting a transaction, creating and allocating
reputation markers to a payer; (3) monitoring and detecting information (i.e.,
a distributed reputation market blockchain and transfer of reputation
markers); (4) receiving a request; and (5) providing information (i.e.,
reputation marker transfer information).
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When considered collectively and under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, the limitations of claim 7 recite a method for monitoring and
tracking the reputation of payers and payees performing crypto currency
transactions. Although our characterization of exemplary claim 7 may differ
from the Examiner’s, we nevertheless agree with the Examiner’s
determination that claim 7 recites a certain method of organizing human
activity in the form of a fundamental economic practice. 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
We also note that the present claims are similar to certain
“unpatentable mental processes” that our reviewing courts have found patent
ineligible, such as “steps [that] can be performed in the human mind, or by a
human using a pen and paper” in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and “using an electronic
device to obtain clinical trial data that would otherwise be collected by pen-
and-paper diary, and analyzing the data to decide whether to prompt action”
in eResearchTechnology, Inc. v. CRF, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 463, 473 (W.D.
Pa. 2016), aff’d, 681 F. App’x 964 (mem) (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2015));
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Mortg. Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that computer-implemented method for “anonymous loan
shopping” was an abstract idea because it could be “performed by humans
without a computer”).
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We disagree with Appellant’s argument that independent claim 7
cannot be considered to be a patent ineligible mental process
because the operations (e.g., at least “monitoring a distributed
crypto currency blockchain” and “monitoring the distributed
reputation marker blockchain and detecting a transfer of at least
one of the first amount of reputation markers on the distributed
reputation marker blockchain from the first payer reputation
marker public address to a first payee reputation marker public
address”) cannot be practically performed in the human mind.
Appeal Br. 9. The difficulty with that argument is that, as discussed in detail
below, the only interconnection or interaction required by claim 7 is
monitoring, detecting, creating, allocating, monitoring, detecting, receiving,
and providing data between generic computer devices over a network Cf.
Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still
found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via
pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”).
Accordingly, we conclude independent claim 7 recites an abstract idea
that may be characterized as a “[c]ertain method[] of organizing human
activity— . . . commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the
form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities
or behaviors; business relations)” and, in the alternative, a “[m]ental
process[]—concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” 2019 Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Having concluded that claim 7 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to the Step 2A, Prong Two of the 2019 Revised
Guidance and determine whether the claim integrates the recited judicial
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exception into a practical application of the judicial exception. We look to
see if, for example, any additional elements of the claim (i) reflect an
improvement in the functioning of a computer or to another technological
field, (ii) implement the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine, (iii) effect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing, or (iv) use the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP §§ 2106.04(d).
Here, the only additional elements recited in independent claim 7
beyond the abstract idea are “one or more system provider devices” that
perform the claimed steps over a “network.” However, these additional
elements are described generically as “one or more general purpose or
specific purpose computers and/or computer systems, networked and/or
otherwise” in the Specification. Spec. ¶ 69; see also id. ¶¶ 52 (“[T]he
network 810 may include the Internet and/or one or more intranets, landline
networks, wireless networks, and/or other appropriate types of networks.”),
53 (“The payer devices 802, user devices 803, payee devices 804, payment
service provider device 806, and/or system provider devices 808 may each
include one or more processors, memories, and other appropriate
components for executing instructions.”). We find no indication in the
Specification, nor does Appellant direct us to any indication, that the steps
recited in claim 7 invoke any assertedly inventive programming, require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
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functions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation
of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim
patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record that attributes an
improvement in computer technology and/or functionality to the claimed
invention or that otherwise indicates that the claimed invention integrates the
abstract idea into a “practical application,” as that phrase is used in the
2019 Revised Guidance.5
Appellant argues that claim 7 “cannot appropriately be characterized
as simply an abstract idea” because “various elements [of claim 7] integrate
the abstract idea into a practical application of tracking a crypto currency
transaction reputation.” Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 6. Appellant’s argument
is not persuasive.
Here, the focus of independent claim 7 is not on any technological
advancement, but rather on the implementation of the abstract idea, “for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” See Enfish, 822 F.3d at
1336. Appellant argues that the limitations of independent claim 7

5 The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in
describing the considerations that are indicative that an additional element or
combination of elements integrates the judicial exception, e.g., the abstract
idea, into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application, as determined under one or more of these MPEP sections, the
claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception.
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“improv[es] the technical area of distributed blockchain enabled reputation
tracking.” Appeal Br. 12. However, independent claim 7, unlike the claims
found to be non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic technology to perform
the functions of (1) monitoring and detecting information (i.e., a distributed
crypto currency blockchain and confirmation of a current crypto currency
transaction); (2) based on detecting a transaction, creating and allocating
reputation markers to a payer; (3) monitoring and detecting information (i.e.,
a distributed reputation market blockchain and transfer of reputation
markers); (4) receiving a request; and (5) providing information (i.e.,
reputation marker transfer information), and does not recite an improvement
to a particular computer technology. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
As explained in McRO, the “abstract idea exception has been applied
to prevent patenting of claims that abstractly cover results where ‘it matters
not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished.’ [O'Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1853)]; see also Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301.” McRO
stated that therefore, a court must “look to whether the claims in these
patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1314. Here, the invention is claimed at a very high level of
generality without integrating the abstract idea into a practical application at
least because Appellant fails to explain sufficiently why exemplary claim 7
provides an additional element, outside the abstract idea, that improves the
technology or technical field. See, e.g., Appeal Br. 10–11.
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We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 7 “is
analogous to Example 42, claim 1 in the subject matter eligibility examples
provided with the 2019 Revised EG.” Appeal Br. 11; Reply Br. 6.6 In
Example 42, the claimed subject matter was determined to be patent eligible
because, “the additional elements recite a specific improvement over prior
art systems by allowing remote users to share information in real time in a
standardized format regardless of the format in which the information was
input by the user.” Unlike claim 1 of Example 42, independent claim 7 does
not improve the functioning of a device nor is it an improvement to a
technology or technical field, as discussed above. See 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Accordingly, we conclude that the judicial exception in Appellant’s
exemplary claim 7 is not integrated into a practical application.7
Turning to Step 2B of the of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
determine, among other considerations, whether the additional elements (1)
add a specific limitation or combination of limitations that is not well-
understood, routine, and conventional activity in the field, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may be present or (2) simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the

6 Example 42 -- Method for Transmission of Notifications When Medical
Records Are Updated, Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Abstract Ideas,
1–5, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/101_examples_37to42_
20190107.pdf
7 We acknowledge Appellant’s references to a decision by another other
panel of the Board. Appeal Br. 12 (citing Appeal No. 2016-006265 for
Application No. 14/052,397). However, we are not, in any event, bound by
a non-precedential decision of another panel of the Board.
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industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present. See 2019
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As discussed above, there is no indication here that the steps, recited
in independent claim 7, require any specialized computer or inventive
computer components — the Specification indicates just the opposite. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 50–70. Here, the only claim elements in independent claim 7
beyond the abstract idea are “one or more system provider devices,” i.e.,
generic componentry, operating in its routine and ordinary capacity to
monitor, detect, create, allocate, monitor, detect, receive, and provide
information related to the reputation of payers and payees performing crypto
currency transactions. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (gathering,
sending, monitoring, analyzing, selecting, and presenting information does
not transform the abstract process into a patent-eligible invention); Trading
Techs. Int’l, Inc.v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (data
gathering and displaying are well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (determining that there was “no ‘inventive
concept’ that transform[ed] the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and
manipulating XML data into a patent-eligible application of that abstract
idea.”); OIP Techs, 788 F.3d at 1363 (claims reciting, inter alia, sending
messages over a network, gathering statistics, using a computerized system
to automatically determine an estimated outcome, and presenting offers to
potential customers found to merely recite “‘well-understood, routine
conventional activit[ies],’ either by requiring conventional computer
activities or routine data-gathering steps” (alteration in original)).
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Viewed as a whole, independent claim 7 simply recites a series of
limitations instructing how to monitor and track the reputation of payers and
payees performing crypto currency transactions. See Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he claimed sequence of
steps comprises only ‘conventional steps, specified at a high level of
generality,’ which is insufficient to supply an ‘inventive concept.’” (citing
Alice, 573 U.S. at 222)). Here, independent claim 7 does not, for example,
purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect
an improvement in any other technology or technical field, as discussed
above with respect to prong two of Step 2A. Instead, independent claim 7
amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply the
abstract idea using generic computing elements, which, under our
precedents, is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 7, and claims 1–6 and
8–20, which fall with independent claim 7. Because our rationale differs
from the Examiner’s, we designate our affirmance as a new ground of
rejection.
Written Description
Independent claims 1, 7, and 14, and dependent claims 2–6, 8–13,
and 15–20
The Examiner rejected independent claims 1, 7, and 14 because
[c]laims 1, 7, and 14 recite: “receiving a first request for
reputation information for the payee....” According to Fig. 1[,]
Item 110 and corresponding paragraph 0047 of the PGPUB, the
request for reputation information “from any other user of the
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distributed crypto currency reputation system.” The
[S]pecification also disclose[s] a plurality of other entities. See
Figure 8[,] Item[] 802 through Item[] 808. Therefore, the claim
limitation is broader than the [S]pecification as the “first request
for reputation information” does not come from any or all
devices.
Final Act. 9–10; see also Reply Br. 4–5.
Appellant argues that “the present disclosure clearly states that the
request for reputation information may come ‘from any other user of the
distributed crypto currency reputation system.’” Appeal Br. 7–8 (quoting
Spec. ¶ 45).
In response, the Examiner argues that there are a number of devices
disclosed in the Specification, e.g., “User Device(s), Payer Device(s),
System Provider Device(s), and a single Payment Service Provider Device.”
Ans. 5 (citing Fig. 8). In light of this disclosure, the Examiner concludes
“the claims are broader than the [Specification] because the [Specification]
fails to disclose, specifically, that a ‘System Provider Device’ may receive
the claimed request from other System Provider Device.” Ans. 5 (citing
Spec. ¶ 45). However, the Examiner does not persuade us that more is
needed to show possession of the invention as claimed.
To satisfy this requirement, the specification must describe the
invention in sufficient detail so “that one skilled in the art can clearly
conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing
date sought.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1019 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“‘[I]t is
unnecessary to spell out every detail of the invention in the specification;
only enough must be included to convince a person of skill in the art that the
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inventor possessed the invention.’ LizardTech[, Inc. v. Earth Resource
Mapping, Inc.], 424 F.3d [1336,] 1345 [(Fed. Cir. 2005)].”).
Here, we agree with Appellant that “the receipt of a request for
reputation information that is recited by the claims may come from a device
controlled by any user of the system (including a user that would simply like
to determine a reputation) while being supported by the present disclosure.”
Appeal Br. 7–8; see also Reply Br. 5. Thus, we agree with Appellant that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably understand from the
Specification, as originally filed, that Appellant was in possession of the
claimed invention, including the step of “receiving, by the one or more
system provider devices over the network, a first request for reputation
information for the payee,” as recited in limitation [f] of independent claim
7, and similarly recited in independent claims 1 and 14, at the time the
application was filed.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20,
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
Indefiniteness
Independent claims 1, 7, and 14, and dependent claims 2–6, 8–13,
and 15–20
The Examiner rejected independent claims 1, 7, and 14 because
independent claims 1, 7, and 14
recite: “creating...a first amount of reputation markers in a
distributed reputation marker blockchain that is a separate
blockchain from the distributed c[r]yptocurrency blockchain....”
The language of “that is a separate blockchain” is duplicative.
The language in the claim uses, correctly, antecedent markers
(“a” and “the”) to indicate two separate and distinct blockchains
(e.g. (i) a distributed reputation marker blockchain in the 3rd
limitation and (ii) a distributed crypto currency blockchain in the
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1st limitation). The duplicative language renders the claim
unclear because it is unclear what further limitation is to be
imposed by “that is a separate blockchain.” See In re Zletz, 893
F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Final Act. 11 (emphasis added).
In response, Appellant acknowledges the “duplicative” language
identified by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant points out that the
language was included to ensure that the blockchains were characterized as
being separate and “agrees to remove such language from the claims to
obviate this rejection going forward.” Id.
Accordingly, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
The Examiner additionally rejects claims 1–6 and 14–20 under
§ 112(b) on the ground that claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 14, 15, and 17–20 are hybrid
claims. According to the Examiner, these claims are indefinite because
claims 1–6 and 14–20 are directed to a system and product, but also recite
method steps. Final Act. 11–12; Ans. 6.
In response, Appellant argues that “each of these claims simply
operates to provide additional details about the recited addresses,” and, thus,
“it is clear that infringement occurs when the claim functionality occurs in
association with payers or payees that satisfy that criteria, and does not fall
within multiple statutory classes.” Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 5. We
agree with Appellant.
Although claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 14, 15, and 17–20 admittedly include
functional language, the inclusion of functional language does not in and of
itself convert claims 1–6, which are system claims, and claims 14–20, which
are product claims, into methods of use or hybrid claims.
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Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1–6
and 14–20 under § 112(b) on this additional basis.
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20 1–20
1–20 112(a) Written
Description
1–20
1–20 112(b) Indefiniteness 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20 1–20
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant to
this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the
following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid
termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the
claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both,
and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the
proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under
§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The request for rehearing must
address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points
believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new
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ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is
sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in MPEP § 1214.01.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED; NEW GROUND 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)