MasterCard International Incorporated

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 16, 2020

14496572 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/496,572 09/25/2014 Debashis Ghosh P01594-US-UTIL 4007
98665 7590 03/16/2020
Otterstedt, Wallace & Kammer, LLP
P.O. Box 381
Cos Cob, CT 06807
EXAMINER
KAZIMI, HANI M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/16/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEBASHIS GHOSH
Appeal 2019-000487
Application 14/496,572
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHN A. EVANS, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–18, 20, 21, 23, and 24. (Final
Act. 1.) The claims 19 and 22 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
MasterCard International Incorporated. (Appeal Br. 3.)
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an apparatus, method, and computer
program product for extracting insights from bill presentment data to
determine credit worthiness and payment propensity of customers. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising the steps of:

obtaining access to a database of bill presentment data in
an electronic bill presentment system connecting a plurality of
customers with a plurality of billers, at least some of said billers
comprising payment card issuers;

extracting from said database of bill presentment data at
least one presentment record for at least one of said customers,
said at least one presentment record for said at least one of said
customers comprising a presentment record for a bill of a credit
card, said credit card having been issued to said at least one of
said customers by one of said payment card issuers; and

determining, based on said at least one presentment
record for said at least one of said customers, at least one of
credit worthiness of said at least one of said customers and
payment propensity of said at least one of said customers.
Appeal Br. 35 (Claims App., emphasis added).
REJECTION2
Claims 1–18, 20, 21, 23, and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (abstract
idea) without significantly more.

2 The Examiner withdrew the obviousness rejection. (Ans. 3.)
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OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Legal Principles
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
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(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
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“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised
guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019
Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50 (“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.

See Memorandum.
B. The Examiner’s Conclusions and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain methods of
organizing human activity. Final Act. 3; Ans. 5 (“an abstract idea of
extracting data to determine customer creditworthiness and payment
history”). The Examiner also determines the present claims do not amount
to significantly more than an abstract idea itself because the abstract idea is
implemented using additional elements that are well-understood, routine,
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and conventional. (Final Act. 4 (“generic recitation of a processor
performing its generic computer functions [see page 8, portable payment
devices 102, 112, 142 and processor 130 of specification for generic
computer functions] of obtaining access to a database of bill presentment
data in an electronic bill presentment system;”) Ans. 5 (“generic computer
components (see para [0117-0124] of the specification) are claimed to
perform their basic functions of obtaining access to a database, extracting
bill data from database and determining credit worthiness of a customer.”
[Citing to the description of a Figure 5 in published application
2016/0092981 A1, published March 31, 2016 corresponding to pages 30–34
of the original Specification])).
Appellant contends the Examiner does not establish a prima facie case
of subject matter ineligibility because the Examiner fails to identify clearly
the abstract idea and oversimplifies the claim. (Appeal Br. 8–19; Reply
Br. 2–3.) Appellant also contends the Examiner's analysis has improperly
oversimplified the claims instead of considering them as a whole. (Appeal
Br. 9; Reply Br. 3.)
Appellant argues “Embodiments of the claimed invention have
concrete and tangible applications and represent significant improvements to
technologies in the marketplace.” (Appeal Br. 17; Reply Br. 9.) The
remainder of Appellant’s arguments regarding the alleged “improvements”
are merely quotations from cases and the MPEP without any substantive
argument regarding the specific claimed “improvement” in the claimed
invention.
Appellant further argues the present claims are necessarily rooted in
technology to solve problems specifically arising in the realm of technology
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because in situations when a transaction decision process is taking too long,
this problem is solved by modifying a computer system instead of hiring
more human reviewers. (Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 13) (citing DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
Additionally, Appellant argues the present claims provides an
unconventional technical solution and cite to the Specification at page 22,
which provides an unclaimed “example,” and Appellant provides a list of
additional citations to the Specification without specific argument thereto.
(Appeal Br 15; Reply Br. 14.) Appellant does not specifically identify any
additional elements, such as, “database of bill presentment data,” “electronic
bill presentment system,” “memory,” “processor,” or “persistent storage
device” that would be “significantly more” than the abstract idea. (Appeal
Br. 14–19; Reply Br. 7–21.)
Appellant further recites cases for the proposition that the Examiner
should provide clear and convincing evidence to support the finding that the
additional elements implementing the abstract idea are well-understood,
routine, and conventional, but does not provide any specific argument that
the Examiner has not performed the required findings. (Appeal Br. 14–19;
Reply Br. 7–21 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018); Reply Br. 18.)) We disagree with any implied argument by
Appellant regarding a lack of evidence and find that the Examiner provided
citation to the Specification citing only generic computer components in the
disclosed invention. (Ans. 5.)
C. Discussion
1. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is
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reviewable de novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012). We, therefore, conclude the emphasized portions of claim
1, reproduced above (see supra at 2), recite commercial interactions
including sales activities or business relations because claim 13 requires bill
presentment data and extracting data for determining customer
creditworthiness and payment history to determine credit worthiness or
payment propensity of customers. According to the Memorandum,
commercial interactions including sales activities or business relations fall
into the category of certain methods of organizing human activity. See
Memorandum. Moreover, those certain methods of organizing human
activity are a type of an abstract idea. See id.; see also Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (verifying payment information, as well as “financial transactions . . .
and data collection related to such transactions” “are directed to an abstract
idea under Alice step one.”); buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1352–54 (Claims
reciting sending and receiving communications over a computer network to
facilitate online commercial transactions are directed to “contractual
relations, which are intangible entities” and “constitute[] ‘a fundamental

