Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

May 11, 2001

No. 75530656 (T.T.A.B. May. 11, 2001)

5/11/01 Paper No. 11
CEW
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc.
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Serial No. 75/530,656
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Harold V. Stotland of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson for applicant.
Katherine Stoides, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office
109 (Ronald Sussman, Managing Attorney).
____________
Before Cissel, Walters and Holtzman, Administrative
Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Walters, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc. has filed a trademark
application to register the mark CRESCENT ARCHERY for
“arrowheads.”1 The application includes a disclaimer of the
word ARCHERY apart from the mark as a whole.
The Trademark Examining Attorney has finally refused
registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15
U.S.C. 1052(d), on the ground that applicant’s mark so
resembles the previously registered mark CRESCENT, both in

1 Serial No. 75/530,656, in International Class 28, filed August 4,
1998, based on an allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce.
THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT
CITABLE AS PRECEDENT OF
THE TTAB
Serial No. 75/530,656
2
typed format2 and in the stylized script shown below,3 for
arrowhead blades, hunting knife blades and hobby blades,4
that, if used on or in connection with applicant’s goods, it
would be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.
Applicant has appealed. Both applicant and the
Examining Attorney have filed briefs, but an oral hearing
was not requested. We reverse the refusal to register.
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an
analysis of all of the probative facts in evidence that are
relevant to the factors bearing on the likelihood of
confusion issue. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours and

2 Registration No. 1,767,181, issued April 27, 1993, to Crescent
Manufacturing Company. [Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and
acknowledged, respectively.]
3 Registration No. 1,742,755, issued December 29, 1992, to Crescent
Manufacturing Company. [Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and
acknowledged, respectively.]
4 The cited registrations include the following goods considered
not pertinent by the Examining Attorney: industrial and utility
cutting blades, in International Class 7; medical blades, in
International Class 10; and single edge blades, leather cutting
blades, automotive gasket cutting blades, rubber cutting blades,
twine cutting blades, paper slitting blades, hook blades, food
processing blades, plexiglass scoring blades, textile cutting
blades, adhesive tape cutting blades, roofing blades, potato
Serial No. 75/530,656
3
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). In
considering the evidence of record on these factors, we keep
in mind that “[t]he fundamental inquiry mandated by Section
2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the
essential characteristics of the goods and differences in
the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,
544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976); and In re Azteca
Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999) and
the cases cited therein.
The Examining Attorney contends that applicant’s mark
is “highly similar” to the registered marks. Regarding the
goods, the Examining Attorney contends that that both
applicant’s and registrant’s goods are used by hunters; that
arrowhead blades, hunting blades and hobby blades are all
complementary products, i.e., a hunter “is likely to use
hunting blades and/or hobby blades in addition to his bow
and arrow (for which he must purchase arrowheads)”; that
arrowheads are comprised necessarily of arrowhead blades;
and that consumers familiar with applicant’s arrowheads will
mistakenly assume that registrant’s arrowhead blades are
specifically manufactured for use therewith. Regarding the
channels of trade, the Examining Attorney states that
applicant’s and registrant’s goods “will be offered for sale
in all normal channels of trade, including stores featuring

slicing blades, utility knife blades, pill cutting blades,
Serial No. 75/530,656
4
hunting-related goods, sporting goods section of department
stores, and mail order catalogs featuring hunting-related
goods and accessories.”
Applicant contends that there is no likelihood of
confusion because applicant’s and registrant’s goods are
sold to different customers through different channels of
trade. Applicant states that its arrowheads “are sold at
retail to consumers who want to replace their arrowheads,
while the registrant’s arrowhead blades are sold to
manufacturers of arrowheads … arrowhead manufacturers buy
registrant’s blades and assemble them into arrowheads.”
Applicant concedes there may be uncommon isolated incidences
where arrowhead blades may be found at retail.
Considering, first, the marks, the question is whether
applicant’s mark and the registered marks, when viewed in
their entireties, are similar in terms of appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. The test is not
whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a
side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are
sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial
impressions that confusion as to the source of the goods or
services offered under the respective marks is likely to
result. The focus is on the recollection of the average
purchaser, who normally retains a general rather than a

linoleum cutting blades, in International Class 8.
Serial No. 75/530,656
5
specific impression of trademarks. See Sealed Air Corp. v.
Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975). Furthermore,
although the marks at issue must be considered in their
entireties, it is well settled that one feature of a mark
may be more significant than another, and it is not improper
to give more weight to this dominant feature in determining
the commercial impression created by the mark. See In re
National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
The term CRESCENT is clearly the dominant portion of
applicant’s mark, CRESCENT ARCHERY. Not only is it the
first word in the mark, but there is no question that the
additional word ARCHERY is merely descriptive in connection
with arrowheads. The dominant portion of applicant’s mark
is identical to both of registrant’s CRESCENT marks. The
stylization of the word in Registration No. 1,742,755 is
minimal and the initial “C” is shaped like a crescent moon,
which merely reinforces the word portion of the mark. Thus,
not only are applicant’s mark and registrant’s marks similar
in terms of sight, sound and connotation, they have
substantially similar overall commercial impressions.
Turning to consider the goods involved in this case, we
note that neither the Examining Attorney nor applicant has
submitted any evidence in support of their respective
positions regarding the goods. Both the Examining Attorney
Serial No. 75/530,656
6
and applicant have made unsupported statements about the
nature of the purchasers, the relatedness of goods and the
channels of trade for the respective goods. However, it is
the Examining Attorney’s burden to establish a prima facie
case in support of her refusal to register on the ground of
likelihood of confusion. Thus, we find that the Examining
Attorney has not established any facts regarding the nature
or relatedness of the goods, or the nature of the purchasers
and channels of trade of the respective goods.
Therefore, despite the substantial similarity in the
commercial impressions of applicant’s mark, CRESCENT
ARCHERY, and registrant’s CRESCENT marks, due to the total
lack of evidence regarding the goods involved in this case,
we conclude that the Examining Attorney has not established
that the contemporaneous use of the marks herein is likely
to cause confusion as to the source or sponsorship of such
goods.
Decision: The refusal under Section 2(d) of the Act is
reversed.