National Real Estate Solutions, LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 17, 2011

No. 77722256 (T.T.A.B. Jun. 17, 2011)

Mailed:
June 17, 2011

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re National Real Estate Solutions, LLC.
________

Serial Nos. 77722235 and 777222561
_______

Daniel J. Noblitt and David W. Schnell of The Noblitt
Group, PLLC for National Real Estate Solutions, LLC.

Cory Boone, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 104
(Chris Doninger, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Bucher, Zervas and Bergsman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Zervas, Administrative Trademark Judge:

National Real Estate Solutions, LLC (“applicant”)
filed the following two applications:
1. Application Serial No. 77722235 (“the ‘235
application”) for the mark

1 In its order mailed October 22, 2010, the Board consolidated
these two applications for purposes of briefing and decision.
THIS OPINION IS NOT
A PRECEDENT OF
THE T.T.A.B.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
2
2. Application Serial No. 77772256 (“the ‘256
application”) for the standard character form mark
NATIONAL QUICK SALE.

Both applications seek registration pursuant to Section
1(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a), and recite
the following International Class 36 services:
Mortgage foreclosure mitigation and loan default
mitigation services, namely, providing a web-
based database for purchasing and selling real
estate for others; On-line real estate investment
services in the nature of purchasing and selling
real estate for others; Facilitating and
arranging for real estate procurement for others.

There are numerous refusals we must address in this
opinion. Registration of applicant’s combination word and
design mark is refused under Sections 6(a) and 2(e)(1) of
the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1052(e)(1) and
1056(a), because applicant has not disclaimed the wording
in the mark. Registration of applicant’s standard
character mark is refused under Section 2(e)(1) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1), on the ground
that applicant's proposed mark merely describes a feature
of applicant's services. Also, registration of both marks
is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that applicant's marks so
resemble the following three previously registered marks so
as to be likely to cause confusion:
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
3
• Registration No. 2397454 (“the ‘454 registration”)
on the Principal Register (renewed) for the mark

for “mortgage banking, namely, an alternative to
warehouse financing for lenders” in International
Class 36;

• Registration No. 3438458 (“the ‘458 registration”)
on the Supplemental Register for the mark A QUICK SALE
(in standard character form, SALE is disclaimed) for
“financial valuation of real property; arranging or
facilitating the leasing or rental of real property;
real estate agencies; real estate property brokerage”
in International Class 36; and

• Registration No. 3497625 (“the ‘625 registration”)
on the Principal Register for the mark

(A QUICK SALE is disclaimed) for “financial valuation
of real property; arranging or facilitating the
leasing or rental of real property; real estate
agencies; real estate property brokerage” in
International Class 36.

The marks of the ‘458 and ‘625 registrations are referred
to collectively as “the A QUICK SALE marks”; and the same
entity owns the ‘458 and ‘625 registrations while a
different entity owns the ‘454 registration.
Applicant has appealed the final refusals. Both
applicant and the examining attorney have filed briefs.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
4
Mere Descriptiveness
We consider first the merits of the examining
attorney’s Section 2(e)(1) refusal in the ‘256 application
and the disclaimer requirement in the ‘235 application.
A mark is merely descriptive if it immediately
describes the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics of
the goods or services or if it conveys information
regarding a function, purpose, or use of the goods or
services. In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200
USPQ 215 (CCPA 1978). See also In re Nett Designs, 236
F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To be merely
descriptive, a term need only describe a single significant
quality or property of the goods or services. In re
Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Also, “[t]he perception of the relevant purchasing public
sets the standard for determining descriptiveness. Thus, a
mark is merely descriptive if the ultimate consumers
immediately associate it with a quality or characteristic
of the product or service. On the other hand, if a mark
requires imagination, thought, and perception to arrive at
the qualities or characteristics of the goods or services,
then the mark is suggestive.” In re MBNA America Bank
N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 67 USPQ2d 1778, 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
5
The examining attorney’s arguments and evidence
According to the examining attorney, NATIONAL is a
common, merely descriptive term used to describe services
that are nationwide in scope; applicant services are
provided across the United States; QUICK “is a common term
describing services done speedily, easily, or without
delay”; and SALE “is a common term that means the transfer
of ownership of something.” Brief at unnumbered p. 13. In
addition, QUICK SALE is a “common phrase with a specific,
recognized meaning in the fields of real estate and
mortgage foreclosure … [which is] also known as a short
sale, [and] means a sale of real estate, usually processed
at a fast pace, that occurs because the seller faces
foreclosure or is otherwise in need of liquidity”; and
that:
As with a short sale, a “quick sale” is made at a
price below the balance remaining on the
mortgage, and often below the current or expected
future market price. While not ideal, selling
quickly at whatever price can be had may help a
seller avoid problems of foreclosure by a
creditor because of a loan default. Or a seller
may simply need to free up assets (cash) rendered
illiquid as merely equity in the real estate.
Similarly, a mortgage lender may prefer that a
mortgagee sell when nearing or in default so
costly foreclosure proceedings are avoided and so
another, solvent owner may continue to pay off
the loan. As noted in the evidence, “the primary
function of a quick sale is to allow all parties
involved with a particular piece of real estate
the ability to lessen or mitigate their current
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
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or anticipated losses.” … The term “QUICK SALE”
… thus describes the nature and purpose of the
applicant’s services, which concern mortgage
foreclosure mitigation and loan default
mitigation through activities concerning the
purchase or sale of real estate.

Id. at 13 – 14. In other words, “quick sale” generally
refers to the fast sale of real estate for any one of a
number of reasons, including a short sale, or a sale for
reasons of divorce, personal circumstances, job transfer or
probate; and a short sale is one reason for a quick sale.
The examining attorney relies on the following
evidence of record to establish the mere descriptiveness of
the wording in the mark for the claimed services:
• dictionary definitions of the three terms in the marks,
demonstrating ordinary meanings of each term;

• webpages showing use of “quick sale,” e.g.:

- nextwave.org
Quick Sale – The Step Before Foreclosure

In the pre-foreclosure period, home owners have
the option to pursue what’s called a “quick
sale.” In many circumstances, a successful quick
sale can save the homeowner’s credit rating, and
net the real estate investor a bargain. … In a
quick sale, the owner offers their [sic] property
for sale at a price lower than market value, in
the hopes of obtaining an interested investor who
can complete the sale quickly and circumvent the
foreclosure process.

- investopedia.com
Staging Your Home for a Quick Sale.

When real estate agents talk about staging your
home, they’re referring to a method of decorating
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
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that is designed to showcase the home’s best
assets, impress buyers and sell your home quickly
for the highest possible price.

- ehow.com
Definition of a Quick Sale

In real estate law, a quick sale (or short sale)
is a type of transaction in which property is
sold for a price that falls below what is due and
owing on a mortgage loan. … The quick sale has
been employed with greater frequency in the past
five years.

* * *

The primary function of a quick sale is to allow
all parties involved with a particular piece of
real estate the ability to lessen or mitigate
their current or anticipated losses. In most
instances the owner of the real estate will be
unable to meet his or her mortgage obligation,
and foreclosure is on the horizon. The mortgage
lender determines that it actually will lose less
money by accepting a quick sale than it will lose
through the mortgage foreclosure process.

- wikipedia.org
Hard money lenders structure loans based on a
percentage of the quick sale value of the subject
property.

- shortsale show.com
But what exactly IS a “quick sale”? And how does
it differ from a “short sale”?2

- a-quick-sale.co.uk
Want a quick sale of your home?

- trulia.com, Internet postings from persons identified
as brokers or agents, stating:

2 The webpages of record do not provide an answer to this
question. Because of the other evidence of record which suggests
that a “short sale” is a type of “quick sale,” we do not find
this website particularly persuasive of any argument that there a
meaningful distinction between a “quick sale” and a “short sale.”
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
8
• Lawrence wrote: ‘Quick sale is a situation
where a seller is forced to sell his property
as quick as possible just before the final
proceedings of bank to take over the
property …. As Don pointed out, there are many
other reasons someone might need a “quick sale”
besides th[e] lender taking over.

Not always. As Don pointed out, there are many
other reasons someone might need a “quick sale”
besides th[e] lender taking over. Divorce, job
transfer, probate, court order and personal
circumstances come immediately to mind.

• There isn’t a standard definition of a “quick
sale” … it doesn’t have to be, as Lawrence
describes it, a sale to avert a foreclosure,
but it certainly can be. … A job transfer
requires a quick sale.

• Quick sale is a situation where a seller is
forced to … sell his property as quick as
possible just before the final proceedings of
[a] bank to take over the property.

• “Quick Sale” is usually something a distressed
seller is looking for. Usually, this means
they have already discounted the property to
hopefully attract a wholesale-type Buyer or
investor. A typical advertisement would look
like, “Motived Seller. Priced for Quick Sale.”

• numerous Supplemental Register or Principal Register
registrations for marks containing one or more of the words
in applicant’s marks, some with a disclaimer of such
word(s), e.g.:

- QUICK CLAIMS CREW for “insurance underwriting
services in the fields of property and casualty
insurance, namely the processing of insurance
claims,” with QUICK CLAIMS disclaimed;

- NATIONAL DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE for services
including “mortgage foreclosure mitigation and
loan default mitigation services, namely,
acquisition and lease-back of real estate; real
estate services to stop foreclosure, namely,
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
9
mortgage debt management,” with NATIONAL DEBT
RELIEF disclaimed;

- NATIONAL VALUATION SERVICES on the Supplemental
Register for “appraisal of real estate,” with
VALUATION SERVICES disclaimed; and

- NATIONAL HOME LENDERS and Design for “mortgage
banking, mortgage lending and mortgage
brokerage,” with NATIONAL HOME LENDERS
disclaimed.

Applicant’s arguments and evidence
Applicant maintains that its marks are suggestive,
arguing that QUICK SALE “is subject to an unlimited number
of interpretations” because it does not indicate “what item
is being sold in connection with the term QUICK SALE ….”
Brief at 22. “[T]hought, imagination, perception, and
pause are required to reach a conclusion that the nature of
the services are [sic] real estate sales and short sales.”
Id. Applicant also argues that if QUICK SALE “refers to
‘the practice of selling a home for less than the appraised
or market value of the property,’ then it would require
thought, imagination, perception, and pause to think that a
‘web-based database for purchasing and selling real estate
for others’ and ‘on-line real estate investment services in
the nature of purchasing and selling of real estate for
others’ is the subject of the applicant’s services.” Id.
at 23.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
10
Applicant introduced into the record a small number of
registrations for marks having one or more of the terms
appearing in applicant’s marks. Such terms have not been
disclaimed in these registrations and the marks are
registered on the Principal Register. See, e.g.:
NATIONAL PUNCTUATION DAY for goods including
jewelry (no disclaimer of NATIONAL);

QUICK SELL PRO for “Assessment and management of
real estate, operating marketplaces for sellers
of goods and/or services in connection with real
estate, real estate agencies, real estate
brokerage, real estate consultation, real estate
listing, real estate management consultation,
real estate valuation services” (no disclaimer);

QUICK ASSIST for “mortgage prequalification
services provided to prospective real estate
purchasers” (no disclaimer); and

MONEY SALE for “banking services” (disclaimer of
MONEY only).3

We find these registrations are not probative of any issue
before us because they either recite goods or services that
are unrelated to those of the involved applications or are
too few in number.

3 Applicant submitted additional registrations which are
unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below:
- the QUICKTRADE and QUICKPOST marks may have been considered
to be unitary by the Office;
- the registration for NATIONAL SENIOR CAMPUSES, INC. is a
Supplemental Register registration; and
- the lack of a disclaimer of NATIONAL in the NATIONAL LEAGUE
OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS SINCE 1876 and design mark
may be due to the integration of NATIONAL into the baseball-
themed design element of the mark.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
11
Upon consideration of the examining attorney’s and
applicant’s arguments and evidence, we find that NATIONAL
QUICK SALE merely describes a feature of applicant’s
services, namely, that its services are offered nationwide
and that they are directed to the “quick” or “fast” sale of
real estate.
We find that NATIONAL in applicant’s marks has the
meaning of “… relating to … a nation as an organized
whole,”4 and hence identifies the scope of applicant's
services, i.e., that they are available throughout the
United States. See In re Nat’l Rent A Fence, Inc., 220
USPQ 479 (TTAB 1983)(NATIONAL RENT A FENCE merely
descriptive of nationwide fence rental services).
Additionally, the numerous third-party registrations on the
Supplemental Register or on the Principal Register with
NATIONAL disclaimed lend further support that NATIONAL is a
merely descriptive term. See In re Box Solutions Corp., 79
USPQ2d 1953, 1955 (TTAB 2006)(“the term ‘SOLUTIONS’ has
been regarded as merely descriptive in a number of third-
party marks, the registrations of which include disclaimers
of the term ‘SOLUTIONS.’”); see also Sweats Fashions, Inc.

4 See the definition of “national” in the record from
education.yahoo.com.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
12
v. Pannill Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560, 4 USPQ2d 1793 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
Further, based on the ordinary definitions of “quick”
and “sale” in the record, as well as the excerpts from the
websites in the record, we find that “quick sale” has a
particular meaning in the real estate field, namely, the
fast sale of property; and that this may occur for any one
of a number of reasons, including to avert foreclosure, or
due to divorce, job transfer, probate, court order or other
personal circumstance. Applicant’s mortgage foreclosure
mitigation and loan default mitigation services, as well as
its real estate investment services and its “facilitating
and arranging for real estate procurement for others”
services, certainly consider how to achieve the “quick
sale” of properties, whether through a drastic reduction in
price or negotiations with a mortgage lender to accept less
than the outstanding amount of the mortgage. On the first
page of its specimen of use (a brochure) filed with its
original application, applicant states that it provides “A
Comprehensive and Accelerated Short Sale Solution.”5 It
promotes its services as providing “the quickest, most

5 According to the brochure, a short sale is when “[p]roperties
are listed with a real estate agent at, or slightly below, the
property’s ‘as-is’ current market value. The Mortgage Servicer
and Investor agree to a reduced payoff for the outstanding loan
amount.”
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
13
efficient way to get a short sale offer processed.” Speed,
or a “quick sale,” is a feature of its services.
Applicant’s arguments that the mark is suggestive
because the mark does not convey the subject of the quick
sale and that “quick” may have multiple meanings when
combined with “sale” are not persuasive; whether a term is
merely descriptive is determined not in the abstract but in
relation to the goods or services for which registration is
sought, the context in which it is being used on or in
connection with those goods or services and the possible
significance that the term would have to the average
purchaser of the goods or services because of the manner of
its use. See In re Bright-Crest, Ltd., 204 USPQ 591, 593
(TTAB 1979). “Whether consumers could guess what the
product [or service] is from consideration of the mark
alone is not the test.” In re American Greetings Corp.,
226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985). In other words, the
question is not whether someone presented only with the
mark could guess the services listed in the application.
Rather, the question is whether someone who knows what the
services are will understand the mark to convey information
about them. In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314 (TTAB
2002); In re Patent & Trademark Services Inc., 49 USPQ2d
1537 (TTAB 1998); In re Home Builders Association of
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
14
Greenville, 18 USPQ2d 1313 (TTAB 1990); In re American
Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365 (TTAB 1985).
Further, applicant’s arguments that it did not intend
to adopt a merely descriptive mark; that if it intended to
adopt a merely descriptive mark, it would have adopted
marks such as NATIONAL ON-LINE SHORT SALE, WEB SHORT SALES,
SHORT HOME SALES; and that QUICK SALE is not merely
descriptive because QUICK BUY has been registered (for
telephone payment services); are irrelevant. Intent is not
a requirement under Section 2(e)(1), and the issue here is
the asserted mere descriptiveness of applicant’s applied-
for marks, not other marks.
Additionally, we find that the combination of
“national,” “quick” and “sale” or “national” and “quick
sale,” does not evoke a unique commercial impression. It
is not incongruous or bizarre as applied to the services.
See In re Shutts, 217 USPQ 363 (TTAB 1983). It does,
however, describe an aspect of applicant’s services, i.e.,
the fast (or quick) sale of properties, nationwide in
scope. Further, it does so without imagination, thought or
perception on the part of the consumer. We therefore find
that the examining attorney has established prima facie
that NATIONAL QUICK SALE is merely descriptive of a feature
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
15
of applicant's services and that applicant has not rebutted
the prima facie case. Accordingly, we conclude:
• NATIONAL QUICK SALE is merely descriptive of an
aspect of applicant’s services;

• the mark of the ‘256 application is merely
descriptive and unregistrable under Section
2(e)(1); and

• the mark of the ‘235 application may not
proceed to registration without a disclaimer
under Section 6(a) of NATIONAL QUICK SALE.

Likelihood of Confusion
Our finding that NATIONAL QUICK SALE is merely
descriptive is sufficient to bar registration of
applicant’s word mark, and its combination word and design
mark, without the required disclaimer. However, in order
to render a complete opinion on all of the refusals at
issue in this appeal, we will consider the likelihood of
confusion ground as well in connection with both
applications. In discussing these refusals, we will treat
NATIONAL QUICK SALE as being highly suggestive.
Our determination under Trademark Act § 2(d) is based
on an analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence
that are relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood
of confusion issue. See In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also
Palm Bay Imp., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
16
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir.
2005); In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311,
65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003); and In re Dixie Rests.
Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In
considering the evidence of record on these factors, we
keep in mind that “[t]he fundamental inquiry mandated by
Section 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences
in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services]
and differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA
1976); and In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209
(TTAB 1999).
A. The Similarity Or Dissimilarity of The Services,
Consumers and Established, Likely-to-Continue Trade
Channels.
Reg. Nos. 3438458 and 3497625 for the A QUICK SALE marks

Applicant’s “on-line real estate investment services
in the nature of purchasing and selling real estate for
others” and “facilitating and arranging for real estate
procurement for others” are encompassed within registrant’s
“real estate agencies” and “real estate property
brokerage.”6 Thus, the services are in part identical. We

6 See merriam-webster.com definition of “broker”:
1: one who acts as an intermediary: as a : an agent
who arranges marriages b : an agent who negotiates
contracts of purchase and sale (as of real estate,
commodities, or securities).
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
17
need not also make determinations regarding the similarity
or dissimilarity of any of the other services in the
applications. Similarity between any of the services in
the applications and cited registrations will dictate a
refusal as to all of the services in the class, should the
ultimate conclusion in the case be that a likelihood of
confusion exists. See Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General
Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986 (CCPA 1981).
In addition, these registrations do not have any
limitation to particular channels of trade or classes of
consumers. When identical goods or services are recited in
an application and registration with no limitations as to
their channels of trade or classes of consumers, such
channels of trade and classes of consumers must be
considered to be legally identical. Genesco Inc. v. Martz,
66 USPQ2d 1260, 1268 (TTAB 2003) (“Given the in-part
identical and in-part related nature of the parties' goods,
and the lack of any restrictions in the identifications
thereof as to trade channels and purchasers, these clothing
items could be offered and sold to the same classes of
purchasers through the same channels of trade.”); In re
Smith and Mehaffey, 31 USPQ2d 1531, 1532 (TTAB 1994)
(“Because the goods are legally identical, they must be
presumed to travel in the same channels of trade, and be
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
18
sold to the same class of purchasers.”). Accordingly, we
consider applicant's and registrant’s services to be
offered in the same channels of trade to the same potential
purchasers.
Registration No. 2397454 for QUICK$ALE
The services of the applications and the ‘454
registration differ; however, “[i]n order to find that
there is a likelihood of confusion, it is not necessary
that the goods or services on or in connection with which
the marks are used be identical or even competitive. It is
enough if there is a relationship between them such that
persons encountering them under their respective marks are
likely to assume that they originate at the same source or
that there is some association between their sources.”
McDonald's Corp. v. McKinley, 13 USPQ2d 1895, 1898 (TTAB
1989). See also In re G.B.I. Tile and Stone Inc., 92 USPQ2d
1366 (TTAB 2009).
The ‘454 registrant’s services are “mortgage banking,
namely, an alternative to warehouse financing for lenders.”
The Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms (8th ed.
2010), defines “mortgage banker” as follows:
company, or individual, that originates mortgage
loans, sells them to other investors, services
the monthly payments, keeps related records, and
acts as escrow agent to disperse funds for taxes
and insurance. A mortgage banker’s income
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
19
derives from origination and serving fees,
profits on the resale of loans, and the spread
between mortgage yields and the interest paid on
borrowings which a particular mortgage is held
before resale.7

Potential purchasers of registrant’s services include
real estate purchasers.8 Once the loan is made, registrant,
as a mortgage bank(er), may service the loan itself or, of
course, sell the loan to another mortgage bank for loan
servicing. Additionally, potential purchasers include
other mortgage bankers. Registrant’s webpages at
gatewayfsb.com, made of record in the final Office action,
state:
The Quick$ale® product provides a mechanism for
mortgage bankers to warehouse loans prior to
their purchase by secondary market investors.
Unlike conventional mortgage warehouse
facilities, Quick$ale® is a “purchase and sale”
facility. The bank purchases the loan at the
time of origination and subsequently delivers the
committed loan to the secondary market investor
as arranged by you, the mortgage banker.

Applicant's services are:
Mortgage foreclosure mitigation and loan default
mitigation services, namely, providing a web-

7 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions,
and we take judicial notice of this definition of “mortgage
banker.” See In re CyberFinancial.Net Inc., 65 USPQ2d 1789, 1791
n.3 (TTAB 2002). See also University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.
C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982),
aff'd, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
8 Applicant’s statement that registrant’s services are “clearly
directed towards high end, commercial, sophisticated business
entities who engage in the movement of substantial amounts of
capital money,” brief at. 13 – 14, is unpersuasive; there are no
such limitations in the identification of services.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
20
based database for purchasing and selling real
estate for others; On-line real estate investment
services in the nature of purchasing and selling
real estate for others; Facilitating and
arranging for real estate procurement for others.

Applicant’s recitation of services is broad, and a wide
array of purchasers may use applicant’s services as
identified. Applicant’s specimen identifies its customers
as follows; “if you are a Seller, Realtor, Buyer, Mortgage
Servicer, or MI Company, National Quick Sale … provides an
invaluable service in facilitating short sale solutions.”
As part of its facilitating and arranging for real
estate procurement services, applicant’s specimen
states that it offers its services to, among others,
mortgage servicers, and explains:
When market conditions continue to drive property
values down, and borrowers experience financial
hardships, refinancing a home becomes difficult,
if not impossible.

When this situation exists, and the Mortgage
Services and homeowner collectively believe that
a foreclosure is inevitable, a short sale is
often the only viable alternative.

Properties are listed with a real estate agent
at, or slightly below, the property’s “as-is”
current market value. The Mortgage Servicer and
Investor agree to a reduced payoff for the
outstanding loan amount.

Simultaneously, as an offer is submitted on a
property, a comprehensive package is
electronically delivered to the Mortgage
Servicer. Our offer management system details
the full financial aspect of the offer along with
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
21
all of the required documentation for the
Mortgage Servicer to accept, decline, or counter
the short sale offer.

The mortgage servicer, or the mortgage banker, hence is
also a customer of applicant.
Because the same purchasers, namely, other mortgage
bankers and purchasers of real estate in general, may use
both applicant’s and registrant’s services, and both
applicant’s and registrant’s services involve the financing
of real estate (albeit, one involves the purchase of real
estate and the other involves the sale of real estate), and
possibly the same real estate, we find that persons
encountering the services under their respective marks are
likely to assume that they originate at the same source or
that there is some association between their sources.
Thus, we find applicant’s and the ‘454 registrant’s
services similar and the purchasers are identical in part.
Further, we find that there is insufficient information in
the record regarding applicant’s and registrant’s trade
channels. Therefore, as to this du Pont factor regarding
the ‘454 registration, the factor is neutral.
B. The Similarity Or Dissimilarity of the Marks in Their
Entireties as to Appearance, Sound, Connotation and
Commercial Impression; Strength/Weakness of the Marks.

In a likelihood of confusion analysis, we compare the
marks for similarities and dissimilarities in appearance,
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
22
sound, connotation and commercial impression. Palm Bay, 73
USPQ2d at 1692. “[T]he test is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison,
but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their overall commercial impression so that
confusion as to the source of the goods [or services]
offered under the respective marks is likely to result.”
H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1715, 1727 (TTAB
2008). “[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a
conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing
improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or
less weight has been given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on
consideration of the marks in their entireties. Indeed,
this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.” In re
Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
Reg. Nos. 3438458 and 3497625 for the A QUICK SALE marks

As noted above, applicant's services are identical in
part to those services of the A QUICK SALE registrations.
“When marks would appear on virtually identical goods or
services, the degree of similarity necessary to support a
conclusion of likely confusion declines.” Century 21 Real
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
23
Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23
USPQ2d 1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In our analysis, when considering each of applicant’s
marks, we focus on the ‘458 registration, in standard
characters. If confusion is likely as between applicant’s
marks and the marks of the ‘458 registration, consideration
of registrant’s ‘625 (A QUICK SALE and design) registration
is irrelevant. And if confusion is not likely with regard
to registrant’s standard character mark, it would be even
less so with regard to the ‘625 registration.
We therefore turn to applicant’s and registrant’s
standard character marks, and applicant’s argument that
registrant’s mark is weak. Applicant points out that
registrant’s mark is registered on the Supplemental
Register; that marks registered on the Supplemental
Register are presumed to be merely descriptive and hence
deserve a lesser scope of protection than arbitrary or
suggestive marks registered on the Principal Register.
Brief at 8. First, we note that while the mark indeed is
registered on the Supplemental Register, other than the
cited QUICK$ALE mark, the record contains no evidence of
other marks combining QUICK and SALE.9 Second, even if a

9 Applicant has placed Registration No. 3340883 into the record
for QUICK SELL PRO for, inter alia, real estate brokerage,” but
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
24
mark is “weak” or “descriptive,” it does not mean that it
is not entitled to any significant protection:
The description of marks as “weak” or “strong,”
and references to the “breadth of protection” to
be given a mark, have served as a convenient type
of shorthand in the literature of opinions
concerned with likelihood of confusion. ... Such
expressions, however, should not obfuscate the
basic issue. Confusion is confusion. The
likelihood thereof is to be avoided, as much
between “weak” marks as between “strong” marks, or
as between a “weak” and a “strong” mark.

King Candy Co. v. Eunice King's Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d
1400, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (CCPA 1974). Thus, even if a prior
mark is descriptive, it does not settle the issue. As
applicant itself has acknowledged, marks on the
Supplemental Register – which are typically descriptive and
have not acquired secondary meaning – may be cited as a bar
to registration of a mark under Trademark Act § 2(d).
E.g., In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 198 USPQ 337 (CCPA
1978). Thus, while the scope of protection we accord to A
QUICK SALE is limited, it is not so limited as to allow any
similar mark onto the Principal Register.
Next, we consider the meaning of the marks. We find
that the meaning of each mark only slightly differs from
one another. In the context of the services, both marks

the mark in this registration is sufficiently different than
registrant’s mark. Also a single registration is not persuasive
of any issue in this appeal.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
25
inform purchasers that the services are directed to a
“quick” or “fast” sale of real estate – applicant’s mark
merely adds that the services are national in scope. The
additional information offered by applicant’s mark would
not necessarily be recalled by consumers. In comparing the
marks, the test is not whether the marks can be
distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison
but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in
terms of their overall commercial impression so that
confusion as to the source of the goods and services
offered under the respective marks is likely to result.
San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Electronics
Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1 (CCPA 1977);
Spoons Restaurants Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735
(TTAB 1991), aff'd unpublished, No. 92-1086 (Fed. Cir. June
5, 1992). In addition, due to the shared phrase QUICK
SALE, the marks are similar in sound and appearance. As
for the commercial impressions of the marks, we find them
to be similar due to the shared reference to the fast or
“quick” sale (of real estate), with NATIONAL in applicant’s
mark merely indicating the geographic scope of the
services.
In support of registration of its mark, applicant
points out that NATIONAL is the first term in its mark; and
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
26
that “[c]onsumers are generally more inclined to focus on
the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or
service mark.” Brief at 9. While NATIONAL is the first
term in applicant's mark, it also serves to inform
purchasers that the services provided by applicant are
national in scope.10 Applicant has not explained why
consumers would be more inclined to focus on this term
under these circumstances.11 Thus, we are not persuaded by
applicant’s arguments that NATIONAL in its mark
sufficiently distances its mark from that of registrant.
In this situation where the services are identical in
part, and the degree of similarity necessary to support a
conclusion of likely confusion declines, we find that
applicant’s and registrant’s standard character marks are
similar.
We now turn to applicant’s word and design mark and
registrant’s standard character mark on the Supplemental
Register, i.e., the marks of the ‘235 application and the
‘458 registration. Even though registrant’s mark contains
the identical phrase QUICK SALE, we find applicant’s design
combined with the additional wording NATIONAL sufficiently

10 If consumers indeed focus on the first term in any mark, “A”
would be the term consumers would focus on when considering
registrant’s mark.
11 In the cases cited by applicant to support its proposition, the
first term in the marks in question were not descriptive terms.
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
27
remarkable and significant to distinguish applicant’s mark
from registrant’s merely descriptive mark on the
Supplemental Register. The marks hence are dissimilar in
appearance and commercial impression. These differences
outweigh any similarity in meaning or sound due to the
shared terms QUICK SALE. We therefore find the marks of
the ‘458 registration and of the ‘235 application when
considered in their entireties, to be dissimilar.
Because we found registrant’s standard character mark
to be similar to applicant’s standard character mark, we
resolve the du Pont factor regarding the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks against applicant in the ‘256
application. As regards applicant’s combination word and
design mark of the ‘235 application, we resolve the du Pont
factor in applicant’s favor.
Registration No. 2397454 for QUICK$ALE
We first consider applicant’s standard character mark.
In considering the marks, we keep in mind that (i)
QUICK$ALE is registered on the Principal Register and must
be accorded all of the presumptions of validity due a
registered mark, including the presumption that the mark is
distinctive; and (ii) the record does not contain any
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
28
evidence of third party marks containing QUICK and SALE in
the United States.12
QUICK$ALE is comprised of a combination of QUICK and
SALE, with a dollar sign used as the “S” in “sale.”
Applicant offered a number of alternatives for pronouncing
this mark, stating:
[I]t is unclear how the dollar sign in the mark
QUICK$ALE could be spoken. For example, the
dollar sign could be ignored by pronouncing the
mark as “quicksale,” presuming the dollar sign is
to be spoken as the letter “s.” In contrast, the
dollar sign could be emphasized as “quick cha-
ching sale” or another way of indicating the
presence of the dollar sign.

Brief at 10. There is no correct pronunciation of a mark
which is not a common English word because it is impossible
to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark.
Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. VigiLanz Corp., 94 USPQ2d
1399 (TTAB 2010). Thus, it is quite plausible, and we
believe likely, that a majority would pronounce
registrant’s mark in the manner proposed by the examining
attorney and acknowledged by applicant, namely, as “quick
sale,” without verbalizing the dollar sign. The marks
hence are similar in sound because both marks include
“quick sale.” With respect to appearance, even though

12 The webpages from the A QUICK SALE registrant in the record
reflect a United Kingdom web address.

Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
29
applicant’s mark does not have a space between QUICK and
SALE and has the additional term NATIONAL, and registrant’s
mark has a dollar sign instead of the letter “S,” we find
the appearance of the marks more similar than dissimilar
due to the presence of “quick” and “sale” juxtaposed to one
another. The meaning of the marks is similar too because
the substitution of the dollar sign for the letter “S” in
“sale” does not change the meaning of “quick sale” and the
dollar sign is not likely to be articulated. At best, the
substitution suggests “cash” which a customer seeks from
the “quick sale” of his or her real estate, which also is
suggested by the term “quick sale.” The addition of
NATIONAL does not affect the meaning of “quick sale.”
Further, because the meaning of the marks does not
considerably change due to the differences between the
marks, and because the dollar sign would not make any
significant impression on purchasers, the marks are similar
in commercial impression. See In re Home Federal Savings
and Loan Association, 213 USPQ 68, 69 (TTAB 1982) (“That
applicant's mark ‘TRAN$FUND’ has a dollar sign where
registrant's mark has a letter ‘S’ is inconsequential in a
comparison of the sound, appearance, and meaning of the two
marks.”).
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
30
In view of the similarities between applicant’s
standard character mark and registrant’s mark in sound,
meaning, appearance and commercial impression, the du Pont
factor regarding the similarity of the marks is resolved
against applicant with regard to the ‘454 registration.
We also resolve this du Pont factor against applicant
in our consideration of applicant’s combination word and
design mark. Applicant’s mark and the QUICK$ALE mark are
similar in sound and meaning for the same reasons discussed
above in connection with the sound, meaning and commercial
impression of applicant’s standard character mark. Any
difference in appearance is outweighed by the similarities
in sound, meaning and commercial impression.
C. Balancing the Factors

After careful consideration of the record evidence and
arguments, and balancing the relevant du Pont factors, we
conclude as follows on the question of likelihood of
confusion:
• Because the services, trade channels and
consumers are identical, and the marks are
similar, we find that applicant’s standard
character mark for its recited services is likely
to be confused with registrant’s A QUICK SALE
(standard characters) mark for its recited
services.

• In view of the differences between the marks,
we find that applicant’s combination word and
design mark is not likely to be confused with
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
31
registrant’s standard character A QUICK SALE
mark.

• Because the marks and services are similar, and
the purchasers overlap in part, we find that both
of applicant’s marks are likely to be confused
with registrant’s QUICK$ALE mark for its recited
services.

Decision: The refusal to register applicant’s standard
character mark which is the subject of the ‘256 application
under Trademark Act §2(e)(1) is affirmed.
The requirement for a disclaimer of the wording in
applicant’s combination word and design mark which is the
subject of the ‘235 application under Trademark Act §§
2(e)(1) and 6(a) is affirmed.
The refusal to register applicant’s standard character
mark which is the subject of the ‘256 application under
§2(d) of the Trademark Act in view of the A QUICK SALE mark
(in standard character form) is affirmed.
The refusal to register applicant’s combination word
and design mark which is the subject of the ‘235
application under §2(d) of the Trademark Act in view of the
A QUICK SALE registration (in standard character form) is
reversed.
The refusals to register (i) applicant’s standard
character mark which is the subject of the ‘256
application, and (ii) applicant’s combination word and
Ser. Nos. 77722235 and 77722256
32
design mark which is the subject of the ‘235 application,
both under §2(d) of the Trademark Act, in view of the
QUICK$ALE registration, are affirmed.