Milne, Roger Brent. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 22, 2019

12851538 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 22, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/851,538 08/05/2010 Roger Brent Milne 45WE-029009 1904
124910 7590 11/22/2019
ESPLIN & ASSOCIATES
c/o DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
5411 Avenida Encinas
Suite 100
Carlsbad, CA 92008
EXAMINER
JOO, JOSHUA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2445
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/22/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@esplin.legal
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte ROGER BRENT MILNE, JEFFREY C. WARD,
MICHAEL G. INGOLDBY, JONATHAN B. BALLAGH,
THOMAS E. FISCHABER, and KRISTA M. MARKS
________________

Appeal 2019-000201
Application 12/851,538
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before SHARON FENICK, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
RUSSELL E. CASS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CASS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which constitute all the
pending claims. Appeal Br. 25.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant lists Disney Enterprises, Inc. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Brief filed June 11, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 3.
2 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s contentions in
their entirety, we refer to the above mentioned Appeal Brief, as well as the
following documents for their respective details: the Non-Final Action
mailed January 5, 2018 (“Non-Final Act.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed
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We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The present invention relates to systems and methods for content
filtering. Spec. ¶ 4. The Specification explains that the identification of
inappropriate text is important for Internet sites that allow users to contribute
text, such as online chat-type applications. Id. ¶ 17. Content filtering is
particularly challenging when children are creating the content, the
Specification explains, because they have a tendency to be creative and a
natural desire to test the rules. Id. ¶ 19. Typically, content created by a user
will be checked to determine if it contains words on a “black” list, but
children may attempt to subvert the blacklist by adding spaces or other
letters or characters to words on the blacklist. Id. For example, the word
“ABCD” may be written as “A_B_C_D, A B C D, ABC$, AB!D, A_B_C_$,
and the like.” Id. ¶ 20. The blacklist may be expanded to include
permutations of the original blacklisted words, but this increases the time
needed to compare a word against the blacklist and requires greater
computing resources. Id.
According to the Specification, the present invention seeks to solve
this problem by pre-processing the input, thereby allowing a much smaller
blacklist to be used. Id. ¶ 22. This pre-processing includes several steps.
Id. ¶ 31. First, the input is collapsed around white space within the input by
turning all whitespace into space characters and removing repeated spaces so
that single spaces remain. Id. ¶ 32. Next, character strings (words) are
formed by removing punctuation and underscoring, and selectively

August 6, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed October 8, 2018 (“Reply
Br.”).
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removing whitespace characters. Id. ¶ 33. Whitespace can be identified for
removal by examining the contents of adjacent words for length, vowel
counts, consonant counts, and other statistical language patterns. Id. ¶ 36.
For example, whitespace may be selectively deleted between words that
have less than two vowels. Id. The word output is then expanded by
generating multiple possible interpreted words by defining a list of
characters and strings that each expand into a list of one more additional
characters and strings, and then creating derived words based on these
additional characters and strings. Id. ¶¶ 41–43. The expanded word output
is then reviewed for any repeated letters or symbols, because objectionable
words in the English language do not have more than two repeating
characters. Id. ¶ 45. Following this pre-processing, the pre-processed input
is evaluated against the blacklist in a known manner. Id. ¶ 30.
Claim 1 is illustrative and is reproduced below with numerals added at
the beginning of each limitation, so that it may be referred to more clearly
throughout this Decision:
1. A method for content filtering, the method comprising
the steps of:
[i] receiving an input of characters entered by a user on a
client device;
[ii] standardizing the input of characters into one or more
character strings, wherein standardizing the input of characters
into one or more character strings comprises processing the
input of characters to:
[iii] selectively remove white spaces based on a
statistical language pattern comprising examining content
of words having more than one character, wherein the
content of words is selected from the group consisting of
vowel counts and consonant counts;
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[iv] break the one or more character strings into
words at remaining white space boundaries; and
[v] expand one or more of the words resulting
from breaking the one or more character strings;
[vi] compare the one or more character strings against a
blacklist; and
[vii] provide, based upon the one or more character
strings matching a character string included on the blacklist, an
indication that the one or more character strings are included on
the blacklist.
Appeal Br. 27 (Claims Appendix).

II. PATENT ELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), and
Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
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U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and
Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a
law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January of 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101, which
was updated in October 2019. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”);
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942
(available at the USPTO’s website) (“October 2019 PEG Update”). Under
the 2019 Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Contentions
In the Non-Final Office Action, the Examiner rejects claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Non-
Final Act. 4. The Examiner determines, inter alia, that claims 1–20 are
directed to a process of receiving data, analyzing data, comparing data to a
list, and providing an action based on the comparison, which is similar to
content filtering, which has been determined to be an abstract idea. Id. at 3,
5; Ans. 3, 6–7. The Examiner further determines that the additional element
in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea is merely the step of “receiving an input
of characters entered by a user on a client device,” which is merely a
conventional function of a general purpose computer, and does not make the
invention significantly more than the abstract idea. Non-Final Act. 5–6.
The Examiner also determines that the additional limitations in claims 11
and 20 (processors, a memory, and computer readable program code),
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simple recite components of a general purpose computer and also do not
amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Id. at 6–8.
Appellant contends that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea,
but rather to technological improvements to the field of filtering content.
Appeal Br. 17–20. According to Appellant, the specific limitations improve
over existing techniques, and therefore provide a technological improvement
as in Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 101 (Fed. Cir.
2017). Id. at 20–22. Appellant further contends that the claims pass Step 2B
because the claimed method of standardizing the input characters is
unconventional and unknown, and that the claims are therefore similar to
those in Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Id. at 23–25.
B. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance
Under Step 2A, Prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, we first must
determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the
claim. The 2019 Guidance identifies three judicially excepted groupings:
(1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity
such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. 2019
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53. Based on existing Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit precedent, the 2019 Guidance has identified “mental
processes” as including “concepts performed in the human mind (including
an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).” Id. at 53 (footnote
omitted). The “mental processes” judicial exception also includes concepts
that can be performed by a human with a pen and paper as well as those that
can be performed entirely in the mind. See October 2019 PEG Update at 9
(“a claim that encompasses a human performing the step(s) mentally with
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the aid of a pen and paper recites a mental process”); Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding
claims to be patent ineligible because “with the exception of generic
computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that
foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and
paper”).
Claim 1, as drafted, recites steps for filtering content provided by a
user that can be performed in the human mind or by a human using pen and
paper without the use of computers or other technological elements. These
steps are discussed in more detail below.
First, claim 1, limitation [ii] recites the step of “standardizing the
input of characters into one or more character strings, wherein standardizing
the input of characters into one or more character strings comprises
processing the input of characters.” This step can be performed by having a
human review a series of characters received at an input and break up the
series of characters into a number of words using a set of rules.
Claim 1, limitation [iii] recites that the step of “standardizing the input
of characters into one or more character strings” includes the step of
“selectively remov[ing] white spaces based on a statistical language pattern
comprising examining content of words having more than one character,
wherein the content of words is selected from the group consisting of vowel
counts and consonant counts.” This step can be performed by identifying
words in the input of characters that have less than two vowels and deleting
whitespace between the letters of those words so that, for example, A B C D
becomes ABCD. See Spec. ¶ 36. This is a step that can be performed by a
human in the mind or with pen and paper.
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Claim 1, limitation [iv] recites that the step of “standardizing the input
of characters into one or more character strings” includes the step of
“break[ing] the one or more character strings into words at remaining white
space boundaries.” This step can be performed by a human in the mind or
with pen and paper by reviewing the character strings, visually identifying
remaining white space boundaries, and breaking up the character strings into
words at those white space boundaries, for example by writing down each of
the words identified in this step.
Claim 1, limitation [v] recites that the step of “standardizing the input
of characters into one or more character strings” includes the step of
“expand[ing] one or more of the words resulting from breaking the one or
more character strings.” The Specification explains that this step can be
performed by identifying certain characters that can be used to represent
other characters or combinations of characters, such as having a “!”
represent either an “!,” a “l,” or an “i”. Spec. ¶¶ 41–43. Then, additional
words are created by replacing the original character (e.g., “!”) with one of
the other identified characters (e.g., “l” or “i”). ¶¶ 41–42. For example,
“F!ne” could be expanded to include “Fine” or “Flne.” This step can be
performed by a human in the mind or using pen and paper, for example, by
visually identifying particular characters, and writing the expanded words
with substitute characters together with the original word on a piece of
paper.
Claim 1, limitation [vi] recites the step of “compar[ing] the one or
more character strings against a blacklist.” This step can be performed by a
human in the mind or using pen and paper by visually observing a character
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string and comparing it to a blacklist of objectionable words on a piece of
paper to determine if a match exists.
Claim 1, limitation [vii] recites the step of “provid[ing], based upon
the one or more character strings matching a character string included on the
blacklist, an indication that the one or more character strings are included on
the blacklist.” This step could be performed by a human by using a pen to
place an indicator next to a character string that is included on the blacklist,
such as by circling or placing a check mark next to the offending character
string.
Appellant argues that steps [ii]–[vi] do not recite an abstract idea
because they are “directed to technological improvements to the
technological field of filtering content,” citing paragraphs 2–3 and 17–21 of
the Specification. Appeal Br. 17–18. Appellant further argues that these
steps “reduce the ability of a user to subvert the blacklist while still
maintaining a small blacklist as when compared to traditional techniques,
thereby reducing the processing resources and time required to determine if
a word or a permutation of a word should be filtered.” Id. at 18. However,
Appellant drafted these claim elements without including any limitations
referring or relating to computer technology. As drafted, these steps could
feasibly be performed by a human in the mind or using pen and paper,
particularly in situations where processing speed is not of the essence, and
therefore they do not recite an improvement to a technological field. See
October 2019 PEG Update at 13 (“it is important to keep in mind that an
improvement in the judicial exception itself . . . is not an improvement in
technology”).
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Appellant cites to paragraph 17 of the Specification, which states that
“[i]n some cases (e.g., online chat-type applications) where complete real-
time moderation is impractical, an automated software solution is
necessary.” Spec. ¶ 17. Claim 1, however, does not limit the claim to online
chat-type applications or other computer applications where moderation by a
human is impractical and an automated software solution is necessary. It
would be improper to read these limitations from the specification into the
claim, particularly because the specification does not limit the use of the
invention to computer environments where performance of the claimed steps
by a human would be impractical. Id. ¶ 17 (merely stating that “[i]n some
cases” an automated software solution is necessary).
We also do not agree that this case is analogous to the claims at issue
in Trading Techs. See Appeal Br. at 20–22. In Trading Techs., the claims at
issue “require a specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a
prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user interface’s
structure.” 675 Fed. Appx. 1004. It is this improved graphical user interface
that constituted an improvement to computer technology. Id. at 1004–05.
Here, by contrast, steps [ii]–[vi] do not require a graphical user interface.
Indeed, these steps do not recite any computer technology at all.
For these reasons, we determine that claim 1 recites a mental process,
which is one of the recognized judicial exceptions to patent eligibility. See
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–53.
C. Analysis under Step 2A, Prong 2, of the 2019 Guidance
Having determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, we next
consider whether the claims recite “additional elements that integrate the
[judicial] exception into a practical application.” See 2019 Guidance,
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84 Fed. Reg. at 54; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We determine that
they do not do so.
Aside from the steps discussed above that can be performed by a
human in the mind or with pen and paper, the remaining limitation of claim
1 is the step of “receiving an input of characters entered by a user on a client
device.” We agree with the Examiner that this limitation merely represents a
generic computer component (a client device) performing generic computer
functions (receiving an input of characters entered by a user). Non-Final
Act. 5–6; Ans. 4. Independent claim 11 further includes a “computer
program product” comprising “a non-transitory computer readable program
code,” and independent claim 20 further includes “one or more processors”
and “a memory operatively connected to the one or more processors,” which
we also agree are generic computer components performing generic
computer functions. See Non-Final Act. 6–7; Ans. 4; Spec. ¶¶ 55, 63
(disclosing that “system processor 42” is “a general-purpose processor” and
that “computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a
general purpose computer”).
The inclusion of these generic computer components does not take the
claims out of the mental process category of abstract ideas. As the 2019
Guidance explains, “[i]f a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation,
covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer
components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim
cannot practically be performed in the mind.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 52 n.14. See also October 2019 PEG Update at 8 (“The courts have found
claims requiring a generic computer or nominally reciting a generic
computer may still recite a mental process even though the claim limitations
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are not performed entirely in the human mind.”). Federal Circuit precedent
is in accord. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811
F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that computer-implemented
method for “anonymous loan shopping” was an abstract idea because it
could be “performed by humans without a computer”); Versata Dev. Grp.,
Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have
examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
or in a person’s mind.”); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654
F.3d 1366, 1375, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the incidental use of
“computer” or “computer readable medium” does not make a claim
otherwise directed to process that “can be performed in the human mind, or
by a human using a pen and paper” patent eligible).
Consequently, the additional limitations in claim 1 beyond the judicial
exception do not serve to integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.
D. Analysis under Step 2B
Under Step 2B, we determine whether claim 1 includes additional
elements individually or in combination that provide an inventive concept
and, therefore, amount to significantly more than the exception itself. See
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. We agree with
the Examiner that claim 1 does not include additional elements that provide
any such “inventive concept,” and that claim 1 does not add limitations
beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, [or]
conventional” in the field. See MPEP § 2106.05(d); Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
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As discussed above with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2, the only
additional element in claim 1 beyond those which recite an abstract idea is
the step of “receiving an input of characters entered by a user on a client
device,” and the only additional elements in claims 11 and 20 beyond those
discussed involve a “computer program product,” “a non-transitory
computer readable program code,” “one or more processors,” and/or “a
memory operatively connected to the one or more processors.” However, as
discussed above, these are simply generic computer elements. As such, we
agree with the Examiner that they are well-understood, routine, and
conventional and are therefore insufficient to provide an “inventive concept”
that amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See Non-
Final Act. 5–7; Ans. 4–5; Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“the mere recitation of a
generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention”).
Appellant contends that claim 1 passes Alice Step 2B because it,
requires something more than a generic computer by filtering
content by standardizing the input of characters into character
strings by removing white spaces of the character string using a
statistical language pattern, breaking the character string into
words, expanding the words, and comparing the expanded
words to a blacklist to determine if the word is included in the
blacklist.
Appeal Br. 23. However, as explained above with respect to Step 2A, Prong
1, the steps that Appellant identifies here fall into the mental process
category and therefore are part of the judicial exception itself.
In a similar vein, Appellant argues that
standardizing the input characters by selectively removing
white spaces, breaking the character strings into words, and
expanding the words to essentially remove any subversion
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techniques that a user may have used to modify an offensive
word into a word that may not be included on the blacklist is
unconventional and unknown.
Id. at 24. These steps, again, are mental process steps that are part of the
judicial exception itself. They, therefore, are not “additional elements”
sufficient to provide an inventive concept that provides “significantly more”
than the abstract idea itself.
Finally, we disagree with Appellant that these mental process steps
are similar to Bascom, and to Example 34 of the USPTO’s Subject Matter
Examples: Business Methods, 3–4 (Dec. 15, 2016), which was based on the
Bascom decision. Appeal Br. 25. In Bascom, the claim limitations at issue
did not recite mental process steps devoid of computer technology, but
rather were directed to “the installation of a filtering tool at a specific
location, remote from the end users-with customizable filtering features
specific to each end user.” 827 F.3d at 1350. The claim specifically recited
that this filtering tool was implemented using specific computer technology,
namely,
a remote ISP server coupled to said client computer and said
Internet computer network, said ISP server associating each
network account to at least one filtering scheme and at least one
set of filtering elements, said ISP server further receiving said
network access requests from said client computer and
executing said associated set of logical filtering elements.
Id. at 1345. By contrast, the claims at issue do not recite improvements to
an ISP server or to other computer technology, but rather recite mental
process steps carried out using generic computer elements.
Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that independent claims 1,
11, and 20 are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. We therefore
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sustain the rejection of these claims, as well as the rejection of dependent
claims 2–10 and 12–19, which are not argued separately.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. §   Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101  Eligibility 1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED