Megan S. McAveney, Appellant,v.George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 15, 1998
01981870 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 15, 1998)

01981870

10-15-1998

Megan S. McAveney, Appellant, v. George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.


Megan S. McAveney v. Central Intelligence Agency

01981870

October 15, 1998

Megan S. McAveney, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01981870

) Agency No. 98-04

George J. Tenet, )

Director, )

Central Intelligence Agency. )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

On December 31, 1997, the appellant filed an appeal from a final decision

of the agency dated December 2, 1997 concerning her complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of �501 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. The appeal is timely (see

29 C.F.R. �1614.402(a)), and it is accepted under 29 C.F.R. �1614.401.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the agency (1) properly dismissed portions of the appellant's

complaint for failure to timely seek EEO counseling, (2) properly

dismissed a portion of the complaint for alleging that a proposal or

preliminary step to taking a personnel action was discriminatory, and

(3) whether the agency properly defined the complaint.

BACKGROUND

The appellant was hired effective October 16, 1996 as a part-time

contract employee, with a pay equivalent of GS-7, step 1. The term of

the contract was 13 months, subject to extension or early termination.

She commenced working in the Work and Family Center. From September 19,

1997 onward she worked in the General Counsel's Office. In November 1997

the appellant filed an EEO complaint alleging that she was discriminated

against on the basis of her disabilities (physical) when:

1. She was excluded from meetings on her ability to continue working,

2. she was required to report to a physical examination on July 2, 1997,

3. her medical condition was discussed with her supervisor by an agency

medical physician on or about July 2, 1997,

4. she was placed on administrative leave on July 3, 1997,

5. she was required to undergo additional medical examinations and

testing on July 15, 1997 and July 21, 1997 to August 7, 1997,<1>

6. she was denied an advocate of her choice at a meeting with management

on September 10, 1997 to discuss her return to work,

7. she was advised on September 10, 1997 that she was required to use

all her sick leave for the period she was sent home commencing on July 3,

1997,

8. she was advised on September 10, 1997 that she could not return to

work unless she agreed to various conditions of a return to work offer,

including wearing a helmet which she was later advised had to be worn

on all federal property because of her seizure disorder,

9. she was advised on September 10, 1997 that she only had 24 hours to

review the return to work offer,

10. upon returning to work on September 19, 1997, a project she had been

promised was already completed, and no research project materialized,

11. she was informed on September 19, 1997 that her employment contract

would not be extended,

12. she was not provided appropriate training and duties during the

entire course of her internship,

13. she did not receive a proper telephone vocal amplification device

until September 26, 1997.

The agency accepted allegations 1, 6, 7 and 9 for investigation.

It dismissed allegations 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the grounds that the appellant

failed to timely seek EEO counseling. The agency accepted allegations 8

and 10, but defined them more narrowly than set forth above. With regard

to allegation 12, the agency accepted for investigation "position(s)"

the appellant occupied within 45 days prior to her contact with an

EEO counselor.

The final agency decision did not address allegations 11 and 13.

The appellant noted this in her appeal, and in response the agency

acknowledged this and argued that allegations 11 and 13 should be

dismissed. It reasoned that allegation 11 alleged a proposal or other

preliminary step to taking a personnel action was discriminatory, and

that the appellant failed to timely seek EEO counseling with regard to

allegation 13.

On appeal, the appellant argues that the agency misdefined portions

of her complaint and improperly dismissed portions of her complaint.

In response to the appellant's appeal, the agency argues that its final

decision should be affirmed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) provides that an aggrieved

person must initiate contact with a counselor within 45 days of the

date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a

personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action.

However, 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(2) provides that the agency or the

Commission shall extend the time limit when the complainant shows that

she was not notified of the time limit and was not otherwise aware of

it, that she did not know and reasonably should not have known that the

discriminatory event or personnel action occurred, that despite due

diligence she was prevented by circumstances beyond her control from

contacting the counselor within the time limit, or for other reasons

considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission. With regard to

determining when a complainant knew or should have known of alleged

discrimination, the Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion"

standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when

the limitation period is triggered under the EEOC Regulations. Ball

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880247 (July 6,

1988). The appellant sought EEO counseling on September 22, 1997.

Allegations 2, 5 and 13

With regard to allegation 5, the appellant clarified on appeal that the

agency required her to undergo a psychiatric examination on July 15,

1997, and psycho-neurological testing from July 21, 1997 to August 7,

1997. The agency's response to the appeal does not contest this. The

appellant's EEO counselor contact on Monday, September 22, 1997 was within

the 45 day time limit of the last day of this set of mental-neurological

fitness-for-duty examinations. 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1) and .604(d).

Moreover, the physical examination on July 2, 1997 was part of the above

series of fitness-for-duty examinations. Accordingly, we find that the

appellant timely sought EEO counseling with regard to allegations 2 and

5.<2>

With regard to allegation 13, the appellant sought EEO counseling within

45 days of the date she allegedly was still not provided with a reasonable

accommodation, allegation 13 is timely.

Allegations 3 and 4

The appellant argues that her allegations are timely under the continuing

violation rule. The 45 day time limit to seek counseling is subject

to extension under the continuing violation rule. To establish a

continuing violation, the appellant must show a series of related acts,

one or more of which falls within the limitations period. An essential

ingredient of a continuing violation is an analogous theme uniting the

alleged discriminatory acts of the employer into a continuous pattern.

Vissing v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, EEOC Request No. 05890308

(June 13, 1989). An important factor in making a determination on

whether a series of acts are related is their degree of permanence which

should trigger an employee's awareness of and duty to assert her rights,

or which should indicate to the employee that the continued existence

of the adverse consequences of the act is to be expected without being

dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate. Berry v. Board of

Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir. 1983).

In her complaint, the appellant is alleging a series of related acts,

i.e., a set of fitness-for-duty examinations that led to her being placed

on administrative leave. Allegation 3 is inextricably intertwined

with this. Further, one of the acts, i.e., a medical examination,

occurred within the limitations period. While the appellant expressed

dissatisfaction all along about being required to undergo fitness-for-duty

examinations, the record does not show that she had a reasonable suspicion

of discrimination with regard to the above matters outside the limitations

period.

Accordingly, we find the appellant timely sought EEO counseling with

regard to allegations 3 and 4.

Allegation 12

E-mails reflect that as early as June 1997, the appellant was complaining

to agency officials about assignments. In a July 2, 1997 e-mail the

appellant complained that the Work and Family Center was not a place

to learn new things and to be challenged to think and create new ideas.

This demonstrates that the appellant believed she was not being properly

developed with assignments and training by at least early July 1997.

The Commission finds that the agency properly dismissed a portion of

allegation 12 for untimeliness, and that the agency must investigate the

aspects of the allegation regarding assignments and training that occurred

commencing 45 days prior to the date the appellant sought EEO counseling.

Allegations 8 and 10

The agency defined these allegations too narrowly, and their proper

definitions are set forth above. These allegations are timely.

Accordingly, the agency shall accept for investigation allegations 8

and 10 as defined in this decision.

Allegation 11

The appellant sought EEO counseling on this issue, contending that

in September 1997 she was informed that her contract of employment

with the agency would cease on November 16, 1997. EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. �1614.107(e) provides in relevant part that an agency shall

dismiss a complaint or a portion thereof that alleges a proposal or

other preliminary step to taking a personnel action. The agency argues

that this allegation should be dismissed under the above regulation.

We disagree. The appellant alleged that the decision to terminate

her contract was made in September 1997, not that a proposal or other

preliminary step to do so was done at that time. The appellant did

not have to wait to seek EEO counseling until the effective date her

contract expired when the decision to let it expire was made earlier.

The counselor's report, which is dated November 24, 1997, indicated that

the appellant was no longer employed with the agency.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons, it

is the decision of the Commission to MODIFY the final agency decision.

Specifically, the decision of the agency to dismiss allegations 2, 3, 4,

5, 11 and 13 is REVERSED, and the agency's definition of allegations 8,

10 and 12 are modified as set forth in this decision. The decision of

the agency to dismiss a portion of allegation 12 is AFFIRMED, as modified

herein.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to process the remanded allegations, as defined

in the body of this decision, in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.108 and

instructions in this decision. The agency shall consolidate the remanded

allegations with the other allegations in her complaint. The agency shall

acknowledge to the appellant that it has received the remanded allegations

within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

The agency shall issue to appellant a copy of the investigative file and

also shall notify appellant of the appropriate rights within one hundred

fifty (150) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, unless

the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. If the appellant

requests a final decision without a hearing, the agency shall issue a

final decision within sixty (60) days of receipt of appellant's request.

A copy of the agency's letter of acknowledgment to appellant and a copy

of the notice that transmits the investigative file and notice of rights

must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of

your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the

complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file

a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the

Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision

on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct. 15, 1998

______________

Date Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1In her complaint, the appellant alleged these events occurred in July

1997. On appeal, she clarifies the precise dates. The record suggests

that the medical exams and tests referred to in allegations 2 and 3 were

fitness-for-duty exams.

2With regard to allegation 5, the appellant states on appeal for the

first time that the "final appointment in the imposed examination

process..." was on September 3, 1997, when she was given the results

of the exams. This appointment did not concern a required medical exam

or test, the subject of allegation 5. Accordingly, the Commission will

not address this appointment.