3 Claim 1, reproduced above with emphases, recites similar features as
independent claims 18 and 20. Appellant does not argue claims 2–13, 15,
16, 18,20, 21, 23, and 24 separately, but asserts the § 101 rejection of those
claims should be withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for
independent claim 1. (Appeal Br. 8–21.) We, therefore, group claims 1–13,
15, 16, 18,20, 21, 23, and 24 together and separately address Appellant's
arguments to dependent claims 14 and 17.
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economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’”).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims
recite an “abstract idea of extracting data for determining customer
creditworthiness and payment history is similar to cases found by the courts
to be abstract idea” and “a generically computer-implemented solution to a
business-related or economic problem” and the present claims recite certain
methods of organizing human activity. (Final Act. 3–4, 6; Ans. 6.)
Because the present claims recite commercial interactions including
sales activities or business relations that fall into the category of certain
methods of organizing human activity (i.e., an abstract idea), we proceed to
prong 2.
2. Step 2A, Prong 2
The claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing
the abstract idea. In particular, we disagree with Appellant’s argument that,
similar to Enfish, the present claims recite an improvement in computer-
related technology.4 (Appeal Br. 14–16; Reply Br. 9–13.)
The first step of obtaining access to a database in the first step of the
method is merely insignificant extra-solution activity that could be
performed alternatively by a person. Therefore, under the broadest
reasonable interpretation, the claim starts the process that only requires
acquiring data which is insignificant extra-solution activity.
Appellant does not identify persuasively how the Specification sets
forth an improvement in technology. The USPTO October 2019 Patent

