Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 11, 2022

2020006371 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2022)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/621,803 06/13/2017 Khuram Shahid 402408-US-NP 9246 69316 7590 02/11/2022 MICROSOFT CORPORATION ONE MICROSOFT WAY REDMOND, WA 98052 EXAMINER BOUSTANY, JIHAD KAMAL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2459 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/11/2022 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chriochs@microsoft.com ljohnson@microsoft.com usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte KHURAM SHAHID, ADARSH SRIDHAR, ALEKSANDAR UZELAC, ADINA TRUFINESCU and SHAHIN SHAYANDEH Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHN A. EVANS, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1-5, 7-13, and 15-22, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We Affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2018). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s disclosure is directed to transitioning communications across services. Abstr., ¶¶ 5, 13, 14, 27, Figs 3, 4. Claim 1 is exemplary of the invention and reads as follows (emphases added): 1. A system comprising: a processing device; and a memory coupled to the processing device and storing instructions that, when executed by the processing device, cause the system to perform operations comprising: receiving, via a first service, a first communication from a user to an automated personal assistant; associating the first communication with a communication session; processing the first communication by the automated personal assistant to identify a request with respect to a second service, the request explicitly identifying a second service with which to transfer the first communication; initiating the second service in response to the request; receiving a second communication via the second service; and associating the second communication with the communication session. Appeal Br. 41 (Claims Appendix). (Emphasis added). REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 3 Song US 2003/0195963 A1 Oct. 16, 2003 Gross US 2016/0360336 A1 Dec. 8, 2016 Singh US 2017/0041437 A1 Feb. 9, 2017 Claims 1-3, 5, 7-10, 15, 16, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Singh and Gross. Final Act. 5-11. Claims 4, 11-13, and 17-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Singh, Gross, and Song. Final Act. 11-18. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief that the Examiner has erred, as well as the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief. Arguments which Appellant could have made, but did not make, are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). As discussed below, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions of Examiner error. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis. We agree with Appellant’s assertion that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “communication session” will play a key role in deciding this Appeal. Appeal Br. 5, 12. Appellant refers to Specification, paragraphs 13, 14, and 25, and proposes the broadest reasonable interpretation encompasses two important concepts. Id. at 12. The first concept is that of a series of communications provided in relation to one another and the second concept is an explicit association between the communications. Id. Appellant asserts, without the first concept, the communication session is unbounded and without the second concept, there is only a series of stateless Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 4 communications without the notion of a session. Id. at 12-13. Appellant then asserts that the broadest reasonable interpretation of ‘communication session’ in light of the specification is “a series of communications that are provided in relation to one another and that are associated together in an ongoing session” (emphasis added). The Examiner disputes Appellant’s proposed interpretation and refers to Specification, paragraph 25 which states “Such a communication session can be a series of communications that are provided in relation to one another (e.g., in a sequence, in response to one another, within a defined amount of time/chronological proximity to one another, etc.).” Ans. 4. The Examiner reasons that “[t]he Specification therefore only requires the communications are provided ‘in relation’ to one another.” Id. The Examiner then reasons that “this relationship is not defined so one of ordinary skill in the art will readily understand that any relationship between two communications will therefore satisfy the recitations of the Specification and will therefore share a communication session.” Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates and argues that its proposed broadest reasonable interpretation is supported by paragraphs 13, 14, and 25. Reply Br. 2. Appellant refers to paragraph 14 Specification statement “ ... the described technologies can receive communications from a user (e.g., via a personal assistant) and associate these communication with an ongoing communication session.” Id. at 3. Appellant argues the approach of reading a single paragraph of the specification in isolation in interpreting a claim term is not supported by the MPEP § 211l.0l (IV)(B). Id.; also citing In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 5 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although we interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Our reviewing court states that “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). However, the broadest reasonable interpretation differs from the broadest possible interpretation. In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is “an interpretation that corresponds with what and how the inventor describes his invention in the specification, i.e., an interpretation that is ‘consistent with the specification.’” Id. at 1382-83 (quoting In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The disputed term of claim 1 simply recites “a communication session” without any clarification2 of Appellant’s proposed interpretation. The Specification, paragraph 25, is consistent with the Examiner’s interpretation and is inconsistent with Appellant’s interpretation. The Specification paragraphs cited by Appellant, even assuming they are consistent with Appellant’s proposed interpretation, are not inconsistent with the Examiner’s interpretation Additionally, the Specification expressly states 2 We note independent claim 9 recites “the communication session having associated context and control.” Appeal Br. 42 (Claims Appendix). Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 6 the description “is not to be taken in a limiting sense, and the scope of various implementations is defined only by the appended claims, along with the full range of equivalents to which such claims are entitled.” Spec., ¶ 81. Similarly, paragraph 82 of the Specification states “[t]he specification and drawings are, accordingly, to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense.” In view of the above, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s proposed interpretation of “a communication session” as it is unreasonably narrow. We agree with the Examiner’s interpretation that a relationship between or among communications sets forth the ordinary meaning of the term, and this is consistent with the Specification. Regarding MPEP ¶ 2111.01(IV)(B), Appellant provides no persuasive evidence that the Specification disavows the plain meaning of “communication session.” In the Final Action, the Examiner finds the combination of Singh and Gross teaches the limitations of claim 1, and provides reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would combine the teachings. Final Act. 5-7. The Examiner finds Singh teaches many of the claim 1 limitations and relies on the teaching of Gross for “identifying a second service.” and “a direct communication from a user to an automated personal assistant,” Id. at 7 (citing Singh ¶¶ 5, 41-48, 50; Gross ¶¶ 54, 302, 303). For the disputed limitation, “associating the first communication with a communication session,” the Examiner finds Singh, paragraph 42, describes the server identifies the entity in the message, and teaches this limitation. Id. 6 (citing Singh ¶ 42). In the Appeal Brief, Appellant reiterates the proposed claim interpretation, discussed supra, and applies the asserted claim interpretation Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 7 to Singh. Appeal Br. 17-21. According to Appellant, Singh paragraph 42, teaches that a message can be received as contextual data and that the server may identify an application function, but, according to Appellant, Singh makes no mention of “communication session” and does not meet Appellant’s proposed claim interpretation. Id. at 17-18. Appellant additionally argues, because Singh does not explicitly teach messages associated together in an ongoing communication, the Examiner must rely on inherency, and the Examiner provides no basis for inherency. Id. at 20. Appellant further argues Singh does not teach the “associating a communication received by a second service with the same communication session as the communication received by the first service.”3 Id. at 20-21. (citing Singh ¶¶ 43-45). According to Appellant, even if messages 312 and 330 are part of the same communication session, which Appellant disputes, no input of the user provided by a different Appellant is associated with the same communication session. Id. at 21. Appellant argues there is insufficient motivation to combine Singh and Gross and the combination would change a principle of operation of Singh and/or render Singh unsuitable for its intended purpose. Id. at 21-22. In the Answer, the Examiner applies the previously discussed broadest reasonable interpretation of the disputed limitation to the teachings of Singh: Singh et al. (US 2017 /0041437 Al), hereinafter "Singh", teaches of a server receiving a message, and then performing an active step recited as "identify the entity 310 in the message 312" {Singh Paragraph [0042)). Singh further teaches that the server 3 It appears Appellant is referring to the claim 1 limitation “associating the second communication with the communication session.” Appeal Br. 20- 21. Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 8 may receive more than one message from the client (Singh Paragraph [0041]) and identifying an entity ("a restaurant") present in two messages ("The server receives the contextual data including the messages 312 and 330. The server may use the messages 312 and 330 to predict an application function that the user of the client computing device 140 may use subsequent to using the application function 146-4. The server may identify the entity 310 as a restaurant.") (Singh Paragraph [0047])). Based on Appellant's interpretation of a "communication session", Singh teaches a communication session as the messages are provided in series (messages 312 and 330) and are associated together (both are associated with the entity "restaurant") in an ongoing session. Given the teachings of Appellant's Specification, Singh teaches two distinct messages both[] comprising the[] same "entity". These messages are therefore clearly related and are part of a communication session given the meaning as recited by the Specification. Even if, arguendo, Appellant's Specification recited the same subject matter as present in the arguments ("series of communication that are provided in relation to one another and that are associated together in an ongoing session"), Singh teaches the aforementioned subject matter, as messages are constantly being received by the system of Singh and the same entity is identified in different messages ("the active application is a messaging application, and the application function 146-4 is a messaging function of the messaging application. The application function 146-4 may enable a user of the client computing device 140 to send and receive messages." (Singh Paragraph [0041]) and "The server receives the contextual data including the messages 312 and 330. The server may use the messages 312 and 330 to predict an application function that the user of the client computing device 140 may use subsequent to using the application function 146-4. The server may identify the entity 310 as a restaurant. The server may identify a date entity 332 and a time entity 334 in a subsequent message 330." (Singh Paragraph [0047])). One of ordinary skill in the art may clearly read in aforementioned Paragraphs [0041] and [0047] of Singh that two Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 9 distinct messages, received using a messaging application which sends and receives messages, have the same entity ("entity 310 as a restaurant") which the system identifies. The communication session is ongoing as messages can still be sent and received, and the messages are related to one another as they share the same entity. Ans. 4-5. Regarding Appellant’s argument that messages 312 and 330 are independent communications, unassociated in any type of communication session, the Examiner disagrees and finds that prior to the active step of "associating" the first and second communications with the communication session in claim 1, the first and second communications in claim 1 appear to be unassociated. As such, are they not independent communications? Singh teaches of the active step of identifying an entity in a message (Singh Paragraph [0042]), which serves to associate that message with that entity, and indirectly with every other messages sharing the same entity (such as messages 312 and 330). Once again, a "session" both claimed and described in the specification lacks detail or structure. An "association" is a broad relation between elements, and it is unreasonable to argue that the communications in the claimed invention are associated with a communication session while the messages in Singh are completely independent and unassociated, when they both require an active step of identifying the association. Id. at 6. Regarding motivation to combine, the Examiner refers to “applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results” (citing MPEP § 2141) and finds: Gross et al. (US 2017 /0041437 Al), hereinafter "Gross", teaches of a personal automated assistant that can receive user input at the client device (Gross Paragraph [0054]). Such a personal automated assistant Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 10 is now present in a multitude of smart devices, and renders user interaction easier. Appellant argues that such an implementation would replace the server of Singh and render the invention of Singh "unsuitable for its intended purpose". However, Examiner has not indicated the server, or any elements of Singh, would be altered with the addition of a virtual assistant. Rather, a virtual assistant only alters the way a user communicates with their device, allowing for more user friendly features. Such an implementation would still require servers to send and receive information with (otherwise, the Internet itself would be rendered "unsuitable" with the prolific use of virtual assistants in many personal computers). Applying a known technique, such as the use of personal virtual assistants to interface with a user, provides immediate improvement to the user-side experience of interacting with a device and applications, and does not necessarily effect any server-side implementations. Furthermore, localizing elements does not render Singh unsuitable for its purposes. If all data necessary to perform Singh was present on the client device, then the virtual assistant may take the role of the server and perform specific processing. The inventive concept of Singh is maintained as the user experience is completely opaque of the server- side operations which could be implemented locally. Id. at 7-8. In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates arguments and argues Singh fails to teach “associating the second communication with the communication session” and “processing the first communication by the automated personal assistant to identify a request with respect to a second service, the request explicitly identifying a second service to which to transfer the first.” Reply Br. 3-5. Appellant argues Singh does not teach processing of a single communication to identify a request with respect to a second service because Singh teaches that that two different actions (the sending of the message 312 and the press on the application card 50-1) are Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 11 performed in order to cause a YELP application to be launched. Id. at 5 (citing Singh ¶¶ 41, 42). As discussed below, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments as they are based on unreasonably narrow claim interpretation, individual reference arguments rather than the combination, inapplicable bodily incorporation, and conclusory attorney arguments. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner does not present sufficient articulated reasons to support the suggested combination of HH, Singh, and Song. Nor are we persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the cited references do not teach the disputed limitations. We agree, instead, with the Examiner’s broadest reasonable interpretation claim interpretation, findings, and conclusions. Singh teaches determining application cards for display on a mobile computing device based on contextual data of the mobile computing device. Singh, Abstr., Figs. 1, 3A, 3B, ¶¶ 41-43. Messages are presented and additional applications identified. Id. Gross teaches proactively populating an application with information that was previously viewed by a user in a different application. Gross, Abstr., ¶¶ 302, 303, Fig. 6A. Appellant argues an unreasonably narrow teaching of the cited references to attempt to limit the teaching to the express disclosures, and asserts an overly demanding standard of obviousness. However, we note: [t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 12 the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection must be based on: [S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Here, the Examiner provides articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. In particular, as discussed supra, the Examiner identifies specific teachings of Singh and Gross and explains why and how one of ordinary skill would combine the teachings to result in the disputed limitations as broadly and reasonably interpreted. Final Act. 7; Ans. 7-8. Additionally, we note these findings and conclusions regarding motivation to combine Singh and Gross are not persuasively argued in the Reply Brief. In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and dependent claim 2 as this claim is not argued separately. Regarding dependent claims 3-8, the Examiner notes much of Appellant’s arguments are based on the disputed term “communication session,” discussed supra, and are unpersuasive. In instances where Appellant’s arguments are not solely based on the disputed terms, the Examiner provides reasonable basis for the claim interpretation, finding, and Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 13 conclusions. See Ans. 12-15. Additionally, we note Appellant’s Reply Brief does not persuasively dispute the Examiner’s Answer regarding claims 3, 5, 7, and 8. As discussed, infra, claim 4 limitations regarding “storing the plurality of communications in a session repository; and making the session repository available to the second service” are additionally addressed in the discussion of independent claim 17. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-5, 7, 8 Claim 9 and Dependent claims 10-13, 15, 16 Independent claim 9 is similar to claim 1, discussed supra, and is set forth below: 9. A method comprising: receiving, via a first service, a first communication from a user to an automated personal assistant; associating the first communication with a communication session having associated context and content, the content comprising communications from the user to the automated personal assistant during the communication session; processing the first communication by the automated personal assistant to identify a request with respect to a second service, the request explicitly identifying a second service to which to transfer the first communication; initiating the second service in response to the request; and transitioning the communication session to the second service thus maintaining the content and context of the communication session in future user interactions with the second service (emphasis added). Appeal Br. 42 (Claims Appendix). Claim 9 includes the recitation the communication session “having associated context and content.” Appellant argues its claim interpretation regarding “communication session,” discussed supra, and argues Singh does not teach the communication session has both a context and content. Appeal Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 14 Br. 25. According to Appellant, although Singh, paragraph 42, states that the “server ... may receive the message as contextual data,” receiving a message as contextual data is not the same as specifically associating a communication with a communication session that has both content and context as claimed. Id. at 26. Appellant also argues Singh does not teach a communication with a request to explicitly transfer the first communication to a second service. Id. at 26-28. In the Answer, the Examiner notes Appellant’s arguments are similar to those discussed supra regarding claim 1, and Singh teaches the communication session has both a context and a content. Ans. 8 (citing Singh ¶¶ 30, 41). In particular, the Examiner finds: The messages of Singh are entirely composed of contextual data (Singh Paragraph [0030]) and by plain meaning they have context. Further, the messages in Singh comprise an entity which is clearly content (Singh Paragraph [0041]). Since the communication session comprises the messages of the session, the communication session comprises the context and content of each message. Appellant has not recited any structure or requirements that limit the session to an entity that would overcome the cited art. Id. at 8. Regarding Singh message 312 and the limitation “identify a request with respect to a second service, the request explicitly identifying a second service to which to transfer the first communication,” the Examiner finds that Singh is directed to launching applications based upon user intent and teaches the user performing a specific action (pressing on the application card) which launches a second application as a subsequent application function. Id. at 9 (citing Singh Abstr., ¶¶ 45, 41, 42, 47). The Examiner additionally finds the user specifically interacting with the application card Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 15 is an explicit request which launches the second service and the system of Singh must first “process” the first communication to identify the request (identifying an entity in a message which shows user intent to interact with a second application function. Id. (citing Singh ¶¶ 41, 42). The Examiner finds the message is clearly processed to identify the request, and a second interaction (the user pressing the application card) shows an explicit request to launch the second application “to a state that displays the restaurant review of Thai place” (the same entity identified in the message, showing that the context and content is transferred). Id. at 9 (citing Singh ¶ 47)). In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues Singh does not teach processing of a single communication to identify a request with respect to a second service; rather Singh teaches that that two different actions (the sending of the message 312 and the press on the application card 50-1) are performed in order to cause a YELP application to be launched. Reply Br. 5 (citing Singh ¶¶ 41, 42). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments to the extent they rely on claim 1 arguments discussed supra. Additionally, Singh teaches pressing the app card is an act of communication. Additionally, the disputed limitation does not recite a single communication. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 9, and dependent claims 10-13, 15, 16 as these claims depend from claim 9 and are not argued separately. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claim 22 which depends from claim 1 and recites a similar limitation as claim 9. Independent Claim 17 Independent claim 17 (and dependent claims 18, 19, 20) is similar to claim 1 and includes a session repository and browser feature for which the Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 16 Examiner relies on the additional teachings of Song. Final Act. 16-17. Claim 17 is set forth below (emphasis added): 17. A non-transitory computer readable medium having instructions stored thereon that, when executed by a processing device, cause the processing device to perform operations comprising: receiving, via a first service, a plurality of first communications from a user to an automated personal assistant; associating the plurality of first communications with a communication session; storing the plurality of first communications in a session repository; processing one of the plurality of first communications by the automated personal assistant to identify a request with respect to a second service, the request explicitly identifying a second service with which to transfer the first communication; initiating the second service in response to the request; and making the session repository available to the second service. Appeal Br. 43-44 (Claims Appendix). Appellant argues Song does not teach “storing the plurality of communications in a session repository.” Appeal Br. 30-31 (citing Song ¶¶ 30, 31). Appellant reiterates arguments presented regarding claims 1 and 9, discussed supra. In the Answer, the Examiner notes that Song is not relied upon as teaching storing the plurality of communications because Singh already teaches the plurality of communications. Ans. 10 (citing Singh ¶ 47). The Examiner finds Song teaches storing data in a session repository (capturing and storing the current state of an active session between a browser and a server. Id. (citing Song ¶ 81). The Examiner finds storing data is a known technique in the art, and has an almost infinite number of benefits as data can be used to further learn or understand almost any system. Id. The Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 17 Examiner finds applying the technique of storing data is an obvious feature to include with any invention in the art. Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues Song does not state that the repository server stores any data, but rather only a “current browser state.” Reply Br. 6 (citing Sony ¶¶ 8, 30, 31). According to Appellant, Song defines “current browser state” as a browser cache and a browser history that includes the last page displayed by the browser and the current state of document objects and scripting objects. Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because they rely primarily on arguments discussed regarding claims 1 and 9. Additionally, Appellant argues an unreasonably narrow teaching of Song’s repository and storing data. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 17, and dependent claims 18-20 as these claims are not argued separately. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claim 21 which depends from claim 4 and recites similar limitations. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 21 and 22 In view of the above, on the record before us, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because the Examiner provides sufficient evidence that the cited references teach the disputed limitations as broadly and reasonably interpreted, and the Examiner provides sufficient articulated reasoning with some rational underpinnings to support the combination of the cited references. Therefore, we conclude the Examiner does not err in rejecting claim 1-5, 7-13, and 15-22. Appeal 2020-006371 Application 15/621,803 18 CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we sustain the obviousness rejections of claim 1-5, 7-13, and 15-22. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1-3, 5, 7- 10, 15, 16, 22 103 Singh, Gross 1-3, 5, 7- 10, 15, 16, 22 4, 11-13, 17-21 103 Singh, Gross, Song 4, 11-13, 17-21 Overall Outcome 1-5, 7- 13, 15-22 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED