Merlin Technology, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 17, 2020

13763582 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/763,582 02/08/2013 Mark Marvin HTK-3 6003
21833 7590 03/17/2020
PRITZKAU PATENT GROUP, LLC
16162 Olive St
Brighton, CO 80602
EXAMINER
HUTCHENS, CHRISTOPHER D.
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3647
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@dockettrak.com
mpritz@msn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MARK MARVIN, MARC FEIFEL,
NICHOLAS ALBION, and JOHN E. MERCER
____________________

Appeal 2019-003461
Application 13/763,582
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAHR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 7–31. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Merlin Technology,
Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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THE CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 7 and 21, reproduced below, are illustrative of the claimed
subject matter.
7. An autopilot system for controlling the flight of a helicopter,
said autopilot system comprising:
a sensor arrangement that produces a set of sensor inputs
for the autopilot system to characterize the flight of the
helicopter for generating autopilot actuator control signals;
a processing arrangement that is configured to generate
the autopilot actuator control signals based on no more than the
set of sensor inputs to control the flight of the helicopter in a
pilot selected one of a plurality of flight modes and to further
generate a slaved gyro output signal based on no more than the
set of sensor inputs;
an actuator arrangement to manipulate a cyclic control of
the helicopter based on the actuator control signals to fly the
helicopter; and
an autopilot display that is configured to display autopilot
flight mode information to the pilot while displaying a slaved
gyroscopic heading to the pilot based on the slaved gyro output
signal.

21. An autopilot system for controlling the flight of a
helicopter, said autopilot system comprising:
a plurality of sensors for generating a plurality of sensor
outputs that characterize the flight of the helicopter;
a processing arrangement that is configured to determine
a current flight status of the helicopter based on the plurality of
sensor outputs for operating the helicopter in a selected one of a
plurality of autopilot flight modes and to generate a customized
menu that includes a subset of one or more but less than all of
the plurality of autopilot flight modes which subset is
customized for pilot selection based on the current flight status
of the helicopter; and
a display for presenting the customized menu to the pilot
for selection of one autopilot flight mode of the subset of
autopilot flight modes.
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EVIDENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
REJECTIONS2
I. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Adams.
II. Claims 27, 28, 30, and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Bachelder.
III. Claims 7–9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hamburg and Younkin.

2 The Final Action contained rejections of claims 1–6 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a). Final Act. 5–8. Appellant cancelled claims 1–6 in the amendment
filed October 3, 2018, subsequent to the Final Action. In the Advisory
Action dated October 30, 2018, the Examiner indicated that the amendment
would be entered for purposes of appeal. As such, cancelled claims 1–6 are
not involved in this appeal, and the rejection of these claims presented in the
Final Action is rendered moot. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.31(c) (“An appeal, when
taken, is presumed to be taken from the rejection of all claims under
rejection unless cancelled by an amendment filed by the applicant and
entered by the Office.”).
Name Reference Date
Skutecki US 4,628,455 Dec. 9, 1986
Calise US 6,092,919 July 25, 2000
Adams US 6,314,343 B1 Nov. 6, 2001
McCall US 6,697,758 B2 Feb. 24, 2004
Beard US 2006/0058928 A1 Mar. 16, 2006
Bachelder US 2007/0164167 A1 July 19, 2007
Younkin US 2007/0182590 A1 Aug. 9, 2007
Cerchie US 2007/0221782 A1 Sept. 27, 2007
Hamburg US 2011/0022250 A1 Jan. 27, 2011
Duerksen US 8,195,346 B1 June 5, 2012
Shue US 2013/0261853 A1 Oct. 3, 2013
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IV. Claims 10–14 and 17–19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, and Beard.
V. Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, Beard, and Calise.
VI. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, Beard, Calise, and
McCall.
VII. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, and Cerchie.
VIII. Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Adams and Duerksen.
IX. Claim 23 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Adams, Duerksen, and Hamburg.
X. Claims 24 and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Adams, Duerksen, Hamburg, and Shue.
XI. Claim 29 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bachelder and Skutecki.
OPINION
Rejection I—Anticipation by Adams
In rejecting independent claim 21, the Examiner finds that Adams
discloses, in relevant part,
a processing arrangement (12) that is configured to . . . generate
a customized menu that includes a subset of one or more but
less than all of the plurality of autopilot flight modes which
subset is customized for pilot selection based on the current
flight status of the helicopter (e.g. menu C generated in fig. 3
does not provide the same flight modes available in menus D
and E, given that the modes are viable).
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Final Act. 2–3. Appellant argues that “[t]he sub-menus in Adams are not
customized based on which flight modes are viable, non-viable or otherwise.
Adams tests whether a flight mode is viable only after that flight mode has
been selected.” Appeal Br. 8 (underlining omitted). In particular, Appellant
asserts that “the screens of figure 3 show responses to actuations of
hardwired or soft switches merely in response to switch actuations made by
the pilot.” Id. at 9 (underlining omitted). We agree with Appellant that the
Examiner’s rejection is in error.
Adams discloses, with reference to Figure 3, that “there is shown a
sequence of display screen menus which can occur when a particular
combination of the hard wired switches and the soft bezel switches are
actuated.” Adams, col. 5, ll. 25–28 (boldface omitted). Adams also
discloses “that the ability to switch from one sub-menu to another sub-menu
requires the approval of the flight control computer 32 that the sub-menus
are viable options in ongoing flight conditions.” Id., col. 6, ll. 15–18
(boldface omitted). In this regard, the Examiner takes the position that
“Adams teaches limiting of sub-menu modes after the main-menu modes
have been selected.” Ans. 5. The Examiner explains that,
[a]s shown in the example of fig. 3, the pilot has selected the
Approach (APP) mode at main-menu switch (72). The display
screen (4) displays the sub-menus ILS (86), BC (90), and VAP
(94) available in the Approach (APP) mode (60) as shown in
part B (upper left section of figure 3). If the pilot selects ILS
switch (76), display screen 4 changes to sub-menu part C
(lower left section of figure 3). If the pilot selects BC switch
(78), display screen 4 changes to sub-menu part D, and so on.
Id. However, to the extent that Adams discloses customizing sub-menus to
include a subset of less than all of a plurality of flight modes, such
customizing is based on the mode selected by the pilot at the main menu and
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not based on the flight status of the helicopter. In other words, Adams
displays sub-menus C, D, and E, each including a subset of modes, based on
the main menu selection made by the pilot, but Adams does not disclose that
the sub-menus are customized based on the current flight status of the
helicopter. Thus, the Examiner’s finding that Adams discloses “generat[ing]
a customized menu that includes a subset of one or more but less than all of
the plurality of autopilot flight modes which subset is customized for pilot
selection based on the current flight status of the helicopter” (see Final Act.
2–3) lacks adequate evidentiary support.
For at least the above reasons, the Examiner fails to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Adams anticipates the subject matter of
claim 21. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 21 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Adams.
Rejection II— Anticipation by Bachelder
Claims 27, 28, and 30
In rejecting independent claim 27, the Examiner finds that Bachelder
discloses, in relevant part,
automatically activating an emergency descent mode
(autorotation) to generate said autopilot actuator control signals
responsive to the sensor outputs to first pitch the helicopter in a
way that initially establishes a forward speed of the helicopter
(push-over to gain airspeed (para [0078])) that is within a
predetermined range of speed (i.e. desired speed for landing
(para [0076]–[0078])) irrespective of a given forward speed at a
time when the activation signal occurred (landing speed
understood to be irrespective of speed at which failure
occurred).
Final Act. 3–4. Appellant argues that “[t]he heavyweight condition
described in paragraph 78 of Bachelder starts from a hover, which is
generally an airspeed of zero. There is nothing in paragraph 78 to suggest
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that the response would be the same irrespective of airspeed in the manner
recited by claim 27.” Appeal Br. 9 (boldface and underlining omitted). We
agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s rejection is in error.
Bachelder discloses that “[t]he capability of the automatic guidance
algorithm of the present invention to safely autorotate for the heavyweight
condition is demonstrated in FIG. 12. The engine is failed when the
helicopter is at a hover at an altitude of 400 ft above ground.” Bachelder
¶ 78 (boldface omitted). Bachelder discloses that “[t]he optimal guidance
commands an almost immediate push-over to gain airspeed (contrast with
almost no pitch input for several seconds in FIG. 9) and maintain rotor-speed
with a very rapid pull-up to about 35 degrees to arrest sink rate at low
altitude.” Id. (boldface omitted). In other words, Bachelder’s guidance
system commands the helicopter to pitch to increase airspeed in response to
an engine failure for a heavyweight condition at a hover. However, the
Examiner does not point to, nor do we find, any disclosure in Bachelder that
the command to pitch the helicopter described in paragraph 78 would take
place irrespective of the helicopter’s forward airspeed at the time of the
engine failure. Given that Bachelder only discloses pitching the helicopter
forward in the context of a helicopter at a hover (i.e., stationary condition) at
the time of engine failure, the Examiner’s finding that Bachelder discloses
first pitching the helicopter in a way that initially establishes a forward speed
of the helicopter that is within a predetermined range of speed irrespective of
a given forward speed at a time when the activation signal occurred (see
Final Act. 3–4) lacks adequate evidentiary support.
For at least the above reasons, the Examiner fails to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Bachelder anticipates the subject matter
of claim 27. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 27, or its
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dependent claims 28 and 30, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Bachelder.
Claim 31
The Examiner finds that Bachelder discloses, in relevant part,
generate said autopilot actuator control signals responsive to the
sensor outputs to manage the cyclic control without control
inputs from a pilot (as understood by activation via autopilot) at
least during an initial portion of the descent to hold a constant
airspeed (20 kts. para [0076]) for descent so that there is
sufficient flow through the rotor to maintain the RPM of the
main rotor at an acceptable rate (above 75% (para [0076])).
Final Act. 4–5. Appellant argues that Bachelder’s “[p]aragraph 76 is devoid
of any mention of a constant airspeed or pitch angle.” Appeal Br. 10.
Appellant asserts that “[c]laim 31 involves an initial portion of the descent,
immediately upon receiving the activation signal, not a run-on landing speed
which is a final airspeed.” Id. (underlining omitted). We are not persuaded
by this argument.
Bachelder discloses that “[t]he collective is lowered immediately but
there is no command to push the nose over or pitch down and gain airspeed
until the rotor-speed approaches its lower constraint of 75%.” Bachelder
¶ 76. Referring to Figure 9 of Bachelder, the Examiner takes the position
that
the airspeed (V) is held constant at 0 kts. (1st graph) after engine
failure (0 to 5 seconds) while the helicopter descends 400 ft. to
300 ft. (5th graph) to maintain the rotor speed (Ω) above 75%
(3rd graph) as recited in the paragraph, which meets the
limitation of the claim to “an initial portion of the descent (400
ft. to 300 ft.) to hold a constant airspeed (0 kts.).”
Ans. 8. In this regard, Appellant does not specifically address the
Examiner’s position or explain why it is deficient. Given that Bachelder
discloses an initial period of time (time = 0–5 sec) in which the helicopter
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remains at a constant airspeed (V = 0) while descending from 400 feet to
300 to maintain rotor speed (Ω) (see Bachelder, Fig. 9, ¶ 76), a
preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that
Bachelder meets the disputed limitation.
For the above reasons, Appellant fails to apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s finding that Bachelder anticipates the subject matter of claim 31.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as anticipated by Bachelder.
Rejection III—Obviousness Based on Hamburg and Younkin
In rejecting independent claim 7, the Examiner finds that Hamburg
teaches, in relevant part, “a processing arrangement (onboard computer) that
is configured to . . . generate a heading output signal based on no more than
the set of sensor inputs (high-lighted magnetic course flown based on
previously recorded GPS coordinates).” Final Act. 8. The Examiner finds
that “Hamburg fails to disclose generation of a slaved gyro output signal,
and displaying a slaved gyroscopic heading to the pilot based on the slaved
gyro output signal.” Id. at 9. However, the Examiner finds that “Younkin
discloses generating a slaved gyro output signal (heading source may be
slaved (para [0067])); while displaying a slaved gyroscopic heading to the
pilot based on the slaved gyro output signal (heading source may be
displayed with GPS course by elliptical scale (113) (para [0067])).” Id. The
Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to modify Hamburg
to generate a slaved gyro output signal based on no more than
the set of sensor inputs, and display a slaved gyroscopic
heading to the pilot based on the slaved gyro output signal,
since Hamburg states that the display screen may show the GPS
coordinates and the magnetic course (para [0005]) and Younkin
states that heading sources may be slaved to a magnetic heading
source, and since doing so allows the pilot to know the
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difference between the displayed heading and the magnetic
heading, increasing the pilot’s understanding of the surrounding
environment.
Id.
Appellant argues that Younkin fails to make up for the acknowledged
deficiency in Hamburg. Appeal Br. 11. In particular, Appellant asserts that
“there remains nothing in either reference to reasonably suggest the
combined requirements of claim 7 wherein no more than the sensors used by
the processing arrangement to generate the actuator control signals are used
by that same processing arrangement to generate a slaved gyro.” Id.
(underlining omitted). According to Appellant, “[t]here is no mention of the
sensors being shared between an autopilot and a slaved gyro in either
reference, nor is there any mention of the processor that is shared between
these two instruments.” Id. We are not persuaded by these arguments
because they attack the references individually rather than as combined by
the Examiner in the rejection. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by
attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the
teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d
1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981).
As discussed above, the Examiner relies on Hamburg for teaching a
processing arrangement that generates control signals and a heading output
signal based on no more than the set of sensor inputs. Final Act. 8 (citing
Hamburg ¶¶ 5, 7); see also Ans. 8–9 (explaining that, “[a]s shown in fig. 2
of Hamburg, the sensors (1–4) provide inputs to the autopilot (or CPU) for
actuation of the control signals (10), and for generating a course (or heading)
signal via the high-lighted magnetic course (para [0004]) on the GPS display
(7, 9)”). The Examiner relies on Younkin only for teaching a slaved gyro
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output signal. Final Act. 9 (citing Younkin ¶ 67); see also Ans. 9
(explaining that “Younkin provides an azimuth, or aircraft course (para
[0027]) output signal by using a slaved gyro (para [0067])”). In other words,
the Examiner does not rely on either reference individually for teaching
generating a slaved gyro output signal based on no more than the set of
sensor inputs, but, rather, determines that this feature would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the combined teachings
of the cited references. See Final Act. 9 (reasoning that the proposed
modification of Hamburg would “allow[] the pilot to know the difference
between the displayed heading and the magnetic heading, increasing the
pilot’s understanding of the surrounding environment”). In this regard,
Appellant does not specifically address the Examiner’s articulated reasoning
for the conclusion of obviousness. The Examiner articulates adequate
reasoning based on rational underpinnings for the proposed modification of
Hamburg, and Appellant does not offer any factual evidence or persuasive
technical rationale to refute the Examiner’s reasoning or explain why it
would be deficient.
Appellant also argues that Younkin teaches away from using the same
processing arrangement to generate actuator control signals and a slaved
gyro output. Appeal Br. 11–12. In particular, Appellant asserts that
Younkin “appears to utilize an autopilot control system that is isolated from
the remainder of his system including his azimuth source 518.” Id. at 11
(citing ¶ 73). According to Appellant,
[a]side from adding weight in Younkin as a result of using
separate autopilot and azimuth source units, the duplication of
sensors in association with these units requires still more
additional weight, not just arising from the weight of the
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additional sensors, but also the weight of their associated
electrical connections.
Id. at 11–12. This line of argument is unconvincing.
A reference teaches away from a claimed invention or a proposed
modification if “a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference,
would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or
would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by the
applicant.” In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re
Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Prior art does not teach away
from claimed subject matter merely by disclosing a different solution to a
similar problem unless the prior art also criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages the solution claimed. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, Appellant does not point to, nor do we find, any
disclosure in Younkin criticizing, discrediting, or otherwise discouraging the
combination of teachings proposed by the Examiner in the rejection. Even
assuming arguendo that Younkin uses separate processing arrangements for
autopilot and azimuth source (see Appeal Br. 11), this does not constitute a
teaching away from the Examiner’s proposal to use Hamburg’s processing
arrangement to generate a slaved gyro output signal based on no more than
the set of sensor inputs (see Final Act. 9). Moreover, Appellant’s argument
appears to improperly presume a bodily incorporation of Younkin’s separate
processing arrangements and associated structures into the system of
Hamburg. See Appeal Br. 11–12. “It is well-established that a
determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references
does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet,
686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Keller, 642 F.2d at 425
(stating, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
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secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the
primary reference”).
For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s determination that the subject matter of claim 7 would have been
obvious. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 7, and its dependent
claims 8 and 9, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments (see
Appeal Br. 12), under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hamburg and
Younkin.
Rejection IV—Obviousness Based on Hamburg, Younkin, and Beard
Claims 10, 11, 14, and 17
In contesting the rejection of claims 10, 11, 14, and 17, Appellant
relies on the arguments asserted against the rejection of independent claim 7,
and contends that Beard does not make up for the argued deficiencies in the
combination of Hamburg and Younkin. Appeal Br. 12. For the reasons
discussed above, Appellant’s arguments do not apprise us of error in the
rejection of claim 7, and, likewise, do not apprise us of error in the rejection
of claims 10, 11, 14, and 17. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims
10, 11, 14, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hamburg,
Younkin, and Beard.
Claims 12 and 18
Claim 12 depends from claim 10, via claim 11, and recites that “said
sensor arrangement includes a GPS that produces a GPS heading and the
processing arrangement periodically updates the yaw heading based on the
GPS heading.” Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App.). Appellant argues that the
Examiner’s rejection is in error because it “[f]ails to identify any reason that
one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably be led to update a yaw
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heading in Hamburg based on a GPS heading.” Id. at 13. We agree with
Appellant that a sustainable case of obviousness has not been established.
In rejecting claim 12, the Examiner finds that
Hamburg discloses said sensor arrangement includes a GPS that
produces a GPS heading and the processing arrangement
periodically updates the yaw heading based on the GPS heading
(GPS coordinates recorded every 4 to 30 seconds of flight (para
[0005]) and automatic flight control adjustments are made to
match the real-time GPS coordinates (para [0006]) and the
autopilot makes automatic flight control adjustments of yaw,
pitch, roll, and airspeed (para [0015])).
Final Act. 11.
Appellant correctly points out that Hamburg’s “paragraphs 5, 6 and 15
appear to be devoid of any mention of a yaw heading.” Appeal Br. 12. The
Examiner responds to Appellant’s assertion by stating that “the limitations
are not solely disclosed in the teachings of Hamburg.” Ans. 10. The
Examiner maintains that “the limitations are understood to be taught by
Hamburg as modified by Younkin and Beard, as is clear from the section
heading.” Id. However, the rejection does not set forth any reasoning to
explain how or why one of ordinary skill would have been led—based on the
teachings of Hamburg, Younkin, and Beard—to periodically update the yaw
heading based on the GPS heading, as claimed. In other words, the
Examiner errs by failing to articulate a sufficient rational evidentiary
underpinning to support the conclusion that the claimed feature would have
been obviousness to one to ordinary skill in the art. See In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (requiring “some articulated reasoning with
some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness”)
(cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418
(2007)).
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Accordingly, based on the record before us, the Examiner has not met
the burden of establishing a proper case that claim 12 is unpatentable based
on the cited references. On this basis, we do not sustain the rejection of
claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin,
and Beard.
The rejection of claim 18 relies on the same findings and reasoning as
those discussed above with respect to claim 12. See Final Act. 12; see also
Appeal Br. 14 (relying on the arguments presented for claim 12).
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Hamburg, Younkin, and Beard.
Claims 13 and 19
In rejecting claim 13, the Examiner finds that Hamburg teaches “a
magnetometer arrangement that produces a magnetic heading signal (i.e.
magnetic course) and the processing arrangement periodically updates the
yaw heading based on the magnetic signal heading (directed to pass through
the magnetic course (para [0004]) is understood to include changes in yaw
heading).” Final Act. 11. The Examiner explains that “the ‘magnetic
heading signal’, not the magnetic compass, is taught by the magnetic course
referenced in para [0004] of Hamburg.” Ans. 11.
Appellant argues that “Hamburg merely records the compass heading
for each GPS recorded point and does not disclose or suggest utilizing the
magnetic heading signal to update any yaw heading in the manner required
by claim 13.” Appeal Br. 13 (underlining omitted). We agree with
Appellant that a sustainable case of obviousness has not been established.
Here, the rejection suffers from the same deficiency as the rejection of
claim 12, discussed above. Namely, the rejection does not set forth any
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reasoning to explain why one of ordinary skill would have been led—based
on the teachings of the cited references—to periodically update the yaw
heading based on the magnetic signal heading. In other words, the Examiner
errs by not articulating a sufficient rational evidentiary underpinning to
support the conclusion of obviousness. See Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988 (cited
with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Accordingly, based on the record before us, the Examiner has not met
the burden of establishing a proper case that claim 13 is unpatentable based
on the cited references. On this basis, we do not sustain the rejection of
claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin,
and Beard.
The rejection of claim 19 relies on the same findings and reasoning as
those discussed above with respect to claim 13. See Final Act. 12.
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, we do not sustain the
rejection of claim 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Hamburg, Younkin, and Beard.
Rejections V and VII—Obviousness Based on Hamburg,
Younkin, and either Beard and Calise or Cerchie
Appellant does not present any separate argument for patentability of
claims 15 and 20, apart from their dependence from claim 14 and from claim
7, respectively. See Appeal Br. 8–20. For the reasons discussed above,
Appellant’s arguments do not apprise us of error in the rejections of claims 7
and 14, and, likewise, do not apprise us of error in the rejections of claims
15 and 20. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
of claim 15 as unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, Beard, and Calise, and
claim 20 as unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, and Cerchie.

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Rejection VI—Obviousness Based on Hamburg, Younkin,
Beard, Calise, and McCall
In rejecting claim 16, the Examiner finds that “neither Hamburg,
Younkin, Beard, nor Calise disclose[s] said inner loop determines the
helicopter attitude based on a direction cosine matrix.” Final Act. 13.
However, the Examiner finds that “McCall discloses the helicopter attitude
is based on a direction cosine matrix (attitude and heading processor (80)
includes direction cosine matrix (806) in figure 15).” Id. The Examiner
determines that it would have been obvious to modify
Hamburg in view of Calise to have the inner loop determine the
helicopter attitude based on a direction cosine matrix, since
Calise discloses the use of control loops to regulate aircraft
dynamics, and providing a direction cosine matrix in the control
loop aids in the computation of the attitude and heading angle
in aircraft flight (col. 8 ln. 38–65), allowing the processor to
make highly accurate attitude and heading measurements as
stated in col. 1, ln. 15–23.
Id.
Appellant contests the Examiner’s reasoning articulated in support of
the conclusion of obviousness. See Appeal Br. 14–15. In particular,
Appellant asserts that the Examiner
fail[s] to cite to any evidence gleaned solely from the references
to suggest why one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably
be led to utilize a direction cosine matrix in an inner loop.
Moreover, it is respectfully submitted that there is nothing in
the references [that] would teach one to overcome the sweeping
technical challenges that would be introduced.
Id. at 14 (underlining omitted). According to Appellant, “the necessary
modifications are well beyond the capabilities of one having ordinary skill in
the art.” Id. at 15. This line of argument is unpersuasive.
Appeal 2019-003461
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Appellant appears to insist on an explicit teaching, suggestion, or
motivation in the cited art to establish obviousness, but such a requirement
has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (stating
that a rigid insistence on teaching, suggestion, or motivation is incompatible
with its precedent concerning obviousness). The Court noted that an
obviousness analysis “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for [an examiner] can take
account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ.” Id. at 418. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether
the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Kahn, 441
F.3d at 988 (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Here, as discussed above, the Examiner articulates adequate reasoning
based on rational underpinnings as to why it would have been obvious to
modify the combination of Hamburg, Younkin, Beard, and Calise so that the
inner loop taught by Calise determines helicopter attitude based on the
direction cosine matrix taught by McCall. See Final Act. 13 (explaining that
providing a direction cosine matrix in the control loop taught by Calise
would allow the processor to make highly accurate attitude and heading
measurements (citing McCall, col. 1, ll. 15–23)). In this regard, Appellant
does not persuasively refute the Examiner’s articulated reasoning or explain
why it would lack rational underpinnings. In particular, Appellant does not
set forth any factual evidence or persuasive technical reasoning as to what
technical challenges would need to be overcome to use a direction cosine
matrix in an inner loop (Appeal Br. 14), as proposed by the Examiner, or
why such a modification would have been somehow beyond the capability
of one of ordinary skill in the art (id. at 15).
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19
For the above reasons, Appellant does not apprise us of error in the
Examiner’s determination that the subject matter of claim 16 would have
been obvious. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Hamburg, Younkin, Beard, Calise,
and McCall.
Rejections VIII–X—Obviousness Based on Adams and
Duerksen, alone or further in combination with Hamburg or
Hamburg and Shue
The rejections of claims 22–26, which depend directly or indirectly
from independent claim 21, are deficient for the same reasons discussed
above in connection with Rejection I. The Examiner relies on Duerksen,
Hamburg, and Shue for teaching additional features, but does not articulate
any findings or reasoning that would cure the aforementioned deficiency in
Adams. See Final Act. 15–19. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of: claim 22 as unpatentable over Adams and
Duerksen; claims 23 and 25 as unpatentable over Adams, Duerksen, and
Hamburg; and claims 24 and 26 as unpatentable over Adams, Duerksen,
Hamburg, and Shue.
Rejection XI—Obviousness Based on Bachelder and Skutecki
The rejection of claim 29, which depends from independent claim 27,
is deficient for the same reasons discussed above in connection with
Rejection II. The Examiner relies on Skutecki for teaching additional
features, but does not articulate any findings or reasoning that would cure
the aforementioned deficiency in Bachelder. See Final Act. 19–20.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Bachelder and Skutecki.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
21 102(b) Adams 21
27, 28, 30, 31 102(b) Bachelder 31 27, 28, 30
7–9 103(a) Hamburg, Younkin 7–9
10–14, 17–19 103(a) Hamburg, Younkin,
Beard
10, 11, 14,
17
12, 13, 18, 19
15 103(a) Hamburg, Younkin,
Beard, Calise
15
16 103(a) Hamburg, Younkin,
Beard, Calise, McCall
16
20 103(a) Hamburg, Younkin,
Cerchie
20
22 103(a) Adams, Duerksen 22
23, 25 103(a) Adams, Duerksen,
Hamburg
23, 25
24, 26 103(a) Adams, Duerksen,
Hamburg, Shue
24, 26
29 103(a) Bachelder, Skutecki 29
Overall Outcome 7–11, 14–
17, 20, 31
12, 13, 18,
19, 21–30
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART