Neal Patterson et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 27, 202014048349 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/048,349 10/08/2013 NEAL PATTERSON 27098.176025 7886 46169 7590 03/27/2020 SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P. (CERNER CORPORATION) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT 2555 GRAND BOULEVARD KANSAS CITY, MO 64108-2613 EXAMINER AUGUSTINE, VICTORIA PEARL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3686 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/27/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): BPARKERSON@SHB.COM IPDocket@shb.com docket.shb@clarivate.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte NEAL PATTERSON, RYAN HAMILTON, BHARAT SUTARIYA, and TEHSIN SYED ____________________ Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before DAVID M. KOHUT, BETH Z. SHAW, and JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies Cerner Innovation, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant identifies that the present application is related to Application No. 14/048,377 (Appeal No. 2018-008194, currently pending). Appeal Br. 3. In addition, we note the present application is also related to Application No. 14/048,365 (Appeal No. 2018-000645, decision mailed March 27, 2019). Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to “organizational management of population health.” Spec. ¶ 4. More particularly, Appellant describes the managing population health techniques includes building and maintaining data stores related to healthcare organizations, healthcare providers, and information concerning contractual provisions between healthcare organizations and payers. Spec. ¶¶ 4–5. In one embodiment, the disclosed system “builds, maintains, and updates data stores that include longitudinal patent-centric [sic: patient centric] information drawn from a variety of disparate data sources.” Spec. ¶ 28. Patient information from various reference records is combined “to form person-centric longitudinal health records known as population records. Each record is longitudinal in that it contains information on all of the patient’s health encounters even though the encounters may have occurred at disparate locations and with disparate providers.” Spec. ¶ 61; see also Spec. ¶¶ 65–67 (describing converting raw patient data from different sources into a longitudinal population record). Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is reproduced below: Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 3 1. A system for organizational management of patient population health, the system comprising: a computing device having one or more processors and one or more computer-storage media; one or more data stores; and a population health management service run via the computing device and coupled to the one or more data stores wherein the population health management service: receives a plurality of sets of organizational data associated with one or more healthcare organizations; stores the plurality of sets of organizational data in the one or more data stores; receives raw data associated with a population of patients from one or more raw data sources; creates source-specific reference records from the raw data, each source-specific reference record including raw data received from a single corresponding raw data source, wherein the source-specific reference records are created via the one or more processors by: (i) when the raw data contains conflicting data, reconciling the conflicting data, (ii) transforming the raw data received from the one or more raw data sources into multiple medical nomenclatures, (iii) for each of the one or more raw data sources, compiling the raw data, as transformed, into a source-specific reference record, the source-specific reference record supporting each of the multiple medical nomenclatures, and (iv) storing the source-specific reference records as accessible to the one or more of a disease condition-specific program or objective-specific program; generates longitudinal population records, each longitudinal population record including patient data for a single patient in the population associated with the raw data, wherein the longitudinal population records are generated via the one or more processors by: Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 4 (i) matching each patient to corresponding source-specific reference records based on the raw data associated with the patient and used to create the source-specific reference records, wherein matching each patient includes, when the source- specific reference records utilize multiple identifiers for the same patient, reconciling the multiple identifiers with one another; (ii) upon matching each patient to the corresponding source-specific reference records, creating the longitudinal population records of patient data obtained from the corresponding raw data in the source-specific reference records, and (iii) storing the longitudinal population records for use by the one or more of a disease condition-specific program or objective-specific program; and provides the plurality of longitudinal population records to one or more of a disease condition-specific program or objective- specific program. The Examiner’s Rejections 1. Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Final Act. 2. 2. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–15. ANALYSIS2 Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) Claim 13 depends from independent claim 10 and recites “wherein the multiple medical nomenclatures comprise two or more Logical Observation 2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed October 24, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed May 29, 2018 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed April 5, 2018 (“Ans.”); and Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 5 Identifiers Names and Codes (LOINC), Unified Medical Language System (UMLS), or Systemized Nomenclature of Medicine (SNOMED).” The Examiner indicates the claim does not recite the specific implementation of these protocols, stating that the claim would be “subjected to future revisions of these protocols to include when the protocols become obsolete.” Final Act. 2. Additionally, the Examiner explains SNOMED is a trademark and is being used in the claim to identify or describe a particular material or product and, therefore, does not comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Ans. 3 (citing Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2173.05(u) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). The presence of a trademark in a claim is not, per se, improper under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). MPEP § 2173.05(u). Because a trademark is used to identify a source of goods rather than the goods themselves, the scope of the claim including a trademark may be uncertain if the trademark is being used to identify a particular material or product. MPEP § 2173.05(u). In Ex parte Simpson, 218 USPQ 1020 (Bd. App. 1982), the claim at issue recited, in part, “a surface comprising a thin Hypalon membrane.” Simpson, 218 USPQ at 1021. Addressing the Hypalon trademark term, the Board concluded it was uncertain as to the particular material that forms the Hypalon membrane (i.e., a chlorosulphonated polythene). Simpson, 218 USPQ at 1021. The Board explained that other manufacturers could produce a synthetic resin like chlorosulphonated polythene, either alone or with other materials or additives. Simpson, 218 USPQ at 1021. Thus, the Board explained it was unclear “how much, if any, chlorosulphonated the Final Office Action, mailed June 5, 2017 (“Final Act.”), from which this Appeal is taken. Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 6 polythene must be present in a material that is employed in the claimed combination before infringement occurs.” Simpson, 218 USPQ at 1022. As such, the use of Hypalon did not sufficiently circumscribe the metes and bounds of the claim. Simpson, 218 USPQ at 1021. However, in Ex parte Regen, Appeal No. 2011-005683, 2013 WL 6253158, at *1–2 (PTAB Dec. 2, 2013), the Board reversed the Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection of claim 31, which recites in part “a transmitter operating according to a protocol compatible at least with Bluetooth external wireless devices.” The Board explained that “the term ‘Bluetooth’ identifies a source of interoperability standards . . . [and] one skilled in the relevant art would have understood that the terms ‘Bluetooth external wireless devices,’ in the context of the claimed invention, refers to devices that conform to the Bluetooth interoperability standard.” Regen, 2013 WL 6253158, at *2. We find the reasoning of Regen to be applicable to the pending rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Similar to the interoperability standard of Bluetooth (see Regen, 2013 WL 6253158, at *2), the LOINC, UMLS, and SNOMED nomenclatures set forth a standard format and terminology for medical terms and clinical documentation that allows for interoperability. An ordinarily skilled artisan would understand, in the context of the claimed invention and in light of the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. ¶ 59) that use of the trademarked terms refers to transforming the raw data into a nomenclature that conforms to the SNOMED (for example) format. For the reasons discussed supra, we are persuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) of claim 13. Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 7 Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 11–24; Reply Br. 2–4. In particular, Appellant argues the Examiner overgeneralizes the claims and that the claims recite specific steps, rooted in computer technology, to accomplish a desired result that improves a computer-related technology (e.g., “provides a new computer-based functionality and/or improves computer functionality through the creation of new data structures from raw data for specific use by computer programs”). Appeal Br. 16–21; Reply Br. 3. In addition, Appellant challenges the Examiner’s findings that the claims recite computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Reply Br. 2. The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 8 DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Per Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two prongs of analysis (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, see infra, the claim passes muster under § 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step is to determine whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, we conclude Appellant’s claims recite an abstract idea because they recite mental processes. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of a “computer” or “computer readable medium” does not make a claim otherwise directed to a process that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” patent eligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 9 71 (2012) (explaining mental processes are not patentable); 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53 nn.14–15. More specifically, Appellant’s claims are directed to generating longitudinal population records from raw patient-centric data drawn from disparate sources that has been transformed into industry-standard nomenclatures. See Spec. ¶¶ 28 (describing the disclosed system as building data stores that include “longitudinal patent-centric [sic: patient-centric] information drawn from a variety of disparate data sources”), 61–69, Fig. 7; Appeal Br. 3 (“the claimed embodiments include a population management service that builds, maintains, and updates electronic source-specific reference records and electronic longitudinal patent-centric [sic: patient- centric] information, that are usable by various computer programs and which create technological compatibility across different and/or incompatible electronic record systems”). Generating longitudinal population records from raw patient-centric data drawn from disparate sources that has been transformed into industry-standard nomenclatures is an evaluation that can be performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper. Consistent with our Office Guidance and case law, we conclude that generating longitudinal population records from raw patient-centric data drawn from disparate sources that has been transformed into industry- standard nomenclatures is a mental process and, thus, an abstract idea. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 10 category”); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding the claimed method of processing information from various sources (i.e., hard copy documents) was directed to the abstract idea of “1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory”); Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (concluding claims to collecting physiologic data from disparate medical devices, converting the data to a common format, analyzing the data, and displaying the data were directed to an abstract idea); HealthTrio LLC v. Aetna, Inc., 673 F. App’x 1006 (mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming district court decision holding “collection of data from various sources with the goal of compiling a single, comprehensive, patient health record” is patent ineligible); EResearchTechnology, Inc. v. CRF, Inc., 681 F. App’x 964 (mem.) (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming district court ruling that “using an electronic device to obtain clinical trial data that would otherwise be collected by pen-and-paper diary, and analyzing the data to decide whether to prompt action” and “[c]lassifying clinical trial results by obtaining data using a portable electronic device and comparing same to a norm” are patent ineligible). Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim limitations that recite generating longitudinal population records from raw patient-centric data drawn from disparate sources that has been transformed into industry-standard nomenclatures, emphasized in italics: 1. A system for organizational management of patient population health, the system comprising: a computing device having one or more processors and one or more computer-storage media; Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 11 one or more data stores; and a population health management service run via the computing device and coupled to the one or more data stores wherein the population health management service: receives a plurality of sets of organizational data associated with one or more healthcare organizations; stores the plurality of sets of organizational data in the one or more data stores; receives raw data associated with a population of patients from one or more raw data sources; creates source-specific reference records from the raw data, each source-specific reference record including raw data received from a single corresponding raw data source, wherein the source-specific reference records are created via the one or more processors by: (i) when the raw data contains conflicting data, reconciling the conflicting data, (ii) transforming the raw data received from the one or more raw data sources into multiple medical nomenclatures, (iii) for each of the one or more raw data sources, compiling the raw data, as transformed, into a source-specific reference record, the source-specific reference record supporting each of the multiple medical nomenclatures, and (iv) storing the source-specific reference records as accessible to the one or more of a disease condition-specific program or objective-specific program; generates longitudinal population records, each longitudinal population record including patient data for a single patient in the population associated with the raw data, wherein the longitudinal population records are generated via the one or more processors by: (i) matching each patient to corresponding source-specific reference records based on the raw data associated with the patient and used to create the source-specific reference records, wherein matching each patient includes, when the source- Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 12 specific reference records utilize multiple identifiers for the same patient, reconciling the multiple identifiers with one another; (ii) upon matching each patient to the corresponding source-specific reference records, creating the longitudinal population records of patient data obtained from the corresponding raw data in the source-specific reference records, and (iii) storing the longitudinal population records for use by the one or more of a disease condition-specific program or objective-specific program; and provides the plurality of longitudinal population records to one or more of a disease condition-specific program or objective- specific program. More particularly, the concept of generating longitudinal population records from raw patient-centric data drawn from disparate sources that has been transformed into industry-standard nomenclatures comprises (i) receiving raw patient-centric data from disparate data sources (i.e., the claimed step of receiving raw data associated with a population of patients from one or more raw data sources); (ii) transforming the raw data into industry-standard nomenclatures (i.e., the claimed steps of creating source- specific reference records from the raw data by transforming the raw data into multiple medical nomenclatures); and (iii) generating longitudinal population records from the transformed raw data (i.e., the claimed steps of generating longitudinal population records by matching each patient to corresponding source-specific reference records). Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 13 are “any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Here, we find the additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a “particular machine” to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, the additional limitations merely provide additional detail on the creation of the source-specific reference records or generation of the longitudinal population records (i.e., the judicial exception). Also, the additional limitations recite such extra-solution activities such as storing the transformed raw data as source-specific reference records, or storing the longitudinal population records. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1066 (E.D. Mo. 2011) aff’d, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that “storing, retrieving, and providing data . . . are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activity”). Similarly, merely providing the longitudinal population records for use by other programs does not confer patent eligibility. See, e.g., Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (recognizing “that merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 14 more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”). Further, the steps of receiving and storing sets of organizational data and the elements of one or more data stores and a computing device running a population health management service also fail to confer patent eligibility. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions (see, e.g., Appeal Br. 12–16, 20– 21; Reply Br. 3), the claims do not recite a new functionality in computer capabilities or address a problem necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem arising in the realm of computer networks. See Berkheimer v. HP, Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Instead, as the Examiner notes (see Ans. 4–6), the claims merely use computers and computer devices that operate in their normal, expected manner. See also DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1258–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Additionally, as the court in Enfish explained, “the first step in the Alice inquiry . . . asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As discussed above, the focus of the pending claims is on generating longitudinal population records from raw patient-centric data drawn from disparate sources that has been transformed into industry- standard nomenclatures and the recited computing elements are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36. Further, we note that using a computer to perform tasks more quickly or efficiently does not confer patent eligibility on an otherwise ineligible abstract idea. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 15 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”). For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice to determine if there are additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77– 79). As stated in the Office Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. “Whether something is well- understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual determination.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (alone or when considered as an ordered combination) that are not well-understood, routine, and conventional. For example, when describing the computers of a computing environment for practicing the claimed invention (see, e.g., Fig. 1), Appellant describes the components at a high level of generality and Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 16 note the components are “well-known computing systems” such as personal computers or laptop devices. Spec. ¶ 31; see also Spec. ¶¶ 35–38. As the Examiner finds, our reviewing court has recognized that receiving, processing (i.e., transforming), and storing data; and receiving or transmitting data over a network are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities. Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 4–5. Consistent with the Berkheimer Memorandum,3 we agree with the Examiner’s findings that the claims merely recite generic computer components (e.g., a computing device comprising a processor and memory) performing generic computing functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional (e.g., receiving and transmitting data, processing data, and presenting the results of the data processing). See Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (generic computer components, such as an “interface,” “network,” and “database,” fail to satisfy the inventive concept requirement); Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and a ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims.”); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“That a computer receives and sends 3 On April 19, 2018, the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy issued a memorandum entitled: Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (i.e., “the Berkheimer Memorandum”) (discussing the Berkheimer decision) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer- 20180419.PDF). Support for a finding that an element was well-understood, routine, or conventional may be shown by citation to one or more court decisions noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the element(s). See Berkheimer Memorandum 3–4. Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 17 the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). Additionally, to the extent Appellant contends the claims do not seek to preempt an abstract idea (see Reply Br. 3–4), we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. “‘[W]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.’” FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Further, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379. For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellant relies on similar arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 10 and 18. See Appeal Br. 24. For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error and sustain the Examiner’s rejection of these claims. Further, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2–9, 11–17, 19, and 20, which depend directly or indirectly therefrom and were not argued separately with particularity. See Appeal Br. 24; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2018-006331 Application 14/048,349 18 CONCLUSION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 13 112(b) Indefiniteness 13 1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20 Overall Outcome 1–20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation