Pacific Coast Supply, LLC d/b/a Anderson Lumber Company

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 19, 2013

20-CA-086308 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 19, 2013)

JD(SF)– 28–13
State of California
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES, SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
PACIFIC COAST SUPPLY, LLC d/b/a
ANDERSON LUMBER COMPANY
and Case 20-CA-086308
CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, AND HELPERS
LOCAL 150, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS
Elvira T. Pereda, Esq. and Matthew C. Peterson, Esq.
for the Acting General Counsel
Costa Kerestenzis, Esq., for the Charging Party
Stephen Thomas Davenport, Esq., for the Respondent
DECISION
Mary Miller Cracraft, Administrative Law Judge: On July 20, 2012, Pacific Coast Supply,
LLC d/b/a Anderson Lumber Company (Respondent) withdrew recognition from Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, and Helpers Local 150, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the Union). The
issue in this case1 is whether the withdrawal of recognition was lawful pursuant to Levitz
Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717 (2001)(employer may unilaterally withdraw
recognition only if it can demonstrate that “the union has actually lost the support of the majority
of the bargaining unit employees.”)
The parties’ collective-bargaining agreement expired shortly before withdrawal of
recognition. There is no claim that supervisory involvement tainted the signatures nor are there
any contemporaneous, unremedied unfair labor practices at issue. The parties agree that all
signatures are authentic and that the unit consisted of fifteen employees at the time of
withdrawal of recognition. The parties’ dispute is whether the eight statements of disaffection
indicated that these eight employees no longer desired Union representation.
I find that four of the eight statements relied upon by Respondent do not reflect that
those employees no longer wish to be represented by the Union. Thus, I find that withdrawal of
recognition was not based upon proof that the Union had actually lost the support of a majority
of unit employees. Accordingly, I find that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act in withdrawing recognition from the Union.

1 The unfair labor practice charge was filed on July 27, 2012, and complaint was issued on
January 31, 2013.
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Hearing was held in Sacramento, California on April 16, 2013. On the entire record,
including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,2 and after considering the briefs
filed by counsel for the Acting General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent, I make the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Findings of Fact
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
Respondent is a California corporation in the business of supplying lumber to home
builders. It has an office and place of business in North Highlands, California. Respondent
admits and I find that it meets the interstate commerce criteria for direct inflow and further
admits and I find that it is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act).3
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Respondent further admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization with the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Since the late 1960s, the Union has been the exclusive representative of
employees of Respondent within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act in a unit
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act.
The parties have had a collective-bargaining relationship since the late 1960s with
successive contracts throughout the years. The most recent contract, in effect from April 1, 2011
to February 28, 20124 covers saw tail off employees (who stack materials from the saw, operate
forklifts and perform yard work), material handlers, sawyers, and drivers. The parties agree and
I find that this unit is appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act. The parties further agree and I find that the Union has been the
exclusive representative of these employees within the meaning of Section 9(a) since the late
1960s.
4. Upon expiration of the most recent collective-bargaining agreement on February
28 and after an initial bargaining session on March 27, Respondent withdrew
recognition of the Union on July 20.
Upon expiration of the most recent agreement, the parties began bargaining for a
successor agreement with their first negotiating session held on March 27. The next session
was scheduled for July 30. On July 20, Mark Ingram, Respondent’s Labor Consultant, an
admitted agent of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, who was

2 Credibility resolutions have been made based upon a review of the entire record and all
exhibits in this proceeding. Witness demeanor and inherent probability of the testimony have
been utilized to assess credibility. Testimony contrary to my findings has been discredited on
some occasions because it was in conflict with credited testimony or documents or because it
was inherently incredible and unworthy of belief.
3 29 U.S.C. Sec. 152(2), (6), and (7).
4 All dates are in 2012 unless otherwise referenced.
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authorized to communicate on Respondent’s behalf regarding withdrawal of recognition, spoke
by telephone with Michael C. Tobin, Business Agent of the Union and the assigned
representative of the unit employees of Respondent. Ingram told Tobin that Respondent did not
think that the Union had majority support. Tobin responded, “Where’s your proof.” Ingram said
he would send it to Tobin.
5. Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition was based solely upon statements signed
by eight of its fifteen bargaining unit employees.
At the time of this July 20 conversation, the parties stipulated and I find that there were
fifteen bargaining unit employees, as follows: Jorge Alvarado, Donald Davis, Vital Estacio, Jorge
Garcia, Luis Gonzalez, Craig Hartog, Miguel Hernandez, Don Hogg, Ricky Otto, Mario Ramos
Pompa, Richard Remner, Mark Rocha, Ralph Schow, Sandeep Singh, and Terry Tillis.
After the phone conversation, Ingram sent an e-mail to Tobin around 5 pm stating in
relevant part,
Following up on our conversation this morning, attached for your review are eight
(8) individual statements from bargaining unit employees working at
[Respondent]. As you can see, a majority of the employees have told
[Respondent] they no longer wish to be represented by [the Union].
While we’ve enjoyed a good working relationship over the years, both the Union
and [Respondent] have an obligation to respect the employees’ choice in this
regard. Accordingly, [Respondent] must now withdraw recognition for [the Union].
As we discussed, under the circumstances, it would not be appropriate for the
parties to continue in collective bargaining negotiations.
After receiving this e-mail,5 Tobin called Ingram and told him he disputed that the eight
statements showed the employees no longer wanted the Union and the Union would be filing an
unfair labor practice charge. The parties have not engaged in further bargaining. In withdrawing
recognition, the Respondent relied only on these eight statements.
The signed and dated statements of the 8 employees are as follows:6
 Chris if it is all possible I Donald Davis would like to exit the union. This is due to the
union not doing any services for the cost that they are charging. (July 16)
 My name is Jorge Garcia and I am a load/bldr at [Respondent] and do not wish to be a
part of the Union now or in the future. (July 16)
 My name is Luis Gonzalez am working for [Respondent] in the production area
Load/bldr. I do not wish to be part of the union. Thank you. (July 16)
 Hi my name is Craig Hartag. I am employed with [Respondent]. I no longer wish to be a
part of [the Union]. (July 12)

5 Although Tobin could not access the attached employee statements, they were later faxed
to him by Ingram.
6 The 8 employee statements are written in English although 5 of the 8 employees testified
in Spanish and stated that they spoke and wrote only a little English. Some of the non-English
speaking employees had assistance from a co-worker who drafted the statement in English for
them and translated it into Spanish for them.
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 I resign from [the Union]. Miguel Hernandez. (July 19)
 I Mario Ramos [Pompa]7 am working at [Respondent]. I do not wish to be part of the
Union. (July 16)
 I Mark A. Rocha do not wish to be a Union member. (July 17)
 I Sandeep Singh employee of [Respondent] wish to get out of the Union. (July 17)
There is no dispute that the signatures of these individuals are authentic.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. An employer may unilaterally withdraw recognition only on a showing that the
union has in fact lost the support of a majority of employees
The foundation for exclusive bargaining representative status is majority support of unit
employees. Auciello Iron Works v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 786 (1996). In order to foster industrial
peace and stability in bargaining relationships as well as employee free choice, the Board
presumes that an incumbent union retains its majority status. Id. 785-786. This presumption is
irrebutable during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement not to exceed three years.
Trailmobile Trailer, LLC, 343 NLRB 95, 97-98 (2004). At the expiration of a collective-bargaining
agreement, the presumption becomes rebuttable. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494
U.S. 775, 778 (1990). Withdrawal of recognition in this case occurred after the most recent
contract expired; thus, the presumption of majority status was rebuttable.
In Levitz, the Board overruled Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 664, 671-673 (1951)(employer
may withdraw recognition from incumbent union on basis of reasonable good-faith doubt as
clarified in Allentown Mack8 to a “genuine, reasonable uncertainty”) and held that “an employer
may rebut the continuing presumption of an incumbent union’s majority status, and unilaterally
withdraw recognition, only on a showing that the union has, in fact, lost the support of a majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit.” Levitz, supra, 333 NLRB at 725. Because the
presumption of continued majority status is based on important principles underlying the Act,
those of fostering industrial stability as well as employee rights to designate their collective-
bargaining representative, the Board noted, id., that the evidence of loss of majority must be
objective and that the employer acts at its peril by withdrawing unilaterally:
We emphasize that an employer with objective evidence that the union has lost
majority support – for example, a petition signed by a majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit – withdraws recognition at its peril. If the union contests the
withdrawal of recognition in an unfair labor practice proceeding the employer will
have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the union has, in fact, lost
majority support at the time the employer withdrew recognition.
In rejecting the lower Celanese standard (genuine reasonable uncertainty) and adopting
the more stringent Levitz Furniture standard of actual loss of majority, the Board relied heavily
on its parallel holding that when in doubt, an employer may forego unilateral action and resolve
the issue in a representation proceeding based on a lower “uncertainty” standard. Id. at 727.
Respondent relied on statements from eight employees in a unit of fifteen employees. It

7 The parties stipulated that employee Mario Ramos Pampa wrote this statement which is
signed “Mario Ramos.”
8 Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 367 (1998).
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is undisputed that the remaining seven unit employees would not constitute majority support for
the Union. There is no evidence of supervisory taint on the record nor is there any evidence of
contemporaneous, unremedied unfair labor practices.
2. Respondent has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Union
lost the support of a majority of employees.
It remains for consideration whether the eight statements satisfy Respondent’s burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that a majority of employees no longer supported the
Union. In order to sustain the preponderance of the evidence burden, an employer must show
that it relied upon a “reasonable interpretation” of the language utilized to prove loss of majority
support. Wurtland Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, 351 NLRB 817 (2007). In other words, as
the Board explained, id., the language need not be unambiguous.
[T]he preponderance-of-the-evidence standard “simply requires the trier of fact to
believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.”
The extent to which specific evidence is ambiguous is merely a factor to be
considered in determining whether the employer has met the preponderance
standard. Here, the majority of the employees signed the petition [stating they
desired “a vote to remove the union”], and, as explained above, we conclude that
the more reasonable interpretation of the petition language is that the signatory
employees rejected union representation. Accordingly, it is more probable than
not that the employees rejected union representation.
a. Four of the eight statements of disaffection clearly indicate that these four
employees desired to withdraw from Union membership.
I find that four of the statements, those of Davis (I would like to exit the union),
Hernandez (I resign from the Union), Rocha (I do not wish to be a Union member), and Singh (I
wish to get out of the Union), clearly state a desire to withdraw from membership in the Union.
They are not in the least ambiguous.
b. Statements of a desire to withdraw from union membership may not be relied
upon to withdraw recognition.
Statements of desire to terminate union membership do not support withdrawal of
recognition. Termination of membership in a union means only that an employee does not wish
to pay dues to the union. It does not mean that the employee no longer wishes the union to
represent employees. Thus, the statements of Davis, Hernandez, Rocha, and Singh are an
insufficient basis to support unilateral withdrawal of recognition. DaNite Sign Co., 356 NLRB No.
124 (2011);9 Crete Cold Storage, LLC, 354 NLRB 1000 fn. 2 (2009)(determination of majority

9 The Board adopted Administrative Law Judge Amchan’s decision which stated: The Board
has held for over 40 years that “there is no necessary correlation between membership and the
number of union supporters since no one could know how many employees who favor union
bargaining do not become or remain members thereof,” Terrell Machine Co., 173 NLRB 1480,
1481 (1969), [enfd. 427 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1970)]. The reasons as to why there is no such
correlation was explained by Administrative Law Judge Fannie Boyls (then called a trial
examiner) in Gulfmont Hotel Co., 147 NLRB 997 (1964), enfd. 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966), at
pp. 1000–1001: Employees for various reasons unconnected with their desire to have a union
represent them, may fail to execute check off authorizations. There may be some who prefer, as
Continued
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support turns on whether a majority of unit employees wish to be represented by a particular
union, not on whether a majority choose to become members of the union).10 See also, Narricot
Industries, supra, 353 NLRB at 776 (decreased union membership does not constitute objective
proof of a union’s loss of majority support).
Respondent argues that these cases are inapplicable in California, a non-right-to-work
state, because Respondent operated as a closed shop.11 Thus, Respondent claims an
employee’s resignation from the Union under closed shop circumstances in which Union
membership is a condition of continued employment can only mean that the employee no longer
desires to be represented by the Union. I reject this argument as it rests on a misapprehension
of the law. Closed shops are prohibited by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Union shop or agency
shop provisions are common in both right-to-work and non-right-to-work states. However, these
provisions do not compel full union membership. Rather, membership as a condition of
employment is whittled down to its financial core. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734,
742 (1963).
c. Were it necessary to determine the meaning of the four remaining statements, I
would find they support withdrawal of recognition.
It is unnecessary to determine whether the remaining four statements are clear or
ambiguous and, if ambiguous, whether it is more probable than not that they reflect an intention
to no longer be represented by the Union. Were it necessary to consider these statements –
those of Garcia (I do not wish to be a part of the Union), Gonzalez (I do not wish to be a part of
the union), Hartag (I no longer wish to be a part of [the Union], and Pompa (I do not wish to be a
part of the Union) -- I would find they are ambiguous and further find that the more reasonable
understanding of these statements is that these four employees no longer desired to be
represented by the Union.
My finding regarding the Garcia, Gonzalez, Hartag, and Pompa statements is based not
only on the reasonable meaning of the words used but also on a pre-Levitz decision. In Green
Oak Manor, 215 NLRB 658 (1974), the employer relied on oral statements from a majority of
unit employees that they did not want the union or did not want any part of the union. The Board
adopted the administrative law judge’s conclusion, id. at 663-664, that these statements meant
that employees were dissatisfied with the union’s representation and no longer desired the
union to represent them.
_________________________
a matter of principle, to pay their financial obligations in person; there may be others who prefer
to decide when and if they can afford to spare the money for dues and fees; and there may
even be some who are willing to vote for and accept union representation but who decide to be
free riders and enjoy the expected benefits of representation without paying for them at all.
Accordingly, although the voluntary signing of check off authorization by a majority in the unit
may be considered as evidence of a union’s majority status, the converse is not true. . . .
10 The Board cited Trans-Lux Midwest Corp.,335 NLRB 230, 232 (2001), enfd. mem 53 Fed.
Appx. 571 (D.C. Cir. 2002); TLC St. Petersburg, Inc., 307 NLRB 605 (1992), enfd. 985 F.2d 579
(11th Cir. 1993); see also, generally, Narricot Industries, 353 NLRB 775, 776 (2009), enfd. 587
F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 131 S.Ct. 59 (2010).
11 Respondent cites Terrell Machine Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir. 1970), in
support of this argument. However, I do not find that Terrell supports the argument. It merely
notes that in a right to work state, evidence of union membership is entitled to little or no weight
as evidence of employee disaffection because many employees in these states are content to
reap the benefits of the union’s representation without paying union dues.
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d. Respondent has failed to rebut the presumption of majority support.
Four of the eight employee statements of disaffection indicated a desire to withdraw from
membership in the Union. These statements do not indicate that those four employees no
longer desired Union representation. Those four employees plus the seven remaining
employees who did not submit statements of disaffection (11 in total) constitute a majority of the
15-employee unit – a clear majority -- who continue to support the Union. Thus, Respondent
has failed to rebut the Union’s continuing presumption of majority support.
3. By withdrawing recognition from the Union without proof of loss of majority
support, Respondent has failed to rebut the presumption of continuing majority
status and has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
Respondent withdrew recognition after its most recent collective-bargaining agreement
expired and thus at a time when the presumption of majority status was rebuttable. Respondent
relied on eight statements of disaffection. Four of the statements indicated a desire to terminate
membership in the Union. Those four statements could not be relied upon to withdraw
recognition and thus the presumption of continuing majority has not been rebutted. Evidence of
a desire to withdraw from membership in a union is insufficient to satisfy the Levitz requirement
of proof that the Union has in fact lost the support of a majority of the unit. Thus, by unilaterally
withdrawing recognition from the Union without proof that the Union had in fact lost majority
support, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. This unfair labor practice
affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent’s post-withdrawal, subjective evidence is irrelevant
Respondent argued at the hearing and on brief that subjective, after-acquired evidence
is relevant to the question of whether a majority of unit employees supported the Union. In
disagreement, I find the evidence irrelevant not only because the Levitz standard is objective
and Respondent’s proffered evidence was subjective, but also because Levitz requires that
Respondent have objective evidence of loss of majority status at the time it withdraws
recognition – not later.
Respondent avers that in January 2013, it learned that when the eight employees were
asked the question “When you wrote [your statement], did you mean you wanted to be
represented by the Union or you did not want to be represented by the Union for purposes of
collective bargaining?” the employees uniformly meant that they did not want to be represented
by the Union for purposes of collective bargaining.12
General Counsel strenuously objected to introduction of this subjective, after-acquired
evidence. I sustained these objections and thereafter rejected the Respondent’s question and
answer offers of proof on this issue because the evidence was subjective and because it post-
dated the withdrawal of recognition and therefore Respondent was not aware of this evidence at
the time it withdrew recognition.
Moreover, given the leading format of the offer of proof question that elicited these

12 Respondent produced acknowledgements signed by the eight employees regarding their
Johnnie’s Poultry rights. See Johnnie’s Poultry, 146 NLRB 770, 774, 775 (1964), enforcement
denied, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965)(setting out safeguards for pre-trial employee questioning).
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subjective revelations, “When you wrote [your statement], did you mean you wanted to be
represented by the Union or you did not want to be represented by the Union for purposes of
collective bargaining?,” I would be unwilling to accord the responses much weight even were
there no objection to the questions. In any event, during the offer of proof each of the eight
employees stated that what they meant was that they did not wish to be represented by the
Union for purposes of collective bargaining.
Similarly, after withdrawing recognition, Respondent learned that five unit employees of,
at that time, twelve total unit employees signed an attendance sheet at a March 22, 2013 Union
meeting to discuss Respondent’s bargaining proposals. Not only does this after-acquired
evidence not tend to support Respondent’s position,13 it also fails to rise to the level of objective
proof necessary under Levitz. In any event, this evidence was acquired long after withdrawal of
recognition, was not relied on by Respondent in withdrawing recognition, and is not relevant for
that reason.14
In Highlands Regional Medical Center, 347 NLRB 1404, 1407 fn. 17 (2006), enfd. 508
F.3d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the Board stated,
We need not address the sufficiency of the hearing testimony regarding
employees’ bare recollections of their sentiments for or against union
representation as of April 12, because this evidence was not before the
Respondent when it withdrew recognition. As the judge explained, Levitz makes
clear that an employer may withdraw recognition from a union that represents its
employees only when it acts on objective evidence showing that the union lacks
the support of a majority of bargaining-unit members. Levitz, 333 NLRB at 723-
726. Accordingly, the judge correctly deemed the foregoing employee testimony
[of recollections of their sentiments] irrelevant.
In agreement, the court stated,
Levitz places the burden on [respondent] to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that on April 12, the day the collective bargaining agreement expired
[and the date recognition was withdrawn], the union “had, in fact, lost majority
support. Id. [at 725].
* * * * * * *
[The respondent] insists that it did have additional evidence of loss of
majority support. Specifically, it points to the hearing testimony of thirty-five
nurses, five of whom had declined to sign the petition but later claimed, after the
[May 26] pay raise, to have opposed the union. Both the Board and ALJ,
however, refused to credit this testimony, and for good cause: [respondent] had
no knowledge of that corroborating evidence on the day it withdrew recognition.
On that crucial date, then, besides the committee’s petition, [respondent] had
only unsubstantiated hearsay assertions that other employees opposed the

13 For instance, there is no proof that everyone present actually signed the sheet.
Additionally, five of twelve employees attending an informational meeting might be considered
considerable support thus not warranting an inference of lack of majority support.
14 Additionally, Respondent sought to introduce post-withdrawal NLRB affidavits of three of
the eight employees. These statements were rejected as after-acquired.
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union, which “certainly do not establish the fact of . . . disfavor with the degree of
reliability ordinarily demanded in legal proceedings.” [Citations omitted]
Thus, the Board and the court clearly rejected use of after-acquired evidence regarding
employee sentiment. See also, RTP Co., 334 NLRB 466, 469 (2001), enfd. 315 F.3d 951 (8th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 811 (2003)(“In analyzing the adequacy of an employer's
defense to a withdrawal of recognition allegation, the Board will only examine factors ‘actually
relied on’ by the employer. Conduct of which the employer may have been aware, but on which
the employer ‘did not base’ its decision to withdraw recognition from the Union, is of ‘no legal
significance.”’) [citations omitted]. Accordingly, I find that Respondent may not rely on the
evidence it received after withdrawal of recognition – either in NLRB affidavits or at the hearing
herein.
5. Respondent’s claim that it was forced to withdraw recognition or face a claim that
it violated Section 8(a)(2) by continuing to recognize a minority union is
unfounded.
The Board held in Levitz that an employer acts at its peril in withdrawing recognition
based on objective evidence that the union has lost majority support. Due to the presumption of
continuing majority, an employer who cannot meet this burden is not in jeopardy of a finding that
he has rendered unlawful assistance to the union. Levitz, supra, 333 NLRB at 725. The Board
anticipated that by raising the bar for unilateral withdrawal of recognition and lowering the bar
for obtaining an RM election, there would be less temptation to act unilaterally. Id. The Board
rejected the dissent position that the majority holding in Levitz places employers in a “no-win
situation.” The majority stated, id. at 726:
That dilemma, however, is more apparent than real. An employer with evidence
of actual loss of majority status can petition for an RM election rather than
withdraw recognition immediately; we would not find that the employer violated
8(a)(2) by failing to withdraw recognition while the representation proceeding was
pending. [Footnotes omitted]
Thus, Respondent’s argument that it would violate Section 8(a)(2) unless it withdrew recognition
is without merit.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I find that it must be ordered to cease
and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act. Respondent must recognize the Union as the bargaining representative of the
bargaining unit of employees. Although there is no evidence one way or the other as to
continuation of the terms and conditions of employment of the expired collective-bargaining
agreement, if the terms have not been adhered to, then restoration of the status quo ante
requires that Respondent must, upon request of the Union, continue the terms and conditions of
its expired agreement unless and until changed through collective bargaining with the Union.
Respondent must bargain upon request with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and embody any understanding
reached in a signed agreement.
If the terms and conditions of the expired collective-bargaining agreement have not been
adhered to since July 20, 2012, Respondent shall make whole its employees for losses in
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earnings and other benefits which they may have suffered as a result of Respondent’s
repudiation of the collective-bargaining agreement with such losses to be calculated in the
manner set forth in Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1971). Interest on all such sums shall be computed as prescribed in accordance with New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in
Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). Additionally, Respondent shall
reimburse the unit employees for any expenses ensuing from failure to make the required
contributions, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891, 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd.
mem. 661 F2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). Such amounts are to be computed in the manner set forth in
Ogle Protection Service, supra, with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded,
supra, and Kentucky River Medical Center, supra. Further, in accordance with Latino Express,
359 NLRB No. 44 (2012), Respondent must compensate unit employees for any adverse tax
consequences of receiving lump-sum backpay awards and file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay awards to the appropriate calendar quarters for each unit
employee.
Respondent shall post an appropriate informational notice, as described in the attached
appendix. This notice shall be posted in Respondent’s facility or wherever the notices to
employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything covering it up or defacing its
contents. When the notice is issued to Respondent, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 20
of the Board what action it will take with respect to this decision. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by Respondent at any
time since July 20, 2012.
Respondent shall, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due, if any, under the terms of
this Order.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended:15
ORDER
Respondent Pacific Coast Supply, LLC d/b/a Anderson Lumber Company, North
Highlands, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
a. Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the following bargaining unit of its employees as
described in the parties’ most recent collective-bargaining agreement in effect

15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order, as provided in Section 102.48
of the Rules, shall be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived
for all purposes.
JD(SF)– 28–13
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from April 1, 2011 to February 28, 2012: saw tail off employees (who stack
materials from the saw, operate forklifts and perform yard work), material
handlers, sawyers, and drivers.
b. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
Act:
a. Recognize the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
bargaining unit employees described above.
b. Upon request of the Union, adhere to the terms and conditions set out in the
expired collective-bargaining agreement giving effect to its terms retroactive to
July 20, 2012, and continuing those terms and conditions in effect unless and
until changed through collective bargaining with the Union. If no such request is
made by the Union, bargain upon request with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees in the bargaining unit
described above and embody any understanding reached in a signed
Agreement.
c. In the absence of a collective-bargaining agreement, before implementing any
changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees, notify and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of employees in the above descried unit.
d. Make all affected employees whole, with interest, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this Decision and Order for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of Respondent’s repudiation of the collective-
bargaining relationship and compensate them for any adverse tax consequences
of receiving lump sum backpay and file a report with the Social Security
Administration allocating the backpay to the appropriate calendar quarters.
e. Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, make available at a
reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy
of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
f. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in North Highlands,
California, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
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Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
including all places where notices to employees
Reasonable steps shall be taken by
not altered, defaced,
the pendency of these proceedings, Respondent has gone out of
closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all curren
employees employed by Respondent at that facility at any time since July 20,
2012.
g. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with th
Region 20 a sworn certificate of a responsible official on a form prov
Region attesting to the steps that Respondent has taken to comply with the
provision of this Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 19, 2013

JD(SF)
12
are customarily posted.
Respondent to ensure that the notices are
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during
Respondent shall duplicate and
t employees and former
e Regional Director of
____________________
Mary Miller Cracraft
Administrative Law Judge
– 28–13
places,
business or
ided by the
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post, mail, and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local 150,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters by withdrawing recognition from them without proof that they no longer
represent a majority of our cover saw tail off employees (who stack material from the saw, operate forklifts and
perform yard work), material handlers, sawyers, and drivers.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of our
employees with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an agreement is
reached, embody it in a signed document, and WE WILL make employees whole for their losses, if any.
PACIFIC COAST SUPPLY, LLC d/b/a
ANDERSON LUMBER CO.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
901 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, California 94103-1735
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
415-356-5130.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 415-356-5139.