Matthew Mataele, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 27, 2001
01986775 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 27, 2001)

01986775

07-27-2001

Matthew Mataele, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Matthew Mataele v. U.S. Postal Service

01986775

July 27, 2001

.

Matthew Mataele,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01986775

Agency No. 1E-841-1025-96

Hearing No. 350-97-8232X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleges he was discriminated against

on the bases of race (Asian/Pacific Islander), retaliation (prior

EEO activity) national origin (Tongan)<1> and disability (learning

disability) when he was not selected to be a 204(b) supervisor.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

The record reveals that complainant, a Mailhandler PS-4, at the agency's

Processing and Distribution Center in Salt Lake City Utah, filed a

formal EEO complaint with the agency on August 16,1996, alleging that

the agency had discriminated against him as referenced above.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the

investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (AJ). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no

discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of

race and national origin discrimination because the selectees for the

position of 204B supervisor, were not members of his protected classes.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely that the complainant

had disciplinary problems resulting in the termination of his employment

in the past and had some attendance problems related to his lunch hours.

As a result, he did not meet the standards for becoming a supervisor

which required that he have good attendance and an exemplary record.

The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely than

not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful

discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that the

complainant did not dispute the agency's assessments of his behavioral

problems or that he had attendance problems.

On the issue of the complainant's disability, the AJ concluded that he

was not an individual with a disability because he failed to prove that

his learning disability substantially limited a major life activity.

Therefore, he was not covered by the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.

The agency's final decision adopted the AJ's decision.

On appeal, the complainant contends that he was not given a chance to

rebut the agency's argument that he was a disciplinary problem and that,

in any event, his past disciplinary problem was resolved long ago.

He further claimed that the agency's contention that it could not promote

him to a 204B supervisor because he was a regular mail-handler and had to

be paid out of schedule was not credible because others who had the same

status but were all Caucasian, had been promoted. The complainant also

claimed that national origin discrimination was proven by a manager's

testimony that he was not promoted primarily because of a language

barrier.

Regarding his disability, the complainant claimed that his attendance

problems were caused by his learning disability which the agency failed

to accommodate. He further stated that the AJ erred in relying on his

wife's testimony that his disability did not substantially limit any major

life activity because she was not competent to give an opinion. Therefore,

the AJ's conclusion that he was not an individual with a disability was

an error of law.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As an initial matter, the agency claims that the complainant's appeal

was untimely filed because the complainant received the final decision

on August 13, 1998 and did not file his appeal until September 15, 1998.

Our review of the record indicates the appeal was postmarked September

11, 1998 and is therefore, timely filed.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision was based on substantial evidence in the record, and the

Commission finds no reason to disturb her findings. We further note

that complainant knew that the agency had asserted he was not selected

for a 204B supervisor position because of his past disciplinary problems

because it was clearly stated in the selecting official's statement.

Even with this knowledge, he failed to present evidence at the hearing to

support his contention that others who were promoted also had disciplinary

problems. Therefore, we reject the complainant's contention that he was

not given an opportunity to present that evidence and that it should be

considered for the first time on appeal.

On the issue of the complainant's disability, we will assume for the

purpose of this decision that the complainant was an individual with a

disability in order to determine whether he was treated less favorably

because of his condition. Based on the record before us, there was no

evidence presented that the complainant's rejection for a detail to 204B

supervisor was based on his disability. Therefore, we conclude that

the AJ's decision was correct and that there was no discrimination on

this basis. We observed that the complainant's assertion he was denied a

reasonable accommodation for his learning disability was raised for the

first time on appeal. The complainant cannot claim, however, that an

error was committed at the hearing below concerning an issue that was

never raised and on which no evidence was presented. Therefore, for

this reason, we decline to address the issue of reasonable accommodation.

We further affirm the AJ's finding that the complainant failed to

establish that any of the agency's actions were in retaliation for

complainant's prior EEO activity. The AJ found that the complainant

failed to refute the agency's reasons for not selecting him for a detail

to a 204B position and he, therefore, failed to demonstrate that there

was a nexus between his prior protected activity and agency's decision.

On this claim, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's

final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If

you file a

request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action

will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 27, 2001

Date

1The administrative judge's recommended decision indicated that national

origin was a basis for the complaint although it was not originally

stated in the complaint or the EEO counselor's report.