McGraw-Edison Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 22, 1969

178 N.L.R.B. 558 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ingraham Industries -Division of McGraw-Edison
Company and International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 260,
AFL-CIO. Case 1-CA-6536
September 22, 1969
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCUL LOCH AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND ZAGORIA
On May 6, 1969, Trial Examiner Harry R.
Hinkes, issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The
Trial Examiner further found that the Respondent
had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recommended
the dismissal of these allegations. Thereafter, the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision, and a supporting brief, and the
Respondent filed limited cross-exceptions' with a
supporting brief', and an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the
Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, with the limited modification set
forth below.
"(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with
International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, as the
bargaining representative of its hourly rated
employees at its Bristol, Connecticut plant, by
refusing to permit the Union, after the grievance
procedure has been invoked, to perform independent
time studies through its own experts on jobs
involved in grievances arising under the parties'
collective-bargaining agreement."
2. Delete paragraph 2(a) and substitute the
following:
"(a) Upon request, after the grievance procedure
has been invoked, permit the Union through its own
experts to perform independent time studies
pertaining to jobs involved in grievances arising
under the parties' collective-bargaining agreement."
3. Delete the first indented paragraph of the
notice to all employees and substitute the following:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, by
refusing to permit the Union, after the grievance
procedure has been invoked, to perform
independent time studies pertaining to jobs
involved in grievances arising under our
collective-bargaining agreement.
4. Delete the third indented paragraph of the
notice to all employees and substitute the following.
WE WILL, upon request, after the grievance
procedure has been invoked, permit the Union to
conduct its own time studies on the job with
respect to jobs involved in grievances arising
under our collective-bargaining agreement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that those portions of the
complaint as to which no violation have been
found are hereby dismissed.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, and
orders that the Respondent, Ingraham
Industries-Division of McGraw Edison Company,
Bristol, Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as herein
modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(a) and substitute the
following:
'The Respondent does not except to the Trial Examiner's findings and
conclusions , but contends that the Trial Examiner 's Recommended Order
is too broad in scope As the modification set forth herein reflect;, the
Respondent ' s exceptions have been granted to the extent we deem
warranted.
HARRY R. HiNKES, Trial Examiner. The complaint
herein was issued on January 23. 1969, pursuant to a
charge by International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers Local 260, AFL-CIO (herein called the
Union), filed and served upon Ingraham
Industries-Division of McGraw Edison Company (herein
called the Company or Respondent), on or about
November 21, 1968 The complaint alleges that
Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act has refused the Union's request to time study a job
and has failed to notify the Union and permit said union
to attend a meeting with Respondent's employees. By
answer duly filed, Respondent has denied the commission
of any unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint
A hearing was held before me at Bristol , Connecticut,
on March 27, 1969, at which all parties were represented
and were afforded lull opportunity to participate. examine
witnesses, and adduce relevant evidence Briefs have been
received from the Respondent and the General Counsel
and have been given careful consideration.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, I make the
following:
178 NLRBNo 89
INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES 559
FINDINGS of FACT
i. JURISDICTION
Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto
a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue
of the laws of the State of Delaware. It maintains its
principal office and place of business in Bristol,
Connecticut, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale
and distribution of timing devices including clocks,
watches, and related products. In the course and conduct
of its business Respondent causes large quantities of metal
and metal parts used by it to be purchased and
transported in interstate commerce from and through
various states of the United States other than the State of
Connecticut, and causes substantial quantities of timing
devices to be sold and transported from Connecticut to
states of the United States other than the State of
Connecticut. In the course and conduct of its business, the
Respondent annually ships products having a value in
excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of
Connecticut The complaint alleges and Respondent's
answer admits that the Respondent is and has been
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. Till- I ABOR ORGANIZATION iNVOi yhD
The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits
and I find that International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers Local 260, AFL-CIO. is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act
111. THE UNFAIR i.&tiOR PRACTICFS
A Background
The complaint alleges and Respondent's answer admits
that at all times since June 15, 1950, the Union has been
the representative for the purposes of collective bargaining
of a majority of the employees in a unit consisting of all
hourly rated employees of the Respondent employed at its
Bristol plant, exclusive of officers, executives, office and
salaried employees. foreman, assistant foreman, line
foreman, sub-foreman, titnekccpers, assistant timekeepers.
engineers, draftsmen, janitors, nurses, clerks, uniformed
plant protection employees and all supervisors as defined
in Section 2(11) of the Act. In November and December
1967, a contract was negotiated by the Company and the
Union which was signed in May 1968 retroactively
effective. however, to January 1. 1968. Among other
things. said contract at article V I lI provides:
2. (a) Piece or incentive rates, when once set after a
reasonable trial period, shall not be reduced unless
changes in methods, processes or material amounting to
five per cent (5%), up or down, shall indicate the
propriety of such a change in the rate.
(b) Revisions to standards as a result of changes will
be to only those elements affected unless it is possible
for time values of unchanged elements to be different as
a result of their occurring at different points in the
sequence, in which case those elements too will be
included in the revised study
(c) The Company will furnish to the Union, upon
request, all data, including a copy of the time study, to
show the accumulation of elements and time equal to or
in excess of five per cent (5`h) on which the change is
based, but provided that such copies of the time study
will not be removed from the premises, except for safe
keeping in Local Union files, nor allowed to be
disclosed to anyone other than the Union officials and
the particular operators whose job is under discussion.
(d) When there has been an accumulation of changes
amounting to five per cent (5%) or more, up or down,
the changes will be made effective and the standard will
he corrected to include them
(e) The Union will have the right to challenge any
standard set by the Company through the grievance
machinery up to and including arbitration.
3 No employee shall suffer a reduction in his day rate
because of the temporary transfer from one job to
another, unless the employee requests the transfer or
voluntarily agrees to the transfer.
19. After a temporary piecework rate has run for three
(3) calendar months and for not less than 480 work
hours of actual operation either a permanent rate shall
be set on the job or the rate on the job ,it the expiration
of such temporary rate period shall stand as a
permanent rate and shall not thereafter be changed
except as otherwise provided in the contract.
20. A special day rate of S1.85 per hour is established
for all pieceworkers when temporarily working on day
work for any reason.
Said agreement also speaks of grievance procedures and
arbitration. Article XIV provides.
In the event that differences arise between the
Company and any of its employees within the scope of
the provisions in this contract. means are provided for
the settling of such differences by the grievance
procedure outlined in the following sections:
(a) Between the department steward and the
foreman.
(b) Between the department steward and shop
steward and the general superintendent's
representatives.
(c) Between the Union Committee, consisting of not
more than five (5) employees and the management
* * * * *
6. All differences, disputes and grievances between the
parties, that shall not have been satislactorily settled
after following the procedure hereinabove set forth
shall, at the request of either party, be promptly
submitted to arbitration by a Board of Arbitration . .
8 Grievances. within the meaning of the grievance
procedure, shall consist only of disputes about working
conditions, about the interpretation and/or application
of particular clauses of this agreement, and about
alleged violations of the agreement, including alleged
abuses of discretion by supervisors in the treatment of
employees. Changes in general business practice, the
opening or closing of new units, the choice of personnel,
the choice of merchandise to he sold, or other
business questions of a like nature not having to do
directly and primarily with the day-to-day life of the
employees and their relations with their supervisors
shall not be the subject of grievances and shall not be
arbitrable If any question arises as to whether a
particular dispute is or is not a grievance within the
meaning of these provisions. the question may he taken
560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
up through the grievance procedure and determined if
necessary by arbitration.
9 Until the foregoing grievance procedure shall have
been fully exhausted, there shall be no interruption or
curtailment of operation by any employee on account of
a grievance, and the parties agree to handle each stage
of the grievance procedure in as prompt a manner as
possible.
B. The Tirnestudy Issue
In June, 1968, the Union requested permission to have
some of the jobs studied by their own timestudy expert
"especially where the job has been cut drastically and the
ones on which we have filed grievances." Within a few
days thereafter, General Manager Modeen of the Special
Products Division of the Respondent replied stating that
the Company had furnished copies of the Company's
timestudies in all cases
where piece or incentive rates have been set or changed
as provided in Article VIII, Section 2(a). (b), (c), and
(d) of the agreement between the Company and the
Union effective January I, 1968. No job has been `cut
drastically' as alleged by the Union's letter of June 13,
1968. All grievances challenging piecework rates will be
defended on this basis.
In August, 1968, the Union began receiving complaints
from some of the employees who were being transferred
from their jobs to new jobs on a new conveyor being
installed. and who were allegedly experiencing a loss in
their wages as a result. At about the same time the
Company supplied the Union with its timestudies covering
those fobs. Union President Owens, an employee of the
Respondent, then asked Manager Modeen that the Union
be permitted to make its own timestudy, to which Modeen
replied that it could not be done. The union president then
wrote to Modeen requesting the Union's timestudy man
for the various jobs At a subsequent committee meeting
the Company replied that its position was unchanged.
That position was stated by the Company on September
10, 1968 in its answer to the grievance filed by the Union
concerning the employees' loss of pay by their changeover
to the new conveyor.
In it the Company slated
The Company exercised its contractual right when it
instituted a piece work conveyor operation. Article 11
grants the Company the right, among other things, "to
determine the methods, processes and means of
manufacture."
Article VIII, Section 2(a). (b), (c) and (d) are pertinent
only to revisions of standards and rates that have been
enforced beyond a reasonable trial period. While it is
true in Section 2(e) that the Union has the right to
challenge any standard set by the Company, Section 19
of Article VIII defines a period of three calendar
months or not less than 480 work hours as the trial
period. Therefore the conveyor rate in question would
assume a permanent status on at the expiration of this
contractual time period
A contractual step "c" meeting concerning this
grievance was held between the Company and the Union
on October 7, 1968, at which meeting the Company again
raised the defense of the propriety of pursuing step "c"
meetings or arbitrations in view of section 19, article VIII,
which allegedly creates a 3-month trial period for
standards set by the Company. On November 7, the
Union requested arbitration on this grievance and on
November 16 the matter was referred to the American
Arbitration Assocation . As of March 27, 1969, the date of
the hearing in this matter , said arbitration was still
pending before the arbitrator . In the meantime , however,
the Union had filed its charge in this proceeding on
November 20, 1968, and the complaint and notice of
hearing had been issued on January 23, 1969.
C. Analysis and Conclusion on the Timestudy Issue
It thus appears that the grievance filed by the Union
with respect to the new conveyor was concerned with an
alleged loss in pay sustained by the employees in that
department. The Company denied the grievance, arguing
that the 3-month trial period provision of the contract
between the Company and the Union barred the Union's
challenge. That issue has been referred to arbitration for a
decision. it is not, however, before the Board for
adjudication.
The issue before the Board, generated by this
proceeding, is whether the Union's request for their own
timestudy of the new conveyor, in support of their
grievance concerning the rate of pay in that department,
should he enforced. The Company's position was clearly
expressed by Manager Modeen in his testimony:
Q. So you turned down the Union request to have
job studies made by their own time-study expert?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you do that?
A. I felt the issue of time study is well covered in our
contract through the clauses that relate to the method
in which rates shall be set and wages shall be paid and
how they shall be challenged.
Q. When you state how they shall be challenged are
you referring to Article VIII, Section 2(e)?
A. Yes, I am on page 19.
Article VIII, section 2(e), gives the Union the right to
challenge any standard set by the Company through the
grievance machinery up to and including arbitration.
Counsel for the Respondent correctly states that
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act requires an employer, upon
request, to furnish all information relevant to the
bargaining representative's intelligent performance of its
function. He adds
Insofar as grievances are concerned, it has been held
that intelligent performance includes conducting of
independent time studies to determine whether the
Union should accept proposed piece rates or proceed to
arbitration, the final step in the grievance procedure
Counsel for the Respondent further notes that all
material relevant to the arbitration of the new conveyor
grievance was supplied to the Union and that the Union
has elected to proceed to arbitration under the provisions
of the contract between it and the Company, making that
election without waiting for its own independent timestudy
report. He further notes that said election to go to
arbitration was made by the Union even before it filed its
charge against the Company. From this he argues that
since the Union has already made its decision to proceed
to arbitration, it has thereby waived the general rule which
gives it the right to have its own independent time studies
to determine whether it should proceed to arbitration I do
not agree.
It is true, as argued by Counsel for the Respondent,
that in Fafnir Bearing Co v. N L R.B. 362 F.2d 716
(C.A. 2), enfg. 146 NLRB 1582, the Court noted that the
timestudies were needed by the Union to determine
"whether to take the grievances to arbitration in the first
INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES
place " Here. of course, the matter has been referred to
arbitration even without the Company's permission for an
independent time study. 1 do not, however, read the Fafnir
decision as limiting a union's right to timestudies to
situations where the Union is considering the advisability
of going to arbitration. The Supreme Court has explicated
the duty of an employer to furnish information to the
representative of its employees more broadly In N L R B
v Acme Industrial Co . 385 U S. 432, the Union tiled
grievances charging the employer with violations of their
collective agreement by the removal of certain machinery
from the plant Thereafter the Union requested certain
information concerning that removal which the Company
refused to furnish arguing that the grievances were barred
by certain time limitations specified in their collective
agreement. The Board held that the Union was entitled to
the information requested without waiting for the
arbitrator's determination of the relevancy of the
requested information. The Court affirmed the decision of
the Board citing Section 8(d) of the Act which defines
collective bargaining as including "the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer good faith with
respect to . . . any question arising [under an agreement]
The Supreme Court went on to say
For when [the Board] ordered the employer to furnish
the requested information to the Union, the Board was
not making a binding construction of the labor contract.
It was only acting upon the prohahliliti that the
desired information was relevant and that it would he of
use to the union in carrying out the statutory duties and
responsibilities. This discovery-type standard decided
nothing about the merits of the union's contractual
claims. When the Respondent furnished the requested
information, it may appear that no subcontracting or
work transfer has occurred, and, accordingly, that the
grievances filed are without merit. .
Far from intruding upon the preserve of the arbitrator.
the Board's action was in aid of the arbitral process.
Arbitration can function properly only if the grievance
procedures leading to it can sift out unmeritorious
claims. [Emphasis supplied.]
Here, too, the granting of an independent timestudy to
the Union might very well either assist the Union in
presenting a more persuasive argument before the
arbitrator when it appears before him in its function as
the bargaining representative of the employees affected or,
in the alternative, may convince the Union that further
litigation even before the arbitrator may be
advantageously discontinued. In that sense the timestudy
requested is needed by the Union for the proper
performance of its duties.
I conclude, therefore, that the Union is entitled to
make its own independent timestudy of the jobs involved
in the pending grievance. The fact that such requests for
timestudies may be subject to grievance and arbitration
procedures does not constitute a waiver of the Union's
statutory right to such mformation. N L R B v. Perkins
Machinery Co , 326 l-.2d 488 (C.A. 1). Timken Roller
Bearing Co. 138 NLRB 15, 16.
Nor does the fact that the Union elected to proceed
with its grievance and arbitration of the alleged wage loss
without receiving the requested permission to conduct its
own timestudy relieve the Respondent from its statutory
duty to grant such requests. It is conceded that the
requests for time studies were made before the grievance
procedures were completed. The Respondent was under a
561
duty to grant those requests at that time. In failing to do
so it violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act for which a
remedial order is warranted Moreover, I see no logic or
justification in denying the Union its right to an
independent timestudy merely because it attempted to win
its grievance under the contract without such a timestudy
due to the refusal of the employer to furnish it. To adopt
the argument of counsel for the Respondent would mean
that an employer could block a union's attempt at
utiliLation of a contractual grievance procedure by an
unlawful refusal to grant a union an independent time
study or other information to which it is entitled
statutorily and without which it may he unable to prevail
in the grievance or arbitration procedures. On the other
hand, if the union attempted to go forward with the
grievance and arbitration procedures handicapped by the
employer's unlawful refusal to allow an independent
timestudy, counsel for the Respondent would consider this
to he a waiver of their right to the timestudy. A waiver of
a statutory right, however, must be clearly and
unmistakably established and it is not likely to be
inferred. Cloverleaf Divis ion of Adams Dairy Co., 147
NLRB 1410 Moreover, the employer should not be
permitted to gain advantages by his unlawful refusal to
permit timestudies.
Counsel for the Respondent places great reliance upon
the decision of the Board in Ilerculec Motor Corporation,
136 NLRB 1648, where it held that the employer had not
violated the Act in refusing to furnish wage data requested
by the Union. That decision, however, was explained by
the Board in its later decision in Timken Roller Bearing
Company, 138 NLRB 15, 16, fn 4. The Board pointed
out that in Hercules the Union asked for wage data with
respect to a particular matter on which a grievance had
been filed. The Company contended, contrary to the
Union, that the matter could not properly be made subject
of a grievance under the terms of the party's contract. In
view of these conflicting contentions, the Board majority
concluded that the basic issue was not one concerning the
production of wage data but rather one of contract
interpretation, i.e., whether the matter in dispute was
arbitrable and this question, it held, was for the arbitrator.
Here, however, there is no dispute concerning the
arbitrability of the Union's request for an independent
timestudy. Indeed, the Respondent's refusal is based upon
their contract with the Union providing for grievance and
arbitration procedures. Consequently, unlike the Hercules
case, this case presents the issue concerning the production
of data rather than one of contract interpretation.
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent's failure to
grant the Union's requested independent timestudy was an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, in the absence of any showing that the request was
improper or unreasonably burdensome on the company,
Wilson Athletic Goods Manufacturing Co., Inc., 169
NLRB No 82.
D. The Meeting Issue
The complaint alleges:
Since on or about November 19, 1968, Respondent
failed to notify the Union and thereafter refused to
permit the Union to attend a meeting with its
employees relative to the pension and profit sharing
plan. By such actions Respondent bargained directly
and individually with its employees in the unit described
in respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of
employment , or other conditions of employment.
562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Moreover, Respondent thus deprived the Union of
information necessary and relevant to the Union's
administration of the collective- bargaining agreement.
In the agreement of January 1, 1968, referred to earlier,
article IX includes a so-called McGraw-Edison Company
Profit Sharing Plan. In addition , there are provisions
relating to a so-called Ingraham Company Retirement
Income Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the
"pension plan") During January 1968, the Company held
a number of meetings with a total of 650 to 750 of its
employees for the purpose of properly enrolling them in
the Profit Sharing Plan. The Union was represented at all
such meetings.
The Profit Sharing Plan requires 3 years of continuous
service for automatic qualification. January 1 and July 1
of each year are dates when such newly qualified
employees are enrolled and others can stop, start, decrease
or increase their voluntary contributions. Accordingly,
meetings were held shortly before July, 1968 and in
November 1968. Attendance at the July meeting was
limited to seven and attendance at the two November
meetings was divided between 36 employees The
employees who attended the November meetings were
those who had attained the 3 years of continuous service
required under the plan. Union President Owens and
Union Steward Medley heard of the November meetings
and requested permission to attend, charging that the
employer had misinformed the employees concerning their
eligibility in the January meeting. This was denied by
Company Superintendent Bordan, and I credit his
testimony in this respect, particularly since the employees
were given brochures describing the Profit Sharing Plan as
well as copies of the agreement containing details on the
pension plan Moreover, it appears that counsel for the
General Counsel does not insist that the company
"misinformed" its employees. The brief of counsel for the
General Counsel states his position clearly
Here the company was explaining matters relating to
the Profit Sharing Plan, clearly a subject covered by the
current contract The testimony by the Union officials
was that some confusion existed as a result of meetings
held by the company in January. [Emphasis supplied.]
Without going into the merits or even the details of the
plan, it is crystal clear that the Union had a right to be
present while the plan was being explained to the
employees. If there was any possible ambiguity certainly
the Union was entitled to make sure the facts were
correctly explained to the employees.
No assertion is being made that the Plan was changed
unilaterally, only that the Union has a right to be
present during the explanation period. Nor is any
contention made that the Company did not have a right
to address the employees. Simply staled, the Union has
a statutory right to be present.
Counsel for the Respondent, on the other hand, argues
that the November meetings were simply routine in
notifying the newly eligible employees of their coverage
and benefits. He cites the fact that no negotiations took
place nor did the Company bargain directly and
individually with its employees in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment or other conditions of
employment In addition, neither party could unilaterally
change the Profit Sharing Plan Finally, I note the
testimony in the record that union representation is
neither customary nor generally desired in meetings of the
company with individual employees concerning their Blue
Cross, insurance benefits, accident and sickness insurance
and personal individual problems
The Board has recognized that an employee's right to
union representation does not apply to all dealings with
his employer which may eventually or ultimately affect the
terms and conditions of his employment. Jacobe-Pearson
Ford, Inc, 172 NLRB No 84: Chevron Oil Co., 168
NLRB No. 84. In both of these cases, the Board found no
unfair labor practice in a company's refusal to allow
union representation at a meeting called merely for the
purpose of gathering information from employees I see
no basis for according a union even greater rights where
the purpose of the meeting is merely to disseminate
information to the employees, but without any attempt at
negotiation or adjustment of grievances. See also,
American Printing Company, 173 NLRB No. 17, where
despite the absence of the employees' union representative
at a meeting called by the employer, the Board found no
unfair labor practice in an employer's meeting with his
employees to tell them that their wage demand could not
be met and asking them to be "reasonable "
Here, where the meeting was to disseminate
information to the employees concerning a profit-sharing
plan which had been negotiated by the Company with
union representatives of the employees, without any
attempt to modify or re-negotiate such plan, the details of
which must have been well known to the union
representatives, I find no basis for concluding that the
company thereby refused to bargain collectively with the
representatives of the employees within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. Accordingly, I shall
recommend that this allegation of the complaint be
dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I By refusing the Union's request for an independent
timestudy of jobs whose pay rates were the subject of
grievances filed by the Union, the Company has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meanmg of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
3. By meeting with its employees to explain the
provisions of a profit sharing plan, the terms of which had
been agreed upon between the Company and the union
representatives of its employees, the Company did not
engage in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act despite its refusal to
permit union representatives to attend such meetings.
Tiiu REMEDY
Having found that the Company engaged in certain
unfair labor practices I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action
which I find necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law. I recommend that the Respondent,
Ingraham Industries-Division of McGraw-Edison
Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall.
1. Cease and desist from:
INGRAHAM INDUSTRIES
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Local
260, AFL-CIO, as the bargaining representative of its
hourly rated employees at its Bristol, Connecticut plant,
by refusing to permit the Union to perform independent
time studies through its own experts on jobs involved in
grievances arising under the party's collective-bargaining
agreement.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with the
efforts of the Union to bargain collectively with it in
behalf of the hourly rated employees at the Bristol,
Connecticut, plant.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Upon request, permit the Union through its own
experts to perform independent time studies pertaining to
jobs involved in grievances arising under the party's
collective-bargaining agreement.
(b) Post in its offices and plant at Bristol, Connecticut,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies
of said notice on forms to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region I. shall, after being duly signed by
the Respondent's representative, be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places where notices to employees are
customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.'
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMLNDED that the complaint be
dismissed in all other respects.
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the
words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . If the Board's
Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals, the
notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for the words
"a Decision and Order "
'In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provisions shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 1, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
563
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, Local 260, AFL-CIO, by refusing to permit
the Union to perform independent time studies
pertaining to jobs involved in grievances arising under
our collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interlere
with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively on
behalf of the employees covered by our
collective-bargaining agreement.
WF WILL, upon request, permit the Union to conduct
its own time studies on the job with respect to jobs
involved in grievances arising under our
collective-bargaining agreement
INGRAHAM
INDUSTRIES-DI\•iSION 01
MCGRAW-EDISON
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, John F
Kennedy Federal Building, Cambridge & New Sudbury
Streets, Boston, Massachusetts 02203, Telephone
617-223-3300.