Max Robbertze et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 12, 20202018008527 (P.T.A.B. May. 12, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/416,866 01/23/2015 Max Robbertze LUTZ 201965US01 9244 48116 7590 05/12/2020 FAY SHARPE/NOKIA 1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor The Halle Building Cleveland, OH 44115-1843 EXAMINER SMITH, LINDSEY B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3625 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/12/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Nokia.IPR@nokia.com docketing@faysharpe.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MAX ROBBERTZE, NEIL EMMERICH, and IVAN BEDINI Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 Technology Center 3600 Before DENISE M. POTHIER, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges. POTHIER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18. Appeal Br. 19–23. Claims 6 and 16 have been canceled, and claim 13 has been withdrawn from consideration. See id.; see Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Alcatel Lucent. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER According to the disclosure, entities exist[,] which wish to establish operational relationships with other entities, subject to particular rules and restrictions. For example, network nodes within a wireless telecommunications network may wish to communicate with other network nodes within a telecommunications network, but those relationships may be restricted by various characteristics associated with each network node or with links between those network nodes. Spec. 1:9–14. As one example, a first entity can be a content owner and a second entity can be a service provider. Id. at 11:3–7, Fig. 1; see id. at 6:35– 38. An example of an operational relationship can include these entities entering into a license agreement. Id. at 11:24–26, 12:19–22, 13:4–6. The invention’s “aim [is] to provide a means to match entities wishing to form an operational relationship . . . .” Id. at 1:23–24; see id. at 10:12–13. The claims are directed “to a method of establishing enablers[2] of a relationship between a first entity and a second entity . . . .” Spec. 1:4–5. The invention determines relationship characteristics (e.g., technology available to process material) used to define a generic relationship between the entities and then reduces each entity’s requirements to a common language (id. at 2:2–12, 3:12–18). To determine what the entities have in common, the invention identifies the overlap of shared relationship requirements and if their commonality exceeds a threshold, the process establishes the relationship’s operational parameters between the entities. Id. at 2:14–21, 3:20–26, 3:33–38, 4:35–5:4. 2 Operational parameters are “also referred to as ‘enablers’ of a relationship between the first and second entity.” Id. at 2:10–12. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 3 Claim 1, below, illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. A method, performed by one or more processors, of establishing technical communication in a wireless telecommunications network between a first network node and a second network node by establishing operational parameters of a relationship between the first network node and the second network node, said method comprising: determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node, the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics including a format of a material and a technology available to process the material; establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics; expressing relationship requirements of said first network node and relationship requirements of said second network node in terms of said common language, wherein said expressing of relationship requirements comprises analyzing a set of preferred operational parameters associated with each network node to determine how the operational parameters associated with each network node are expressed using said set of indications of primary relationship characteristics; assessing, based on common relationship requirements of said first and second network nodes expressed in said common language, whether overlap between said first network node relationship requirements and said second network node relationship requirements passes a preselected threshold; and, in response to the overlap passing the preselected threshold, establishing the operational parameters of the relationship between said first network node and said second network node based on said common relationship requirements. Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 4 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Nevalainen US 2006/0242291 A1 Oct. 26, 2006 Seeman US 2008/0091634 A1 Apr. 17, 2008 Graham US 2010/0153282 A1 June 17, 2010 REJECTIONS I. Claim 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,3 as failing to comply with the written-description requirement. Final Act. 3–5. II. Claims 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention. Id. at 6–7. III. Claims 1–5, 7–12, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nevalainen and Seeman. Id. at 8–13. IV. Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nevalainen, Seeman, and Graham. Id. at 13–14. 3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 and 103. Changes to §§ 112 and 103 apply to applications filed on or after September 16, 2012 and March 16, 2013 respectively. Because this application has an effective filing date before these dates, we refer to the pre-AIA versions of §§ 112 and 103. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 5 OPINION I. Lack of Written Description Rejection Claim 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written-description requirement. Final Act. 3–5. For claims 1, 11, and 12, the Examiner stated: The subject matter of the claim does not conform to the disclosure in such a manner in which one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize such a process as being that which the Applicant adequately described as the invention of what the Applicant actually had possession of at the time of the invention. Id. at 3. The Examiner additionally stated the Specification does not explain “how to ‘determine’ a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and second network node.” Id. (citing Spec. 2:1–7); see Ans. 4–7. For dependent claim 7, the Examiner stated the step of “determining a further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” lacks written- description support. Final Act. 4–5 (citing Spec. 2:1–7, 2:28–31, 4:1–6, 7:21–22, 8:18–21). Appellant disagrees. Appeal Br. 11–14. MAIN ISSUES Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, has the Examiner erred by determining the following phrases lack written-description support: Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 6 (1) “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node,” as recited in claim 1 and (2) “determining a further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node,” as recited in claim 7? ANALYSIS Based on the record, we find error. To satisfy the written-description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail so that one skilled in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Appellant points to various passages in the Specification to demonstrate written description for claim 1’s “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node.” Appeal Br. 11–12 (citing Spec. 2:2–7, 2:27–31, 4:8–12). In particular, the Specification states: “[D]etermining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics which can be used to define a generic relationship between a first entity and a second entity. . . .” Spec. 2:2–4; id. at 1:28–30. Similarly, the Specification originally claimed “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics to define a generic relationship between said first entity and said second entity.” Id. at 16:5–6. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 7 The Specification further describes “network nodes” as an example of entities. See id. at 1:9–14; see id. at 2:36–37. The Specification also discusses examples of “the determination of the set of indications comprises establishing a database of domain-based relationship parameters” (id. at 3:8–9) and the indicators may depend upon (1) the particular domain within which the first and second entities operate (id. at 3:9–11; see Appeal Br. 12 (discussing the “domain specific atomic concepts” features in claims 8 and 9)), (2) the particular scenario (see Spec. 3:11–12), (3) the functionality provided by the entity (id. at 3:13–14), (4) the communication means between entities (id. at 3:14–15), (5) the material format (id. at 3:17–18), and (6) the technology available to process the material (id.). Thus, although the Specification does not provide an algorithm or software used to perform the “determining” step4 (see Final Act. 3), we determine the Specification describes the step of “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” in claim 1 in sufficient detail that an ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably conclude that Appellant had possession of the claimed invention. Notably, [a]lthough many original claims will satisfy the written description requirement, certain claims may not. For example, a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain 4 The Examiner explicitly states “these [rejections] are not an enablement rejections.” Final Act. 5. We thus do not consider the rejection on this ground. Nonetheless, the Examiner may wish to review whether an ordinarily skilled artisan would know how to make and use the disputed “determining” steps in claims 1 and 7 without undue experimentation. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 8 whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. Here, the Examiner has not demonstrated sufficiently that the “determining” step in claim 1 is akin to the generic claim discussed in Ariad defined by boundaries of a vast genus and that the Specification does not sufficiently demonstrate Appellant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus. See id. Turning to claim 7 and the disputed “determining a further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” (Appeal Br. 20 (Claims App.)), the Examiner presented a similar argument to claim 1 that the Specification does not “provide details on what algorithms/software are used or written to ‘determine’ a common language.” Final Act. 4 (citing Spec. 4:1–6); id. at 4–5 (citing Spec. 7:21–22, 8:18–21). We find error. First, we refer above for details related to the Specification describing indications of relationship characteristics to define a generic relationship and thus the recited “defin[ing] the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” in claim 7. See, e.g., Spec. 3:8–18. Second, turning to the Specification, the disclosure states: the method further comprises determining a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define a primary relationship having a commonality past a predetermined threshold between the first entity and the second entity [and] expressing secondary first entity relationship requirements and secondary second entity relationship Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 9 requirements in terms of the indications of secondary relationship characteristics. Spec. 3:28–33. The Specification also states “the nature of the relationship established between a first and second entity may be further refined by secondary relationship characteristics. Those secondary relationship characteristics again form a common language between entities where no common language may previously have existed.” Spec. 4:1–6. Third, the Specification also addresses determining a common language in general based on relationships between the first and second entities or nodes. See id. at 2:9–15, 3:23–26. We find the above-noted passages collectively describe claim 7’s disputed limitation in sufficient detail that an ordinarily skilled artisan would reasonably conclude that Appellant had possession of the disputed limitation in claim 7. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has persuaded us of error in the rejection of (1) claims 1 and 7 and (2) claims 11 and 12, which recite commensurate limitations to claim 1, and (3) dependent claims 2–5, 8–10, 14, 15, 17, and 18 for similar reasons. II. Indefiniteness Rejection Claims 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant regards as the invention. Final Act. 6–7. Similar to the discussion above when addressing the lack of written description rejection, the Examiner contended “the disclosure does not reveal the manner in which one ‘determines’ a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 10 relationship between said first network node and second network node.” Id. at 6. For this reason, the Examiner argued the “determining” step in claims 1, 11, and 12 does not ensure the scope of claims 1, 11, and 12 is clear and does not demarcate the boundaries of these claims. Id.; see Ans. 8–10. The Examiner additionally found the “determining a further common language” step in claim 7 is indefinite for reasons similar to those discussed for claim 1, arguing the disclosure does not reveal how the process further defines the generic relationship by determining a further common language and thus the scope of claim 7 is unclear. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner further argued claim 7’s “further common language” phrase is indefinite because “no other common language has been determined.” Id. at 6. Appellant disagrees. Appeal Br. 14–17. MAIN ISSUES Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, has the Examiner erred by determining the following phrases are indefinite: (3) “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node,” as recited in claim 1 and (4) “determining a further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node,” as recited in claim 7? Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 11 ANALYSIS Based on the record, we find error. “[T]he statutory language of ‘particular[ity]’ and ‘distinct[ness]’ [in 35 U.S.C. § 112] indicates, claims are required to be cast in clear—as opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite—terms.” In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014). “A decision on whether a claim is [indefinite] under § 112, 2d ¶ [(pre-AIA)], requires a determination of whether those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). Claim 1 recites “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.). An ordinarily skilled artisan would understand this phrase in claim 1 to mean deciding on indications of primary relationship characteristics that form a set and that define a general relationship between the first and second network nodes. Additionally, to the extent the Examiner contends an ordinarily skilled artisan would not understand what “indications of primary relationship characteristics” in claim 1 are, the Specification provides some examples. The Specification describes “the set of indications comprises establishing a database of domain-based relationship parameters” (id. at 3:8–9) and the indicators may depend upon (1) the particular domain that the first and second entities operate (id. at 3:9–11; see id. at 4:8–12 (discussing “domain specific atomic concept”), quoted in Appeal Br. 15), (2) the particular scenario (see Spec. 3:11–12), (3) the functionality provided by the entity (id. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 12 at 3:13–14), (4) the communication means between entities (id. at 3:14–15), (5) the material format (id. at 3:17–18), and (6) the technology available to process the material (id.). See Appeal Br. 14–15 (quoting Spec. 3:8–18). The Specification further discusses the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics that define a generic relationship between entities or nodes are used to find commonality between the entities and to identify entities that are suitable for forming a relationship (e.g., reciprocal, asymmetrical, and producer-consumer) by matching characteristics. See Spec. 22–7, 2:27–37. This discussion provides some further understanding to those skilled in the art what the boundaries of “indications of primary relationship characteristics” in claim 1 are intended to encompass. We therefore determine claim 1’s “determining a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” is cast in clear terms when read in light of the Specification and is thus definite. Similarly, the phrase “determining a further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” in claim 7 is definite. As explained above, an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand the “set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics” in claim 7 include those “indications” described in the Specification. See, e.g., Spec. 3:8–18. The Specification also explains: [A] method may be provided where a course filter is provided by primary relationship requirements, and the nature of the relationship established between a first and second entity may be further refined by secondary relationship characteristics. Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 13 Those secondary relationship characteristics again form a common language between entities where no common language may previously have existed. Spec. 4:1–6. Thus, when read in light of the disclosure, an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand the recited “determining” phrase to encompass ascertaining a common language between entities/nodes that includes a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics, including those discussed in the Specification. We also agree with Appellant that the recitation of “a further common language” in claim 7 is not indefinite. Appeal Br. 16. The Examiner contends that “no other common language has been determined” in the claim. Final Act. 6. Yet, claim 1, from which claim 7 depends, recites “establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics.” Appeal Br. 19–20 (Claims App.). Also, the disclosure discusses further defining a primary relationship between entities or nodes using indications of secondary relationship characteristics and determining commonality (e.g., “a further common language” as claim 7 recites) between these characteristics. See Spec. 3:28– 36; see Appeal Br. 16–17. Accordingly, an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand claim 7’s “determining a further common language comprising a set of indications of secondary relationship characteristics to further define the generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node” step when read in light of the disclosure. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has persuaded us of error in the rejection of (1) claims 1 and 7, (2) claims 11 and 12, which recite Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 14 commensurate limitations to claim 1, and (3) dependent claims 2–5, 8–10, 14, 15, 17, and 18 for similar reasons. III. Obviousness Over Nevalainen and Seeman Claims 1–5, 7–12, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nevalainen and Seeman. Final Act. 8– 13. Appellant argues the claims as a group (Appeal Br. 8–10), and we select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relied on Nevalainen to teach the “determining,” “assessing,” and “establishing the operational parameters” steps. Final Act. 8–9 (citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 7–19, 50, 60–65, 68, 71–72, Abstract). The Examiner turned to Seeman in combination with Nevalainen, to teach or suggest the “establishing a common language” and “expressing relationship requirements” steps and other “common language” features in claim 1. Id. at 9–11 (citing Seeman ¶¶ 17, 48–71, 98, 100, 209, Fig. 4). Appellant argues that Nevalainen and Seeman do not teach establishing a common language and using the common language to determine whether an overlap between the first and second entity relationship requirements passes a threshold as claim 1 recites. Appeal Br. 8. Appellant asserts Nevalainen does not teach creating a common language and more particularly, using its games, which are mapped to the claimed “format of the material,” to create a common language. Id. Appellant further asserts Seeman does not teach what is purportedly missing from Nevalainen. Id. at 9–10. Specifically, Appellant argues Seeman’s teaching to map terms from different fields to abstract code concepts does not suggest establishing a common language that comprises a set of Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 15 indications of primary relationship characteristics and then using the common language to determine an overlap as recited in clam 1. Id. at 9–10 (citing Seeman ¶¶ 1, 48–71, 97–98, 100, 209, Fig. 4). MAIN ISSUE Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by determining that Nevalainen and Seeman collectively would have taught or suggested “establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics”? ANALYSIS Based on the record before us, we find no error. The Examiner found Nevalainen teaches “determining a set of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between” two nodes but does not teach “establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics” as claim 1 recites. Final Act. 8–9 (citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 7–16, 65, 68). More specifically, Nevalainen teaches mobile terminal devices connected to a wireless communication network. Nevalainen ¶ 7, Fig. 1. Nevalainen further teaches mobile terminal users’ preference data (e.g., indications of primary relationship characteristics, including a format of a material and a technology available to process the material, as recited and as mapped by the Examiner) are compared and those with substantially matching preference data are notified. Id. ¶¶ 7–18; see Final Act. 8–9 (citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 7–16, 68). Appellant has not disputed the Examiner’s mapping to Nevalainen for teaching the recited “determining Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 16 a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between” the nodes in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 8–10. The Examiner indicated that Nevalainen does not teach “establishing a common language comprising the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics” as claim 1 recites, turning to Seeman in combination with Nevalainen to teach or suggest this limitation. Final Act. 9–10. Seeman teaches using taxonomies, including those comprising relationships (Seeman ¶¶ 48, 53), and building knowledge bases, including those that address ontologies, concepts, relationships in general, and relationships to core concepts in human knowledge to enable content in different domains to be adapted (id. ¶ 17). Similar to Nevalainen’s data, these taxonomies containing relationships can be viewed as “set[s] of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship” between nodes as claim 1 recites. See id. ¶¶ 17, 48, 53; see Final Act. 10 (noting “creating taxonomies is comparable to a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics defining a generic relationship between said first network node and said second network node.”). Seeman further teaches using terms (e.g., 24) from content and/or knowledge bases to arrive at core concepts (e.g., 22) or a core terms list. Seeman ¶¶ 97–98. Seeman thus suggests using terms that define relationships (e.g., indicate relationship characteristics) to arrive at concepts or a core terms list. See id. When combining this teaching with Nevalainen, one skilled in the art would have recognized the combination would have predictably yielded no more than “establishing a common language” (e.g., concepts or core terms list) “comprising the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics” (e.g., Nevalainen’s preference data), including Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 17 “a format of a material and a technology available to process the material” as taught by Nevalainen. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Notably, Seeman teaches arriving at its concepts or core terms list using terms from content (e.g., relationships) or knowledge bases. See Seeman ¶¶ 97–98. This teaching at least suggests that the concepts arrived at can include “the set of indications of primary relationship characteristics” as claim 1 recites, especially given claim 1 broadly recites the set is “a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics” and not the relationship characteristics themselves. Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). We therefore disagree with Appellant that Seeman’s teaching, when combined with Nevalainen, fails to at least suggest “a common language is established that comprises a set of indications of primary relationship characteristics that includes a format of a material and a technology available to process the material” as argued. Appeal Br. 8; see id. at 9–10. We further disagree with Appellant that the combination fails to teach “[t]he common language is in turn used to determine whether overlap between first and second entity relationship requirements passes a threshold.” Appeal Br. 8; id. at 8–10. For reasons similar to those discussed above when addressing the “common language” feature, we are not persuaded. For instance, the Examiner relied on the combination of Nevalainen and Seeman to teach accessing whether an overlap between relationship requirements passes a threshold in claim 1. Final Act. 9 (citing Nevalainen ¶¶ 11–19, 50, 72, Figs. 1–2 for disclosing assessing whether an overlap between the relationship requirements passes a threshold), 9–11 (citing Seeman ¶¶ 17, 48–71, 98, 100, 209, Fig. 4 for suggesting establishing Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 18 a common language and a common relationship requirement of the nodes expressed in the common language features of claim 1). When combined, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized the Nevalainen/Seeman method would have predictably yielded no more than “assessing, based on common relationship requirements of said first and second network nodes expressed in said common language, whether overlap between said first network node relationship requirements and said second network node relationship requirements passes a preselected threshold” as claim 1 further recites. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Appellant’s arguments do not fully address what the combination teaches or suggests. Appeal Br. 8–10. Instead, Appellant primarily focuses on the references’ individual teachings (see id.), which is not persuasive. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of independent claim 1 and claims 2–5, 7–12, 17, and 18, which are not argued separately. IV. Obviousness Over Nevalainen, Seeman, and Graham Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nevalainen, Seeman, and Graham. Final Act. 13–14. Appellant argues claims 14 and 15 as a group (Appeal Br. 10–11), and we select claim 14 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claim 14 depends from claim 1 and further recites, in pertinent part, “the method further comprises automatically generating a schedule for a license agreement between the licensee and the licensor.” Appeal Br. 22 (Claims App.). The Examiner relied upon Graham in combination with Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 19 Nevalainen and Seeman to teach or suggest automatically generating a schedule for a license agreement. Final Act. 14 (citing Graham ¶¶ 255, 272, 276, Abstract). Appellant argues Graham only teaches automatically generating a draft license and not a schedule for a license agreement. Appeal Br. 11. ANALYSIS The main issue before us is whether the phrase “automatically generating a schedule for a license agreement between the licensee and the licensor” can broadly, but reasonably map to generating a draft license when considered in light of the disclosure. See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Specification uses the word “schedules” on several occasions. Spec. 10:27, 12:4–6, 12:36, 13:23–25. In the context of a license agreement, the Specification describes “[a] system may be operable to automate generation of physical parameters governing processes that comprise part of execution of a license agreement, for example, manifests or schedules.” Spec. 13:23–25. As such, consistent with the disclosure, “generating a schedule for a license agreement” can broadly, but reasonably include generating parameters that govern processes that comprise part of the license agreement to be executed. See id. Graham teaches generating a draft license from the entered parameters and enables building of an econometric model. Graham ¶ 276. Similar to the Examiner, we agree this teaching in Graham at least suggests generating parameters that govern processes that comprise part of the license agreement to be executed. See Graham ¶ 276; see Ans. 13 (stating “a draft is a plan of Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 20 procedure for a proposed objective (i.e., the draft license is a written proposed plan of procedure for an actual license agreement between the parties)”). For example, an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized a draft license may include terms of the agreements (e.g., parameters), such as contract length (e.g., start and end dates), time schedule or release dates for products, a payment schedule, and exclusivity or territorial restrictions. Based on the foregoing teachings and when combined with Nevalainen and Seeman, the combination would have predictably resulted in claim 14’s limitations and would have been within ordinarily skilled artisan’s knowledge when accounting for the inferences and creative steps that these artisans would have employed. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 14 and claim 15, which recites commensurate limitations. CONCLUSION In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, 18 112, first paragraph Written Description 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, 18 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, 18 112, second paragraph Indefiniteness 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, 18 1–5, 7–12, 17, 18 103(a) Nevalainen, Seeman 1–5, 7–12, 17, 18 14, 15 103(a) Nevalainen, Seeman, Graham 14, 15 Overall Outcome 1–5, 7–12, 14, 15, 17, 18 Appeal 2018-008527 Application 14/416,866 21 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation