Myrna Velez, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 28, 2006
01a50005 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 28, 2006)

01a50005

09-28-2006

Myrna Velez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Myrna Velez v. United States Postal Service

01A50005

September 28, 2006

.

Myrna Velez,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A50005

Agency No. 1A-007-0001-03

Hearing No. 150-2003-094

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency order

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. , Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.,

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission reverses and remands

the agency's final order.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Supervisor, Distribution Operations at the agency's

San Juan Processing and Distribution facility. Complainant sought EEO

counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on January 8, 2003,

alleging that she was discriminated against on the bases of a disability

( major depression), sex (female) and age (D.O.B. 1/22/1958) when she

was not granted sick leave.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

finding no discrimination. The AJ stated in her decision that the

agency's Motion for Summary Judgment was correct and should be adopted

in its entirety.

The AJ found that complainant submitted documentation for the period

June 4, 2002 to July 3, 2002 but that complainant failed to submit

documentation to support her request for sick leave for July 3, 2002 to

September 2, 2002. The AJ concluded that other male supervisors were

not treated more favorably because they submitted the required medical

documentation to support their leave requests. The agency's final action

implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends, among other things, that the AJ's

decision granting summary judgment to the agency was in error because

her medical documentation indicated that the possible duration of

her condition would last until July 1, 2002. She contends that the

documentation confirms that she suffered from severe recurrent depressive

symptoms which interfered with her ability for global functioning.

Complainant also contends that the record supports that one of the other

male supervisors was approved for leave taken prior to submitting his

request which indicated the agency's more favorable treatment of its

male employees.

The agency argues that the AJ's decision was correct and that

complainant's arguments on appeal are specious and without merit.

Specifically, the agency argues that complainant does not support her

contention that she was incapacitated during the time in question and

should be excused from following the agency's leave procedures.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission's review of a decision by summary judgment is de novo,

meaning that it is done without regard to the legal or factual conclusions

of the previous decision maker. EEOC Management Directive 110, Chap. 9

(Sect. VI) (Rev. 1999). Our regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision

without a hearing when he or she finds that there are no genuine issues

of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned

after Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme

Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court

determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards

that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh

the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues

for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be

believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential

to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly

consider summary judgment only upon a determination that the record has

been adequately developed for summary disposition. Petty v. Department

of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206, (July 11, 2003).

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February

24, 1995).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when she

concluded that summary judgment was appropriate. Moreover, the AJ's

decision contained no analysis of the record evidence which indicated

why she found it appropriate to grant summary judgment.

Our review of the record revealed that the AJ made improper determinations

regarding the credibility of the witnesses, specifically, she credited

the statements of all the agency's managers over that of the complainant

and records supporting complainant. The courts have been clear that

summary judgment is not to be used as a "trial by affidavit." Redmand

v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted

that when a party submits an affidavit and credibility is at issue,

"there is a need for strident cross-examination and summary judgment

on such evidence is improper." Pedersen v. Department of Justice,

EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February 24, 1995). This is exemplified by

her finding that complainant failed to submit documentation to support

her leave request. On the contrary, complainant submitted the report

of her treating physician which stated that complainant suffered from

Major Depressive disorder, that required hospitalization and follow-up

outpatient treatment for one year.

In addition, the doctor advised that complainant should appear for

monthly clinical visits and that she was on continuing prescription

medicine for depression. Complainant also testified that there was

additional documentation given which the agency failed to produce. Thus,

when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to complainant,

this documentation supported complainant's leave request for the period

past July 1, 2002 and indicated that she had a severe condition during

the entire time period in question.

The AJ concluded that there was no evidence that the agency treated

its male employees more favorably, yet the evidence supports that the

agency granted leave in its entirety where male employees submitted

leave requests. When complainant made her request, all but one week

was approved. Although the agency claimed that her request was not

documented, the physician's note recommended leave for the whole period

through September 2, 2002.

The AJ also did not evaluate whether complainant was an individual

with a disability given the nature and severity of her condition.

Her medical documentation indicated she had a major psychological

disorder, which was recurrent in partial remission. From the medical

evidence, a reasonable inference could be drawn that complainant fit

the definition of �disabled.� If complainant is found to be disabled

within the meaning of the law, complainant's leave request could have

been considered a form of reasonable accommodation.

The Commission has stated that the hearing process is intended to be

an extension of the investigative process, designed to �ensure that the

parties have a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement

the record and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC

Management Directive (MD) 110, as revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 7,

page 7-1; see also 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(e). �Truncation of this process,

while material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses

is still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full

and fair investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also

Peavley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628

(October 31, 1996); Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Request No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995). In sum, there are simply

too many unresolved issues which require weighing of the evidence.

Therefore, judgment as a matter of law for the agency should not have

been granted.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

arguments on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission reverses the

agency's final action and remands the matter to the agency in accordance

with this decision and the Order below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the New York District

Office, San Juan Area Office, the request for a hearing within fifteen

(15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency

is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings

Unit within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final. The agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance

Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been

transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge

shall issue a decision on the complaint in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �

1614.109 and the agency shall issue a final action in accordance with

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal

with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name

and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 28, 2006

__________________

Date