Origamei LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 12, 2020

88010878 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2020)

Mailed: February 12, 2020
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Origamei LLC
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Serial No. 88010878
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Francis John Ciaramella, of Francis John Ciaramella, PLLC for Origamei LLC.

Deborah Meiners, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 110,
Chris A. F. Pedersen, Managing Attorney.
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Before Kuhlke, Wolfson, and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Origamei LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark depicted below for “Foldwear travel clothing consisting of tops, bottoms,
headwear, footwear, belts” in International Class 25.1

1 Application Serial No. 88010878, filed on June 22, 2018, based on an allegation of use of the
mark in commerce pursuant to Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a),
claiming June 6, 2018 as both the date of first use and the date of first use in commerce.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB
Serial No. 88010878
2
The description of the mark reads: “The mark consists of single stroke diamond
shaped logo with several lines vertically giving the impression of [a] folded paper
seashell, with the words ‘ORIGAMEI’ centered underneath and the word
‘FOLDWEAR’ centered underneath ‘ORIGAMEI’ and framed to the left and right
with a single horizontal line.” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. Applicant
disclaims the exclusive right to use “FOLDWEAR” apart from the mark.
The Trademark Examining Attorney refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground of
likelihood of confusion with the marks in Registration Nos. 2893823 and 2978205.
Both marks are owned by Kevin Leong, an individual. The mark in Reg. No. 2893823
is ORIGAMI in stylized form, as illustrated below:

The goods in this registration are “clothing, namely, tee shirts, shirts, sweaters,
pants, hats and menswear apparel, namely, coats, jackets, belts and footwear.”2
The mark in Reg. No. 2978205 is ORIGAMI in typed form.3 The goods in this
registration are “clothing, namely, hats, caps, jackets, tee shirts, shirts, jeans, shorts,

2 Issued October 12, 2004, renewed.
3 A typed mark is the legal equivalent of a standard character mark. In re Viterra, Inc., 671
F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Serial No. 88010878
3
skirts, dresses, scarves, gloves, sweaters, sweatsuits, rainwear, pullovers and
swimsuits.”4
When the refusal was made final, Applicant appealed and requested
reconsideration. After the Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration, the appeal resumed. We affirm the refusal to register.5
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all probative facts
in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood of
confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567
(CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We consider each DuPont factor for which there
is evidence and argument. See In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d
1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019); M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d
1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands,
Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015) (“While we have considered each factor
for which we have evidence, we focus our analysis on those factors we find to be
relevant.”). “[E]ach case must be decided on its own facts and the differences are often
subtle ones.” Indus. Nucleonics Corp. v. Hinde, 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386, 387
(CCPA 1973) (internal citations removed).
For purposes of the DuPont factors that are relevant to this appeal we will

4 Issued July 26, 2005, renewed.
5 The TTABVUE and Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (“TSDR”) citations refer to
the docket and electronic file database for the involved application.
Serial No. 88010878
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consider Applicant’s involved mark and the mark that is the subject of cited
Registration No. 2978205 for the typed form of ORIGAMI. The typed form of
ORIGAMI is more similar to Applicant’s mark than is the stylized form of ORIGAMI,
and the goods recited in both registrations are equally related to those in Applicant’s
application. Thus, if likelihood of confusion is found as to the mark and goods in Reg.
No. 2978205, it is unnecessary to consider the other cited registration. Conversely, if
likelihood of confusion is not found as to the mark and goods in this registration, we
would not find likelihood of confusion as to the mark and goods in the other cited
registration.
A. Relatedness of the Goods
We begin with a discussion of the involved goods. In deciding whether the goods
in Applicant’s application and Registrant’s cited registration are related, we must
look to the goods as they have been identified, “regardless of what the record may
reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant’s [or registrant’s] goods, the
particular channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are
directed.” Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110
USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Hous. Comput.
Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also In re
i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In
reviewing the second factor, ‘we consider the applicant’s goods as set forth in its
application, and the [registrant’s] goods as set forth in its registration.’”) (quoting M2
Software v. M2 Communs., Inc., 78 USPQ2d at 1947.
The goods as identified in the application and cited registration are in-part legally
Serial No. 88010878
5
identical. That is, Applicant’s application includes “headwear” and Registrant’s
registration includes “hats” and “caps,” which goods are encompassed by the term
“headwear.” This overlap is sufficient for a finding that the goods are related. We
need not find any other goods in Applicant’s application to be related to those in the
cited registration. See In re Wacker Neuson SE, 97 USPQ2d 1408, 1409 (TTAB 2010)
(“It is sufficient if likelihood of confusion is established for any item encompassed by
the identification of goods in the application.”) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills Fun Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981)). However,
the remaining goods are highly related. Applicant’s “tops” are legally identical to
Registrant’s “tee shirts” and “shirts,” its “bottoms” are legally identical to Registrant’s
“jeans, shorts, skirts.” The remaining goods are related clothing items. That
Applicant’s goods are described as “foldwear travel clothing” does not differentiate
the goods because Registrant’s goods are broadly described as “clothing,” which can
include clothing designed to be easily folded for transport, such as when travelling.
The second DuPont factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Similarity of Trade Channels and Classes of Purchasers
The third DuPont factor considers “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established,
likely-to-continue trade channels.” DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. It is well established
that in the absence of restrictions in the application and registration, legally identical
goods are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of
purchasers. In re i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1750; see also In re Detroit Athletic
Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The third DuPont
factor -- like the second factor -- must be evaluated with an eye toward the channels
Serial No. 88010878
6
specified in the application and registration, not those as they exist in the real
world.”) Here, neither the application nor the cited registration contain any
restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of customers. As a result, the legally
identical goods are presumed to travel in the same channels of trade and are offered
to the same or overlapping classes of purchasers. The otherwise related clothing items
are presumed to be sold in all normal and usual trade channels for such goods, and
that they are sold to all classes of prospective purchasers for those goods. Stone Lion,
110 USPQ2d at 1161; see also Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d
1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1723 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (absent limitation, “goods are
presumed to travel in all normal channels ... for the relevant goods.”). The ordinary
channels of trade for clothing items include all types of clothing stores, both online
and brick and mortar, including those that specialize in foldwear for travel. Because
the goods are common consumer items sold through similar trade channels, there is
meaningful overlap between the customers of Applicant and Registrant.
Thus, the third DuPont factor also weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of
confusion.
C. Similarity of the Marks
The first DuPont factor requires examination of “the similarity or dissimilarity of
the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial
impression.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En
1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting DuPont, 177
USPQ at 567). Where, as here, the goods are legally identical and otherwise highly
related, the degree of similarity necessary to find likelihood of confusion need not be
Serial No. 88010878
7
as great as where there is a recognizable disparity between the goods. Bridgestone
Ams. Tire Operations LLC v. Fed. Corp., 673 F.3d 1330, 102 USPQ2d 1061, 1064 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Coach Servs., Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1722; Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “The
proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the
marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that
persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between
the parties.” In re i.am.symbolic, 123 USPQ2d at 1748 (quoting Coach Servs., 101
USPQ2d at 1721 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Applicant’s mark is . The cited mark is ORIGAMI. Our comparison of
the marks is determined based on the marks in their entireties. Jack Wolfskin
Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH KGAA v. New Millenium Sports, S.L.U., 707 F.3d
1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (The “touchstone of this factor is
consideration of the marks in total”); see also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co.,
667 F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should
not be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole
in determining likelihood of confusion.”). Nonetheless, “in articulating reasons for
reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing improper in stating
that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular feature
of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in
their entireties.” In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir.
Serial No. 88010878
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1985). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who normally retains
a general rather than a specific impression of trademarks. Joel Gott Wines LLC v.
Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013); L’Oreal S.A. v.
Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012). In this case, because the relevant
goods are clothing, including tops, bottoms, hats, caps, jackets, and tee shirts, the
average purchaser is an ordinary consumer.
It is not improper to focus on the term ORIGAMEI in Applicant’s mark because it
is this term that dominates the overall impression of the mark. Consumers are less
likely to focus on the term “foldwear” because it is displayed in smaller font, and, as
shown by its use in the identification of goods, it is at least merely descriptive for a
type of travel clothing and has been appropriately disclaimed. See Detroit Athletic,
128 USPQ2d at 1050 (Board did not err in giving little weight to non-source
identifying words and focusing on “other, more dominant portions of the marks”); In
re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less
significant or less dominant when comparing marks); Cunningham v. Laser Golf
Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Regarding descriptive
terms, this court has noted that the ‘descriptive component of a mark may be given
little weight in reaching a conclusion on likelihood of confusion.’”) (quoting Nat’l Data
Corp., 224 USPQ at 752). As for the design, consumers are likely to view it merely as
a decorative element. It would not be verbalized by consumers when calling for the
goods. Moreover, the design may be perceived, as Applicant has described it, as a
Serial No. 88010878
9
folded paper seashell, or as a folded fan or other folded object. In light of the abstract
depiction of something folded, the design highlights the nature of the goods as being
foldwear and, as discussed below, the meaning of the mark ORIGAMEI as origami.
For these reasons, the design is less likely to serve a source-originating function. See
In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (when a mark
comprises both words and a design, the words are normally accorded greater weight
because “they are likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, to be
remembered by them, and to be used by them to request the goods”) (citing Viterra,
101 USPQ2d at 1908); see also In re I-Coat Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1736 (TTAB
2018) (“It further is settled that in a mark consisting of wording and a design, the
design tends to make a less significant contribution to the mark’s overall commercial
impression.”); Joel Gott Wines, 107 USPQ2d at 1431.
The initial syllables of the dominant term in Applicant’s mark, and the only term
in Registrant’s mark, i.e., “ori-ga,” are identical in both marks.6 The one-letter
difference in the final syllable, “mei” in Applicant’s mark and “mi” in the cited mark,
is negligible. See In re Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 227 USPQ 483, 485 (TTAB 1985)
(“Considering the similarities between the marks [CAYNA and CANA] in sound and
appearance, and taking into account the normal fallibility of human memory over a
period of time…, we believe that the marks create substantially similar commercial
impressions.”); U.S. Mineral Prods. Co. v. GAF Corp., 197 USPQ 301, 306 (TTAB

6 The Examining Attorney submitted a copy from the online Merriam-Webster dictionary,
showing the breakdown of the term as “ori-ga-mi.” At https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionar/origami, attached to March 4, 2019 Office Action at TSDR 2.
Serial No. 88010878
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1977) (“‘AFCO’ and ‘CAFCO,’ which differ only as to the letter ‘C’ in USM’s mark, are
substantially similar in appearance and sound.”); In re Bear Brand Hosiery Co., 194
USPQ 444, 445 (TTAB 1977) (finding KIKS and KIKI similar).
Moreover, it has long been recognized that there is no correct pronunciation of a
trademark that is not a recognized word in the English language; the “mei” in
Applicant’s mark may be pronounced as “mee,” especially considering that “origami”
is a known term in English, imported from Japanese.7 See, e.g., Trak, Inc. v. Traq
Inc., 212 USPQ 846, 850 (TTAB 1981) (“it is not possible for a trademark owner to
control with certainty how purchasers will vocalize their trademarks”); Viterra, 101
USPQ2d at 1912 (citing Interlego AG v. Abrams/Gentile Entm’t Inc., 63 USPQ2d
1862, 1863 (TTAB 2002) (finding similarity between LEGO and MEGO, despite the
applicant’s contention that consumers would pronounce MEGO as “me go”)). In any
event, consumers are likely to pay less attention to the final “mei” or “mi” in either
mark, focusing on the first two syllables, “ori-ga.” See Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak
Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark
which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”);
Brown Shoe Co. v. Robbins, 90 USPQ2d 1752, 1755 (TTAB 2009) (finding PALOMA
and PALOMITA to be similar; “here the beginning and core elements of the words
are the same”).
The marks are also similar in connotation. The term “origami,” derived from the

7 The dictionary evidence of record defines “origami” as “the Japanese art or process of folding
squares of paper into representational shapes.” March 4, 2019 Office Action at TSDR 2.
Serial No. 88010878
11
Japanese art of folding paper into representational shapes, when used in connection
with clothing, suggests clothing that can be easily folded, especially for travelling. In
connection with apparel such as Applicant’s foldwear, the meaning of the term is
readily apparent, despite the addition of the letter “e” in Applicant’s mark. Given the
strong association with the art of folding that the term “origami” has, and the fact
that the term is viewed in connection with a design that evokes a folded seashell, the
term ORIGAMEI in Applicant’s mark will likely be perceived as simply a misspelling
of “origami.” Accordingly, the marks evoke similar connotations and commercial
impressions.
In short, notwithstanding the design component of Applicant’s mark, which
distinguishes it somewhat visually from the registered mark, we find the sound,
connotation, and overall commercial impression of the two marks considered as a
whole to be highly similar.
The first DuPont factor strongly favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
D. Use of Similar Marks by Third Parties
There is no evidence of any third-party use of similar ORIGAMI marks on similar
goods. However, Applicant submitted copies of five registrations for marks that share
Serial No. 88010878
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the term “-gami” as their final syllable: COREGAMI (two registrations owned by a
single entity), KAMIGAMI, WINDOW ORIGAMI, and .8
Third-party registrations are entitled to little weight on the question of likelihood
of confusion where there is no evidence of actual use, but “they may be given some
weight to show the meaning of a mark in the same way that dictionaries are used.”
Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693, 694-95 (CCPA 1976);
see also Jack Wolfskin, 116 USPQ2d at 1136 (“evidence of third-party registrations is
relevant to ‘show the sense in which a mark is used in ordinary parlance’” (citing
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1675
(Fed. Cir. 2015)).
The only mark that bears enough resemblance to “origami” to be relevant is the
mark WINDOW ORIGAMI; however, that mark is registered for “fabric window
treatments, namely, curtains, valances, and curtain appliques” and therefore does
not impact the cited mark’s significance with respect to clothing. The other marks are
distinguishable by their first portions (i.e., “core-,” “kami-,” and “politeo-”).
Applicant also submitted copies of the file history and registration certificate of

8 Applicant also submitted a copy of Reg. No. 4237325 for the mark ORIGAMI for retail store
services featuring, inter alia, clothing. The registration has now been cancelled. A cancelled
registration is not evidence of anything except that it issued. In re Pedersen, 109 USPQ2d
1185, 1197 (TTAB 2013) (citing Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Krier, 478 F.2d 1246, 1248, 178
USPQ 46, 47 (CCPA 1973) (statutory benefits of registration disappear when the registration
is cancelled).
Serial No. 88010878
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Reg. No. 3875068 for the mark O’RAGEOUS for “beachwear, namely, shorts, tanks,
shirts, swimwear, boardshorts and headwear for men and boys; tees for boys.”9 The
file history shows that the applicant overcame a refusal based on Reg. No. 2547009
for the mark OUTRAGEOUS SPORTS for “clothing, namely shirts.” Applicant also
submitted a copy of the file history and registration for Reg. No. 3890402 for the mark
NOTORIOUS B.I.G. for various types of “sacks and bags,” which mark was ultimately
registered despite an initial refusal due to a registration for the mark NOTORIOUS
for “women’s handbags.”10 Applicant argues that these pairs of co-existing
registrations demonstrate that the USPTO “has consistently allowed applications
similarly situated to the Application to register.”11 Regarding the second pair,
however, one of the registrations has now been cancelled and thus this “pair” does
not support the argument. Regarding the marks in the first pair, not only do they not
bear sufficient resemblance to one another to support the argument, a single pair of
registrations by itself cannot demonstrate USPTO policy to allow similar marks to
co-exist for clothing.
The sixth DuPont factor, the use of similar marks by third parties, is neutral. The
cited mark is entitled to the usual strength accorded a suggestive or arbitrary mark.
E. Sophistication of Consumers
Under the fourth DuPont factor, we consider “[t]he conditions under which and

9 May 7, 2019 Request for Reconsideration, TSDR 79-123.
10 Id. at TSDR 124-46.
11 9 TTABVUE 9.
Serial No. 88010878
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buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.”
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567. Applicant contends that the “buyers of the respective
goods and services will be sophisticated.”12 However, there are no limitations in either
Applicant’s or Registrant’s identification of goods regarding the price at which the
goods are offered or identifying the targeted customers as being sophisticated or
overly discerning. Evidence made of record from Applicant’s website shows that
Applicant’s dresses can be pre-ordered for $80.00.13 Similar dresses from Macy’s
website are sold from around $40-$100.14 Although some range higher, this evidence
shows that Applicant’s goods are relatively average in price, and that travel clothing
includes moderately priced items. For products that are moderately priced, and which
are every-day consumer items, purchasers are held to an ordinary standard of care.
Further, we must base our decision “on the least sophisticated potential
purchasers” at issue. Stone Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1163. Individual consumers of no
special sophistication may have occasion to purchase travel clothing. Even if we were
to assume that all purchasers of travel clothing are sophisticated and careful
purchasers, it is settled that even careful purchasers can be confused as to source
where similar marks are used on related goods. See In re Research Trading Corp.,
793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Carlisle Chemical Works, Inc.
v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d 1403, 168 USPQ 110, 112 (CCPA 1970))

12 9 TTABVUE 7.
13 March 4, 2019 Final Office Action, TSDR 4.
14 Id. at TSDR 10-21.
Serial No. 88010878
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(“Human memories even of discriminating purchasers … are not infallible.”).
This factor favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
F. Actual Confusion
Under the seventh and eighth DuPont factors, i.e., the nature and extent of any
actual confusion and the length of time during and conditions under which there has
been concurrent use without evidence of confusion, Applicant argues that there has
been “no documented evidence that shows that any consumers have confused the
respective marks in commerce.”15
The fact that an applicant in an ex parte case is unaware of any instances of actual
confusion is entitled to little probative weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Majestic Distilling, 65 USPQ2d at 1205; see also In re Bisset-Berman Corp., 476 F.2d
640, 177 USPQ 528, 529 (CCPA 1973) (stating that self-serving testimony of
applicant's corporate president's unawareness of instances of actual confusion was
not conclusive that actual confusion did not exist or that there was no likelihood of
confusion). The Board generally has no way to know whether the registrant likewise
is unaware of any instances of actual confusion, nor is it usually possible to determine
that there has been any significant opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred.
See, e.g., In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1817 (TTAB 2001); In re Jeep Corp.,
222 USPQ 333, 337 (TTAB 1984); In re Barbizon Int’l, Inc., 217 USPQ 735, 737 (TTAB
1983). Moreover, there is no evidence of record relating to the extent of use of
Applicant’s or Registrant’s marks, and thus whether there have been meaningful

15 Applicant’s Brief, 9 TTABVUE 8.
Serial No. 88010878
16
opportunities for actual confusion to have occurred in the marketplace is unknown.
See Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 55 USPQ2d at 1847. Finally, it is not necessary
to show actual confusion in order to establish likelihood of confusion. See Weiss
Assocs. Inc. v. HRL Assocs. Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 223 USPQ 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
This factor is neutral.
G. Extent of any Potential Confusion
Applicant next argues that the twelfth DuPont factor, the extent of potential
confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial, is also a relevant consideration.
According to Applicant, any potential confusion would be de minimis, “especially
given that there have been no present documented cases of actual confusion.”16 We
disagree. We have already noted Applicant’s alleged lack of actual confusion is
entitled to little weight in this ex parte case. Because we have found that (1) the
marks at issue are similar, (2) the parties’ respective goods are legally identical in
part or otherwise related, and (3) the parties’ respective goods are sold in the same or
overlapping trade channels to the same or overlapping consumers, the potential for
confusion cannot be deemed to be de minimis.
Accordingly, this DuPont factor is also neutral.
II. Conclusion
We have considered all of the arguments and evidence of record and all relevant
DuPont factors. We find that the marks at issue are similar and that Applicant’s
foldwear travel clothing and Registrant’s clothing are related goods and that they

16 9 TTABVUE 10.
Serial No. 88010878
17
would move in the same or overlapping trade channels and be offered to the same
class of purchasers. As such, we conclude that Applicant’s mark, as used in connection
with “foldwear travel clothing consisting of tops, bottoms, headwear, footwear, belts,”
so resembles the cited mark ORIGAMI for “clothing, namely, hats, caps, jackets, tee
shirts, shirts, jeans, shorts, skirts, dresses, scarves, gloves, sweaters, sweatsuits,
rainwear, pullovers and swimsuits” as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake, or
to deceive under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark under Section
2(d) of the Trademark Act is affirmed.