Nicholas Wagner et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 27, 2019

14095354 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/095,354 12/03/2013 Nicholas Wagner P2013-18 1312
103720 7590 08/27/2019
Noble Systems Corporation
Attn: Karl Koster
1200 Ashwood Parkway
Suite 300
Atlanta, GA 30338-4747
EXAMINER
STAMBER, ERIC W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/27/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chaggerty@noblesys.com
kkoster@noblesystems.com
noblepatent@gmail.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte NICHOLAS WAGNER, THOMAS J. ETTER,
DEENA S. ETTER, JONATHAN R. BAKER, and
KARL KOSTER1
____________________

Appeal 2017-010725
Application 14/095,354
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, ERIC S. FRAHM, and MICHAEL T. CYGAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–23, which constitute all the claims pending
in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify Noble Systems Corporation as the real party in interest
(App. Br. 2).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Disclosed Invention and Exemplary Claim
Appellants’ disclosed invention relates to “Managing Employee Point
Awards in a Contact Center” (Title), where employees (i.e., contact center
agents) are “awarded employee points for various accomplishments or
actions” (e.g., “for completing a training course, achieving a performance
level, or agreeing to work undesirable work shifts”) and can later bid those
points in an auction for “to indicate a preference in a scheduling event” such
as a better work shift/schedule (Abstract). According to Appellants,
“scheduling agent resources to appropriately handle communications and
accommodating agents’ desired scheduling times is a challenging activity
that must balance the desires of agents with the business needs of the contact
center” (Spec. ¶ 1), because scheduling, “[c]ontact centers may frequently
employee hundreds or even thousands of agents in various locations” and
“agents may be scheduled for handling calls twenty four hours a day, seven
days a week,” therefore “scheduling this many agents represents a
challenge” (Spec. ¶ 2). As a result, “a comprehensive system for addressing
the flexible needs of agents and contact center operators is required” (Spec.
¶ 3).
Appellants’ claimed invention is a method (claims 1–12), workforce
management system having a processor and memory (claims 13–20, and
non-transitory computer readable storage medium storing instructions
executable by a processor in a workforce management system having a
memory (claims 21–23) for managing employee award points using a
workforce management computer system that communicates with employees
(i.e., agents) through smartphones to receive their bids in an award points
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auction (see claims 1, 13, 21). Exemplary independent claim 1 under
appeal, with emphases and bracketed lettering added to key portions of the
claim at issue, reads as follows:
1. A method for managing employee award points using
a workforce management computer system, comprising:
establishing an employee account in the workforce
management computer system configured to store employee
award points for an employee, wherein the employee is a
contact center agent;
allocating a number of employee award points to the
employee account in the workforce management computer
system;
notifying a plurality of employees, including the employee
via a smartphone, of a scheduling event related to a work
related activity, wherein the scheduling event is associated
with a template indicating a transaction type stored in the
workforce management computer system, wherein the
transaction type indicates one of a plurality of processing
methods for processing a bid of the employee award points,
wherein a certain number of the plurality of employees are to be
selected for inclusion in the scheduling event, and wherein the
certain number is an integer of two or more;
receiving bids at the workforce management computer
system from at least a subset of the plurality of employees for the
scheduling event, including a bid from the employee wherein
the employee uses the smartphone to indicate the bid, wherein
the bid is one of the bids received at the workforce management
computer system;
processing the bids by the workforce management
computer system according to a processing method indicated by
the transaction type indicated by the template;
identifying a set of selected employees including the
employee by the workforce management computer system based
on the bids from the subset of the plurality of employees, wherein
the set of selected employees is equal to the certain number; and
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generating a work schedule by the workforce management
computer system for the plurality of employees wherein the set
of selected employees is included in the scheduling event.

Claims Appendix (App. Br. 35).
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (abstract idea). Non-Final Act.
22–26; Ans. 2–20.
(2) Claims 1–10 and 12–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over O’ Brien (US 6,587,831 B1; issued July 1, 2003),
Kish (US 2003/0004799 A1; published Jan. 2, 2003), Noble (US 8,538,006
B1; issued Sept. 17, 2013), Wu (US 7,269,253 B1; issued Sept. 11, 2007),
and Ausubel (US 6,026,383; issued Feb. 15, 2000). Non-Final Act. 27–54;
Ans. 20–39.
(3) Claims 11 and 23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over O’ Brien, Kish, Noble, Wu, Ausubel, and Flockhart (US
2005/0071241 A1; published Mar. 31, 2005). Non-Final Act. 54–58; Ans.
20–39.
Appellants’ Contentions
(1) Appellants contend (App. Br. 5–17; Reply Br. 11–21) that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, because the
claims are not directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea and the claimed invention amounts to significantly more than
an abstract idea. Appellants presents arguments as to the claims as a group
(see generally App. Br. 5–17; Reply Br. 11–21), only mentioning method
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claim 1 briefly by way of example (see App. Br. 16). Therefore, with regard
to the patent-eligibility rejection, we select claim 1 as representative of
the group of claims 1–23 pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
(2) Appellants contend (App. Br. 17–28, 33; Reply Br. 2–4) that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–10 and 12–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
for various reasons, primarily based on the contention that the Examiner
applied an incorrect claim construction when interpreting several limitations
recited in independent claims 1, 13, and 21. Specifically, Appellants
contend the Examiner has misconstrued the claim terms “scheduling event,”
“template,” and “transaction type” (see App. Br. 17–20; Reply Br. 2–10).
Appellants present arguments as to all claims in general (App. Br. 17–28,
33; Reply Br. 21–25; 27–28), and addresses method claim 1 as exemplary
(see App. Br. 20–24, Reply Br. 23–25). Appellants also present separate
arguments as to claims 3, 7, 9, and 12 (see App. Br. 28–33; Reply Br. 25–
27). Therefore, with regard to the obviousness rejection of claims 1–10 and
12–22, we select claim 1 as representative of the group of claims 1, 2, 4–6,
8, 10, and 13–22 pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Accordingly, our decision will address only the obviousness of
representative claim 1, as well as dependent claims 3, 7, 9, and 12 separately
argued.

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Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 5–33)
and Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–28),2 the following principal issues are
presented on appeal:
(1) Have Appellants shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter, because representative claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea that is
not patent eligible, without significantly more?
(2) Have Appellants shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–
10 and 12–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the applied references fail to
teach or suggest the disputed limitations, as recited in representative claim 1,
and each of dependent claims 3, 7, 9, and 12 separately argued?

ANALYSIS
Claim Interpretation
We agree with Appellants (see Reply Br. 2–10) that the interpretation
of the terms “scheduling event,” “template,” and “transaction type” is crucial
to the outcome of both the patent eligibility and obviousness issues.
However, because the Examiner’s explanation and position as to these claim
interpretation issues (Ans. 20–25) are more persuasive, and for the reasons
that follow, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejections under
either 35 U.S.C. § 101 or 35 U.S.C. § 103.

2 Notably, Appellants present no arguments as to the rejection of claims 11
and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over O’Brien, Kish,
Noble, Wu, Ausubel, and Flockhart. Therefore, (i) no issue is presented as
to; (ii) we summarily sustain; and (iii) we will not further discuss, this
rejection in our decision herein.
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Issue (1): Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection (Non-Final Act. 22–26) in
light of Appellants’ contentions (App. Br. 5–17; Reply Br. 2–21) and the
evidence of record, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellants’
arguments in the Appeal Brief (Ans. 2–20). We are not persuaded by
Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–23
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter,
without significantly more.
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
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in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
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to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first
look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a
fundamental economic practice, or mental processes)
(Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”)
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, 2018)
(Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception. (Step 2B.)
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether
the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because
essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim involving
physical products and actions involves a law of nature
and/or natural phenomenon—after all, they take place in
the physical world. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all
inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon,
or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-
one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification,
based on whether “their character as a whole is directed to
excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).

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Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, claim 1, as well as claims 2–12
depending therefrom, recite “[a] method for managing employee award
points using a workforce management computer system” by performing a
series of acts, for example, “receiving bids” and “processing bids,” then
“generating a work schedule” (claim 1). Therefore, claim 1, and claims 2–
12 depending therefrom, as method claims, recite at least one of the
enumerated categories (e.g., process) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
Claim 13, and claims 14–20 depending therefrom, recite “[a]
workforce management system for managing employee award points,
comprising: a processor” for interacting with employees via “a smartphone”
to notify employees of scheduling events and receive and process bids, and
“a memory” for storing employee reward points, and interactive rewards
computing system” (claim 13). Therefore, claim 13, as well as claims 14–20
depending therefrom, as system claims, recite at least one of the enumerated
categories (e.g., a machine and/or manufacture) of eligible subject matter in
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 21, and claims 22 and 23 depending therefrom, recite “[a] non-
transitory computer readable storage medium storing instructions that when
executed by a processor in a workforce management system” store employee
award points in “a memory” and interacting with employees via “a
smartphone” to notify employees of scheduling events and receive and
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process bids (claim 21). Therefore, claim 21, as well as claims 22 and 23
depending therefrom, as medium claims, recite at least one of the
enumerated categories (e.g., a manufacture) of eligible subject matter in
35 U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claims 1–23, we continue our analysis under Step
2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to determine whether the claims (1) recite a
judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter
within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); and (2) are patent-
eligible.
Step 2A, Prong 1 – Abstract Idea(s)
At a high level, representative claim 1 recites “[a] method for
managing employee award points using a workforce management computer
system” that is focused on providing an auction for employees to use
“employee award points” to bid on “scheduling event[s]” so that an
employee work schedule can then be generated. The Examiner determines
(Non-Final Act. 22; Ans. 2), and we agree, that claim 1 is “directed to the
abstract idea of allowing employees to be awarded points for completing
activities and then use those points to bid for preferred future work shifts to
be scheduled,” which involves at least three different fundamental economic
practices). More specifically, the Examiner determines (Ans. 2–3) the
claims encompass at least the following three fundamental economic
practices: (1) awarding/using points for shift assignments, which is a
bargained for exchange; (2) a market for exchanging points for shift
assignments, which is commerce; and (3) bidding in an auction. The
Examiner also determines (Ans. 3) the claims encompass a mental process
that can be performed in the human mind.
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This is in agreement with Appellants’ disclosures that the invention
relates to (i) “Managing Employee Point Awards in a Contact Center”
(Title); and (ii) “[a]n employee point award management (“EPAM”) system”
that provides for “bidding” with points for preferable work shifts (i.e.,
“scheduling events”) (Abstract); (iii) “systems and methods for facilitating
an interactive digital rewards experience” (Spec. ¶ 1).
Appellants, however, argue the claims on appeal are not directed to an
abstract idea but to an improvement to existing technology, because:
Thus, the invention recited i[n] the present claims is not
simply directed to allowing employees to be awarded points for
completing activities and then use those points to bid
for preferred future work shifts to be scheduled as the Office
Action suggest, but instead is directed to providing a flexible and
easy-to-use approach for selecting a plurality of call center
employees for a scheduling event by defining a template
indicating a transaction type, which indicates a processing
method for processing employee points.

App. Br. 12 (emphases added).
We determine that limitations of claim 1 recite business and
commercial activities, i.e., an employee award points, bidding, and auction
method/system for scheduling work shifts (i.e., scheduling events), which
involves business relations between people. In other words, claim 1 recites
three major components: (1) employee award points; (2) bidding, as in an
action; and (3) scheduling employee work shifts. As such, the claimed
invention recites certain methods of organizing human activity, such as
fundamental economic practices, which are an abstract idea.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 recites a method for
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generating a work schedule by managing employee award points used by
employees to bid on work shifts, which is a method of organizing human
activity, such as a commercial interaction (e.g., auction based on bidding)
and/or business relation between people (e.g., scheduling work shifts).
Because we conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we proceed to Step
2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 is “directed to”
the judicial exception, by determining whether additional elements of the
claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Such additional
elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or technical field. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application. If the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim is not directed
to the judicial exception.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “a workforce
management computer system,” and “a smartphone.” Considering claim 1
as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or uses the abstract idea
in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole are more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the exception. The “workforce management
system” recited in claim stores employee award points, receives and
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processes bids in accordance with a transaction type, identifies employees
based on the bids, and generates a resultant work schedule.
Contrary to Appellants’ assertions (App. Br. 7–16; Reply Br. 11–20),
Appellants have not shown claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application. In particular, Appellants
have not shown the additional elements of a workforce management
computer system and a smartphone integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application.
We further note that the steps of storing employee award points and
transaction types, receiving bids via smartphone, and generating a work
schedule using a computer are merely insignificant extra-solution activities.
The claimed invention receives, processes, and generates data – this is
merely conventional data gathering and analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g);
OIP Techs., Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Electric Power Group LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). As such, based on the record before us, we determine that the
claimed invention is not integrated into a practical application.
Appellants’ arguments that (i) “the present invention is clearly
distinguishable from an auction platform” because multiple
employees/agents are selected as opposed to just the high bidder (App. Br.
10); (ii) the rules and parameters of the template indicate how points are to
be processed to select the winning bidders, providing flexibility in selecting
employees for scheduling events in work schedules (App. Br. 10); (iii) the
claimed invention provides (a) “a technological improvement in workforce
management systems that is ‘advantageous for a business that desires
efficient personnel scheduling’” (App. Br. 15–16), and (b) “flexibility as to
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how point awards are processed” (Reply Br.11); and therefore, (iv) “the
invention recited in the present claims provides an improvement to existing
technology that is not abstract” and “the present claims are not directed to an
abstract idea” (App. Br. 12), are unpersuasive. Merely adding a
programmed computer to perform generic computer functions does not
automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358-59 (2014). Furthermore, the use of a
general purpose computer to apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does
not qualify as a particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716-17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); TLI Communications LLC v.
AV Automotive LLC, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation of
concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); Eon Corp. IP
Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or
software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer
to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice
Corp. decisions). In this light, Appellants’ contention that “[m]erely using a
computer to practice the claimed invention does not automatically make the
claimed invention patent ineligible” (Reply Br. 15), is unpersuasive.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellants’ claim 1
(and claims 2–23 grouped therewith) invokes generic computer components
merely as a tool in which the computer instructions apply the judicial
exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical
application.
Because claim 1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a
method of organizing human activity) that is not integrated into a practical
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application, in accordance with the Guidance, we conclude claims 1 and
claims 2–23 grouped therewith, are directed to an abstract idea under Step
2A, and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims 1–23 proceeds to Step
2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claims 2–23 grouped therewith are
directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application,
we now evaluate whether the additional elements add a specific limitation
that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or
simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract
idea. See Guidance. Thus, we determine whether the claims “focus on a
specific means or method that improves the relevant technology” or are
“directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke
generic processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In the instant case on appeal, the additional elements recited in claim
1 do not “contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
221 (internal quotation marks omitted), or “include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer implementation and fails
to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id. We do
not agree that the use of “a template indicating a transaction type” that (i)
“indicates one of a plurality of processing methods for processing a bid of
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the employee award points,” and is “associated with” a scheduling event
(that the employee is bidding on) transforms claim 1 into patent eligible
subject matter.
Here, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements
beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components used to perform
generic computer functions (Non-Final Act. 23–24; Ans. 10–19) — a
determination that is supported by Appellants’ Figures 1, 2, and 16 and the
related descriptions found in the Specification (see, e.g., Figs. 1, 2, 16; Spec.
¶¶ 4, 5, 9, 10, 24, 253–259). Specifically, the recited workforce
management computer system, WFM/EPAM system 255 shown in Figure 2,
and/or EPAM 156 shown in Figure 1, all use the computer processing
system shown in Figure 16, and “may be exemplified by, for example, but
without limitation: a personal computer, server, desktop computer, tablets,
smart phones, notebooks, laptops, distributed systems, servers, blades,
gateways, switches, and the like, as well as any combination of device or
entities adapted to perform the functions described herein” (Spec. ¶ 253).
The various components of the computer processing system shown in Figure
16, such as processor 1601,3 communication interface 1602, controller 1603,
interface 1604, memories 1606 and 1607, and EPAM module 1609, are all
described in generic terms, and as performing generic computer functions
(see Spec. ¶¶ 254–258). In summary, the computing components of the
disclosed and recited workforce management (WRM) computer system 155

3 In the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section of Appellants’
Appeal Brief (see App. Br. 2–5), the only structure Appellants point to as
supporting the claimed invention is with respect to the processor of claim 13
(see App. Br. 3), which Appellants allege is described in paragraphs 253 and
254 and shown in Figure 16 (i.e., processor 1601).
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and employee point award management (EPAM) system 156 (Fig. 1), and
WFM/EPAM 255 (Fig. 2) are described in generic terms and perform
generic computing functionality (see generally Spec. ¶¶ 4, 5, 9, 10, 24, 253,
254; Figs. 1, 2, 16).
Thus, Appellants’ Specification only describes well-understood,
routine, conventional computer components (e.g., a computing system,
processor, memory, interface, smartphone) in a manner that indicates the
components and the functions they perform were well known in the
art. See Hybritech Inc., 802 F.2d at 1384 (explaining that “a patent need
not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see
also Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1331 (“The claimed mobile
interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a
generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the
performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific
resources.”).
When generically claimed, storing and retrieving and operating on
information in memory and displaying/generating information (e.g., the
generation of a work schedule) are computer functions that have been
recognized as either insignificant extra-solution activity or well-understood,
routine, conventional functions. MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata
Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). More
specifically, the steps of storing employee award points, and received bids
with those points, and generating a work schedule are merely insignificant
extra-solution activity, and include merely conventional data gathering and
analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc., 788 F.3d at 1363;
Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1354.
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The Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly
recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims
have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the
idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional
processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP
Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring). As seen
from the discussion above, Appellant’s claim 1, as well as claims 2–23
grouped therewith, recite nothing more than the implementation of a
combination of abstract ideas using existing computers and smartphones
with no alteration of computer functionality.
As a result, we are not persuaded that the operations recited in claim 1
are anything beyond generic computer functions as opposed to an
improvement to a fundamental economic practice and/or method of
organizing human activity. Considering the elements of claim 1 individually
and as an ordered combination, claim 1 does no more than simply instruct
the practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a generic computer or
processer. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an
abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent
eligible.”).
Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 12–
16; Reply Br. 13–20) that claim 1 recites something more than the abstract
idea, such as a unique algorithm, and is therefore patent eligible. Rather,
claim 1 merely recites the use of a computing system and smartphone as
tools to implement a method of organizing human activity involving a
fundamental economic principle (i.e., an abstract idea). See, e.g.,
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RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“Unlike Enfish, [the claim] does not claim a software method that
improves the functioning of a computer . . . [but] claims a ‘process that
qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.’”).
Claim 1 neither explicitly recites (i) improving the efficiency or speed
of the computing system, computer memory, computing processor
components, and/or smartphone, nor (ii) reducing needed memory storage
space. Instead, claim 1 merely recites computer elements performing
generic computer functions in order to improve the efficiency of making a
work schedule. In other words, claim 1 improves the efficiency of human
activities. Thus, the computing system recited in Appellants’ claim 1 does
not exhibit the type of activity that distinguishes inventions having
significantly more than the abstract idea from those claims that do no more
than generically link the use of the method to a particular technological
environment, that is, by computers, memories, processors, input devices, or
communication interfaces. Alice, 573 U.S. at 226.
Appellants do not persuasively argue any specific limitation is not
well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field. Nor do Appellants
persuasively argue the Examiner erred in that aspect. In particular,
Appellants’ attorney arguments that the recited computer system is adapted
to perform the functions described in the Specification (e.g., an algorithm
disclosed in the flow charts and descriptions of the Specification) (App. Br.
15; Reply Br. 18), and therefore cannot be the “‘generic, general purpose
computing environment’” referenced by the Examiner (App. Br. 15) are
unpersuasive, because it is not supported by competent evidence. See
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Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1470; Meitzner, 549 F.2d at 782. Similarly, Appellants’
assertion that the recited “template” indicating a “transaction type” form a
“unique data structure” that provide the method/system with “unparalleled
flexibility” are not supported by competent evidence. Id. As a result,
Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred with respect to the
Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, Step 2B.
We agree with the Examiner that the additional limitations are not
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Non-
Final Act. 23–24. Namely, as the Examiner explains, “[t]here is no
indication that the combination of elements improves the functioning of a
computer or improves any other technology. Their collective functions
merely provide conventional computer implementation” (Non-Final Act.
24). Generic computers performing generic functions, do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. The Examiner goes on to
determine, and we agree, that “[t]he data collection, storage, processing, and
transmitting limitations are recited at a high level of generality and comprise
generic computer components performing generic computer functions
routinely used in computer applications” (Non-Final Act. 24), and “the
additional elements do not amount to significantly more than the . . . abstract
idea” (Non-Final Act. 24). And, lastly, there is no indication that the
combination of elements improves the functioning of the computer or
improves any other technology. See Electric Power Group LLC, 830 F.3d at
1354 (finding that use of “conventional computer, network, and display
technology for gathering, sending, and presenting the desired information”
does not add significantly more to the claimed abstract idea); Content
Extraction & Transmission, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347
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(Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing that data collection, recognition, and storage is
well-known); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decision, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he incidental use of a computer to perform the
[claimed process] does not impose a sufficiently meaningful [limitation] on
the claim’s scope.”).
Claim 1 recites an abstract idea (i.e., a fundamental economic practice
such as business relations and/or commercial practices), and does not
include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer
implementation and fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. Id. Claim 1, as whole, is focused on an easier and more efficient
process for bidding on and making work schedules for employees based on
employee award ponits, invokes generic computer components, and does not
serve to improve the computing system/components. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question
is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that
improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect
that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and
machinery”). In other words, the focus of claim 1 is to improve flexibility in
providing scheduling decisions based on bids consisting of employee award
points for work shifts in order to generate a work schedule, not to improve
the efficiency of the computing components or other technology used in the
implementation of the workforce management computer system.
As stated by Appellants in the Specification, “[i]n general,
embodiments of the present invention provide computer-program products,
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methods, systems, apparatus, and computing entities for management of
employee awarded points in a work environment” (Spec. ¶ 4), and serves as
a scheduling tool (see Spec. ¶ 3). As a result, Appellants’ arguments that
“the system provides unparalleled flexibility in allowing various types of
scheduling decisions to be administrated that involve different processing
methods for how employee points are processed” by using “unique data
structures” (App. Br. 12), are not persuasive.
Therefore, based on the record before us, we are not persuaded of
error in the Examiner’s determination that the appealed claims are directed
to patent ineligible subject matter, without significantly more. Accordingly,
we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23 as directed to patent
ineligible subject matter.
Preemption
Appellants’ arguments that, even if the claims are directed to the
abstract idea of allowing employees to be awarded points for completing
activities and then use those points to bid for preferred future work shifts to
be scheduled, the claims do not preempt all forms of practicing the abstract
idea (App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 20–21), are unpersuasive. Preemption is not
the sole test for patent eligibility, and any questions on preemption in the
instant case have been resolved by the Examiner’s Alice analysis. As our
reviewing court has explained: “questions on preemption are inherent in and
resolved by the § 101 analysis,” and, although “preemption may signal
patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does
not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
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claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).
In view of the foregoing, we determine claim 1 does not recite an
inventive concept because claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the abstract idea.
Summary
Therefore, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility Guidance,
informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellants
have not shown the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 and claims 2–23
grouped therewith are directed to a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea,
without significantly more, and thus are patent-ineligible under § 101. In
view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims
1–23 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Issue (2): Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 10, and 13–22
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection (Non-Final Act. 27–54) in
light of Appellants’ arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 17–28; Reply
Br. 2–10, 20–28) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
contentions. With regard to independent claim 1, we adopt as our own
(1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office
Action from which this appeal is taken (Non-Final Act. 28–36), and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 20–34) in
response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions
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reached by the Examiner. Specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s claim
interpretation of the disputed terms, “scheduling event,” “template,” and
“transaction type” (Ans. 20–25).4 More specifically, we agree with the
Examiner’s determinations that the Specification (i) does not provide formal
definitions of the disputed terms; and (ii) provides alternative and inclusive
descriptions of the disputed claim terms5 that are not sufficient to clearly set
forth a different definition for these terms as compared to their plain and
ordinary meaning (see Ans. 21–22). As a result, we concur with the
Examiner’s findings as to the individual references, as well as the rationale
articulated for combining the references (Non-Final Act. 28–36; Ans. 25–
34).
In view of the foregoing, and based on the proper interpretation of the
disputed claim terms, Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 10, and 13–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
combination of O’ Brien, Kish, Noble, Wu, and Ausubel, because the
combination of applied references teaches or suggests the disputed

4 When construing claim terminology (such as “scheduling event,”
“template,” and “transaction type”) during prosecution before the Office,
claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2004). “Construing claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the
applicant . . . because the applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims
to obtain more precise claim coverage.” Id. The Specification is the best
guide to the meaning of a disputed term. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
5 For example, the Specification describes that “a scheduling decision may
be associated with a template” (Ans. 21 citing Spec. ¶ 5), and a scheduling
decision “may be referred to as a ‘scheduling event’” (Ans. 21 citing Spec.
¶¶ 48–49).
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limitations recited in representative claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the
obviousness rejection of representative claim 1, as well as claims 2, 4–6, 8,
10, and 13–22 grouped therewith, as being obvious over O’ Brien, Kish,
Noble, Wu, and Ausubel.
Claims 3, 7, 9, and 12
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3, 7, 9, and 12
(Non-Final Act. 38–39, 42–46) in light of Appellants’ arguments in the
Appeal Brief (App. Br. 28–33; Reply Br. 25–27) that the Examiner has
erred. We disagree with Appellants’ contentions. With regard to dependent
claims 3, 7, 9, and 12, we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set
forth by the Examiner in the Office Action from which this appeal is taken
(Non-Final Act. 38–39, 42–46), and (2) the reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 34–39) in response to Appellants’
Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner.
More specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s determinations that
(i) the combination of O’ Brien and Wu teaches or suggests the recited
“sealed-first-price bidding format” recited in claim 3 (see Non-Final Act.
38–39; Ans. 34–36); and (ii) the combination of O’ Brien, Wu, and Ausubel
teaches or suggests a set of selected employees is identified as recited in
claim 7 (see Non-Final Act. 42–44; Ans. 36–38). We also agree with the
Examiner’s claim interpretations of the disputed terms, “scheduling event,”
“template,” and “transaction type” (Ans. 20–25), which in large part results
in our agreement with the Examiner’s determinations that (i) the
combination of O’ Brien and Wu teaches or suggests the bidding format
based on a transaction type identified in a template, recited in claim 3 (see
Non-Final Act. 38–39; Ans. 34–36); and (ii) that the combination of applied
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references meets the limitations recited in claims 9 and 12 (see Non-Final
Act. 44–46; Ans. 38–39)(relying on the Examiner’s claim interpretation for
“scheduling event”).
Claim 3
Claim 3 recites, “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the transaction type
indicated by the template is a sealed-first-price bidding format” (claim
3)(emphasis added).
With regard to claim 3, Appellants admit that “Wu discloses a ‘sealed-
bid’ (App. Br. 29), and “O’ Brien disclose that the highest bidder receives
the shift” (App. Br. 30), but argue (App. Br. 28–30; Reply Br. 25) that (i)
Wu does not disclose a sealed-first-price bidding format, which is defined by
paragraph 66 of the Specification as “‘a bidding format where agents
provide their single highest and best bid, which is not published to other
agents’” (App. Br. 28 citing Spec. ¶ 66); (ii) “O’Brien does not keep the bids
secret (or sealed) from other employees” (App. Br. 29); and therefore, (iii)
no prima facie case of obviousness has been made for claim 3.
The Examiner finds (Non-Final Act. 38–39; Ans. 34–36), and we
agree, that O’ Brien and Wu are properly combined (see Ans. 35–36), and
O’ Brien and Wu, thus the combination of O’ Brien, Kish, Noble, Wu, and
Ausubel, teaches or suggests the limitation recited in claim 3.
Claim 7
Claim 7 recites, “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the certain number
of the plurality of employees is equal to N representing an integer value
equal or greater than two and a highest N bids are used to identify the set of
selected employees.”
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With regard to claim 7, Appellants argue (App. Br. 30–31) that (i) Wu
fails to “disclose any aspect of using bids ‘to identify the set of selected
employees’ to be included in a scheduling decision where multiple
employees are involved” (App. Br. 30); (ii) O’ Brien only selects a single
winner based on the highest bid; and therefore, (iii) no prima facie case of
obviousness has been made as to claim 7.
The Examiner finds (Non-Final Act. 42–44; Ans. 36–38), and we
agree, that Wu (as amplified in Ausubel) combined with O’ Brien teach or
suggest the limitation recited in claim 7. More specifically, the Examiner
finds (see Ans. 37–38), and we agree, that (i) Wu (col. 10, ll. 21–31; col. 13,
l. 64–col. 14, l. 21) discloses a plurality of employees bidding (see Ans. 37);
and (ii) Ausubel (col. 9, ll. 35–41) discloses making an awards to multiple
high bidders (see Ans. 38).
Claim 9
Claim 9 recites, “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein the scheduling
event related to the work related activity comprises a plurality of work shifts
in a contact center.”
With regard to claim 9, Appellants argue (App. Br. 32; Reply Br. 26)
although O’ Brien discloses generating a “work schedule,” this is not the
same as the recited “scheduling event” as defined in paragraph 30 of the
Specification (App. Br. 32); therefore, “the Examiner’s rationale is based on
an incorrect understanding of the recited limitation ‘“scheduling event’”
(Reply Br. 26).
The Examiner finds (Non-Final Act. 44–45; Ans. 38–39), and we
agree, “there is no special definition present to change the broadest
reasonable interpretation of said claim limitation[] [i.e., scheduling event]”
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(Ans. 38), therefore, O’ Brien (col. 2, l. 64–col. 3, l. 4) as modified by Kish,
Noble, Wu, and Ausubel teach or suggest the limitations recited in claim 9.
Claim 12
Claim 12 recites, “[t]he method of claim 1, wherein identifying the set
of selected employees including the employee is predicated on the employee
submitting a bid in conjunction with another scheduling event” (claim
12)(emphasis added).
With regard to claim 12, Appellants argue (App. Br. 33; Reply Br. 27)
O’ Brien fails to disclose the limitation recited in claim 12 when the proper
interpretation is given to the term “scheduling event.”
As already stated, we agree with the Examiner’s broader interpretation
of “scheduling event” (see Ans. 20–25). On this basis, the Examiner finds
(Non-Final Act. 45–46; Ans. 39), and we agree, O’ Brien (col. 4, l. 32–39;
col. 7, l. 53–col. 8, l. 16 (describing steps 680 and 685)), as modified by
Kish, Noble, Wu, and Ausubel teaches or suggests the limitations recited in
claim 12. We also agree with the Examiner (see Ans. 39) that Appellants
have taken too broad of an interpretation of “scheduling event” in reaching
their conclusion that the limitation of claim 12, “in conjunction with another
scheduling event,” is not met by the applied references. In any event, one of
ordinary skill in the art of making work schedules for employees would
understand the need for scheduling shifts for an employee with an eye
towards avoiding other conflicts, like other shifts the employee has bid on,
or overlapping shifts for that same employee.
Summary
In view of the foregoing, Appellants have not persuaded us the
Examiner erred in reaching the conclusion that claims 3, 7, 9, and/or 12 are
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obvious over the combination of O’ Brien, Kish, Noble, Wu, and Ausubel,
and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection as to these claims.

CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter, without significantly more.
(2) Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting (a)
claim 1 and claims 2, 4–6, 8, 10, and 13–22 grouped therewith; (b)
dependent claims 3, 7, 9, and 12; and/or (c) claims 11 and 23, as being
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the same base combination of
O’Brien, Kish, Noble, Wu, and Ausubel.

DECISION
As explained above, we sustain the rejections of claims 1–23 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED