Nancy P. Crider, Appellant,v.Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 16, 1998
05960632 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 16, 1998)

05960632

10-16-1998

Nancy P. Crider, Appellant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,) Agency.


Nancy P. Crider v. Department of Veterans Affairs

05960632

October 16, 1998

Nancy P. Crider, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Request No. 05960632

) Appeal No. 01950282

Togo D. West, Jr., ) Agency No. 93-3304

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs,)

Agency. )

)

GRANT OF REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

INTRODUCTION

On June 12, 1996, Nancy P. Crider (appellant) timely initiated a request

to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to

reconsider the decision in Nancy P. Crider v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01950282 (May 13, 1996). EEOC regulations

provide that the Commissioners may, in their discretion, reconsider

any previous Commission decision. 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party

requesting reconsideration must submit written argument or evidence

which tends to establish one or more of the following three criteria:

new and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1);

the previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation, or material fact, or misapplication of established

policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2); or the previous decision is of such

exceptional nature as to have substantial precedential implications, 29

C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons set forth herein, appellant's

request is GRANTED.

The previous decision examined whether the agency discriminated against

appellant when she was removed from employment for inability to perform

the essential functions of her position. The previous decision

adopted the administrative judge's recommended decision finding no

discrimination.

BACKGROUND

The record reflects that appellant was employed by the agency at its

St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office and Insurance Center, Loan Guaranty

Division, as a Clerk-Typist, GS-3 (CT3). Appellant sustained injuries

to her spine in an automobile accident. When she returned to work, her

only medical restriction was no lifting more than 30 pounds. However,

she also requested and received the further accommodations of being

provided with a telephone headset and use of a room in which she could

perform therapeutic exercises.

Following a reorganization, all CT3 positions in the Loan Guaranty

Division were to be abolished, and the only remaining GS-3 positions

would be File Clerks and Mail Clerks,<1> positions having essentially

the same duties. The record reflects that a File Clerk, GS-3, (FC3)

retired, but could not be replaced until another position was abolished.

The agency determined that appellant's position, the last remaining CT3,

would be abolished in order to be able to fill the FC3 position.

On April 1, 1993, the Chief Loan Guaranty Officer (Chief LGO) informed

appellant that she would be reassigned to the FC3 position effective

April 2, 1993. Appellant immediately informed the Chief LGO that

she did not believe she could perform the duties of the position.

The Chief LGO e-mailed appellant later that day stating that he had

reviewed a January 23, 1992, note from her then-attending physician

which set forth a 30-pound weight-lifting limitation, but that this note

was "too old." The Chief LGO did not solicit new medical evidence from

appellant at that time. The record reflects that, nonetheless, appellant

was detailed,<2> not reassigned, to the FC3 position effective April 3,

1993; her CT3 position continued to exist until April 19, 1993, when

the proposal to reassign appellant to the FC3 position and to abolish

her CT3 position was approved. On April 6, 1993, appellant provided

the agency with a note from her attending chiropractor setting forth

restrictions of no pulling or pushing, no stooping or bending, and no

lifting more than 20 pounds, duties which appellant had not been required

to perform in her CT3 position. The agency did not solicit additional

medical evidence from appellant until May 3, 1993, at which time it

requested appellant to provide a report from a medical doctor rather than

a chiropractor. Appellant did so, supplying a report which contained

additional restrictions, including those set forth by her chiropractor.

Appellant subsequently stipulated, and does not now contest, that she

cannot perform the essential functions of the FC3 position with or

without reasonable accommodation.

ANALYSIS and FINDINGS

Disability Discrimination

The agency does not dispute that appellant is a "qualified individual with

disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore

entitled to the Act's protection. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(a)(6); Burton

v. Dept. of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01932449 (October 28, 1994).

The only question is whether the agency met its burden to reasonably

accommodate appellant's known disability.

The Commission finds that the previous decision erred when it found that

the agency had met its burden. The Commission's regulations provide,

in relevant part, that when an employee becomes unable to perform

the essential functions of his or her position even with reasonable

accommodation due to a disability, an agency must offer to reassign the

individual to a funded vacant position at the same grade or level, the

essential functions of which the individual would be able to perform with

reasonable accommodation if necessary unless the agency can demonstrate

that the reassignment would impose an undue hardship on the operation

of its program. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(g); DeMeo v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01951047 (October 31, 1996). Further, the

Commission's regulations contemplate that an agency will engage in an

interactive process with the disabled employee in order to identify the

employee's precise limitations resulting from the disability, and the

potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome the limitations.

See 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(o)(3); Haug v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01951337 (January 9, 1998); Hupka v. Department of Defense, EEOC

Appeal No. 02960003 (August 13, 1997).

In the instant case, the agency abolished appellant's CT3 position and

reassigned her to the FC3 position. However, it immediately became

apparent that appellant, on account of her disability, could not perform

the essential functions of the FC3 position. At that point, the agency

became obligated to attempt to locate a position whose essential functions

appellant could perform, as set forth above. There is no evidence that

the agency looked beyond the Loan Guaranty Division of the St. Paul

Regional Office and Insurance Center to locate a suitable position for

appellant. There is no evidence that a suitable position could not be

found elsewhere in the St. Paul Regional Office and Insurance Center, or

at such other agency facilities as might exist in the St. Paul commuting

area. Further, although the agency finally solicited medical evidence

from appellant bearing on her limitations, once it became clear that the

duties of the FC3 position exceeded appellant's limitations the agency

failed to engage appellant in the exploration of how her disability might

be accommodated. Accordingly, the agency has not met its obligation to

reasonably accommodate appellant's disability.

Equitable Relief

When discrimination is found, the agency must provide the complainant

with an equitable remedy that constitutes full, make-whole relief to

restore him or her to the position he or she would have occupied absent

the discrimination. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424

U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Adesanya v. U.S. Postal Service, 01933395 (July

21, 1994). To avoid providing a remedy, the agency must show by clear

and convincing evidence that even absent discrimination, the complainant

would not have received the benefit sought. 29 C.F.R. �1614.501(c)(2);

see Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

In this case, the remedy requested by appellant is reinstatement to a

clerical position with the agency. The record reflects, however, that

the only GS-3 positions which exist in the Loan Guaranty Division are

the FC3 position which appellant is unable to perform, and a Mail Clerk

position which has essentially the same physical requirements as the

FC3 position. Some five years have passed since the events at issue,

and it is not impossible that a vacant funded position suitable for

appellant may now exist. The Commission therefore will order the agency

on remand to attempt to locate a suitable position for appellant without

restricting its search to the Loan Guaranty Division. In addition, the

Commission will order the agency to pay appellant back pay and benefits

from the effective date of her removal through the effective date of her

reinstatement or the date on which the agency determines that a suitable

position for appellant does not exist, whichever is applicable.

Compensatory Damages

There remains one unresolved matter. The record contains a document

marked at the hearing as appellant's Exhibit 1, a July 27, 1993, note from

Dr. M, appellant's attending physician. Dr. M states, in relevant part:

[Appellant] has endoscopically documented reflux esophagitis with

aggravation of symptoms associated with increased anxiety. She developed

increased reflux symptoms associated with increased anxiety when she was

switched from a clerical position to a file clerk position. Her work as

a file clerk did not cause her reflux esophagitis -- but did aggravate

her reflux esophagitis.

Dr. M's statement clearly raises the prospect that appellant may be

entitled to compensatory damages related to the agency's discriminatory

conduct.

The Commission notes that compensatory damages may be raised at

any time during the administrative process, up to and including the

appeal stage, but not thereafter. Banks v. Dept. of the Interior, EEOC

Request No. 05920680 (March 4, 1994); Kyriazi v. Dept. of Defense, EEOC

Request No. 05930086 (March 4, 1994); York, EEOC Appeal No. 01930435;

Pacheco v. Dept. of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 01933253 (March 24,

1994); Stoll v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930057 (January

14, 1994). In this case, the issue of compensatory damages arose when

Dr. M's note was entered into evidence at the hearing. Where a finding of

discrimination is entered, and the claim for compensatory damages has not

been considered by the agency, the case will be remanded to the agency

for a supplemental investigation and a separate final agency decision

on the compensatory damages claim. York, EEOC Appeal No. 01930435;

McGowan-Butler v. Dept. of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01930662 (April

21, 1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, EEOC Request No. 05940636

(September 9, 1994).

Compensatory damages may be awarded for all pecuniary and non-pecuniary

losses attributable to acts of discrimination occurring on and after

November 21, 1991, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). In Carle

v. Dept. of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993), the

Commission described the type of objective evidence that an agency may

obtain when assessing the merits of a complainant's request for emotional

distress damages:

[E]vidence could have taken the form of a statement by appellant

describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both

on and off the job, describing the distress. To properly explain the

emotional distress, such statements should include detailed information

on physical or behavioral manifestations of the distress, information on

the duration of the distress, and examples of how the distress affected

appellant day to day, both on and off the job. In addition, the agency

should have asked appellant to provide objective and other evidence

linking ... the distress to the unlawful discrimination ....

Objective evidence may include statements from appellant concerning her

emotional pain or suffering,<3> inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of

enjoyment of life, injury to professional standing, injury to character

or reputation, injury to credit standing, loss of health, and any other

non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the discriminatory

conduct. Statements from others, including family members, friends, and

health care providers could address the outward manifestations or physical

consequences of emotional distress, including sleeplessness, anxiety,

stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, loss of self-esteem,

excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Objective evidence may also

include documents indicating appellant's actual out-of-pocket expenses

related to medical treatment, counseling, and so forth, related to the

injury caused by the respondent's discriminatory action.

Upon remand, the agency will afford appellant a period of time,

as specified below, to produce evidence in support of her claim for

compensatory damages. Thereafter, the agency will issue a new FAD

addressing only whether, and to what extent, appellant has established

her entitlement to compensatory damages.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

appellant's request for reconsideration is GRANTED. The decision in

Appeal No. 01950282 is REVERSED and the case is remanded to the agency

for further processing consistent with this Decision and the Order of the

Commission, below. There is no further right of administrative appeal

from the decision of the Commission on this request for reconsideration.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

(1) The agency shall conduct a new investigation to determine whether

there exists a funded vacant position, in the same commuting area

and serviced by the same appointing authority as appellant's former

Clerk-Typist position, which would be suitable for appellant given her

current limitations, including any position which might be made suitable

through reasonable accommodation. Prior to initiating the job search,

the agency shall solicit from appellant medical evidence delineating

her current limitations.

(2) If a suitable position is located for appellant, the agency shall

offer the position to appellant, and shall allow appellant a period of

not less than five (5) business days to accept or reject the offer.

(3) The agency shall tender to appellant back pay and benefits for

the period July 23, 1993, to the date of appellant's reinstatement.

Should appellant reject the offer of reinstatement, her entitlement to

back pay shall cease on that date. Should the agency determine that

no suitable position exists for appellant and she therefore cannot be

reinstated, her entitlement to back pay shall cease on the date of that

determination.

(4) The agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation into the

matter of appellant's entitlement to compensatory damages. The agency

shall solicit from appellant evidence bearing on this matter, and shall

afford appellant no fewer than forty-five (45) days from the date she

receives its request to supply such evidence. Within sixty (60) days

after receipt of appellant's evidence, the agency shall issue a final

agency decision on the matter of compensatory damages.

(5) The agency shall pay appellant's reasonable attorney fees and costs

in accordance with the paragraph below entitled, "Attorney Fees."

(6) The agency shall post a notice of the finding of discrimination in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled, "Posting Order."

(7) The agency shall conduct EEO training for all supervisory/managerial

personnel in the Loan Guaranty Division of its St. Paul, Minnesota,

Regional Office and Insurance Center. Such training shall include,

but not be limited to, training on the agency's obligations toward its

disabled employees and applicants for employment.

The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay,

with interest, and other benefits due appellant, pursuant to 29

C.F.R. �1614.501, no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the date

this decision becomes final. Appellant shall cooperate in the agency's

efforts to compute the amount of back pay and benefits due, and shall

provide all relevant information requested by the agency. If there

is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back pay and/or benefits,

the agency shall issue a check to appellant for the undisputed amount

within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the agency determines the

amount it believes to be due. Appellant may petition for enforcement or

clarification of the amount in dispute. The petition for clarification

or enforcement must be filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address

referenced in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision."

The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due appellant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice,

after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall

be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date

this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)

consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where

notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take

reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,

or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be

submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph

entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)

calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

ATTORNEY FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. �1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney fees shall be paid by

the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,

D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to appellant. If the

agency does not comply with the Commission's order, appellant may petition

the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a).

Appellant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance

with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative

petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and

1614.503 (g). Alternatively, appellant has the right to file a civil

action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408

and 1614.409. a civil action for enforcement or a civil action

on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42

U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If appellant files a civil action,

the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition

for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

RIGHT TO FILE a CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such an action in an appropriate

United States District Court. It is the position of the Commission

that you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that

courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of

1991 in a manner suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

To ensure that your civil action is considered timely, you are advised to

file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive

this decision or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time

period in the jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the

alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180)

CALENDARS DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency,

or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY

HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result

in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 16, 1998

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated _____________ which found that a

violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791

et seq., has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of that person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL

DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,

or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center supports and will comply with such Federal law and

will not take action against individuals because they have exercised

their rights under law.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center has been found to have discriminated against the

individual affected by the Commission's finding. The Department of

Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office and Insurance

Center shall attempt to locate a suitable position for the affected

individual and reinstate her with back pay and benefits; if a suitable

position does not exist, tender back pay and benefits through the date

on which such a determination is made; pay such compensatory damages as

may be proven; pay reasonable attorney fees and costs; and conduct EEO

training for the supervisory/managerial officials of its Loan Guaranty

division.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional

Office and Insurance Center will ensure that officials responsible for

personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide

by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws

and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce,

or retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her right to

oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings

pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.

_________________________

Date Posted: ____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated _____________ which found that a

violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791

et seq., has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of that person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL

DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,

or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center supports and will comply with such Federal law and

will not take action against individuals because they have exercised

their rights under law.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center has been found to have discriminated against the

individual affected by the Commission's finding. The Department of

Veterans Affairs, St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office and Insurance

Center shall attempt to locate a suitable position for the affected

individual and reinstate her with back pay and benefits; if a suitable

position does not exist, tender back pay and benefits together with

one year of front pay; pay such compensatory damages as may be proven;

pay reasonable attorney fees and costs; and conduct EEO training for

the supervisory/managerial officials of its Loan Guaranty Division.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional

Office and Insurance Center will ensure that officials responsible for

personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will abide

by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity laws

and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.

The Department of Veterans Affairs St. Paul, Minnesota, Regional Office

and Insurance Center will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce,

or retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her right to

oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings

pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.

_________________________

Date Posted: ____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1Although referred to throughout the record as "Mail Clerk," this job

title does not appear on the table of positions provided by the agency.

Rather, the actual title of this position appears to be "Documents

Clerk."

2The memorandum apprising appellant of her change in position referred

to an "informal detail" that would be made permanent at a later date.

3The Commission notes that a request for compensatory damages related

to emotional pain and suffering may permit the agency to seek personal

and sensitive information from appellant in order to determine whether

the injury is linked solely, partially, or not at all to the alleged

discriminatory conduct.