01A32443_r
06-26-2003
Michael D. Hornbuckle, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Michael D. Hornbuckle v. United States Postal Service
01A32443
June 26, 2003
.
Michael D. Hornbuckle,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A32443
Agency No. 4H-350-0005-02
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision
concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was
employed as a Carrier Technician at the agency's Bessemer Post Office in
Bessemer, Alabama. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently
filed a formal complaint on November 21, 2001, alleging that he was
discriminated against based on race when on September 13, 2001, he was
issued a 14-day suspension following a vehicular accident.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of
his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or
alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. The record
in this case reflects that complainant initially requested a hearing;
but that the request was subsequently withdrawn. The agency thereupon
issued a final decision.
In its final decision, the agency concluded that complainant failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race. The agency
further stated that assuming arguendo that complainant established a
prima facie case of race discrimination, complainant failed to show that
the agency's articulated reasons for his 14-day suspension was pretextual.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that
a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to
the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the
complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder
by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of
a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third
step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether
complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
The Commission determines that the evidence supports a finding that
the agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its
employment actions. The record reveals that on September 13, 2001,
complainant was issued a 14-day suspension for failure to operate a
vehicle in a safe manner. Specifically, the record reflects that while
in the performance of his letter carrying duties complainant felt ill and
hot, and as if he were going to faint. Complainant decided to drive the
agency vehicle he was assigned to get something to drink. While driving,
complainant fainted at the wheel and struck another vehicle.
The record contains an affidavit from complainant's Supervisor. Therein,
the Supervisor stated that complainant had a previous at-fault accident
which was resolved through arbitration and that he issued complainant a
14-day suspension because he felt that this particular accident could
have been prevented. The Supervisor further stated that management
was being progressive in its disciplinary action, given complainant's
accident history.
The record also contains an affidavit from the Postmaster. Therein,
the Postmaster stated that medical records had indicated complainant was
tested positive for alcohol; however, upon investigation, these findings
turned out to be a transcription error. The Postmaster further stated
that complainant has not accepted responsibility for his actions and that
his accident history required progressive disciplinary procedures. The
Postmaster determined that the accident at issue in the instant complaint
could have been prevented, as complainant should not have commenced to
drive a vehicle in the state that he was in (feeling ill/faint) prior to
the accident. Morever, the Postmaster stated that the 14-day suspension
is considered "corrective in nature rather than punitive."
Complainant has not demonstrated that the agency's articulated reasons
for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.
After a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the agency's final
decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 26, 2003
__________________
Date