01984121
03-20-2000
Milinda Spranger, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific/Western Region), Agency.
Milinda Spranger v. United States Postal Service
01984121
March 20, 2000
Milinda Spranger, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01984121
v. ) Agency No. 1F-957-0073-97
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
(Pacific/Western Region), )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)
concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the
bases of race (White), sex (female), reprisal (prior EEO activity) and
mental disability (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et
seq. and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791,
et seq.<1> Complainant alleges she was discriminated against when the
agency removed her in August 1997. The appeal is accepted in accordance
with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following reasons, the Commission
affirms the FAD's finding of no discrimination.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was
employed as a Clerk at the agency's Processing and Distribution Center
in West Sacramento, California. Complainant had not reported to work
for approximately eighteen months prior to her removal. Believing the
agency denied her a reasonable accommodation and treated her less
favorably than other individuals, complainant sought EEO counseling
and filed a formal complaint on October 22, 1997. At the conclusion of
the investigation, when complainant failed to timely request a hearing
before an EEOC Administrative Judge, the agency issued a final decision
from which complainant now appeals. On appeal, complainant presents no
new evidence but reiterates her claims of discrimination. The agency
requests that we affirm its final decision.
Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act
Federal agencies are required to provide reasonable accommodation to
qualified individuals with disabilities who are employees or applicants
for employment unless to do so would cause undue hardship.<2> 29 C.F.R. �
1630.9(a). An employee is a qualified individual with a disability if the
employee has a disability which substantially limits one or more major
life activities but who can, with or without reasonable accommodation,
perform the essential functions of the position in question or the
essential functions of any position which she could have held as a
result of job restructuring or reassignment. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2;
Hawkins v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 03990006
(February 11, 1999).
The record contains a medical report dated August 9, 1996 from
complainant's attending psychiatrist. The psychiatrist stated that
upon complainant's return to work in August 1995, after approximately
four years of being on disability-related leave, she immediately began
to suffer a recurrence of the symptoms which originally disabled her.
He diagnosed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder accompanied by major, severe
depression. Her psychiatrist stated unequivocally that complainant was
permanently disabled from working at the agency because any contact
with the agency would trigger her condition. She requested that the
agency reasonably accommodate her by reassigning her to a less stressful
position.
For purposes of this analysis, the Commission assumes that complainant
suffers from a mental disability which substantially limits her ability
to work in any position which the agency could offer her. Accordingly,
the Commission declines to find that the agency could have reassigned
complainant to any position given that her physician stated and
complainant herself believed her disability precluded her from ever
being able to return to work at a postal facility. We thus conclude
that complainant is not a qualified individual within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m). Therefore complainant's
claims of disability discrimination under the theories of reasonable
accommodation and disparate treatment both fail. See Prewitt v. United
States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Jilek v. United
States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01971549 (July 13, 1999).
Disparate Treatment Discrimination under Title VII
Based on the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental
Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222
(1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases),
the Commission finds that complainant failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Regarding race and
sex discrimination, complainant names two employees outside of her
protected classes whom she alleges were granted reasonable accommodation
for their disabilities. However, we find that these two individuals
were not similarly situated to complainant because the agency could
grant them reasonable accommodation whereas the agency could not do so
for complainant. Regarding retaliation, we note that the supervisor
who removed complainant was aware of complainant's prior protected
activity although not involved in it, and complainant asserts that this
supervisor was biased against her because this supervisor acted as the
Liaison for Safety and Injury Compensation and represented the agency
in its opposition to complainant's second OWCP claim.<3> However,
we find no evidence to support complainant's assertion of a causal
link between her prior protected activity and the notice of removal.
See Devereux v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960869
(April 24, 1997).
Even assuming that complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation, the agency articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, namely that complainant failed
to submit adequate medical documentation explaining her continued absence
and failure to report for work. Complainant argues that this is pretext
because she had, in fact, submitted adequate medical documentation in
August 1996 (the above referenced psychiatrist's report) and responded
immediately to her supervisor's July 1997 request for an explanation for
her inability to report for work as scheduled. Complainant also argues
that based on her employment history with the agency, the status of her
condition was well known to her supervisors. Complainant's supervisor
attests that she did not receive any medical documentation until the
day after the removal notice was issued, which consisted of a letter
from complainant's psychiatrist restating his earlier conclusion that
she would never be able to return to work at a postal facility.
The Commission cannot determine whether the agency was in possession
of the documentation complainant allegedly submitted in August 1996
because complainant submitted the documentation to the Department of
Labor in connection with her claim for disability benefits. Complainant
questioned her supervisor as to how the agency was going to accommodate
her disability while relying on a medical report which stated that she
would never be able to return to work at a postal facility again. We find
that the real reason complainant was removed was because she failed to
report for work and submitted no medical documentation, at any time,
which indicated that she would ever be able to report to work again.
Accordingly, we find that the agency's decision to remove complainant
was not motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory animus.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD's finding
of no discrimination. We admonish the agency for the poor quality of
its final decision. Not only did the agency confuse complainant's race
and disability, but the FAD was a mere recitation of the law followed
by legal conclusions without a discussion of the facts supporting those
conclusions. See Alaban v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01956281 (June 25, 1997).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE
DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case
in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and
not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
3/20/00
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
_____________
Date
________________________
Equal Employment Assistant
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.
2 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,
the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints
of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's
website: WWW.EEOC.GOV.
3 We note that in May 1997, OWCP rejected complainant's compensation
claim. Complainant asserts that she appealed OWCP's decision.