Neel Ishwar. Murarka et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 17, 2019

13679365 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 17, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/679,365 11/16/2012 Neel Ishwar Murarka 079894.0774 6661
91230 7590 07/17/2019
Baker Botts L.L.P./Facebook Inc.
2001 ROSS AVENUE
SUITE 900
Dallas, TX 75201
EXAMINER
NDIAYE, CHEIKH T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/17/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
judy.wan@bakerbotts.com
ptomail1@bakerbotts.com
ptomail2@bakerbotts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte NEEL ISHWAR MURAKAWA,
CHRISTOPHER TURITZIN, and
BRYAN GUILLEMETTE

___________

Appeal 2018-0085531
Application 13/679,3652
Technology Center 2400

_________________

Before DANIEL N. FISHMAN, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISHMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1–20 (all pending claims). Final Act. 1; App. Br. 3. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 In this Decision, we refer to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
February 20, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 28, 2018);
the Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed April 19, 2017); the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 29, 2018); and the originally filed
Specification (“Spec.,” filed November 16, 2012).
2 Appellants assert Facebook, Inc. is the real party-in-interest. App. Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ recited methods, computer-readable media, and systems
“relate[] to Short Message Service (SMS) messages and social-networking
systems.” Spec. ¶ 1.
In particular embodiments, a social-networking system
will collect information associated with a Short Message Service
(SMS) message, email message, instant messaging service (IM)
message, voice-over-IP (VoIP) call, or cellular-network call
from a user's mobile device and then cross-reference that
information with information associated with the social-
networking system’s social graph. Based on this cross-reference,
the social-networking system can then take actions for the benefit
of the user.
Id. ¶ 5. Appellants’ Figure 2 is reproduced below.

In Figure 2, social graph 200 includes one or more nodes, such as user nodes
202, concept nodes 204, and edges 206 connecting the nodes. Id. ¶ 27.
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“The nodes and edges of social graph 200 may be stored as data objects, for
example, in a data store (such as a social-graph database). Such a data store
may include one or more searchable or queryable indexes of nodes or edges
of social graph 200.” Id. Each user node 202 may be, for example, a human
user, an entity such as a business or third-party application, or a group of
humans and/or entities. Id. ¶ 28. Each concept node 204 may correspond to,
for example, a place, a website, an entity, a resource, a game, an activity, an
idea or theory, or combinations of such concepts. Id. ¶ 29.
A social-networking system may create edge 206 between a user node
202 and a concept node 204 in response to, for example, a user,
corresponding to the user node, transmitting a message indicating that it
“likes” a concept corresponding to the concept node. Id. ¶ 34.
According to Appellants, a social-networking system may cross-
reference information extracted from a message (e.g., SMS, VoIP, IM,
email, etc.) sent or received by a user (corresponding to a user node) with
information represented by one or more nodes or edges of the social-network
graph to better tailor information presented to the user to that user’s needs.
Id. ¶ 47. In general, “[b]ased on this cross-reference, the social-networking
system can then take actions for the benefit of the user.” Id. ¶ 5.
Furthermore, “[b]y cross-referencing contacts appearing in the same SMS
thread with user nodes and edges connecting those nodes on a social graph,
the social-networking system is able to suggest new friend requests to third
parties.” Id. ¶ 6.
As noted above, claims 1–20 are pending of which claims 1, 10, and
15 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative.
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1. A method comprising:
extracting, by a computing device, information from an
electronic message, the electronic message having been
communicated to or from a first user of a social-networking
system, the social-networking system comprising a social graph
that comprises a plurality of nodes, the plurality of nodes
comprising user nodes and concept nodes and a plurality of edges
connecting the nodes, the first user corresponding to a first user
node in the social graph, wherein a first subset of the plurality of
nodes is connected to the first user node by a first subset of the
plurality of edges;
identifying, by the computing device, a second subset of
the first subset of nodes that are within a pre-determined
threshold number of edges from the first user node;
analyzing, by the computing device, whether the extracted
information is associated with at least one of the identified nodes
or edges of the social graph, wherein the determining is based on
fuzzy string matching; and
sending, by the computing device, information of the first
user stored on the social-networking system to a client system
associated with at least one of the identified second subset of
nodes based on the analysis.
App. Br. 30. Independent claim 10 recites a storage medium embodying
software operable to perform functions similar to the steps of claim 1. Id. at
32. Independent claim 15 recites a system with one or more processors and
a memory comprising program instructions that, when executed by the
processor(s), perform functions similar to the method steps of claim 1. Id. at
33–34.
Rejections
The Examiner rejects all claims (1–20) under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–5.
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The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 13–16, and 18–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Langos et al. (U.S. Patent Publication
No. 2012/0099484 A1) (“Langos”) and Kremen et al. (U.S. Patent
Publication No. 2013/0013489 A1) (“Kremen”). Id. at 5–11.
The Examiner rejects claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Langos, Kremen, and Hein et al. (U.S. Patent Publication No.
2012/0089690 A1) (“Hein”). Id. at 11–12.
The Examiner rejects claims 6, 12, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Langos, Kremen, and Hull et al. (U.S. Patent Publication No.
2005/0171799 A1) (“Hull”). Id. at 12–14.

ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Unless
otherwise indicated, we adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Final Office
Action and the Answer as our own and add any additional findings of fact
appearing below for emphasis.
We address the rejections below.

1. Section 101 Rejection
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
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abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Alice and Mayo.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, in which “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The Office recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
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Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Guidance”).3 Under the Guidance, in
determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we first look
to whether the claim recites:
(1) Step 2A — Prong One: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity, such as a fundamental
economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) Step 2A — Prong Two: additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP4
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Revised Step 2A”). Only if a claim
(1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into
a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim (Step 2B):
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See id. at 56 (“Step 2B: If the Claim Is Directed to a Judicial Exception,
Evaluate Whether the Claim Provides an Inventive Concept.”).
Appellants do not separately argue the claims with respect to the
§ 101 rejection. See App. Br. 10–24. We select claim 1 as representative.
As an initial matter, the claims must be directed to at least one of four
recognized statutory categories, namely, machine, process, article of

3 This Guidance supersedes previous guidance memoranda. Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 51 (“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency
management, expected to follow the guidance.”).
4 All Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) citations herein are
to MPEP, Rev. 08.2017, January 2018.
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manufacture, or composition of matter. MPEP § 2106(I); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Here, independent claims 1, 10, and 15 are directed to a method (i.e.,
a “process”), a computer-readable medium (i.e., an “article of
manufacture”), and a system (i.e., a “machine”), respectively. Thus, the
pending claims are directed to recognized statutory categories of § 101 and
we turn to the two-step Alice/Mayo analysis applied in accordance with the
Office Guidance.

A. Step 2A
Applying the first step of the Alice/Mayo analysis, the Examiner finds
“claims 1–20 are directed to [an] abstract idea because comparing extracted
information with information in order to establish further links/edges can be
performed mentally.” Final Act. 2. The Examiner further finds “collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying the results of the collection and
analysis” relate to an idea of itself. Ans. 13.
Appellants do not directly address the Examiner’s position regarding
the claims being directed to a mental process but contend “fuzzy string
matching is not a mental exercise and is necessarily rooted in computer
technology.” Reply Br. 2. Additionally, Appellants contend “by reciting the
analysis whether the extracted information is associated with at least one of
the identified nodes or edges of the social graph, ‘the claimed solution is
necessarily rooted in computer technology,’” and therefore the claims are
necessarily removed “from being a mere abstract idea under part one of the
Alice test.” App. Br. 13–14 (citing DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Appellants argue “the claimed invention is
overcoming a problem specifically arising in the context of an online social
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network” and, therefore, “the claims are clearly directed to a non-abstract
improvement in computer technology.” Id. at 15 (citing Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellants further argue
that a machine (a computer) plays a significant part in the claimed process in
that “the claims absolutely require that a client device, a social graph server,
a relationship database, and a member database each play a significant part,”
and, therefore, “the claims recite patent eligible subject matter.” Id. at 16.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Initially, we note
that the server and databases that Appellants argue “play a significant part”
in the claims do not appear in the claims. Regardless, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.

Prong One
Independent method claim 1 includes recitations regarding the
structure of a social networking system as comprising a social graph, which,
in turn, comprises a plurality of nodes (user and concept nodes) coupled by a
plurality of edges—thus, reciting the structural context in which the method
steps of claim 1 are applied. As discussed supra, Appellants’ Figure 2
depicts a social graph of a social-networking system, the social graph
comprising a plurality of nodes (user nodes 202 and concept nodes 204)
wherein the nodes are related to one another as represented by corresponding
edges 206 of the social graph. Also, although not a function of the
extracting step, the claim recites that a first subset of nodes of the social
graph are connected to the first user’s node by corresponding edges. In
other words, the first user has relationships (connecting edges) with other
users and/or entities (other user and/or concept nodes).
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In the context of such a social graph, claim 1 recites the following
steps (each performed by a computing device): (1) “extracting
. . . information from an electronic message, the electronic message having
been communicated to or from a first user of a social-networking system, the
social-networking system comprising a social graph that comprises a
plurality of nodes, the plurality of nodes comprising user nodes and concept
nodes and a plurality of edges connecting the nodes, the first user
corresponding to a first user node in the social graph, wherein a first subset
of the plurality of nodes is connected to the first user node by a first subset
of the plurality of edges”; (2) “identifying . . . a second subset of the first
subset of nodes that are within a pre-determined threshold number of edges
from the first user node”; (3) “analyzing . . . whether the extracted
information is associated with at least one of the identified nodes or edges of
the social graph, wherein the determining5 is based on fuzzy string
matching”; and (4) “sending . . . information of the first user stored on the
social-networking system to a client system associated with at least one of
the identified second subset of nodes based on the analysis.”
First, we agree with the Examiner that the steps recite a mental
process that may be performed by a human with or without pen and paper.
The social graph itself may be drawn on paper by a human (much as
Appellants’ Figure 2 depicts the social graph). The extracting step extracts
information from an electronic message. An electronic message may be

5 We note that there is no antecedent basis for “the determining” as recited in
the analyzing step. For purposes of this Decision, we presume the phrase
was intended to recite “the analyzing” so as to further refine the particular
type of analysis to be performed by the analyzing step.
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displayed or printed for a human to read and extract information. The
identifying step may identify the second subset of nodes by a human
mentally (visually) reviewing the social graph of the system and locating
those nodes connected to the first user by a number of edges that is within a
predetermined threshold. For example, referring to Appellants’ Figure 2
(reproduced above on paper), a human can readily observe
(visually/mentally) that “User ‘C’” used “App ‘Spotify’” and, thus, “App
‘Spotify’” is a node in the first subset as claimed. A human can further
readily observe that “User ‘E’” also used the same “App ‘Spotify’” and,
thus, is in the second subset of nodes if the predetermined threshold number
of edges is at least 2. The fuzzy matching of the analyzing step may be
performed mentally by a human in the manner described in paragraph 48 of
Appellants’ Specification (i.e., insertion, deletion, substitution, or
transposition of a letter between two words to be compared). Lastly, the
sending step may be performed by a human communicating information
about the first user to another human or by composing a message to send to
the client system (e.g., send the name “User ‘C’” to “User ‘E’” because they
are connected within the predetermined threshold number of edges).
Therefore, disregarding the generic use of a computer system in the method
steps, the entire process may be performed by a human mentally with or
without pen and paper. Undoubtedly, performing the claimed method using
a computer enables the process to proceed faster and to analyze a larger
volume of information. However, “[i]f a claim, under its broadest
reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the
recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the
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mind.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (citing Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘‘[W]ith the
exception of generic computer implemented steps, there is nothing in the
claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human,
mentally or with pen and paper.’’)). Thus, in accordance with the Guidance,
claim 1 falls within the judicial exception category of a mental process and,
therefore, recites an abstract idea.
In essence, the extracting step merely collects information about a
first user (i.e., a user represented by a user node of the social graph, the user
node connected to a first subset of other nodes). The information is
collected from electronic messages sent to or from the first user. Other than
being extracted from an electronic message, the extracting step is not limited
to any particular type of data to be extracted. Furthermore, the extracting
step is not limited to any particular type of electronic message from which
the information is to be extracted. Regardless of the particular source from
which the information is extracted and the content of the extracted
information, the extracting step recites nothing more than collecting or
gathering information about a first user.
The identifying step generates further information by identifying a
second subset of the first subset of nodes. The identified second subset of
nodes are within a predetermined threshold number of edges from the first
user node—i.e., within a predetermined number of degrees of separation.
See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 47. Thus, the identifying step merely collects (generates)
further information (a second subset of nodes) by analyzing the degrees of
separation between other nodes and the first user node.
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The analyzing step merely analyzes the extracted information
comparing it with other nodes and edges of the social graph using fuzzy
string matching techniques.6 Lastly, responsive to the analysis of the
extracted information, the sending step sends information of the first user to
a system associated with associated with a node of the second subset of
nodes. Sending information is clearly analogous to displaying the results of
the collection or analysis.
In view of the above discussion, we determine that the claims are
directed to collecting information, analyzing the collected information, and
displaying results of the collection and/or analysis of the information, which
involves “observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion.” Guidance 84
Fed. Reg. at 52. Therefore, these steps recite a mental process, which is a
category of abstract ideas under the Guidance. Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. at 52;
see also Electric Power Group, LLC, v. Alstom, 830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[M]erely selecting information, by content or source, for
collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a
process from ordinary mental processes, whose implicit exclusion from
§ 101 undergirds the information-based category of abstract ideas”).
In addition, the Examiner finds the claims are “directed to the abstract
idea of analyzing information communicated on a social network with other
information associated with other person(s)/node(s) on the social network in
order to establish further linkages,” which is “a category of ‘organizing

6 As noted supra, the step recites that “the determining” is based on fuzzy
matching without antecedent basis for “the determining.” We presume the
claim intended to recite that “the analysis” is based on fuzzy matching.
Should this application proceed in further prosecution, we urge Appellants to
correct this apparent error.
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human activities’ or ‘using categories to organize information.’” Final Act.
4–5. Still further, the Examiner finds the claims “involve collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying the results of the collection and
analysis” and “these concepts relate to ‘certain methods of organizing
human activity.’” Ans. 13. In addition to reciting a a mental process and,
hence, an abstract idea, we also agree with the Examiner’s finding that the
claims recite using categories to organize information which is a certain
method of organizing human activity and, hence, an abstract idea.

Prong Two
As discussed supra, Appellants argue that a machine (a computer)
plays a significant part in the claimed process in that “the claims absolutely
require that a client device, a social graph server, a relationship database,
and a member database each play a significant part,” and, therefore, “the
claims recite patent eligible subject matter.” App. Br. 16.
The Examiner concludes, “The claims invoke computer or machine
merely as a tool to perform the steps. The courts have identified in Affinity
Labs or TLI that merely using a generic computer/machine after the fact to
an abstract idea does not amount to significantly more than the abstract
idea.” Ans. 16 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(f)). We agree.
The Specification explains that the recited “computing device”
(performing the various steps and functions) is generic:7

7 We acknowledge that some of the considerations at Step 2A, Prong Two,
properly may be evaluated under Step 2 of Alice (Step 2B of the Office
guidance). For purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the
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A mobile computing device - such as a smartphone, tablet
computer, or laptop computer - may include functionality for
wireless communication, such as BLUETOOTH
communication, near-field communication (NFC), or infrared
(IR) communication or communication with a wireless local area
networks (WLANs) or cellular-telephone network. Such a
device may also execute one or more applications such as for
example, communications through short-message service
(SMS), communications through multimedia-messaging service
(MMS), accessing e-mail, accessing Internet content,
communications through a short-range wireless (e.g. infrared or
BLUETOOTH), business applications, gaming, or photography
using a camera integrated into the mobile electronic device.
Spec. ¶ 4. Appellants’ Specification further explains:
FIG. 5 illustrates an example computer system 500. In
particular embodiments, one or more computer systems 500
perform one or more steps of one or more methods described or
illustrated herein. In particular embodiments, one or more
computer systems 500 provide functionality described or
illustrated herein. In particular embodiments, software running
on one or more computer systems 500 performs one or more
steps of one or more methods described or illustrated herein or
provides functionality described or illustrated herein. Particular
embodiments include one or more portions of one or more
computer systems 500. Herein, reference to a computer system
may encompass a computing device, and vice versa, where
appropriate. Moreover, reference to a computer system may
encompass one or more computer systems, where appropriate.
Spec. ¶ 53.
Neither the claims nor the Specification states that any of the
described embodiments necessarily invokes particular hardware or software
or, as discussed above, results in improvements in computer technology or

Office, we evaluate them under Step 1 of Alice (Step 2A of the Office
guidance). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.25, 27–32.
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functions. Thus, the claims do not provide meaningful limitations beyond
generally linking the use of the identified abstract idea to a particular
technological environment, i.e., social networks. See MPEP § 2106.05(h).
Appellants contend that the claimed invention “is overcoming a
problem specifically arising in the context of an online social network, and
particularly facilitates the exchange of information between known
associated users of social-networking system used by prior art systems.”
App. Br. 15; see also id. at 19 (“[O]ne of skill in the art would recognize that
the claimed invention as an ordered combination of its elements is
‘necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.’”).
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Appellants’ claimed
methods, computer-readable media, and systems only use the recited
components to perform the abstract idea. That is, the additional components
“merely include[] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer,
or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea.” Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also MPEP § 2016.05(f); see also Credit Acceptance
Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (using a
computer as a tool to process an application for financing a purchase).
Appellants further argue the claimed invention transforms data by the
recited steps of extracting, identifying, analyzing, and sending and, thus,
requiring a fundamental change to the data. App. Br. 18–19 (citing PNC
Bank v. Secure Access, LLC, Case CBM2014-00100, Paper 10 at 20 (PTAB
Sept. 9, 2014)).
We remain unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument. Appellants do not
specifically identify any such fundamental change in the data nor do we
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discern any such transformation of data. The non-precedential decision in
PNC specifically found, “[r]ather, the challenged claims specifically recite
‘transforming . . . received data by inserting an authenticity key to create
formatted data,’ thereby authenticating a web page with an authenticity
stamp. Thus, the claims require a fundamental change to the data; a change
that cannot be performed in the human mind.”). PNC at 22. We find no
such data transformation in the claimed invention. Claim 1 merely recites
collecting (extracting) information regarding a first user and, following
analysis to identify other users or entities, sending “information of the first
user” to such other identified users or entities. Claim 1 does not require any
particular type of “information of the first user” be sent to the others, no
specific transformation of the initially collected (extracted) data is required
by the claim (let alone a transformation beyond the capability of a human
mind).
In view of Appellants’ Specification, claims, and contentions and
consistent with the Examiner’s determinations, we conclude the pending
claims do not recite:
(i) an improvement to the functioning of a computer;
(ii) an improvement to another technology or technical field;
(iii) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(iv) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(v) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Thus, we conclude that the pending
claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.

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C. Step 2B
Having determined that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we
apply the second step of the Alice/Mayo analysis. The Examiner finds,
“That the extraction of the information from a communication of an
electronic nature may utilize technological systems is also not sufficient to
amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because these are
generic computer operations of a well-known nature and not an
improvement to that technology.” Final Act. 5. The Examiner further finds,
The claims do not include additional elements that are
sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because extracting information from message an
electronic message, analyzing the extraction against identified
information using fuzzy matching, and sending information
based on the analysis do not sufficiently amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception because the additional
limitations amounts to mere instructions to implement the
abstract idea on a computer.
Ans. 13; see also id. at 14–18.
Appellants argue,
Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that Claims
1-20 were directed to an abstract idea, the claims contain an
“‘inventive concept,’—i.e., an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent’” upon the alleged
abstract idea.
App. Br. 17 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–
73)). Appellants then quote the identifying and analyzing steps of claim 1,
quote paragraphs 47 and 51 of the Specification, and assert,
Furthermore, independent Claims 1, 10, and 15 recite steps that,
taken as a whole, relate to “a computer-implemented method to
transform data in a particular manner by” at least “extracting, by
a computing device, information from an electronic message,”
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“identifying, by the computing device, a second subset of the first
subset of nodes that are within a pre-determined threshold
number of edges from the first user node,” “analyzing, by the
computing device, whether the extracted information is
associated with at least one of the identified nodes or edges of
the social graph, wherein the determining is based on fuzzy string
matching,” and “sending, by the computing device, information
of the first user stored on the social-networking system to a client
system associated with at least one of the identified second subset
of nodes based on the analysis,” which is patent-eligible subject
matter.
App. Br. 17–19.
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments asserting the invention
improves a technology or the functioning of a computer but merely quoting
the claim language in support of that contention. Appellants do not identify
and we do not discern where the Specification or claims assert that any of
the recited components, alone or in combination, are not generic. To the
contrary, as discussed above, the Specification makes clear that only generic
components (e.g., a computing device) perform the recited functions in
Appellants’ claimed invention. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 4, 53–62. Appellants’
arguments are devoid of evidence that the claims change the operation of
any recited technology or technical field or improve the functioning of the
computer itself. Instead, the recited “computing device” of claim 1 is
merely a tool to collect and analyze data and display results of such
collection and analysis. In like manner, the instructions on a computer
readable medium as in claim 10 and the processor(s) and memory of claim
15 are merely generic tools for collection, analysis, and presentation of data.
Appellants do not show that the recited combinations of these claimed
elements operate in any way that is unconventional, non-routine, or non-
generic. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (“In holding that the process was patent
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ineligible, we rejected the argument that ‘implement[ing] a principle in some
specific fashion’ will ‘automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject
matter of § 101.’”) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
Still further, Appellants argue the claims do not preempt an entire
field. App. Br. 20–21. The Examiner does not find the claims preempt a
field of technology. Furthermore, we are not persuaded the Examiner’s
rejection is in error, because, even if the claims were understood to not
preempt an entire field, the courts do not use the absence of preemption as a
stand-alone test for patent eligibility. Although preemption “‘might tend to
impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting
the primary object of the patent laws” (Alice, 573 U.S. at 216 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71)), “the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility” (Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See also OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the
claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price
optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).

D. Conclusion Regarding § 101 Rejection
As noted supra, because Appellants do not argue independent claims
10 and 15 separate from arguments directed to independent claim 1, we
selected claim 1 as representative. On this record, we agree with the
Examiner that independent claims 1, 10, and 15 are directed to a mental
process as identified in the Guidance and, thus, are directed to an abstract
idea. In addition, we agree with the Examiner that claims 1, 10 and 15 are
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directed to using categories to organize information, which is one of certain
methods of organizing human activity identified in the Guidance and, thus,
are directed to an abstract idea. Furthermore, we determine the claims do
not recite limitations that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea
itself. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
determining that the independent claims (1, 10, and 15) are patent ineligible,
and we sustain the rejection of those claims.
Appellants do not argue the eligibility of the dependent claims
separately and, therefore, we find that the dependent claims fall with their
respective base claims as directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Thus,
we sustain the rejection of the dependent claims, as well.

2. Section 103 Rejection
Appellants do not separately argue the claims with respect to the
§ 103 rejection. See App. Br. 24–28. We select claim 1 as representative.
The Examiner finds the proposed combination of Langos and Kremen
or Langos and Kremen in further combination with other references renders
all claims (1–20) obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Final Act. 5–14. In
particular, the Examiner articulates a reason for combining Langos and
Kremen asserting:
Langos does not explicitly disclose wherein the
determining is based on fuzzy string matching (paragraph 0072;
claim 3 disclose the use of fuzzy matching in the field of social
networking) in order to efficiently verify user relationships
(Abstract). Therefore, based on Langos in view of Kremen, it
would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made to utilize the teaching of
Kremen to the system of Langos in order to efficiently verify user
relationships.
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Final Act. 7.
Appellants argue, inter alia, that the Examiner must identify a
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation, either in the references themselves or
in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to
modify the reference or to combine reference teachings.” App. Br. 27
(citing MPEP § 2143(G) (Rev. 6, Sept. 2007)). Appellants contend “the
Examiner merely speculates that the proposed combination would have
provided the following benefit of ‘efficiently verifying user relationships.’”
Id. Appellants further contend the proposed benefit “have no relation to the
limitations of Claim 1” and, therefore, the ordinarily skilled artisan would
not have been motivated to make the proposed combination to achieve the
claimed invention. Id.
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
failing to articulate a reason to combine Langos and Kremen based on
rational underpinnings. First, the Examiner does not identify any reference
in Langos to any problem of efficiency in comparing information and fails to
identify any reference in Kremen suggesting improved efficiency in
comparing information. Second, we discern no rational basis for the
Examiner speculation that fuzzy matching in comparing strings of
information would be more efficient than requiring exact matches when
comparing string information. To the contrary, it seems to us that fuzzy
matching, as known to the ordinarily skilled artisan and as disclosed in
Appellants’ Specification, would require more computational processing (or
mental processing) than would simple comparisons requiring exact matches
between two strings being compared. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 48–51.
In view of the above discussion, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
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rejections of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 as ineligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 as obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we affirm at least one rejection of each claim, we affirm the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED