Michael Fredericks et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 24, 2020

2020000407 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/773,282 05/04/2010 Michael Fredericks 000005-071200US 5632
58735 7590 06/24/2020
Fountainhead Law Group P.C.
Chad R. Walsh
900 LAFAYETTE STREET
SUITE 301
SANTA CLARA, CA 95050
EXAMINER
JOSEPH, TONYA S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/24/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@fountainheadlaw.com
klhussain@fountainheadlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL FREDERICKS, ELLEN TROTOCHAUD,
SARAH KUBERRY, JOYCE CLIPPINGER, VALERY GORODNICHEV,
SCOTT JOHNSON, LEONARD TONG, SANJAY ALMEIDA,
ANIL BHAGWAT, PAUL PARTER, and JOHN LOVE
Appeal 2020-000407
Application 12/773,282
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1 and 3–40. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Concur Technologies, Inc.
Appeal Brief 2, filed April 17, 2019 (Appeal Br.).
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BACKGROUND
This patent application concerns “ancillary travel vendor fee expense
management.” Specification, Abstract, filed May 4, 2010 (Spec.). Claim 1
illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method of ancillary travel fee
expense management comprising:
receiving, by at least one expense management application
in communication with at least one database connected to at least
one processor comprising at least one circuit, travel expense
transaction data for at least one expense incurred from at least
one main travel provider comprising: at least one airline, at least
one rental car agency, or at least one hotel, or any combination
thereof;
generating, by the at least one expense management
application, at least one travel expense transaction record,
wherein the at least one travel expense transaction record
comprises the travel expense transaction data, wherein the travel
expense transaction data comprises at least two of: credit card
data, transaction data obtained directly from at least one travel
vendor, receipts obtained directly from at least one travel vendor,
data manually entered into at least one expense reporting
application, transaction data obtained from at least one travel
agency, and transaction data obtained from at least one airline
transaction settlement organization;
storing the at least one expense transaction record in at
least one expense transaction database;
analyzing, by at least one ancillary fee module, the at least
one expense transaction record to determine when the at least one
expense transaction is for at least one fee for at least one travel
event ancillary good or service and when the at least one expense
transaction matches at least one travel event main purchase,
wherein the at least one ancillary good or service is offered by at
least one third party who is not the main travel provider, and
wherein: the at least one main purchase comprises: at least one
plane ticket, at least one rental car, or at least one hotel room, or
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any combination thereof; and the at least one ancillary good or
service comprises: at least one good or service other than at least
one plane ticket, rental car, or hotel room, or any combination
thereof;
adding the at least one expense transaction record to at
least one expense report; and
indicating on the expense report that the at least one travel
event main purchase is coded with a first code for at least one
plane ticket, at least one rental car, or at least one hotel room and
the at least one expense transaction for the at least one fee for at
least one ancillary good or service offered by the at least one third
party is coded with a second code that indicates the at least one
fee for at least one ancillary good or service is an ancillary fee,
and a third code that indicates the at least one fee for at least one
ancillary good or service matches the at least one fee for the at
least one travel event main purchase from the at least one main
travel provider.
Appeal Br. 12–13.
REJECTIONS2
Claims 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis 
1, 3–40 101 Eligibility
1–4, 6, 8–13, 16–
20, 23–25, 27–31,
34, 37–393
103(a) Wofford,4 Fredericks,5 Vance6
5 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Dufour7

2 The Examiner withdrew a rejection of claims 1 and 3–40 under § 112.
Examiner’s Answer 3, mailed August 23, 2019.
3 Although the heading of this rejection does not include claims 2 and 39, the
accompanying analysis makes clear that claims 2 and 39 stand rejected on
this ground. See Final Office Action 6–12, mailed November 29, 2018.
4 Wofford et al. (US 2008/0319808 A1; December 25, 2008).
5 Fredericks et al. (US 2004/0167808 A1; August 26, 2004).
6 Vance et al. (US 6,442,526 B1; August 27, 2002).
7 Dufour (US 2010/0228628 A1; September 9, 2010).
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Claims 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis 
7, 21, 26, 35 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Keeling8
14, 32 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Scanlan9
15, 22, 33, 36 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Official Notice
DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s
arguments, and Appellant has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1 and 3–40 under § 101. For this rejection, as consistent
with the discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s reasoning, findings, and
conclusions on pages 2–5 of the Final Office Action mailed November 29,
2018 (Final Act.), and pages 6–8 of the Examiner’s Answer mailed
August 23, 2019 (Ans.). But Appellant has persuaded us that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1 and 3–39 under § 103. We address these
rejections in turn.
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).

8 Keeling et al. (US 2005/0165680 A1; July 28, 2005).
9 Scanlan et al. (US 2006/0247993 A1; November 2, 2006).
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To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54; see also USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter
Eligibility at 1–2, 10–15, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf (“October SME Update”) (providing
additional guidance on determining whether a claim recites a judicial
exception and integrates a judicial exception into a practical application). If
the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we then determine
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whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised Guidance explains
that when making this determination, we should consider whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the § 101 rejection.
Appellant argues claims 1 and 3–40 together, so as permitted by 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal for this ground of rejection based on
claim 1.
Directed To
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “mental processes,” that is, acts that people can perform in their
minds or using pen and paper. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 &
nn.14–15. The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
also includes “certain methods of organizing human activity” such as
(1) fundamental economic principles or practices, (2) commercial or legal
interactions, and (3) managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The
Examiner determined that claim 1 recites subject matter that falls within
these abstract idea categories. See Final Act. 4; Ans. 6–7.
We agree. Claim 1 recites “[a] computer-implemented method of
ancillary travel fee expense management” that includes a series of broadly
worded, result-oriented steps. See Appeal Br. 12–13. The recited receiving,
generating, storing, analyzing, adding, and indicating steps recite what the
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method does but do not meaningfully limit how the method does it. See
Appeal Br. 12–13. We thus see no meaningful difference between claim 1
and other broadly worded claims that courts have determined are directed to
mental processes. See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1146–52 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1353–56 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1316–19 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re BRCA1- &
BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 761–65
(Fed. Cir. 2014); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1370–77 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Like the patent-ineligible claims in these
decisions, claim 1 is so broadly worded that it encompasses acts that people
can perform in their minds or using pen and paper. We thus agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 recites mental processes.
Appellant asserts that claim 1 does not recite mental processes
because the “generation of the codes for the expense transaction method are
not performed in the human mind.” Appeal Br. 9. But claim 1 does not limit
who or what generates and uses these codes, nor does the claim specify how
the method generates the codes. See Appeal Br. 12–13. Given the expansive
wording of the claim, the claim encompasses people mentally determining
the codes and writing them on an expense report. Mentally determining
information and writing it down fall within the mental processes category of
abstract ideas. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (determining that
“unpatentable mental processes are the subject matter of” a claim when the
claim’s “method steps can be performed in the human mind, or by a human
using a pen and paper”); October SME Update at 9 (explaining that “[t]he
use of a physical aid (i.e., the pen and paper) to help perform a mental step
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. . . does not negate the mental nature of this limitation”). We thus find this
argument unpersuasive.
In any event, we also agree that claim 1 recites certain methods of
organizing human activity. Claim 1 recites a method that identifies, matches,
and codes travel expenses on an expense report. See Appeal Br. 12–13. This
type of expense categorization is a commercial practice that is similar to
other practices that courts have determined are directed to abstract ideas.
See, e.g., Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054–
56 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (processing an application for financing a purchase);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313–16
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (filtering files or emails); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367–69 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Capital
One Bank) (tracking financial transactions to determine whether they exceed
a pre-set spending limit); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells
Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and
storing that recognized data in a memory); see also October SME Update at
4–6 (providing examples of fundamental economic practices or principles
and commercial or legal interactions that fall within the certain methods of
organizing human activity category of abstract ideas). We thus agree with
the Examiner that claim 1 recites certain methods of organizing human
activity.
Appellant asserts that claim 1 does not recite certain methods of
organizing human activity, but does not explain why that is so. See Appeal
Br. 9. Appellant’s conclusory argument does not persuade us that the
Examiner erred.
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Because we determine that claim 1 recites abstract ideas, we next
consider whether claim 1 integrates the abstract ideas into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
evaluate the claim as a whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s]
the [abstract ideas] into a practical application, using one or more of the
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also October SME Update at 12
(discussing the practical application analysis). That is, we consider any
additional elements recited in the claim along with the limitations that recite
an abstract idea to determine whether the claim integrates the abstract idea
into a practical application. See October SME Update at 12.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements recited in claim
1 include an “application, modules, circuit, database[,] and [a] processor”
that “are recited at a high[]level of generality.” Ans. 7. The Examiner
determined that claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a
practical application because, among other things, the claim amounts to
“mere instructions to apply the exception using . . . generic computer
component[s]” and “[g]enerally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use.” Ans. 7.
We agree. The additional elements recited in claim 1 include “at least
one expense management application,” “at least one database connected to at
least one processor comprising at least one circuit,” and “at least one
ancillary fee module.” Appeal Br. 12–13. The written description describes
these components in largely functional terms and provides few technical
details about these components. See, e.g., Spec. 6–9, 22–30, Figs. 1, 2. This
description shows that these elements encompass generic computer
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components. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850
F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so
lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic
component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance
of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
The claimed method uses these generic computer components as tools
to implement the recited abstract ideas. See Appeal Br. 12–13. We therefore
agree with the Examiner that when these additional elements are considered
along with the limitations that recite an abstract idea, the claimed method
does not integrate the recited abstract ideas into a practical application. See,
e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation
is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at
1370 (“Steps that do nothing more than spell out what it means to ‘apply it
on a computer’ cannot confer patent-eligibility.”). Because claim 1 recites
abstract ideas and does not integrate the abstract ideas into a practical
application, we determine that claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas.
Appellant contends that claim 1 integrates the recited abstract ideas
into a practical application because “the combination of analyzing the
expense transaction and generation of the codes is a specific way to solve the
problem of matching ancillary expenses to a main travel event.” Appeal
Br. 10. According to Appellant, “[t]his is an additional element that is an
improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology, or technical field.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant relatedly asserts
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that “[t]he claimed subject matter improves the expense management
application by including the three codes on the expense report.” Appeal
Br. 10.
We find these arguments unpersuasive. The method recited in claim 1
at best improves the business practice of categorizing and matching certain
travel expenses. This is not an improvement to computer functionality,
technology, or a technical field. Cf. Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish
Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (determining that “the
claimed invention is at most an improvement to the abstract concept of
targeted advertising wherein a computer is merely used as a tool. This is not
an improvement in the functioning of the computer itself.”) Trading Techs.
Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims of
the ’999 patent do not improve the functioning of the computer, make it
operate more efficiently, or solve any technological problem. Instead, they
recite a purportedly new arrangement of generic information that assists
traders in processing information more quickly.”). As discussed above, the
claimed method simply uses generic computer components to execute
abstract ideas.
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
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previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determined that the additional elements recited in claim
1 are described “at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates
that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the
specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
elements to satisfy the statutory disclosure requirements.” Ans. 8.
Appellant does not explicitly challenge these determinations, and the
record adequately supports them. As noted above, the additional elements
recited in claim 1 include “at least one expense management application,”
“at least one database connected to at least one processor comprising at least
one circuit,” and “at least one ancillary fee module.” Appeal Br. 12–13. As
also noted above, the written description provides few technical details about
these elements. See, e.g., Spec. 6–9, 22–30, Figs. 1, 2. This lack of technical
details shows that these elements encompass well-understood, routine, and
conventional computer components. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent need not
teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”); USPTO,
Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (explaining that
a specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates
that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the
specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
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elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well
understood, routine, and conventional).
Whether we consider the additional elements individually or in
combination, the additional elements do not provide an inventive concept.
Claim 1 recites these elements at a high level of generality, and there is no
indication that these elements override the conventional use of known
features or involve an unconventional arrangement or combination of
elements. At bottom, claim 1 recites a method that employs conventional
computer components to perform the recited abstract ideas, which is not
enough to provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention.”); Customedia Techs., 951 F.3d at 1366
(“[T]he invocation of ‘already-available computers that are not themselves
plausibly asserted to be an advance . . . amounts to a recitation of what is
well-understood, routine, and conventional.’” (quoting SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
Summary
We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them
unpersuasive. For at least the reasons discussed above, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas and lacks an inventive
concept. We thus sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101.
Section 103 Rejection
Claim 1 recites
indicating on the expense report that the at least one travel
event main purchase is coded with . . . a third code that indicates
the at least one fee for at least one ancillary good or service
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matches the at least one fee for the at least one travel event main
purchase from the at least one main travel provider.
Appeal Br. 13. Appellant argues that the Examiner has not shown that the
combination of Wofford, Fredericks, and Vance teaches or suggests this
limitation. See Appeal Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 2–3. In particular, Appellant
asserts that this combination of references does not teach the recited “third
code.” See Appeal Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 2–3. According to Appellant, these
references teach matching data generally but do not teach matching a fee for
ancillary good or service to a fee for a travel event main purchase, much less
applying a code to the matched data. See Appeal Br. 7–9; Reply Br. 2–3.
We agree with Appellant. The Examiner found that Wofford and
Vance each teach the recited matching. See Final Act. 7, 9; Ans. 5–6.
Although the references mention matching data, the cited parts of Wofford
and Vance do not teach or suggest specifically matching the data recited in
the disputed limitation, let alone applying a code to the matched data. We
thus do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claim 1 and its dependent
claims. Because the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 16 suffers
from similar flaws, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claim
16 and its dependent claims.

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CONCLUSION
The following table summarizes our decision for claims 1 and 3–40,
the claims before us on appeal:

Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–40 101 Eligibility 1, 3–40
1–4, 6, 8–
13, 16–20,
23–25, 27–
31, 34, 37–
39
103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance
1–4, 6, 8–
13, 16–20,
23–25, 27–
31, 34, 37–
39
5 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Dufour 5
7, 21, 26, 35 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Keeling
7, 21, 26,
35
14, 32 103(a) Wofford, Fredericks, Vance, Scanlan 14, 32
15, 22, 33,
36 103(a)
Wofford, Fredericks,
Vance, Official Notice
15, 22, 33,
36
Overall
Outcome 1, 3–40

Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. No period for taking any
subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED