Matthew M.I. Romaine et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 4, 2019

14054292 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/054,292 10/15/2013 Matthew M.I. Romaine 141105-200301/US 3061
64494 7590 11/04/2019
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP (SV)
c/o: Greenberg Traurig LLP - Chicago Office
77 West Wacker Drive, Suite 3100
Intellectual Property Department
Chicago, IL 60601
EXAMINER
WAESCO, JOSEPH M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cadanoc@gtlaw.com
clairt@gtlaw.com
gtipmail@gtlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATTHEW M.I. ROMAINE and MATTHEW JAMES SKYRM
Appeal 2018-008703
Application 14/054,292
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–7, 11–15, 19 and 20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Gengo, Inc. Appeal
Br. 3.
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Application 14/054,292
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims “relate to systems and methods configured to accept out-
sourced jobs from customers, present the jobs to workers, accept completed
job output, and allow job output retrieval by customers.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
collecting, in a computing apparatus, data about past
works of transforming, by workers, text-based
content, the data including:
information about the workers performing the past
works, and ratings of work outputs provided
by the workers performing the past works;
determining, by the computing apparatus using the
information about the workers performing the past
works, capacity of the workers;
receiving, in the computing apparatus from customers,
current works of transforming text-based content;
presenting, by the computing apparatus, one or more
multiple-choice questions to the customers for the
current works;
receiving, in the computing apparatus from the customers,
answers to the one or more questions for the current
works;
computing, by the computing apparatus, a set of
expectation metrics for the current works based on
the answers for the current works;
assigning, by the computing apparatus, the current works
to selected ones of the workers; and
automating, by the computing apparatus during
performance of the current works by the selected
ones of the workers, quality assurance check for the
current works, including:
controlling, by the computing apparatus, the performance
of the current works by the selected ones of the
workers, by:
for a text of each of the current works, generating
first tasks of transforming portions of the text
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and second tasks of evaluating results of
transforming the portions of the text;
presenting the first tasks and second tasks to the
workers in an order according to a just-in-
time and best-in-time scheme; and
assembling results of the first tasks and second tasks
for transforming the text as a whole;
monitoring current outputs for the current works generated
by the selected ones of the workers during the
performance of the current works controlled by the
computing apparatus;
computing indicators of completeness of the current
outputs for the current works;
evaluating expectation indices of the current works based
at least in part on the indicators of completeness of
the current outputs for the current works, wherein
each expectation index of a particular work in the
expectation indices representing a ratio of quality
metrics met by a current state of performing the
particular works and respective quality metrics
specified in the expectation metrics; and
iteratively assigning the current works to alternative
workers to raise, above a predetermined threshold,
the expectation indices of the current works for
termination; and
performing, by the computing apparatus, work time limit
management for the current works by:
determining, by the computing apparatus and based
on an indicator of the completeness of work
outputs of a worker who is currently assigned
to work on one of the current works, how
close the worker is to finishing the one of the
current works that the worker is currently
assigned to work on; and
in response to a determination that the indicator
suggests that the work is close to finishing,
automatically providing, by the computing
apparatus, the worker with an option to
request an extension of a work time limit
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without a need to have a staff to manually
adjust the work time limit for the worker.
REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 1–7, 11–15, and 19–20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because the claimed invention is directed to ineligible subject matter
in the form of abstract ideas.
OPINION
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
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mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
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claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate
that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the
claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
Step 2A Prong One
The Appellant essentially argues all claims together as a group, by
directing all argument to claim 1. See generally Appeal Br. 5–10, Reply
Br. 2–8. We select claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R. §
41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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The Examiner finds claim 1 is directed to “collecting information,
analyzing the collected information, and transmitting the analyzed and
collected information,” similar to the claims in “Electric Power Group.”
Final Act. 5.
Under Prong One of Revised Step 2A of the Guidance, we determine
that claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas.
Claim 1 recites a method that performs steps which involve
“collecting . . .data,” “determining . . . capacity of the workers,”
“receiving . . . from customers, current works of transforming text-based
content,” “presenting . . . one or more multiple-choice questions,”
“receiving . . . answers to the one or more questions,” “computing . . . a set
of expectation metrics,” “assigning . . . the current works to selected ones of
the workers,” “[performing] quality assurance check[s] for the current
works, including: controlling . . . performance . . . by: . . . generating [] tasks
. . . ; presenting the [] tasks . . . to the workers in an order according to a just-
in-time and best-in-time scheme; and assembling results of the [] tasks,”
“monitoring current outputs,” “computing indicators of completeness,”
“evaluating expectation indices of the current works,” “iteratively assigning
the current works to alternative workers,” “performing . . . work time limit
management for the current works by: determining . . . how close the
worker is to finishing the one of the current works, and . . . “providing . . .
the worker with an option to request an extension of a work time limit.”
The claim thus establishes a method to control work assignments to
workers. This is a method of “managing relationships or transactions
between people,” “managing human behavior,” and “tracking or organizing
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information,” which are “certain methods of organizing human activity.”
Guidance, 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(A), (C), and (D).
In addition, the steps of claim 1 involve “determining,”
“computing . . . metrics,” “assigning . . . works,” “generating . . . tasks,”
“assembling results,” “monitoring current outputs,” “computing indicators,”
and “evaluating,” which are all processes that can be performed in the
human mind through “observation, evaluation, judgment, [and] opinion.”
Guidance, 52.
Because claim 1 utilizes steps that can be performed through mental
thought, and steps to organize human activity, to “quantify job output
expectations,” “compute indictors of completeness,” and “optimize job
pickup and output submission,” claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas for
managing human activity and performing mental processes. Spec. ¶¶ 10–11.
Step 2A Prong Two
Under Prong Two of Revised Step 2A of the Guidance, we “evaluate
whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a
practical application of the exception.” Guidance, 54.
Here, claim 1 recites steps that collect, receive, and present
information. These are data gathering and output steps that are considered
insignificant extra-solution activity. Guidance, 55; see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(g). The method does not improve the underlying “computing
apparatus” recited as performing the limitations of claim 1, because any
unmodified general-purpose computer can be used to execute the claimed
method. See Spec. ¶¶ 158–74. For example, “the techniques are limited
neither to any specific combination of hardware circuitry and software, nor
to any particular source for the instructions executed by the data processing
system.” Spec. ¶ 170. In addition, the method is directed to optimizing job
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pickup and output submission (Spec. ¶ 11), and as such the claimed method
does not improve another technology. MPEP § 2106.05(a). Because a
particular computer is not required, the claim also does not define or rely on
a “particular machine.” MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the method does not
transform matter. MPEP § § 2106.05(c). Instead, the claim collects,
evaluates, monitors, assigns, and presents data. As such, the method has no
other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and thus merely recites
instructions to execute the abstract idea on a computer (MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
Under Prong Two, claim 1 does not integrate the abstract ideas into a
practical application.
Step 2b
Under Step 2B of the Guidance, we consider “whether an additional
element or combination of elements . . . [a]dds a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive
concept may be present; or simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Guidance, 56.
The “additional element” of claim 1 is the “computing apparatus,”
because every other recited limitation, including the nature of the data
collected, received, presented, determined, generated, and assigned, is part
of the abstract idea itself. The computing apparatus collects, receives, and
presents data, and makes determinations, computes metrics, evaluates and
monitors data, and generates tasks.2 The operations of storing, analyzing,
receiving, and writing data are primitive computer operations found in any

2 The Specification does not describe how to “generate . . . tasks.” See
Appeal Br. 2–3.
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computer system. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig.,
639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower
construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed
below, those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer
without special programming.”). Also see Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that
considering claims reciting data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission as an “ordered combination” reveals that they
“amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply [an]
abstract idea” using generic computer technology).
The additional element of claim 1 is thus well-understood, routine,
and conventional, as well as the combination of data operations for
receiving, evaluating, generating, and presenting data recited in claim 1.
Under Step 2B, we do not discern “something more” to transform the
abstract ideas into eligible subject matter.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s assertions that the claim is
“directed to a novel computer server that can drive to completion, in an
unconventional way, the performance of the work in transforming a text
(e.g., translation).” Appeal Br. 6. As noted above, the “computing
apparatus” of claim 1 is met by a general-purpose computer, and the steps it
performs are routine data operations, so there is nothing “novel” or
“unconventional” in a computer that receives, evaluates, generates, and
presents data.
The Appellant also argues the claimed method is “not found in the
prior art,” and thus “is significantly more than implementing a well-known,
conventional process in a computer.” Appeal Br. 7; see also Reply Br. 6. A
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novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s assertion that the method of
claim 1 “perform[s] a function that is not previously performable by a
computer,” and that a “generic computer and known processes in the prior
art are not sufficient.” Appeal Br. 7. The Appellant does not explain, and
we do not discern, why a generic computer could not have performed the
steps of the method to receive, evaluation, generate, and present data.
The Appellant argues, variously, that the Examiner “failed to provide
a factual determination that the process to drive to the completion of text
transformation in a way as recited in the pending claims is well-understood,
routine, and conventional.” Appeal Br. 10; see also id. 7–10. This is
essentially an argument that if the abstract idea is not novel, and is in fact
not well-understood, routine, and conventional, it is not abstract. But, a
novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
The Appellant has thus not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claim as directed to abstract ideas. Thus, we sustain the rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–7, 11–15, 19 and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–7, 11–15,
19 and 20
101 Abstract 1–7, 11–
15, 19 and
20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED