Nahi Halmann

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 23, 2020

11710773 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/710,773 02/23/2007 Nahi Halmann 215304 (553-1340US) 7783
45436 7590 01/23/2020
DEAN D. SMALL
THE SMALL PATENT LAW GROUP LLC
225 S. MERAMEC, STE. 725T
ST. LOUIS, MO 63105
EXAMINER
LAURITZEN, AMANDA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3793
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Docket@splglaw.com
jleclair@splglaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte NAHI HALMANN
____________

Appeal 2019-0023071
Application 11/710,773
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1, 3–16, 18–34, and 36–41, which constitute
all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed
August 6, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed January 28, 2019), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 29, 2018) and Non-Final
Office Action (“Non-Final Act.,” mailed March 14, 2018).
2 Appellant identifies “General Electric Company” as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 5.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates generally to ultrasound
systems, and more particularly, handheld and hand-carried ultrasound (or
other medical imaging) systems.” Spec. ¶ 1.
Claims 1, 25, 27, and 28 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1, reproduced below with indentation added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. An ultrasound system, comprising:
a probe configured to acquire ultrasound scan data; and
a software backend comprising software run by an operating
system having instructions to:
(i) process the acquired ultrasound scan data; and
(ii) perform image compounding when activated by a
user input and using a number of steering frames for a plurality
of different angles, at least one of the number of steering frames
or the different angles determined from the user input,
wherein the software backend is operating on a backend
processor in one of a handheld device or a hand-carried device.

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 3–16, 18–34, and 36–41 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
2. Claims 11–13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.3

3 The Examiner indicated that “claims 11 and any depending therefrom” are
interpreted under § 112, sixth paragraph. Non-Final Act. 3. However, the
Examiner’s rejection for lack of written description support under § 112,
first paragraph, based on this interpretation does not include claims 12 and
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3. Claims 11–13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant, regards as the
invention.
4. Claims 1, 3–9, 11, 14, 15, 21, 24–27, 30, 31, 33, and 36–38 are
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guracar et al. (US
2004/0225218 A1, pub. Nov. 11, 2004) (“Guracar”) and Hwang et al. (US
2002/0177774 A1, pub. Nov. 28, 2002) (“Hwang”).
5. Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, and Berger et al. (US 2004/0015079 A1, pub. Jan. 22,
2004) (“Berger”).
6. Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, and Grunwald et al. (US 2002/0173721 A1, pub.
Nov. 21, 2002) (“Grunwald”).
7. Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, and Little (US 2006/0058652 A1, pub. Mar. 16,
2006).
8. Claim 16 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, and Washburn et al. (US 2006/0030776 A1, pub.
Feb. 9, 2006) (“Washburn”).
9. Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, and Sabourin et al. (US 2005/0053308 A1, pub.
Mar. 10, 2005) (“Sabourin”).

13, which depend from claim 11. If claim 11 is properly rejected under
§ 112, first paragraph, then claims 12 and 13 are also properly rejected as
well. Therefore, we treat this rejection as applying to claims 11–13.
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10. Claims 19 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Guracar, Hwang, and Wittrock et al. (US 6,527,721 B1,
iss. Mar. 4, 2003) (“Wittrock”).
11. Claims 22 and 23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Guracar, Hwang, and Nefos (US 2005/0228281 A1, pub.
Oct. 13, 2005).
12. Claim 32 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, Sabourin, and Grunwald.
13. Claim 34 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, and Poland (US 2003/0236461 A1, pub. Dec. 25,
2003).
14. Claims 39 and 40 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Guracar, Hwang, Poland, and Entrekin et al. (US
6,126,598, iss. Oct. 3, 2000) (“Entrekin”).
15. Claim 41 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Guracar, Hwang, Poland, and Miller (US 2005/0113696 A1, pub.
May 26, 2005).
16. Claims 28 and 29 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Guracar and Urbano (US 2007/0161904 A1, pub. July 12,
2007).

ANALYSIS
Written Description
Claims 1, 3–16, 18–34, and 36–41
Independent claim 1 recites “a software backend comprising software
run by an operating system having instructions to” perform the steps of
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“(i) process the acquired ultrasound scan data” and “(ii) perform image
compounding when activated by a user input and using a number of steering
frames for a plurality of different angles, at least one of the number of
steering frames or the different angles determined from the user input”
(Appeal Br. 29; Claims App’x.). Independent claims 25, 27, and 28 contain
similar limitations.
In rejecting independent claims 1, 25, 27, and 28 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description
requirement, the Examiner found that these claims “incorporate ‘software’
for which no corresponding algorithm(s) are disclosed” (Non-Final Act. 5).
According to the Examiner, “[s]ince no description of the corresponding
algorithm(s) has been provided, the claims fail to satisfy the written
description requirement for computer-implemented functions” (id.).
Whether a Specification complies with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is a question of fact and is
assessed on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The disclosure, as
originally filed, need not literally describe the claimed subject matter (i.e.,
using the same terms or in haec verba) in order to satisfy the written
description requirement. But the Specification must convey with reasonable
clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, Appellant was in
possession of the claimed invention. See id.
Here, the Specification discloses an algorithm in prosaic terms that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand indicates the inventor
had possession of the claimed subject matter. For example, as to the
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limitation of claim 1 that the software includes instructions to “perform
image compounding . . . using a number of steering frames for a plurality of
different angles,” paragraph 53 discloses that “three different angles are used
to acquire scan data” and paragraph 54 discloses that “frames representing a
left steering frame, a right steering frame, and a no steering frame are
combined to produce a compound image.” As to the claim 1 limitations that
the image compounding is “activated by a user input” and that the number of
frames/angles is “determined from the user input,” paragraph 55 discloses
that “the user may select the number of frames used to construct the
compound image manually.”
In light of the above disclosure, we agree with Appellant (Reply Br. 3)
that the Specification provides adequate written description support for
claims 1, 25, 27, and 28. Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1, 25, 27, and
28 and dependent claims 3–16, 18–24, 26, 29–34, and 36–41 is not
sustained.

Written Description and Indefiniteness
Rejections of Claims 11–13
The Examiner determined that each of the recited modules in claim 11
is properly interpreted under § 112, sixth paragraph (Non-Final Act. 3). The
Examiner further determined that “[t]he modules are not corresponded with
any structure(s) in the specification, as they appear to be purely components
of software” (id. at 4).
Based on this interpretation, the Examiner rejected claims 11–13
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement (id. at 5–6) and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
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paragraph, as being indefinite (id. at 6–7). According to the Examiner,
“while the application discloses generic computer hardware, the
specification fails to disclose the corresponding algorithms for the claimed
functions of at least ‘geometric transformation,’ ‘interpolation,’
‘compounding,’ ‘battery management,’ ‘heat management,’ ‘frame
processing,’ ‘scan conversion’ and ‘resolution selection’” (Ans. 17).
In this case, the correct analysis of claims 11–13 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 involves two questions: (1) whether each of the nine “module”
limitations recited in claim 11 is a “means-plus-function” limitation that
invokes the application of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph; and (2) once the
term “module” is treated as a “means-plus-function” limitation, whether
Appellant’s Specification discloses sufficient corresponding structure, i.e.,
an algorithm for performing the function of that “module.” See Williamson
v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s interpretation and argues that
“the module limitations are not means-plus-function limitations, and are
associated with corresponding structure” (Appeal Br. 16), namely the
backend processor. For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant further
argues that even if the modules are properly interpreted as means-plus-
function limitations, the Specification provides adequate written description
support for these limitations because “finite steps are provided in prose
related to the modules” (Reply Br. 5) (citing Spec. ¶ 36).
Although the Specification does not provide an express definition for
the term “module,” the Specification uses the term “module” in
contradistinction to hardware elements and generally indicates that a
“module” encompasses a software module. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 36 (“software
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backend 82 may include one or more modules or, if hardware implemented,
processing elements.”); Id. ¶ 70 (“the software may be in the form of a
collection of separate programs, a program module within a larger program
or a portion of a program module.”).
“It is well-established that the corresponding structure for a function
performed by a software algorithm is the algorithm itself.” EON Corp. IP
Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(citing WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348–49
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). An applicant may express the algorithm in any
understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose, in a
flow chart, or “in any other manner that provides sufficient structure.”
Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
We see no evidence in the record that the Examiner has properly
analyzed the relevant disclosure in the Specification as to any of the nine
modules recited in claim 11. For example, as to the claimed “compounding
module,” the Specification discloses that “[t]he compounding module
combines a plurality of steering frames corresponding to a plurality of
different angles to produce a compound image” (Spec. ¶ 36). Image
compounding is described in additional detail in paragraphs 51–55, with
reference to Figures 11–13. For example, “Figure 12 is a schematic
illustration of spatial compounding . . .” (Id. at 52). We see no indication
that the Examiner analyzed this disclosure to determine whether the
Specification sufficiently discloses an algorithm for image compounding
that corresponds to the structure of the “compounding module” of claim 11.
See MPEP 2181:
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If the specification explicitly discloses an algorithm, the
sufficiency of the disclosure of the algorithm must be
determined in light of the level of ordinary skill in the art.
Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337, 86 USPQ2d at 1241; AllVoice
Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236,
1245, 84 USPQ2d 1886, 1893 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Intel Corp., 319
F.3d at 1366-67, 65 USPQ2d 1934, 1941 (knowledge of a
person of ordinary skill in the art can be used to make clear how
to implement a disclosed algorithm). The examiner should
determine whether one skilled in the art would know how to
program the computer to perform the necessary steps described
in the specification (i.e., the invention is enabled), and that the
inventor was in possession of the invention (i.e., the invention
meets the written description requirement).

We decline to perform that analysis in the first instance. Accordingly,
even if we agree with the Examiner that each of the nine modules recited in
claim 11 invokes means-plus-function interpretation under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
sixth paragraph, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 11–13 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
being indefinite because the Examiner has not properly analyzed the
Specification to identify the corresponding structure, i.e., the algorithm that
corresponds to the function of each module.

Obviousness
The Rejection of Claims 1, 3–9, 11, 14, 15, 21, 24–27, 30, 31, 33, and
36–38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guracar and Hwang.
Independent Claims 1, 25, and 27 and Dependent Claims 3–9, 11, 14, 15,
21, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, and 36–38
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claims 1, 25, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
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because the combination of Guracar and Hwang fails to disclose or suggest
the subject matter of these claims (see Appeal Br. 18–23; see also Reply Br.
5–7).
Instead, we agree with, and adopt, the Examiner’s findings and
rationales as our own (see Non-Final Act. 8–10 (citing Guracar ¶¶ 5–7, 17,
19, 23, 24, 27, 35, 37, 42, and 58–59)). We add the following discussion for
emphasis.
In rejecting claims 1, 25, and 27, the Examiner finds that Guracar
discloses all of the claim limitations except that “it is not particularly set
forth [in Guracar] that the system or personal computer is a handheld device
or a hand-carried device” (Non-Final Act. 8–9). In particular, the Examiner
finds that Guracar’s compound processor 22 performs “image compounding
. . . using a number of steering frames for a plurality of different angles” as
recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 25 and 27 (id. at 8). And
the Examiner finds that “the compound processor 22 may comprise a
personal computer, as in [paragraph 27 of Guracar], for which an operating
system is standard” (id. at 9–10). The Examiner reasons that
It would have been obvious to those ordinarily skilled in the art
at the time of invention to incorporate the components of
Guracar et al. into a handheld or hand-carried case, as shown in
Hwang et al., or embodying the personal computer of Guracar
et al. as a laptop, as there are clear advantages to reducing the
size of computing systems.

Id. at 9. As to the limitation that the software and processor are “backend”
as claimed, the Examiner finds:
While it is not set forth that the compound processor 22
of Guracar et al. is a backend processor, since it is a
computational processor, it relates to data access and is not
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performing functions merely for display or presentation.
Therefore it is deduced that the processor is necessarily a
functional backend processor. See also Hwang et al. at [0017]
which details program memory and back end processing.

Id. at 9.
Appellant reproduces limitations (i) and (ii) of claim 1 and argues that
The Office Action seemingly points to Guracar at [0035]
as disclosing these limitations. See March 14, 2018 Office
Action at pages 8-9. However, Guracar at [0035] indicates that
a “marker processor 30 is operable to identify one or more
markers.” See Guracar at [0035]. Further, the “marker
processor 30 or compound processor 22 is operable to combine
the correction frame of data responsive to the low pass filter
with the compounded frame of data responsive to the
electronically steered component frames of data or combine
with a component frame prior to compounding.” See id.

Neither Guracar, nor Hwang, even mentions “software,”
in general, or “software backend,” in particular.

Appeal Br. 19. Appellant makes essentially the same arguments for
independent claims 25 and 27. See id. at 20–23.
Responding to Appellant’s arguments in the Answer, the Examiner
states:
The compound processor 22 and its associated software
perform backend processing, since their functions are
computational, relating to data access. The functions associated
with the compound processor and its associated software are
not merely for display or presentation of information.
Therefore it is deduced that the processor is necessarily a
functional backend processor. Deducing that compound
processor 22 is a backend processor is based on the definition
of backend processing.

Ans. 21.
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Appellant disagrees with the Examiner’s interpretation of “backend”
and argues that “the processor of Guracar is not necessarily a functional
backend processor” (Reply Br. 6). As best understood, Appellant’s position
is that “software backend” as recited in claims 1, 25, and 27 should be
interpreted to mean a software backend that “replaces the mid-processor,
scan converter, and host computer” (Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Spec.
¶ 35)).
Appellant fails to direct us to any specific definition in the
Specification for the term “software backend” or “backend processor” which
would serve to distinguish the claimed “software backend” or “backend
processor” from the personal computer that performs image compounding
disclosed in Guracar and relied on by the Examiner. The Specification does
not contain any express definition for “backend,” “software backend,” or
“backend processor.” Paragraph 35 of Appellant’s Specification merely
describes, by way of example, “various embodiments” in which “the
software backend 82 replaces the mid-processor, scan converter, and host
computer.” See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[d]uring examination [of a patent application, a pending
claim is] given [the] broadest reasonable [construction] consistent with the
specification, and . . . claim language should be read in light of the
specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art”)
(internal citation and quotations omitted); CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself,
Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (although the specification can be
examined for proper context of a claim term, limitations from the
specification will not be imported into the claims).
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We agree with the Examiner that Guracar’s disclosure of compound
processor 22 implemented as a personal computer meets the claimed
“software backend” and “backend processor” limitations of claim 1 under a
broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification.
Guracar is directed to “spatial compounding” in ultrasound systems
and, more particularly, “to compounding component frames of data
associated with different angles to reduce speckle and produce a more
continuous border in specular targets, such as muscle layers.” (Guracar ¶ 1).
Figure 1 of Guracar depicts “a system 10 for identifying clinical markers in
steered spatial compounding ultrasound imaging” (id. ¶ 18). “The system 10
includes a transmit beamformer 12, a transducer 14, a receive beamformer
16, a detector 18, a scan converter 20, a compound processor 22, a display
24 and a marker identification circuit 26” (id. ¶ 19). Paragraph 27 of
Guracar discloses that
In one embodiment, the compound processor 22 comprises a
personal computer, motherboard, separate circuit board or other
processor added to an ultrasound system for image processing
using transfers of data to and from the ultrasound image
generation pipeline or processing path (i.e. receive beamformer
16, detector 18, scan converter 20 and display 24).

Webster’s dictionary defines the term “back end” as follows:
The portion of a program that handles the processing tasks that
the program is designed to perform, but in such a way that it is
not apparent to the user. In a local area network (LAN) with
client/server architecture, the back-end application may be
stored on the file server, while front-end programs handle the
user interface on each workstation. See front end.

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“back end,” Webster’s New World™ Computer Dictionary, 10th ed.
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003.4 This definition is consistent with the
Examiner’s position that Guracar’s compound processor 22 is a backend
processor because “it relates to data access and is not performing functions
merely for display or presentation” (Non-Final Act. 9).
We also agree with the Examiner (Ans. 21) that a person of ordinary
skill in the art would understand that a personal computer necessarily
includes operating system software for managing the computer’s basic
operations as well as application software for performing higher-level
operations. See, e.g., “personal computer (PC),” Webster’s New World™
Computer Dictionary, 10th ed. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2003 (“A small
computer equipped with all the system, utility, and application software, as
well as the input/output devices and other peripherals, that an individual
needs to perform one or more tasks.”)5
Equally unpersuasive is Appellant’s argument that “[t]he only reason
to modify Guracar to present a backend processor comes from Appellant’s
specification, evidencing impermissible hindsight reasoning.” This
argument is unpersuasive because the Examiner does not propose to modify
Guracar to include a backend processor. Rather, as explained above, the
Examiner finds that Guracar’s compound processor 22 is a backend
processor.

4 https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/webstercom/back_end/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2019)
5https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/webstercom/personal_com
puter_pc/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2019)
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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 25, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 3–9,
11, 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, and 36–38, which are not argued
separately.

The Rejection of Dependent Claim 39 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Guracar, Hwang, Poland, and Entrekin.
The Examiner finds that Entrekin discloses the subject matter of
dependent claim 39. See Non-Final Act. 15–16 (citing Entrekin, Abstract;
1:11–16; 1:27–31; and 2:26–40).
Regarding claim 39, the Appellant argues that “the Office Action
relies on a portion of Entrekin that indicates that an ultrasound system
automatically senses motion of a scanhead and adjusts a number of images
being compounded accordingly” and “there is nothing in the cited portions
of Entrekin that expressly or necessarily describes an application specific
preset value” (Appeal Br. 26).
Responding to Appellant’s argument in the Answer, the Examiner
finds that Entrekin discloses “in col. 2, lines 26–40, the number of
compound frames is adapted based on the mode of operation” and that
“[m]odes of operation represent specific applications.” Ans. 24.
Appellant does not address claim 39 in the Reply Brief. See
generally, Reply Brief.
Entrekin in column 2, lines 26–40 discloses, inter alia, “adapting the
number of component frames used to form a spatially compound image to
the mode of operation” and that “[t]he change in the number of component
frames used can be switched with the setting of the mode of operation by the
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user or, in the preferred embodiment, the ultrasound system automatically
senses the motion of the scanhead and adaptively adjusts the number of
images being compounded accordingly.”
Appellant has not persuasively explained how the claimed
“application specific preset value” is patentably distinct from the number of
component frames associated with a “mode of operation” in Entrekin.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 39 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

The Rejections of Dependent Claims 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23,
32, 34, 40 and 41.
Each of claims 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 32, 34, 40, and 41
depends, directly or indirectly, from claim 1. Appellant’s arguments for the
rejections of these claims are the same as for claim 1. Accordingly, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19,
20, 22, 23, 32, 34, 40, and 41 for the same reasons set forth above with
respect to claim 1.

The Rejection of Independent Claim 28 and Dependent Claim 29
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Guracar and Urbano
In rejecting independent claim 28, the Examiner relies on Guracar in
essentially the same manner as in the rejection of claim 1 (see Non-Final
Act. 17–18). Appellant’s arguments for independent claim 28 are essentially
the same as for independent claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 27–28). Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 28 for the same
reasons set forth above with respect to claim 1. For the same reasons, we
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also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claim 29, which is not
argued separately.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–16, 18–
34, 36–41
112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
1, 3–16, 18–
34, 36–41
11–13 112, first
paragraph
Written
Description
11–13
11–13 112,
second
paragraph
Indefiniteness 11–13
1, 3–9, 11,
14, 15, 21,
24–27, 30,
31, 33, 36–
38
103(a) Guracar, Hwang 1, 3–9, 11,
14, 15, 21,
24–27, 30,
31, 33, 36–
38

10 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Berger
10
12 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Grunwald
12
13 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Little
13
16 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Washburn
16
18 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Sabourin
18
19, 20 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Wittrock
19, 20
22, 23 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Nefos
22, 23
32 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Sabourin,
Grunwald
32
Appeal 2019-002307
Application 11/710,773

18
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
34 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Poland
34
39, 40 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Poland, Entrekin
39, 40
41 103(a) Guracar, Hwang,
Poland, Miller
41
28, 29 103(a) Guracar, Urbano 28, 29
Overall
Outcome
1, 3–16, 18–
34, 36–41

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED