01A42760_r
06-14-2004
Patricia Norris, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.
Patricia Norris v. United States Postal Service
01A42760
June 14, 2004
.
Patricia Norris,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A42760
Agency No. 1G-761-0092-03
Hearing No. 360-2003-8363X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �
1614.405.
The record reveals that complainant, a Part-Time Flexible Clerk at the
agency's Lubbock, Texas facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on February
20, 2003, alleging that the agency discriminated against her on the bases
of race/color (African-American), national origin (African-American),
sex (female), age (born July 25, 1952), and in reprisal for prior EEO
activity (arising under Title VII and the ADEA) when:
(1) On February 12- 14, 2003, the agency failed to provide complainant
with additional hours of work;
On February 15, 2003, complainant was denied a work opportunity although
the agency allowed casual and transitional employees to work instead,
ostensibly to keep full-time flexible employees from being converted
to full-time regular status; and
On April 5, 2003, the agency directed complainant and other full-time
flexible employees to work seven days a week without a scheduled day off.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the
investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no
discrimination.
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses on
whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when, as here, the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
See Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May
31, 1990). In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant
has established a prima facie case to whether s/he has demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
In this matter, the agency responded that its policy is to make sure
that part-time flexibles are not scheduled in a manner that leads to
the conversion of their position into a full-time regular position,
which meant complainant and other part-time flexible workers could not
work the same number of additional hours as casual and transitional
employees. Regarding claim 2, the agency responded that it did not
schedule complainant to work on February 15, 2003 because that was her
scheduled day off, and there was no contractual obligation to place a
part-time flexible worker to work on that day. The agency noted that
during the week of February 2003, complainant worked the most hours of
any part-time flexible clerk. Regarding claim 3, the agency responded
that because it was having problems covering the staffing for in-bound
operations, it made the decision to schedule part-time flexibles for
seven-day work weeks for a limited time. We find that complainant has
failed to persuasively rebut these legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
as pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's
final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
_June 14, 2004_________________
Date