4 Enfish, LLC v Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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Eligibility Guidance Update (“Update”, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df), addresses how we consider any evidence that is presented to us. The
Update states:
During examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Update at 13 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
In this case, the Examiner concludes the present claims do not recite
an improvement to technology. (Final Act. 5; Ans. 5–6.) Consequently, we
focus on any evidence Appellant cites pursuant to the Update. Here,
Appellant cites pages 1, 12, 13–15, 26, 34 of the Specification as evidence,
but we find these discussions unpersuasive of an improvement to a
technology. (Appeal Br. 13–16; Reply Br. 14.) Therefore, the arguments in
the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief citing to Enfish are merely attorney
argument unsupported by evidence. (Appeal Br. 13–16; Reply Br. 14.)
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Even if the arguments were not attorney argument unsupported by
evidence, which they are, the present claims recite broad limitations such as
“at least one presentment record” (emphasis added) and “at least one of said
customers,” (emphasis added). Because the broadest reasonable
construction of limitations such as “at least one presentment record”
(emphasis added) and “at least one of said customers,” (emphasis added) is
one of each, we disagree with Appellant’s argument that there is an
improvement in computer-related technology due to the limited amount of
data required in the claimed invention. (Appeal Br. 13–16; Reply Br. 14.)
In addition, in Enfish, the Federal Circuit considered how the present
invention was superior to the technology in the prior art. That is, the court
considered “the specification’s emphasis that ‘the present invention
comprises a flexible, self-referential table that stores data,’” “[t]he
specification also teaches that the self-referential table functions differently
than conventional database structures,” and “traditional databases, such as
‘those that follow the relational model and those that follow the object
oriented model[,]’ are inferior to the claimed invention.” Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d at 1337 (citations omitted). Moreover, in Enfish,
“‘[t]he structural requirements of current databases require a programmer to
predefine a structure and subsequent [data] entry must conform to that
structure,’ [and] the ‘database of the present invention does not require a
programmer to preconfigure a structure to which a user must adapt data
entry.’” Id. Based on the foregoing, the court determined the claims
“achieve[d] other benefits over conventional databases, such as increased
flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements.” Id.
Unlike the claims of Enfish, the present claims do not recite an improvement
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in computer-related technology.
Instead, the present claims recite an abstract idea as discussed supra,
or at best, improving an abstract idea—not a technological improvement.
The Specification indicates the additional elements (i.e., “database,” “an
electronic bill presentment system,” “memory,” “processor,” “persistent
storage device”) recited in the present claims are merely generic computer
components used to implement the abstract idea. (Spec. 1, 12, 13–15, 26,
34.)5 Further, the generic computer components, individually and in
combination, do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application. (See Spec.4:8 section “Payment Devices and Associated
Payment Processing Networks,” Spec.4:21–26 “For the avoidance of doubt,
references to MasterCard, unless expressly stated to 10 be limited to
MasterCard, are intended to be exemplary of an operator of an electronic
BPPS and/or an operator of a payment card network, as will be appreciated
from the context, whether or not qualified by words such as “or other
operator.” Spec.12:9–12; “Furthermore, another non-limiting example of an
electronic BPPS with which one or more embodiments of the invention can
be employed is the CHECKFREE® platform available from Fiserv, Inc. of
Brookfield, Wisconsin, USA.” Spec. 11:9–15; Section “System and Article
of Manufacture Details,” Spec. 30–34 disclose generic hardware and
commercially available software to carry out the disclosed invention.)
Additionally, “a claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”

5 We leave it to the Examiner in any further prosecution on the merits to
further evaluate the corresponding structure, acts, or materials for the
claimed “means” limitations of independent claim 20 and if the claim is
sufficiently definite.
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Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (emphasis added). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim
directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or
abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive
concept necessary for patent eligibility.” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial
L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
We further disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to DDR
Holdings, the present claims are necessarily rooted in technology to solve
problems specifically arising in the realm of technology because claims
require “a database of bill presentment data in an electronic bill presentment
system connecting a plurality of customers with a plurality of billers, at least
some of said billers comprising payment card issuers.” (Appeal Br. 15.)
The subject claim considered by the DDR court pertained to clicking on an
advertisement for a third-party product displayed on a host’s website, the
visitor is no longer being transported to the third party’s website. DDR
Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. In DDR, instead of losing visitors to the third-
party’s website, the host website can send its visitors to a web page on an
outsource provider’s server that (1) incorporates “look and feel” elements
from the host website and (2) provides visitors with the opportunity to
purchase products from the third-party merchant without actually entering
that merchant’s website. Id. at 1257–58. In contrast to the claims of DDR,
the present claims do not recite incorporating “look and feel elements” from
a host website and providing visitors with the opportunity to purchase
products from a third-party merchant without actually entering the
merchant’s website.
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We further disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to
Amdocs,6 the present claims provides an unconventional technical solution
by utilizing “a database of bill presentment data in an electronic bill
presentment system connecting a plurality of customers with a plurality of
billers, at least some of said billers comprising payment card issuers” that
results in elements combined in an unconventional manner. (Appeal Br. 15.)
The subject claim considered by the Amdocs court related to distributed
architecture that led to load distribution, which was an advantage over the
prior art because it made it easier to keep up with record flows, allow for
smaller databases, and minimize impact on network and system resources.
Amdocs (Israel) Ltd., 841 F.3d at 1303. Additionally, the court construed
the claimed “enhance” to mean “to apply a number of field enhancements in
a distrusted fashion.” Id. at 1292, 1300. In contrast to the claims of
Amdocs, the present claims do not pertain to field enhancement in a
distributed network.
Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to step 2A,
prong 2. Because the present claims recite an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
3. Step 2B
We agree with the Examiner’s determination that the additional
elements implementing the abstract idea are well-understood, routine, and
conventional. (Final Act. 4–6; Ans. 5 (citing Spec. 8).) The Specification
supports the Examiner’s determination in this regard because the
Specification indicates the additional elements (i.e., “database,” “an

6 Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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electronic bill presentment system,” “memory,” “processor,” “persistent
storage device”) recited in the present claims are merely generic computer
components used to implement the abstract idea. (Spec. 1, 12, 13–15, 26,
34.) Appellant’s Specification indicates these additional elements were
well-understood, routine, and conventional components because it describes
them at a high level of generality and in a manner that indicates that they
were sufficiently well-known. Id. Moreover, the additional elements recited
in the present claims, analyzed individually or in combination, do not result
in the claims, as a whole, amounting to significantly more than the judicial
exception.
In addition, the Examiner identifies additional elements including “a
generic recitation of a processor performing its generic computer functions.”
(Final Act. 4.) Claim 1 does not even recite any additional element of a
“processor” (dependent claim 17 recites “hardware processor” (Claim App.,
Appeal Br. 41)), but does set forth a “database.” Therefore, Appellant’s
argument that the Examiner does not identify any additional elements is
unavailing because no additional elements are recited in the language of
independent claim 1.
We also disagree with Appellant’s argument that, similar to
Berkheimer, the Examiner fails to provide clear and convincing evidence to
support the finding that the additional elements implementing the abstract
idea are well-understood, routine, and conventional. (Reply Br. 18–19.)
Indeed, as noted above, the Examiner provides citations to portions of the
Specification to support this finding. (Ans. 5.) Furthermore, the Examiner
cites to the Specification (Ans. 5 (citing Spec. 30–34 disclose generic
hardware and commercially available software to carry out the disclosed
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invention)) and the Specification supports the Examiner’s determination in
this regard because it explains that the additional elements are generic
computer components.
Appellant does not argue dependent claims 2–13, 15, 16, 23 and 24
separately, but asserts the § 101 rejection of those claims should be
withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for independent claim 1.
(Appeal Br. 8.) Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of:
(1) independent claims 1, 18, 20, and 21; and (2) dependent claims 2–13, 15,
16, 23 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claims 14 and 17
With respect to claims 14 and 17, Appellant additionally “submits that
the additional limitations recited in claims 14 and 17 are not ‘simply steps
performed by a generic computer.’ For example, claim 14 specifies that the
steps recited in claim 1 are carried out by an operator of said electronic bill
presentment system.” (Reply Br. 22 (emphasis added).) We note that the
“operator” is merely a corporate entity. We find Appellant’s argument to be
unpersuasive to show an improvement to another technology and the
additional limitation of an operator of the system does not evidence
“significantly more” than the abstract idea. Appellant’s reliance on page 7
of the Specification merely evidences a broad interpretation of the claim
language because “elements or components can combine or ‘mix and match’
one or more features.” (Spec. 7:13–14.) Appellant further identifies pages
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9–11 of the Specification which additionally identifies that “MasterCard,” a
single corporate entity, “operate both a payment card network and an
electronic bill presentment and payment system.” (Spec. 11:21–22.) But,
Appellant does not show the additional element evidences “significantly
more” than the abstract idea.
DECISION
The Examiner’s obviousness rejection is affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–18, 20,
21, 23, 24 101 Eligibility
1–18, 20,
21, 23, 24
FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED