Monark Silver King, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 3, 1951

94 N.L.R.B. 295 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

MONARK SILVER KING, INC. 295
MONARK SILVER kING, INC. and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTO-
MOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT W ORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER. Case No. 13-RC-1635. May 3, 1951
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Herman J. De Koven, hear-
ing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem-
ber panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Styles].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. The Employer and the Association urge their most recent col-
lective bargaining contract as a bar to this proceeding. The Peti-
tioner contends that it is not a bar, as it was prematurely extended and
was not executed until after the filing of the petition.
On December 17, 1948, the Employer and the Association executed
a 2-year agreement, which contained no automatic renewal clause, for
the period extending from January 1, 1949, to December 31, 1950. On
October 9, 1950, the contracting parties, fearing the institution of a
Government wage freeze, signed an agreement, effective that day,
amending the wage scale set forth in the contract of December 17,
1948.2 And on November 7,1950, following negotiations, which began
in late September 1950 and resulted in an unsigned draft by early
October 1950, they executed another 2-year contract, incorporating
the new wage scale and other changes, and covering the period from
January 1, 1951, to December 31, 1952. However, the terms of the
new contract were put into effect on October 9, 1950.
The instant, petition was filed on October 23, 1950. As the new
contract was not formally executed until after the filing of the peti-
tion, it cannot serve as a bar to this proceeding.3 It is well settled
that an agreement will not be considered a bar to a petition filed before
' The United Employees ' Association , herein called the Association , was permitted to
intervene on the basis of its contractual interest.
2 The contract provided that either party could upon 60 days' notice reopen on January
1, 1950 , regarding wages and union security.
s National IVorhs, General Chemical Division, Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, 91
NLRB No. 181 ; Eagle Pencil Company, Inc., 90 NLRB No. 203.
94 NLRB No. 46.
296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the agreement is signed, despite the fact that it is made retroactive
to a date preceeding the petition.'
We find that a question affecting commerce exists concerning the
representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of
Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The parties agree, and the Board finds, that the following em-
ployees at the Employer's plant in Chicago, Illinois, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9 (b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees, including factory cler-
ical employees, but excluding office clerical employees, draftsmen,
outside truck drivers engineers, guards, watchmen, professional em-
ployees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this
volume.]
4 Southern Heater Corporation, 91 NLRB 1118; Peter Pirsch and Sons Company, 90
NLRB No. 253.
CAMP CONCRETE ROCK COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPER-
ATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 925, A-B-C, TAMPA, FLORIDA, AFL, PETI-
TIONER. Case No. 10-RC-1166. May 3, 1951
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Frank E. Hamilton,
Jr., hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hear-
ing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer, a Florida corporation, is engaged in mining,
crushing, washing, and grading limestone at its Brooksville, Florida,
mines. Its sales are all made f. o. b. at the mines and its customers
arrange to have the stone transported. All the Employer's sales are
made to the Florida Crushed Stone Company, which acts as its ex-
clusive selling agent and, in turn, resells the stone to purchasers. The
Employer owns 50 percent of the stock of the Florida Crushed Stone
Company. The same individual is secretary and treasurer of both
1 At the hearing the hearing officer properly overruled the Employer's objections that
the Petitioner had not evidenced its compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the
Act and that the Petitioner had not made a sufficient showing of interest. The Board
has repeatedly held that the issues of compliance and showing of interest are matters for
administrative determination not subject to litigation by the parties. As to compliance
see Florence Manufacturing Company, Inc., 92 NLRB 185; Sun Shipbuilding and Dry-
dock Company, 86 NLRB 20. As to showing of interest see The E. J. Kelly Company, 90
NLRB No. 239; 0. D. Jennings S Company, 68 NLRB 516.
94 NLRB No.' 51.