Oliver Lei et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 17, 2019

15047236 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 17, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/047,236 02/18/2016 Oliver LEI 83607842 3557
28395 7590 09/17/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
MAHNE, KEVIN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3668
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/17/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte OLIVER LEI and ALLEN R. MURRAY

____________

Appeal 2018-000462
Application 15/047,236
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, DANIEL S. SONG, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
decision rejecting claims 1–20.1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE.

1 Appellant is the Applicant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC, which,
according to the Appeal Brief, is the real party-in-interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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In explaining our Decision, we refer to the Specification filed
February 18, 2016 (“Spec.”), the Final Office Action dated April 18, 2017
(“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed June 30, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer dated August 15, 2017 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief
filed October 16, 2017 (“Reply Br.”).
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to “a method and apparatus for
enhanced telematics security through use of a secondary data channel.”
Spec. ¶ 1. Claims 1, 9, and 15 are independent. Claims 1 and 15,
reproduced below from pages 1 and 3, respectively, of the Claims Appendix
(“Claims App.”) of the Appeal Brief, are illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
wirelessly receive a vehicle system command from a
remote source over a first communication channel;
responsive to receiving the command, open a second
communication channel with an apparent command-originating
source;
request, over the second communication channel,
verification that the command originated from the apparent
command-originating source; and
execute the command responsive to command-origin
verification.
15. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving a command origin verification request, to
verify a command wirelessly received by a vehicle, over a
wireless communication channel at a remote command
originating source;
receiving command-identifying data, as part of the
verification request, relating to the command;
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determining if the command was sent from the remote
command originating source, based on the command-
identifying data; and
verifying the command origin as the remote command
originating source, contingent upon the determining.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art references in rejecting
the claims on appeal:
Simon US 5,937,065 Aug. 10, 1999
Ghabra US 2005/0258936 A1 Nov. 24, 2005
Meyer US 6,992,982 B1 Jan. 31, 2006
Matsubara US 7,383,056 B2 June 3, 2008
Maher US 2013/0212659 A1 Aug. 15, 2013
Zivkovic US 2014/0340193 A1 Nov. 20, 2014
Lin US 2016/0225260 A1 Aug. 4, 2016
Hermann EP 1 024 626 A1 Aug. 2, 2000
REJECTIONS2
I. Claims 1–4 and 9–12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Simon and Hermann.
II. Claims 5, 6, 13, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Simon, Hermann, and Maher.
III. Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Simon, Hermann, and Ghabra.
IV. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Simon, Hermann, Ghabra, and Meyer.

2 A rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) has been withdrawn.
Final Act. 11; Ans. 3.
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V. Claims 15 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Matsubara and Ghabra.
VI. Claims 16 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Matsubara, Ghabra, and Meyer.
VII. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Matsubara, Ghabra, and Lin.
VIII. Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Matsubara, Ghabra, and Zivkovic.
ANALYSIS
Rejection I
The Examiner relies on Simon to disclose a system substantially as
recited in claim 1, but relies on Hermann to teach a second communication
channel. Final Act. 12–15. The Examiner reasons that it would have been
obvious
to use the remote control authorization/verification procedures
disclose[d] in Simon and use the unidirectional wireless
communication channel to establish initial contact between the
transponder and motor vehicle as taught by Hermann and
further to utilize the wireless broadcast medium as also taught
by Hermann to transmit the challenge number and receive[] the
answer from transponder as disclosed by Simon because
establishing the initial contact between the device via a
unidirectional wireless communication channel is intuitive to
users and prevents others from listening in to the channel.
Id. at 15 (citing Hermann ¶¶ 24, 44).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection does not identify a
“request for verification that the command came from the source.” Appeal
Br. 7. According to Appellant, “the prior art assumes that if the source is
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verified as being permitted to send a command, which included a source
identifier, then the command must have come from the source.” Id. For the
reasons provided below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
The Examiner maps Simon’s remote control to the recited remote
source and the initial numeric code transmitted by the remote control to the
recited command, finding that “activation of the [remote control] switch by
the driver causes an initial numeric code to be obtained and transmitted from
the remote control to the control circuit.” Final Act. 13; see also id. at 5
(“[T]he initial code transmitted from the remote control . . . to the vehicle
control circuit in the Simon reference reads on the word command.”). The
Examiner states “receipt of the initial code from the remote control by the
vehicle control circuit wakes up the control circuit and causes the control
circuit to perform the procedure of FIG. 3.” Id. at 5–6 (citing Simon, 5:5–
10, Fig. 3). The Examiner’s rejection, therefore, indicates that the command
(waking up the vehicle control circuit and performing additional functions)
occurs without any verification that the command originated from the
apparent source as required by claim 1. Thus, the Examiner has not set forth
how each of the claim recitations are disclosed or taught by the cited
references. See In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981, 985 (CCPA 1974) (explaining
that the cited references in an obviousness rejection must teach or suggest all
of the claim features).
We additionally note that, when addressing the request recitation, the
Examiner relies on Simon’s disclosure of the vehicle control circuit
generating a challenge number that is sent to the remote control that, in
response, generates and sends to the control circuit an answer number. Final
Act. 13–14.
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Simon discloses keyless systems for gaining entry to and starting
motor vehicles. Simon, 1:5–6. When the user presses a button on a remote
control, the remote control generates and sends an initial numerical code to
the vehicle. Id. at 5:3–19. In response to receiving the initial numerical
code, the vehicle “wakes up,” generates a random challenge number, and
sends the generated challenge number to the remote control. Id. at 5:20–33.
The remote control inputs the challenge number and a predefined seed
number into an algorithm to generate an answer number, which it sends to
the vehicle. Id. at 5:34–55. As part of the transmission, the remote control
also sends an identification number for the remote control and a numerical
indication of the function to be performed in the vehicle. Id. at 5:56–6:7.
The vehicle generates an expected answer using the same algorithm as the
remote control, and compares the received and expected answers. Id. at 6:8–
30. If the answers do not match, the vehicle does not operate any function.
Id. at 6:30–35. If the answers match, the vehicle compares the received
remote control identification number to a list of valid remote control
numbers. Id. at 6:36–43. If the received number is not on the list, the
vehicle does not operate any function. Id. at 6:43–45. If the received
number is on the list, the indicated function is performed. Id. at 6:51–7:38.
Thus, as correctly noted by Appellant, the verification identified by
the Examiner is not whether the command received by the vehicle was sent
by the apparent origin of the command. Rather, the verification identified
by the Examiner is whether the remote control is a previously-established
valid remote control. Id. at 6:36–43. Claim 1, however, requires a processor
configured to request “verification that the command originated from the
apparent command-originating source.” Claims App. 1. The Examiner has
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not identified any disclosure in Simon of verifying that the initial numeric
code (relied upon by the Examiner as the recited command) originated from
the remote control; in other words, that the remote control actually sent the
initial numeric code.
Furthermore, when addressing the execute recitation, the Examiner
identifies a different command (“the function requested by the switch
indication” (Final Act. 14))3 than the Examiner relied upon in the addressing
the wirelessly receive recitation (“an initial numeric code” (id. at 13)). This
lack of internal consistency further evidences shortcomings in the
Examiner’s rejection.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the rejection
of claim 1 as being unpatentable over Simon and Hermann. We do not
sustain the rejection of claims 2–4, which depend from claim 1, for the same
reasons. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Dependent
claims are nonobvious under section 103 if the independent claims from
which they depend are nonobvious.”).
Independent claim 9 contains recitations similar to those discussed
above with respect to claim 1. See Claims App. 2 (“request origin
verification of a control command wirelessly received over a first channel,
over a second channel established with an apparent origin responsive to
receipt of the control command”). The Examiner relies on the same findings
and reasoning to reject claim 9 as with claim 1. Final Act. 16–18. We do
not sustain the rejection of claim 9, and of its dependent claims 10–12, for
the same reasons as set forth for claim 1.

3 We understand the Examiner to reference the numerical indication of the
function to be performed in the vehicle. See Simon, 6:4–7.
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Rejections II–IV
Claims 5–8 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1, and claims 13
and 14 depend directly from claim 9. Claims App. 1–3. The Examiner does
not rely on Maher, Ghabra, or Meyer in any manner that would remedy the
deficiencies noted above with respect to the rejection of claim 1. See Final
Act. 19–24. Therefore, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 5–8, 13,
and 14 for the same reasons as set forth for claim 1.
Rejection V
The Examiner relies on Matsubara to disclose a computer-
implemented method substantially as recited in claim 15, including receiving
a command origin request that contains command-identifying data. Final
Act. 24–25. The Examiner also relies on Ghabra to teach receiving a
command origin request that contains command-identifying data. Id. at 26.
In rejecting claim 15, the Examiner interprets “command-identifying data”
as “data that identifies the source of the command,” and concludes that
Matsubara discloses receiving a command origin verification request
containing such data. Id. at 25–26 (citing Matsubara, 18:20–39, Fig. 3).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection does not identify a
“request for verification of the origin of the command.” Appeal Br. 9.
According to Appellant, Matsubara verifies that its remote source is
authorized to send commands, but does not verify that a received command
was actually sent by the remote source. Id. Appellant also argues that
“command-identifying data” “has an obvious plain-meaning as data that
identifies a command.” Id. Appellant argues that Ghabra also fails to
disclose command-identifying data. Id. at 10. For the reasons provided
below, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
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The Examiner maps Matsubara’s response signal to the recited
command origin verification request and the ID code contained within the
response signal as the recited command-identifying data. Final Act. 24–25;
see also Ans. 24 (“when the response signal is received, the transmitte[r]
compares the ID code that is received along with the response signal to the
ID code originally transmitted with the instruction signal (receiving a
command origin verification request)”).
Matsubara discloses a system for remotely performing vehicle
functions, such as door unlocking and engine starting. Matsubara, 2:25–30.
A portable transmitter includes a memory having an ID code stored thereon
and a plurality of switches for performing various vehicle functions. Id.
at 17:32–43. When one of the switches is operated, the transmitter outputs
an instruction signal including an indication of the selected vehicle function
and the transmitter’s ID code. Id. at 17:44–67, 18:6–12. A vehicle-mounted
processing apparatus includes a memory having an ID code stored thereon.
Id. at 16:35–51. When the processing apparatus receives an instruction
signal to perform a function, it determines whether the included ID code is
the same as the processing apparatus’s ID code to determine if the
instruction signal was transmitted by a paired transmitter. Id. at 19:37–47.
If the ID codes are identical, the processing apparatus transmits a response
signal including its ID code to the transmitter. Id. at 20:12–18. Upon
receiving the response signal, the transmitter determines whether the
included ID code is the same as the transmitter’s ID code. Id. at 18:23–27.
If the ID codes are the same, the transmitter sends an acknowledgement
signal to the processing apparatus and awaits further user action; if the ID
codes are not the same, the transmitter waits for additional responses signals
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for a predetermined amount of time and, if no correct response signal is
received, the transmitter awaits further action without sending an
acknowledgement signal. Id. at 18:28–60. Upon receiving the
acknowledgement signal, the processing apparatus determines whether the
included ID code is the same as the processing apparatus’s ID code. Id.
at 20:23–30. If the ID codes are the same, the processing apparatus causes
the indicated function to be performed and awaits further instruction codes.
Id. at 20:31–39, 21:20–23. If the ID codes are not the same, the processing
apparatus waits for additional acknowledgement signals for a predetermined
amount of time and, if no correct acknowledgement signal is received, the
processing apparatus awaits further action without performing the function
indicated in the instruction signal. Id. at 20:54–21:6.
Thus, as correctly noted by Appellant, by comparing the ID codes,
Matsubara merely determines whether the portable transmitter is paired with
the vehicle processing apparatus. See id. at 19:44–47, 20:31–34. Therefore,
the Examiner has not set forth how Matsubara’s transmitter receives a
command origin verification request as required by claim 15. Nor has the
Examiner adequately explained how the ID code of Matsubara’s processing
apparatus corresponds to the recited command-identifying data.
During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are given their
ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary
skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech.,
Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We agree with Appellant’s
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interpretation that the ordinary and customary meaning of “command-
identifying data” is data that identifies a command. See Appeal Br. 9. The
Examiner interprets this language as data that identifies the source of the
command rather than identifying the command itself. Final Act. 25–26
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 26–27). The Examiner fails to explain adequately why we
should interpret this language as identifying the source of the command, nor
do we glean any reasoning from the cited portions of the Specification.
Appellant cites to paragraph 32 of the Specification in support of its
interpretation. Appeal Br. 10. As correctly noted by Appellant, this
paragraph explains that the command origin verification contains data
identifying the command—“timestamps, command information, command
content, etc.”
The Examiner’s alternative reliance on Ghabra to teach a command
origin verification request including command-identifying data (see Final
Act. 26) does not remedy the shortcomings discussed above. Ghabra
discloses customizable passive entry systems for passenger vehicles.
Ghabra ¶¶ 3, 11. A user triggers an event, such as lifting a door handle or
activating an engine start switch. Id. ¶ 25. The vehicle is provided with two
antennas, one located inside the vehicle and one located outside the vehicle.
Id. ¶ 20. In response to the trigger, a first interrogation signal is sent from
one of the antennas and a second interrogation signal is sent from the other
of the antennas. Id. ¶ 25. The second interrogation signal includes a
challenge-response message. Id. A fob, carried by the user, receives the
interrogation signals and, if the vehicle and indicated function are
recognized, generates a response message that includes a reply to the
challenge-response message and indications of the received strengths of the
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first and second interrogation signals. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. A passive entry
electronic module of the vehicle receives the response message and
determines whether the fob is authorized. Id. ¶ 31. If the fob is authorized
and if the reported strengths of the interrogation signals indicate that the fob
is in the expected position (that is, inside or outside the vehicle) for the
event, the requested passive entry function is performed; otherwise, the
function is not performed. Id.
Initially, we note that the interrogation signals, relied on by the
Examiner to correspond to the recited command origin verification request
(see Final Act. 26), are not requests to verify the origin of any received
command because Ghabra discloses a passive entry system in which the fob
(tacitly relied on by the Examiner as the command originating source) does
not send a vehicle system command. Instead, a user causes a vehicle system
command to be triggered by, for example, lifting a door handle or activating
an engine start switch. Ghabra ¶ 25.
Furthermore, the Examiner does not adequately explain why (or how)
a skilled artisan would “add the vehicle interrogation signal and fob response
message” to Matsubara’s system. See Final Act. 26. As explained above,
Ghabra’s interrogation signals are used to determine whether the fob is in
the expected position inside or outside of the vehicle for the vehicle system
function triggered by the user. The Examiner has not explained adequately
why verifying the location of Matsubara’s transmitter would be beneficial.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the rejection
of claim 15 as being unpatentable over Matsubara and Ghabra. We do not
sustain the rejection of claim 18, which depends from claim 15, for the same
reasons. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d at 1076.
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Rejections VI–VIII
Claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 depend directly from claim 15. Claims
App. 3–4. The Examiner does not rely on Meyer, Lin, or Zivkovic in any
manner that would remedy the deficiencies noted above with respect to the
rejection of claim 15. See Final Act. 27–31. Therefore, we do not sustain
the rejections of claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 for the same reasons as set forth
for claim 15.
CONCLUSION
In summary,
Claims
Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4 and 9–12 § 103 Simon and Hermann 1–4 and 9–12
5, 6, 13, and
14
§ 103 Simon, Hermann, and
Maher
5, 6, 13, and
14
7 § 103 Simon, Hermann, and
Ghabra
7
8 § 103 Simon, Hermann,
Ghabra, and Meyer
8
15 and 18 § 103 Matsubara and Ghabra 15 and 18
16 and 20 § 103 Matsubara, Ghabra,
and Meyer
16 and 20
17 § 103 Matsubara, Ghabra,
and Lin
17
19 § 103 Matsubara, Ghabra,
and Zivkovic
19
Overall Outcome 1–20
REVERSED