Narada Productions, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 10, 2001

No. 75977888 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 10, 2001)

1/10/01
Paper No. 17
UNITED ST
Trad
In
Mark I. Feldman an
Rudnick & Wolfe fo
Ronald E. Aikens,
103 (Michael Szoke
Before Quinn, Walt
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bottorf
In the two ap
applicant seeks re
the mark CUBA L.A.
“prerecorded phono
featuring music; p
featuring music al
related to music,”
namely, live perfo
IS
THIS DISPOSITION
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT
OF THE TTABBottorff
ATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________
emark Trial and Appeal Board
________
re Narada Productions, Inc.
________
Serial No. 75/460,277
Serial No. 75/977,888
_______
d Linda Urbanik Johnson of Piper Marbury
r Narada Productions, Inc.
Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
, Managing Attorney).
_______
ers and Bottorff, Administrative
f, Administrative Trademark Judge:
plications involved in this appeal,
gistration on the Principal Register of
, in typed form, for, respectively,
graph records and cassette tapes
rerecorded compact discs and CD-ROMs
one or coupled with images and texts
in Class 9, and “entertainment services,
rmances by a musical band; production and
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
2
distribution services in the field of musical recordings
and entertainment; recording studio services; music
publishing services,” in Class 41.1 Applicant, a Wisconsin
corporation located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, acknowledges
that the designation “L.A.” in its mark is the abbreviation
for Los Angeles, California. Applicant further
acknowledges that the goods and services on or in
connection with which it uses or intends to use its mark
CUBA L.A. do not originate in or from either Cuba or Los
Angeles.
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused
registration as to each of the applications on the ground
that applicant’s mark is primarily deceptively
geographically misdescriptive of the identified goods and
1 Applicant filed an intent-to-use application (Serial No.
75/460,277) on April 1, 1998 covering both the Class 9 goods and
the Class 41 services. On September 14, 1998, applicant filed an
Amendment to Allege Use covering the Class 41 services only. At
applicant’s request, the application was divided on October 15,
1998. The parent application is Serial No. 75/460,277, which
covers the Class 9 goods and which remains an intent-to-use
application. The child application is Serial No. 75/977,888,
which covers the Class 41 services and which, in view of the
filing and acceptance of the Amendment to Allege Use, is now a
use-based application. Because the ground for refusal, the
evidence of record and the issues to be decided on appeal are the
same in each of the applications, we are consolidating the two
applications for purposes of this appeal, and shall decide both
appeals in this single decision.
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
3
services. See Trademark Act Section 2(e)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§1052(e)(3).2
When the refusals were made final, applicant filed
these appeals. Applicant and the Trademark Examining
Attorney filed main briefs on appeal in each application,
and applicant filed a reply brief in Serial No. 75/460,277.3
No oral hearing was requested.
In reaching our decision herein, we have carefully
considered all of the evidence of record and all of the
arguments presented by the Trademark Examining Attorney and
by applicant’s counsel, including any evidence and/or
arguments not specifically mentioned in this opinion.
It is settled that:
[w]hether a mark is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive … requires an
analysis under a two prong test to establish
(1) whether the primary significance of the
mark as it is used is a generally known
2 Trademark Act Section 1052(e)(3) provides as follows:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it –
(e) Consists of a mark which, … (3) when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them …
3 There is no reply brief of record in application Serial No.
75/977,888. However, we have considered applicant’s single reply
brief in connection with both of the applications involved in
this appeal.
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
4
geographic place; and (2) whether the public
would make a “goods [and/or services]/place
association,” i.e., believe that the goods
[and/or services] for which the mark is sought
to be registered originate in that place.
Institut National Des Appellations D’Origine v. Vintners
Int’l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 22 USPQ2d 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir.
1992). See also In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 213
USPQ 889 (CCPA 1982). If these two prongs are satisfied,
and if, as in the present case, the applicant’s goods and
services do not in fact originate from the place named in
the mark, refusal under Section 2(e)(3) is proper. See In
re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 226 USPQ 865 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
With respect to the first prong of the Section 2(e)(3)
test, applicant contends that the primary significance of
its mark cannot be that of a generally known geographic
place because there is no such place as CUBA L.A. “Cuba is
a place, L.A. is a place, but there is no such place as
CUBA L.A. CUBA L.A. simply does not exist.” (Brief, at
6.) Instead, applicant argues, CUBA L.A. is an incongruous
and arbitrary combination of unrelated geographic locations
which, when viewed as a whole, has no geographic
significance, but which rather is evocative or suggestive
of the style of music featured in applicant’s goods and
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
5
services. For his part, the Trademark Examining Attorney
argues essentially that CUBA and L.A. each are well-known
geographic locations and that applicant’s mere combining of
the two in its mark does not negate the primarily
geographic significance of either, nor does it result in a
composite which is not of primarily geographic
significance.
Both the Trademark Examining Attorney and applicant
cite to the Board’s decision in In re London & Edinburgh
Insurance Group Ltd., 36 USPQ2d 1367 (TTAB 1995). The
issue in that case was whether the mark LONDON & EDINBURGH
INSURANCE was primarily geographically descriptive, under
Trademark Act Section 2(e)(2), of the applicant’s insurance
underwriting services, which the applicant rendered in and
from London, England and Edinburgh, Scotland. The Board
noted that the case presented a question of first
impression for the Board, namely, whether a mark comprising
a combination of two geographic terms was primarily
geographically descriptive. We are faced with essentially
the same question in the present case, albeit in the
context of a Section 2(e)(3) refusal rather than a Section
2(e)(2) refusal.
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
6
In In re London & Edinburgh, supra, the Board
discussed the issue of whether the primary significance of
the applicant’s mark was geographic:
As noted above, the basis for applicant’s
position is that when combined in the phrase
LONDON & EDINBURGH, the individual geographic
terms become nongeographic because London &
Edinburgh is not the name of a particular
geographic place. We disagree. When the mark
is viewed as a whole, the geographic
significance of the words is not lost.
Consumers will still regard the mark as
referring to the cities of London and
Edinburgh, rather than to some mythical place
called “London & Edinburgh.” Nor can London &
Edinburgh be considered such an odd or
incongruous combination of geographic place
names that consumers will view it as an
arbitrary combination without a geographic
significance to the whole, in the way that,
perhaps, “Borneo & Bulgaria” might be. London
and Edinburgh are, respectively, the capitals
of England and Scotland, and these two
bordering countries are, in turn, part of the
United Kingdom. Because of the natural
association between these two capital cities of
the United Kingdom, and their geographical
proximity, consumers are likely to view the
phrase London & Edinburgh as having a
geographic significance. In the context of a
mark used for insurance underwriting services,
that significance will be of services which are
rendered in or originate from both of these
cities.
36 USPQ2d at 1369.
We are not persuaded by applicant’s argument that
because CUBA L.A. is not the name of an actual geographic
place, the primary significance of the mark cannot be
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
7
geographic under the first prong of the Section 2(e)(3)
test. As in the London & Edinburgh case, we find that
purchasers would understand applicant’s mark to be
referring to the two places named in the mark, rather than
to some mythical place called “Cuba L.A.” Nor are we
persuaded that the absence of an ampersand in applicant’s
mark is of any legal consequence; the Board’s finding in
London & Edinburgh did not rest on the existence of the
ampersand in the LONDON & EDINBURGH mark.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by applicant’s argument
that CUBA L.A., like the “Borneo & Bulgaria” hypothetical
set out by the Board in London & Edinburgh, is a
combination of locations which is so arbitrary, incongruous
and random that the primarily geographic significance of
the mark as a whole is negated. It is true that Cuba and
L.A. do not share between themselves the same sort of
geographical proximity and governmental connections as
those which the Board cited in support of its finding that
purchasers of insurance services would make a “natural
association” between London and Edinburgh. However, we
cannot conclude that Cuba and L.A., in terms of their
relationship to each other and to applicant’s identified
goods and services, are as disparate and unrelated as
Borneo and Bulgaria are, or that the association between
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
8
Cuba and L.A. is as fanciful and random as an association
between Borneo and Bulgaria would be.
Rather, we find that the primary significance of CUBA
L.A., when used as a mark in connection with applicant’s
musical goods and services, would be that the goods and
services are rendered in or originate from both of the
locations identified in the mark. That is, purchasers
could reasonably assume from the mark that, for example,
applicant’s goods and services involve music from Cuba
which is performed, recorded or distributed in and/or from
L.A., or that the goods and services involve musicians from
Cuba who perform in, or are based in, L.A. Thus,
purchasers would not necessarily perceive anything
incongruous or fanciful in the combining of “Cuba” with
“L.A.” in a mark for such goods and services, and the
mark’s combination of these two place names does not
detract from the primarily geographic significance of the
mark as a whole. CUBA L.A., for applicant’s goods and
services, is more akin to LONDON & EDINBURGH for insurance
services than it is to a truly random combination like
“Borneo & Bulgaria.”
Finally, we are not persuaded by applicant’s argument
that the primary significance of CUBA L.A. is that it is
suggestive or evocative of the style of music featured in
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
9
applicant’s goods and services. Applicant has presented no
evidence that there is a recognized genre or style of music
known as “Cuba L.A.,” such that the designation CUBA L.A.
would be seen primarily as identifying such style of music
rather than the geographic origin of applicant’s goods and
services. See In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 52 USPQ2d 1539
(Fed. Cir. 1999), aff’g 48 USPQ2d 1689 (TTAB 1998)(no
evidence of a “New York style” of the leather goods at
issue); In re Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 48 USPQ2d 1031 (TTAB
1998)(no evidence that primary significance of HAVANA (as
applied to alcoholic beverages) is that of “pre-Castro
free-wheeling lifestyle” rather than that of geographic
location). Compare In re The Fred Gretsch Company, Inc.,
159 USPQ 60 (TTAB 1968)(NASHVILLE suggestive of style of
country and western music, and thus not primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive of guitars made
in New York); but see In re Opryland USA Inc., 1 USPQ2d
1409 (TTAB 1986)(THE NASHVILLE NETWORK primarily
geographically descriptive of television program production
and distribution).
In sum, we find that the primary significance of
applicant’s mark CUBA L.A. is geographic. The mark is
composed of the names of two well-known geographic
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
10
locations which are neither obscure nor remote.4 The mere
combination of those two names into the composite CUBA L.A.
does not detract from the primarily geographic significance
of each of the place names nor from the primarily
geographic significance of the mark as a whole. We find
that the Trademark Examining Attorney has established,
prima facie, the first prong of his Section 2(e)(3)
refusal, and that applicant has failed to rebut that prima
facie showing by proving that the primary significance of
the mark is other than that of the geographic places named
in the mark.5 See In re London & Edinburgh Insurance Group
Ltd., supra.
4 See, e.g., applicant’s brief at 8: “Likewise, Cuba and L.A.,
individually, represent well-known locations…”
5 Applicant cites various cases wherein it was found that the
primary significance of the marks at issue was not geographic,
i.e., In re International Taste, Inc., 53 USPQ2d 1604 (TTAB
2000)(HOLLYWOOD FRIES); In re Urbano, 51 USPQ2d 1776 (TTAB 1999)
(SYDNEY 2000); In re Municipal Capital Markets Corp., 51 USPQ2d
1369 (TTAB 1999)(COOPERSTOWN); Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading
Co., 30 F.3d 348, 31 USPQ2d 1614 (2nd Cir. 1994)(SWISS ARMY
KNIFE); In re Sharkey’s Dry Goods Co., 23 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB
1992)(PARIS BEACH CLUB); and In re The Fred Gretsch Company,
Inc., supra (NASHVILLE). However, those cases are
distinguishable from the present case. Applicant’s mark is not
incongruous or fanciful like PARIS BEACH CLUB, nor is it of no
geographic significance like SWISS ARMY KNIFE. Likewise, the
places named in applicant’s mark do not have a non-geographic
significance which outweighs their geographic significance, as
was found with respect to HOLLYWOOD (refers primarily to the
movie industry), COOPERSTOWN (refers primarily to the Baseball
Hall of Fame), SYDNEY 2000 (refers primarily to the 2000 Olympic
Games), and NASHVILLE (refers to a style of country and western
music). Applicant has not persuasively shown that CUBA L.A. even
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
11
We turn next to the second prong of the Section
2(e)(3) test, i.e., whether a goods/place and
services/place association exists between applicant’s goods
and services and the places named in the mark. Initially,
we reject applicant’s argument that there can be no
goods/place or services/place association because the mark
does not identify a particular, single place. As discussed
above, the primary significance of the mark would be that
of two well-known geographic locations, Cuba and L.A.,
rather than that of a mythical place called “Cuba L.A.”
The issue to be decided is whether purchasers would
associate those places with the identified goods and
services. See In re London & Edinburgh Insurance Group
Ltd., supra, 36 USPQ2d at 1369-70.
We find that purchasers would make an association
between Cuba and the goods and services identified in
applicant’s applications. Notwithstanding the existence of
the United States embargo on trade with Cuba, it appears
from the record that purchasers reasonably could assume
that music-related goods and services of Cuban origin are
available in the United States, including compact discs and
live performances such as those identified in applicant’s
has a non-geographic significance, much less that any such non-
geographic significance is its primary significance.
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
12
applications. The Trademark Examining Attorney has
submitted excerpts of articles from the NEXIS
database
which include the following:
BEST OF MIAMI ’98: SHOPS AND WARES – Don’t
worry, buying Cuban CDs is perfectly legal in
the United States – and in Miami, too.
Although a lot of stores around town carry a
decent selection of new releases from the
island these days no place has more than the
music counters within Marazul’s three travel
agencies. As the U.S. distributor for Cuba’s
Bis Music, Marazul gets the latest CDs recorded
on the island right from the source. Whether
it’s son, nueva trova, Cuban salsa, filin, or
Cuban jazz, you’ll find it at Marazul. (Miami
New Times, May 14, 1998.)
Even Cuban-based bands now reflect the
influence of American contemporary jazz and
pop, as heard in the recent Los Angeles
appearances of Cuba-based charanga ensemble Los
Van Van and other bands. (Los Angeles Times,
May 24, 1999.)
Cuba Connection: the well-deserved recent
excitement over Cuban music and musicians
coming to Los Angeles reminds us of the Cubans
in our midst. (Los Angeles Times, June 26,
1998.)
Some of the worlds’ finest musicians will
participate in the Massachusetts International
Festival of the Arts. Highlights include:
Three days of popular and classical music from
Cuba featuring Camerata Romeu, Jose Maria
Vitier, La Charanga Habanera, Isaac Delgado and
Gema Cuatro. (The Boston Herald, April 12,
1998.)
SUNFEST’S BIG WEEKEND; Cuban Band Seeks Sounds
of Welcome, but Florida-Based Anti-Castro
Factions are Protesting Cubanismo!’s
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
13
Appearance. (The Palm Beach Post, April 30,
1999.)
CUBAN SINGER GETS RARE WELCOME IN S. FLORIDA -
… Aficionados of contemporary Cuban music said
it is important to stage such events in Miami-
Dade because it helps send a message to the
governments of the United States and Cuba that
people in both countries are eager to separate
music from politics. (Sun-Sentinel (Ft.
Lauderdale, FL), April 22, 1998.)
Music lovers have long bemoaned that the best
of Cuba’s contemporary musicians are now
touring the United States, but there’s little
chance they will appear in or near Miami. That
restrictive atmosphere could be easing. At 9
tonight, Onyx, a South Beach hotspot, will
present popular Cuba headliner Isaac Delgado
and his 19-piece band. (Sun-Sentinel (Ft.
Lauderdale, FL), April 21, 1998.)
CHURNING COMPLEXITY FROM RARE CUBAN VISITORS -
… And Los Van Van aren’t just any group.
Formed in 1969 by Mr. Formell, the band has
consistently been the best dance band in Cuba.
Because of the United States Government’s
blockade, the group has developed, like much of
Cuban music, out of the earshot of the United
States, and salsa here and in Puerto Rico has
developed in a radically different way.
Hearing Los Van Van is like running across your
own identical twin who had been taken away at
birth and… (The New York Times, December 16,
1996.)
Applicant argues that the Trademark Examining
Attorney’s evidence fails to show that Cuban music is “well
known and famous among purchasers,” inasmuch as “none of
the articles points to widespread recognition and/or
industry purchasing statistics.” Citing In re Venice Maid
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
14
Co., Inc., 222 USPQ 618 (TTAB 1984), applicant further
argues that “Cuba is no more famous for its music than any
other country,” and that the Trademark Examining Attorney’s
evidence
merely substantiates the existence of Cuban
music generally, like the existence of Russian
music or Greek music. Clearly, every country
will have its own culture, which likely
includes some form of music. However, that
does not mean that the particular country's
music has attained enough notoriety that
purchasers will connect a particular album to a
particular country based on the trademark. See
In re Venice Maid, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 619. A
decision to the contrary may create a slippery
slope that could, conceivably, preclude the use
of certain terms in almost any mark.
(Brief at 11.)
However, to establish the requisite goods/place and
services/place associations, the Trademark Examining
Attorney is not required to prove that Cuba is famous or
well-known for the goods and services at issue. See In re
Nantucket, supra, 213 USPQ at 898 (Neis, Judge,
concurring); In re Handler Fenton Westerns, Inc., 214 USPQ
848 (TTAB 1982).6 Furthermore, in this case, unlike in the
6 Moreover, we note that certain of the evidence of record would
support a finding that Cuba is, in fact, noted for its music.
See, e.g., the following NEXIS
excerpts in the record:
Will you buy the experts’ contention that the United
States, Cuba and Brazil are the three countries that
contribute most to the evolution of today’s popular
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
15
Venice Maid case, there is sufficient evidence in the
record to establish that the particular types of goods and
services identified in the applications would be known or
assumed to originate in or from the place named in the
mark. The Trademark Examining Attorney has done more than
merely “substantiate[] the existence of Cuban music
generally.”
We also find that the requisite goods/place and
services/place association exists between the goods and
services identified in applicant’s applications and the
other place named in applicant’s mark, i.e., “L.A.” or Los
Angeles. Applicant admits “that people generally recognize
L.A. as an arts and entertainment mecca.” (Brief, at 11-
12.) Moreover, the Trademark Examining Attorney has
submitted an Internet search printout which includes
listings and synopses of web sites involving the music
music? (Chattanooga Times and Free Press, May 10,
1999.)
The cha-cha-cha, mambo, rumba and salsa all began in
Cuba before captivating dancers in the United
States, Africa and elsewhere. (Newsday, October 31,
1993.)
See also the Trademark Examining Attorney’s Internet search
printout which includes, in its listing and synopses of web sites
involving Cuban music, the following excerpt from an online music
catalog: “The island that gave the world the rumba, the mambo,
the chachacha, the danzon and the habanera. Forget sugar,
cigars, and rum[,] music is Cuba’s greatest export.”
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
16
industry in Los Angeles, including those covering the L.A.
Opera, various rock/pop bands and independent artists
located in L.A., music production companies and record
labels located in L.A., and L.A. venues for live musical
performances. This evidence suffices to establish, prima
facie, that purchasers would reasonably assume that music-
related goods and services of the types identified in
applicant’s applications can and do originate in and from
Los Angeles.
Applicant argues, however, that in view of the fact
that numerous musical styles and genres could be associated
with Los Angeles, the Trademark Examining Attorney has
failed to prove
that a purchaser would associate any particular
music with L.A. … Merely stating that many
people recognize L.A. as a city known for arts
and entertainment does not establish that
people would associate these particular
goods/services with L.A. … The evidence does
not establish that a reasonable, mainstream
consumer associates Applicant’s style of music
with L.A. any more so than a consumer would
associate the music with Canada, China, Puerto
Rico or any other country.
(Brief, at 12.) Similarly, applicant argues that
the type of music identified by the Mark does
not exist in one particular region. It
consists of an amalgamation of unique styles,
primarily from Cuba or Cuban in style or
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
17
rhythm, but, in combination with other styles
that make the sound distinctive. Therefore, a
purchaser would have no reasonable basis to
mistakenly believe that the goods/services are
connected with a generally known geographic
location.
(Brief, at 1-2.)
Applicant’s argument that there is no connection
between L.A. and applicant’s particular style of music is
not persuasive. The Board rejected a similar argument in
In re Midwest Nut & Seed Company, Inc., 214 USPQ 852 (TTAB
1982), wherein the applicant sought to register CALIFORNIA
MIX for goods identified in the application as “mixtures of
dried fruits and nut meats.” In finding a goods/place
association between California and the goods identified in
the application, the Board relied on the fact that
purchasers associated California with fruits and nuts
generally, and rejected as irrelevant the fact that
applicant’s actual goods consisted largely of fruits and
nuts which would not be assumed to have originated in
California, such as bananas, pineapples, Brazil nuts and
Mexican pumpkin seeds. Likewise, because there exists an
association between music, generally, and Los Angeles, and
because the identifications of goods and services in
applicant’s applications are not limited in any way as to
musical style or genre, applicant’s contention that there
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
18
is no association between Los Angeles and applicant’s
particular style of music is unavailing.
Moreover, even if applicant’s identifications of goods
and services had been limited in such a way as to cover
only applicant’s particular “Cuban style” of music, we
would find that the requisite goods/place and
services/place associations between applicant’s goods and
services and Los Angeles exist. If, as applicant contends,
purchasers are aware that Los Angeles is the origin of
goods and services involving a wide variety of different
musical styles and genres, it stands to reason that
purchasers could logically assume that goods and services
involving applicant’s particular “Cuban-style” music
likewise have their origin in Los Angeles. We note that
applicant’s own specimens state that Los Angeles is one of
the top twenty SoundScan markets for Cuban music in the
United States, and we further are persuaded by the
Trademark Examining Attorney’s suggestion (unchallenged in
applicant’s reply brief) that, because Los Angeles is named
first in the specimen’s listing of the top twenty markets
for Cuban music such as applicant’s, Los Angeles is in fact
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
19
the top market for such music.7
In sum, we find that the Trademark Examining Attorney
has established, prima facie, the existence of a
goods/place association and a services/place association
between applicant’s goods and services, as identified in
the applications, and the places named in applicant’s mark,
Cuba and L.A. We further find that applicant has not
rebutted the Trademark Examining Attorney’s prima facie
showing on this second prong of the Section 2(e)(3) test.8
For the reasons discussed above, we find that the
primary significance of applicant’s mark is that of the
names of two well-known geographic places, Cuba and L.A.,
and that applicant’s combination of those two place names
into the composite CUBA L.A. does not detract from the
7 The specimen states:
Top 20 SoundScan markets for Cuban music
Los Angeles • New York • San Francisco • Miami • Boston •
Philadelphia • Chicago • Washington, D.C. • Portland •
Seattle • Minneapolis • San Diego • Denver • Austin • Detroit
• Houston • Tucson • Albuquerque • Baltimore • Atlanta
8 We further note that applicant’s reply brief arguments (at pp.
4-5) with regard to the second prong of the Section 2(e)(3) test
are particularly unpersuasive. It is irrelevant that the
geographic origin of applicant’s goods and services might not be
material to purchasers, or that applicant’s mark does not
misrepresent the style or genre of music featured in applicant’s
goods and services. Those questions of “materiality to the
purchasing decision” would be germane if the Trademark Examining
Attorney’s refusal were based on the ground of “deceptiveness”
under Trademark Act Section 2(a), but they are not germane to the
Section 2(e)(3) refusals at issue in this case.
Ser. Nos. 75/460,277 and 75/977,888
20
primarily geographic significance of the mark. We further
find that a goods/place association and services/place
association exists between applicant’s goods and services,
as identified in the applications, and the places named in
the mark, Cuba and L.A. Because applicant’s goods and
services do not originate in or from Cuba and/or L.A., we
conclude that applicant’s mark is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive of applicant’s goods and
services, under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(3).
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed in each
of the applications.