Oaktree Capital Management, LLC and TBR Property LLC, a Single Employer d/b/a Turtle Bay Resorts, an

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2010

355 N.L.R.B. 1272 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
355 NLRB No. 207
1272
Oaktree Capital Management, LLC and TBR Prop-
erty, LLC, a single employer, d/b/a Turtle Bay
Resorts, and Benchmark Hospitality, Inc. and
UNITE HERE! Local 5. Case 37–CA–6827–11
September 30, 2010
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS BECKER
AND PEARCE
On August 17, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Mary
Miller Cracraft issued the attached supplemental decision
in this case. The Respondents filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an an-
swering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the supplemental decision
and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and
has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and
conclusions,3 and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.4
Judge Gontram correctly concluded that a unilateral
change in an employer’s policy permitting access by un-
ion representatives to its premises is a unilateral change
in the employees’ terms and conditions of employment
and is, ordinarily, unlawful. See Ernst Home Centers,

1 The caption has been amended to reflect the fact that all issues in
this consolidated complaint proceeding other than a single issue in Case
37–CA–6827–1 were resolved in Turtle Bay Resorts, 355 NLRB No.
147 (2010), which incorporated by reference the Board’s earlier deci-
sion in Turtle Bay Resorts, 353 NLRB 1242 (2009).
2 Judge Cracraft’s recitation of unfair labor practices found in the
prior Board decision incorrectly includes references to an August 6,
2004 incident involving Union Business Agent Nate Santa Maria and a
January 19, 2005 incident involving Union Business Agents Kimberly
Harmon and Laura Moye. In the prior Board decision, Administrative
Law Judge Joseph Gontram dismissed allegations that the Respondents
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) on those occasions. The Board adopted those
dismissals in the absence of exceptions. See Turtle Bay Resorts, supra,
355 NLRB No. 147, incorporating by reference Turtle Bay Resorts, 353
NLRB 1242, 1242 fn. 6. (2009). Judge Cracraft’s factual misstate-
ments have no effect on our decision in the present case.
3 In affirming the judge’s conclusion that the Respondents violated
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally altering the established parking
validation policy for union agents visiting the resort for representational
purposes, we rely on the judge’s finding that the change was material,
substantial, and significant when considered in the context of the Re-
spondents’ other unlawful conduct aimed at impeding the access of
employees to their union representatives. We find it unnecessary to
pass on whether the change, if considered in isolation from other mis-
conduct, was material, substantial, and significant.
4 To remedy the violation found, the judge recommended modifica-
tions of the Order and notice set forth in the Board’s prior decision.
Inasmuch as the court of appeals now has jurisdiction over that deci-
sion, we lack the authority to modify the recommended Order and
notice. We shall instead set forth in this decision a new recommended
Order and notice limited to the violation found here.
Inc., 308 NLRB 848, 848–849 (1992) (finding employer
violated the Act by unilaterally altering the established
practice of allowing the union’s business representative
to have limited conversations with employees on sales
floor); see also Frontier Hotel & Casino., 323 NLRB
815, 818 (1997) (“Any change that actually interferes
with contractually agreed employee access to the unit
collective-bargaining representatives for representational
purposes is a material change.”), enfd. in relevant part
sub nom. Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795
(D.C. Cir. 1997). In its brief, however, the Respondents
continue to dispute—in addition to the materiality of the
change to its parking validation policy—the general
principle that union access is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. Even assuming that the Respondents’ argument
contesting the mandatory nature of union access has been
preserved and properly is before us,5 the argument lacks
merit under well established Board precedent. It is clear
under established principles of our jurisprudence, that
once employees select a representative, representation is
a condition of employment that cannot be unilaterally
altered. Thus, if an employer unilaterally revokes recog-
nition, i.e., deprives employees of representation, the
employer violates Section 8(a)(5) unless the union has
lost majority support. Similarly, if an employer makes
unilateral changes that impair a representative’s ability to
represent employees effectively, or that impair employ-
ees’ ability to effectively support their representative, the
employer violates Section 8(a)(5). See Ernst Home Cen-
ters, supra, 308 NLRB at 848–849; Tribune Publishing
Co., 351 NLRB 196 (2007) (employer violated Sec.
8(a)(5) by unilaterally terminating direct deposit of union
dues), enfd. 564 F.3d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2009).6 Accord-
ingly, we have long held that a unilateral material change
in a policy permitting union representatives access to an
employer’s premises violates Section 8(a)(5). See Fron-
tier Hotel & Casino, supra; Ernst Home Center, supra.
Consequently, having affirmed the judge’s finding that
the Respondents’ unilateral revocation of the union rep-
resentatives’ free parking privileges was a “material

5 The General Counsel contends that the Respondents’ argument has
been waived.
6 In fact, even if an access policy or direct deposit program is estab-
lished unilaterally prior to employees selecting a representative (i.e., it
was not established contractually), it is a condition of employment that
cannot be unilaterally altered once a representative is selected. Cf.
Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB at 848–849, 865 (employer violated
the Act by unilaterally changing noncontractual practice of allowing
union access to employees on sales floor). A policy permitting access
by union representatives is no less a condition of employment—which
may not be unilaterally changed—than a policy permitting access by
members of employees’ families, and a program permitting direct de-
posit of union dues is no less a condition of employment than a pro-
gram permitting direct deposit into bank accounts or to pay other bills.
TURTLE BAY RESORTS 1273
change” to its access policy, we necessarily affirm her
conclusion that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5).
Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB at 848–849.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents violated the Act,
we shall order them to cease and desist and to take cer-
tain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act. Specifically, having found that the Respon-
dents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally
changing their practice of validating parking for union
business agents present at the Respondents’ resort for
representational purposes, pursuant to the terms of the
expired collective-bargaining agreement, we shall order
the Respondents to rescind this unilateral change and
restore the status quo ante. We shall order the Respon-
dents to make whole the Union for any amounts actually
shown to have been incurred as a result of this unlawful
change, in the manner set forth in Ogle Protection Ser-
vice, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1971), with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, Oaktree Capital Management, LLC, and
TBR Property, LLC, a Single Employer, d/b/a Turtle Bay
Resorts, and Benchmark Hospitality, Inc., Honolulu,
Hawaii, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unilaterally changing the practice of validating
parking for union business agents present at the resort for
representational purposes pursuant to the terms of the
expired collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing their employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the change in the parking validation prac-
tice and reinstate the practice of validation of parking
tickets for union business agents present at the resort for
representational duties pursuant to the terms of the ex-
pired collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Make the Union whole for any amounts incurred
for parking after rescission of the parking validation
practice, in the manner set forth in the amended remedy
section of this decision.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Kahuku, Oahu, Hawaii, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”7 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
20, after being signed by the Respondents’ authorized
representative, shall be posted by the Respondents and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondents have gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondents
shall duplicate and mail, at their own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondents at any time since January
28, 2005.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondents have taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT unilaterally rescind our parking valida-
tion practice for union business agents who are present at
the resort for representational duties pursuant to the
terms of the expired collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

7 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1274
WE WILL reinstate the parking validation practice for
union business agents who are present at the resort for
representational duties pursuant to the terms of the ex-
pired collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL make whole the Union for amounts incurred
in parking fees following our rescission of the parking
validation practice, in the manner set forth in the
amended remedy section of the Board’s decision.

OAKTREE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC, AND
TBR PROPERTY, LLC, A SINGLE EMPLOYER,
D/B/A TURTLE BAY RESORTS, AND BENCHMARK
HOSPITALITY, INC.

Meredith Burns, for the General Counsel.
Robert Murphy and Daniel Berkley, of San Francisco, Califor-
nia, for the Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION ON REMAND
MARY MILLER CRACRAFT, Administrative Law Judge. In
Turtle Bay Resorts, 353 NLRB 1242, 1243–1244 (2009), the
Board severed and remanded a single issue. That issue is
whether Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act1 by unilaterally requiring union agents to pay for parking,
which Respondents had previously validated, when the agents
visited the resort for representational purposes.
Judge Gontram, who heard the underlying cases, found that
the longstanding practice of validating the union agents’ park-
ing receipt was a term and condition of employment, but be-
cause there was no evidence in the record concerning the fees
charged, Judge Gontram concluded it was not evident that the
change was material, substantial, and significant such that it
required bargaining before making the change. The Board
severed and remanded this issue for reexamination in light of
the fact that there was evidence in the record that showed that
the parking fees assessed totaled approximately $2080 per year
since 2005.
Following the remand, the parties were invited to brief this
issue.2 Although Respondents initially took the position that
briefing was inappropriate because the remand was on appeal to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals together with the portion of
the case not remanded, I found that the remand was not a final
order on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and thus overruled Respon-
dents’ opposition to briefing the remanded issue. Respondents
and the General Counsel filed briefs regarding the remand.

1 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) and (5).
2 The parties were advised that four issues might be briefed as fol-
lows: (1) Is the subject of parking privileges for union representatives
who are present at an employer’s premises pursuant to a contractual
access provision a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining? (2)
If such parking privileges (valued at $2080 per year) are a mandatory
subject of bargaining, is the unilateral rescission of such privileges a
material, significant, and substantial change? (3) If such parking privi-
leges are a permissive subject of bargaining, does an employer commit
an unfair labor practice in unilaterally rescinding the parking privi-
leges? (4) Are any or all of the above questions within the scope of the
remand?
Having fully considered these briefs, I find that rescission of
the parking validation practice was a material, substantial, and
significant change. Thus, I find that Respondents violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by unilaterally eliminating park-
ing validation for union agents who were present at the resort to
perform representational duties pursuant to the terms of the
expired collective-bargaining agreement.
FINDINGS OF FACT3
Respondents operate Turtle Bay Hotel and Resort in Kahuku,
Hawaii, on the island of Oahu. The Union represents about 360
employees at the resort. The parties’ most recent collective-
bargaining agreement expired on November 25, 2003. For the
most part, the parties continued to observe the terms of the
expired contract. Dating from at least 2002, union business
agents routinely visited the resort on a twice-weekly basis in
order to perform such representational duties as meeting with
employees, discussing union-related matters, assisting employ-
ees, meeting with management, and processing grievances.
Beginning in May 2004, following rescission of dues deduc-
tion, the union agents also sought to collect union dues. Re-
spondents’ practice was to validate the parking for union
agents. Validation continued, at least for a time, following expi-
ration of the contract.
By letter of January 25, 2005, Respondents informed the Un-
ion that its representatives would no longer receive free parking
at the resort to visit employees. Respondents instituted this
change without notifying the Union or giving it an opportunity
to bargain. The practice of providing free parking to the union
representatives while on the property on official business was
known and facilitated by Respondents. Business agents had to
pass by a kiosk in the driveway in order to access the parking
lot. The parking attendant routinely gave the business agents
parking tickets and the business agents validated these tickets
with Respondents’ security or with Respondents’ human re-
sources department. There is no evidence that the resort
charges anyone other than the business agents for parking at the
resort. Indeed, Respondents admitted providing free parking to
the public for use at the beach.
Rescission of the parking validation practice must be viewed
in the context of the other actions between Respondents and the
Union. After expiration of the contract on November 25, 2003,
the Union launched a campaign to secure a new contract in-
cluding rallies, picketing, and a boycott of the resort. On Feb-
ruary 14, 2004, security officers at Turtle Bay issued a trespass
order to Union Business Agent Marian Marsh while she was
present at the resort to engage in representational duties, in an
attempt to try to prohibit her from accessing the property for 1
year. The trespass notice was issued pursuant to section 708-
814 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, even though that statute
provides that it does not apply to “any conduct or activity sub-
ject to regulation by the National Labor Relations Act.”
Four days later, on February 18, 2004, Marsh and another
business agent were issued additional trespass notices while in

3 Judge Gontram made findings of facts in his initial decision. Those
facts as well as the additional facts noted by the Board in Turtle Bay
Resorts, supra, are included.
TURTLE BAY RESORTS 1275
the employee cafeteria speaking with a unit member. The secu-
rity guard informed the business agents that he was directed to
call the Honolulu police department upon seeing any union rep-
resentatives on the property without regard to whether they were
on the grounds to talk to the employees they represented.
On March 25, 2004, Respondents’ security officers used video
cameras in order to engage in surveillance of employees and
union representatives who were participating in a rally in support
of Turtle Bay employees. Following this rally, Respondents
assigned security officers to “shadow” within several feet union
representatives whenever they were on the property. Judge Gon-
tram found that “the Respondents reaction to the rally—to
shadow Union representatives whenever they came onto the
property—was neither effective nor focused nor reasonable. It
was retaliatory and was designed to intimidate and provoke the
Union, while interfering with the Union’s ability to perform its
representation function at Turtle Bay.”
On April 2, 2004, during a peaceful union rally, the head of
security of the resort sat in his vehicle pointing a video camera at
participants of the rally. On April 17, 2004, during a rally in
support of Turtle Bay employees, a security guard took pictures
of the license plates of participants of the rally, while another
security guard and a sales manager pointed video cameras at
participants of the rally.
On May 4, 2004, while Business Agent Shimabukuro was
meeting with 50 union retirees at a public restaurant on Respon-
dent’s property, two security guards issued trespass orders to her.
They also issued trespass orders to Business Agent Marsh as she
was discussing employment matters with several employees in
the employee cafeteria. The security guards informed the busi-
ness agents that they were prohibited from entering the property
for 1 year, they escorted the business agents to the parking lot,
and they took photos of the license plates of the business agents’
cars.
On May 6, 2004, an official of Respondents told Business
Agent Marian Marsh that the Union was no longer permitted to
collect union dues on Respondents’ property. This occurred after
the employer decided that it would no longer deduct monthly
union dues from employees’ wages as was required under the
expired contract. Though the employer ceased deducting dues, it
continued to comply with most other provisions of the expired
contract.
On June 7, 2004, Marsh was meeting with employees in the
employee cafeteria when she was approached by two security
guards employed by Respondents and a Honolulu police officer
and issued a trespass notice. On June 11, 2004, Marsh was is-
sued a trespass notice for the mistaken belief that she arrived too
early at the resort. On that same day, security guard Hanohano
was assigned to shadow Marsh, and he followed her within 2–3
feet for the entire time she was on the property, except when she
used the women’s restroom, where he waited for her outside the
door.
On June 12, 15, and 17, 2004, while Marsh was talking with
employees in the employee cafeteria, she was issued a series of
trespass notices without being given reasons. On June 22, 2004,
while Business Agent Shimabukuro was collecting union dues in
the employee cafeteria, Respondents had a Honolulu police offi-
cer escort Shimabukuro off the property. On August 6, 2004,
Business Agent Nate Santa Maria was shadowed by a security
officer and then told to leave the property after he talked to em-
ployees at their work stations. He spoke with each worker at
their workstations for approximately 15–20 seconds, and security
claimed that he was disturbing the workers. When Santa Maria
asserted that it was his contractual right to talk with the employ-
ees, there was a 45-minute standoff in full view of the employees,
which ended with Santa Maria being escorted off the property.
On October 22, 2004, General Manager Abid Butt distributed
a memorandum to all Turtle Bay employees which stated in part
that the Union’s attempts to get Respondents to agree to a new
contract will fail. The memorandum stated “Unfortunately for
you, your families, and for everyone associated with Turtle Bay,
the Union has made a terrible mistake. We would rather close
the Resort than allow you and your families to be used as hos-
tages.”
Since January 2005, a security guard has shadowed union rep-
resentatives as they visit the employees. Employees and union
representatives have tried to meet in the parking lot in order to
talk beyond earshot of security guards, but on several occasions
in February and March 2005, the security followed the employ-
ees and business agents through the parking lots.
On January 19, 2005, Business Agents Kimberly Harmon and
Laura Moye were shadowed by security when they attempted to
visit employees. The security guard yelled at the business agents
in front of the employees and eavesdropped on their conversa-
tions with a notebook. When an employee greeted Business
Agent Moye, the security guard told the employee, “You know
better than that.”
On January 27, 2005, 2 days after revocation of the parking
validation practice, upon her return to work after a back injury,
Business Agent Marsh went to the resort to collect union dues.
Marsh was dropped off at the resort because her back problem
made it too difficult to climb the stairs at the loading dock where
she usually entered. She sat on a couch in the hotel lobby while
she waited for her colleague to park the car, but the head of secu-
rity told her that she was not allowed to sit on the couch or be in
the lobby. Marsh complied and when she and her colleague tried
to use an elevator to get to the employees, the security guard held
the door and would not allow her to use that elevator. Marsh
tried to use a different elevator, and the security guard stood in
front of her and bumped her in order to prevent her from using
that elevator. Marsh sat on a bench because her back was caus-
ing her significant pain, and the security guard called a Honolulu
police officer and told him that Marsh was causing a disturbance
and had no right to be on the property.
Judge Gontram found that all of the above actions by Respon-
dents, with the exception of rescission of parking validation
practices, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Thus, he found
that Respondents violated the Act by telling union representa-
tives that they were trespassing, that they had no right to be at
the resort, by telling the Union that it could not collect dues at
the resort, by summoning police to assist in evicting the union
representatives from the resort, by summoning police to witness
service of trespass notices to the union agents, by issuing tres-
pass notices, by evicting union representatives from the resort,
by illegally surveilling union representatives and employees, by
illegally denying union demonstrators and employees access to
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1276
a public beach adjacent to the resort, by threatening to disci-
pline employees who talked to union representatives at the
resort, and by threatening to close the resort in retaliation for
employees’ union activity. The Board affirmed these findings.
Judge Gontram found that the change in parking validation
practices for business agents who were present at the resort to
perform representational duties pursuant to the terms of the
collective-bargaining agreement was a term and condition of
employment. The parties agree that this issue is not before me
on remand.4 Although Respondents argued that the obligation
to bargain was limited to the employee and employer relation-
ship, and therefore excluded union business agents, Judge Gon-
tram rejected this “artificial distinction” for four reasons: (1) as
the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees, ac-
tions taken against the Union are also against the employees;
(2) burdening the Union’s access to employees necessarily
burdens the employees’ access to the Union; (3) extant author-
ity treats the Union’s access to employees as a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining; and (4) the Union’s access was provided for
in the expired collective-bargaining agreement. Furthermore,
Judge Gontram noted that the practice of free parking by busi-
ness agents was known and facilitated by the Respondents for
several years prior to rescission of the practice.
Analysis
In the instant case, Respondents unilaterally implemented a
$20 per visit parking fee on the business agents, equaling ap-
proximately $2080 per year, after at least 3 years of providing
free parking. The business agents were suddenly faced with a
choice to which they had no input: pay $20 for parking two times
a week or park beyond Respondents’ property line and walk
approximately 3 quarters of a mile to the building. The change
was not caused by any outside factors that were beyond the Em-
ployer’s control, but rather was fully initiated and executed by
the Employer. See, generally, United Parcel Service, 336 NLRB
1134 (2001) (Where third party owned the parking facilities and
third party instituted the change the employer must nevertheless
bargain regarding the effects.).
In determining whether the unilateral change was material,
substantial, and significant, the natural context must be consid-
ered. Xidex Corp., 297 NLRB 110, 111 (1989), enfd. 924 F.2d
245 (D.C. Cir. 1991). When an employer takes action “as part of
its concerted strategy to weaken and discredit the union in the
eyes of the employees” it is proper to look at the other elements
of that strategy in order to determine whether the issue is material
and substantial. Xidex Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 245, 253 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied. In Xidex
Corp., the employer argued that unilaterally changing employ-
ees’ lunchbreaks for 2 days was de minimis and was not substan-

4 Respondents’ brief states, “Finally, the questions raised by [the
judge on remand] exceed the scope of the remand as the only issue the
Board ordered addressed was whether the monetary amount . . . suf-
ficed to establish that Respondents’ unilateral change was material,
substantial, and significant and consequently whether Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.” The General Counsel states,
“Thus, the Board’s remand is limited in scope to this particular issue.”
The issue referred to is “evidence of the monetary amounts . . . for the
parking privileges unilaterally revoked by the Respondents.”
tial enough to constitute an unfair labor practice. The Board
held, and the Court agreed, that “by unilaterally implementing the
change, the employer was ‘telegraphing to the employees that the
Union was irrelevant.’” Id. The Board held that in the context of
the other actions of the employer towards the Union, the manda-
tory subject of bargaining of lunch hour changes for 2 days was
material, substantial, and significant.
Respondents in the instant case made it virtually impossible
for the business agents to have meaningful contact with the em-
ployees without being shadowed or issued trespass orders. On
many occasions, Respondent issued trespass notices to union
business agents while they were talking with employees about
employment matters. These trespass notices barred the business
agents access to the property for 1 year, and Respondents tried to
enforce them with numerous calls to the Honolulu police. When
the business agents were on the property, security guards shad-
owed the business agents, staying within a few feet at all times,
except when the business agents used the restroom. When em-
ployees and business agents tried to take their conversations to
the parking lot in order to speak in private, security guards fol-
lowed them outside as well. At times, security even took photos
of the license plates of business agents and security guards and a
sales manger took video footage of employees taking part in
rallies.
The chronology of events illustrates amply that the change in
the terms of parking was one of many means that the employer
used to burden the link between the employees and their exclu-
sive bargaining representative. Respondent’s conduct itself to-
wards the Union blocked or burdened the Union’s access to the
employees at every turn. Thus, Respondents’ unilateral change
of the parking conditions for union business agents on the prop-
erty on official business constituted a material, substantial, and
significant change of employees’ terms and conditions of em-
ployment.
Moreover, even in the absence of the context of Respondents
actions, the amount the Union paid for parking, $2080 per year,
is a substantial amount of money, the distance walked by busi-
ness agents (some of whom had physical limitations) is signifi-
cant, and the time involved in walking the extra distance is sub-
stantial. Given these factors and the concerted strategy to
weaken the Union’s access to employees, the parking validation
practice, as found by Judge Gontram, was a mandatory subject of
bargaining. Unilateral alteration constituted a material, substan-
tial, and signification change and violates Section 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by
unilaterally altering the parking validation policy for union agents
who were present at the facility to service the collective-
bargaining contract.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that they must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]