Martin, Douglas Raymond. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 6, 2019

13553442 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 6, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/553,442 07/19/2012 Douglas Raymond Martin 83191968 5361
28395 7590 12/06/2019
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
BERHANU, SAMUEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2859
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/06/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DOUGLAS RAYMOND MARTIN and
ERICK MICHAEL LAVOIE
____________

Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442
Technology Center 2800
____________
Before CATHERINE Q. TIMM, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and
DEBRA L. DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
DENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1

1 In our Decision, we refer to the Specification (“Spec.”) of Application No.
13/553,442 the filed July 19, 2012 (“’422 App”); the Final Office Action
dated Nov. 3, 2017 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed Apr. 5, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer dated July 27, 2018 (“Ans.”); and
the Reply Brief filed Sept. 25. 23, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–17 of Application 13/553,442, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application.3 We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The subject matter of the invention relates to recharging of vehicle
batteries and methods therefore. Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below from
the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, represents the claimed subject
matter:
1. A vehicle comprising:
a battery;
a charge plate having an associated secondary coil
electrically connected with the battery;
a sensor, separate from the secondary coil, configured to
output a detection signal in response to an object being in a
vicinity of the charge plate; and
at least one controller configured to cause an association
signal to be repeatedly wirelessly transmitted during a battery
charge procedure to maintain authentication such that charging
of the battery via the charge plate is maintained, and in response
to receiving the detection signal, to cause the wireless
transmission of the association signal to be interrupted such that
charging of the battery is stopped.

2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
3 Appellant incorrectly identifies the pending claims as 11–17 on the first
page of the Appeal Brief, but subsequently argues for patentability of claims
1–17. Appeal Br. 1, 2, and 7.
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

3
Appeal Br. (Claims App.) 1.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Melocik et al.
(“Melocik”)
US 4,496,896 Jan. 29, 1985
Odachi et al.
(“Odachi”)
US 5,617,003 Apr. 1, 1997
Watanabe US 2010/0001687 A1 Jan. 7, 2010
Wechlin et al.
(“Wechlin”)
US 2012/0187757 A1 July 26, 2012
Obayashi et al.
(“Obayashi”)
US 2012/0200151 A1 Aug. 9, 2012
Dibben et al.
(“Dibben”)
WO 2009/081115 A1 July 2, 2009
REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections of the claims under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a)4:
A. Claims 1, 10, and 14 over Melocik in view of Watanabe,
Obayashi, and Odachi;
B. Claims 2–9 and 11–13 over Melocik in view of Wechlin,
Watanabe, Odachi, Obayashi, and Dibben; and
C. Claims 14–17 over Melocik in view of Wechlin, Watanabe,
Odachi, Obayashi, and Dibben.5

4 Because this application was filed before the March 16, 2013, effective
date of the America Invents Act, we refer to the pre-AIA version of the
statute.
5 The Examiner did not provide a complete statement of rejection for claims
14–17, as was made for the first two rejections. However, the error was
harmless, as the Examiner addressed the rejection of claims 14–17
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

4
Final Act. 3–9.
OPINION
Obviousness rejection of claims 1, 10, and 14
Appellant argues claims 1, 10, and 14 as a group. Appeal Br. 2–7.
We identify claim 1 as representative of the group. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claims 10 and 14 stand or fall with claim 1.
The Examiner finds that Melocik discloses a vehicle comprising a
battery (16), a charge plate (ferromagnetic station bumper 18) having an
associated secondary coil (coil 28) electrically connected with the battery, a
sensor (charge sensor 88) separate from the secondary coil, and at least one
controller (modulator/demodulator 90). Final Act. 4 (citing Melocik Fig. 5;
2:55; 2:60–61, 3:5–7). Figure 5 of Melocik is reproduced below:

specifically in stating, “As to Claims 14–17, the method merely recites the
steps of using the elements of the device as disclosed above and since each
element must be present to perform the steps, the method as claimed would
be inherent in view of the device as disclosed by Dibben and Wechilin
[sic].” Final Act. 9.
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

5
Figure 5 is a block diagram of an embodiment of Melocik’s invention.
Melocik 2:39–40. The vehicle (right side of diagram) includes battery (16)
and vehicle bumper (18). Id. 2:55–57. The charging station (left side of
diagram) has a ferromagnetic station bumper (20) attached to a station
surface. Id. 2:60–62. Vehicle bumper (18) includes second (28) and fourth
(82) wire coils. Id. 2:62–64; 3:5–6; 5:22–24. Vehicle bumper (18) and
station bumper (20) form respective magnetic flux path elements for the
coils. Id. 2:66–67; 3:8–10; 5:27–29. The various modulated signals
delivered to fourth coil (82) are, in response to the vehicle being positioned
at the predetermined location, inductively coupled to third coil (80) by
ferromagnetic bumpers (18, 20). Id. 6:8–12.
The Examiner finds that Watanabe discloses a control module (power-
source-side battery charge monitoring device 22) configured to cause an
association signal to be repeatedly transmitted during a battery charge
procedure to maintain authentication such that charging the battery via the
charge plate is maintained. Final Act. 5 (citing Watanabe Fig. 3; ¶¶ 71, 78,
83); Ans. 2. The Examiner further finds that Watanabe discloses the control
module causes transmission of the association signal to be interrupted such
that charging of the battery is stopped. Final Act. 5 (citing Watanabe Fig. 3;
¶¶ 71, 78, 83). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to
a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the
invention to have modified Melocik’s charge control apparatus to send
vehicle ID information continuously during charging, as taught by
Watanabe, in order to avoid vehicle theft from occurring during vehicle
charging and effectively extend vehicle battery life. Id.
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

6
The Examiner finds that Obayashi discloses foreign object detection
sensors and a control device that detects presence of foreign object, wherein
the sensors are separated from the coil. Id. (citing Obayashi Fig. 2; ¶¶ 70,
92). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to a POSITA
to have used Obayashi’s sensors in Melocik’s apparatus as modified by
Watanabe because the resulting apparatus would be “capable of reducing
[an] effect from an electromagnetic field on a human body, an animal, or the
like at the time of performing a non-contact charging for a vehicle.” Id. at 6.
The Examiner finds that Melocik’s two-way communication is
performed wirelessly. Ans. 4–5 (citing Melocik Abstract, Figs. 1–3). In
addition, the Examiner finds that Odachi discloses transmitting and
receiving vehicle ID wirelessly, thus disclosing wireless communication
means. Id. at 5 (citing Odachi 5:41–53; 10:36–43).
Appellant provides several arguments against the rejection. First,
Appellant argues that the combination of references “fails to disclose or
suggest the repeated transmission of an association signal from the vehicle.”
Appeal Br. 3.
Claim 1 recites “an association signal to be repeatedly wirelessly
transmitted during a battery charge procedure to maintain authentication
such that charging of the battery via the charge plate is maintained.” Id.
(Claims App. 1). We give claims their broadest reasonable scope consistent
with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The words used in a claim must be read in light of
the specification, as it would have been interpreted by one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention. Id.
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

7
The Specification does not define “association signal.” See generally
Spec. The Specification describes an embodiment in which wireless
communication is used to complete an association procedure between a
vehicle and a vehicle charger. Spec. ¶ 19. The association procedure can
include a signal sent from the vehicle to the charger indicating a request for
authentication and a signal sent from the charger to the vehicle. Spec. ¶ 19.
One of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have
understood transmission of the vehicle side ID of Watanabe to be equivalent
to the claimed association signal. See Ans. 2. A portion of Watanabe Figure
3 is reproduced below:

Watanabe Figure 3 is a flow chart showing the content of the control
of a PLC (power line communications) unit, which is disposed on the plug-
in hybrid vehicle side of a plug-in vehicle/power source installation.
Watanabe ¶¶ 37, 39. Of significance to our decision, the portion of Figure 3
shown above discloses that processing steps S20–S22 are repeatedly
executed during battery charge. Watanabe ¶ 70. In step S20, the control
portion of the hybrid vehicle-side battery charge monitoring device checks
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

8
whether the battery charge is ended; in step S21, the control portion checks
whether the PLC modem is continuing the reception of the power source
side ID sent by the power-source-side battery charge monitoring device or
detects the interruption of the reception; and in step S22, the control portion
transmits the identification information read from the vehicle ID storing
portion. Watanabe ¶¶ 70, 72. Thus, Watanabe discloses repeated
transmission of an association signal until the battery charge is ended.
Appellant’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive.
Next, Appellant argues that the combined references fail to disclose or
suggest “interrupting the transmission [of an association signal] in response
to a sensor detecting an object near the charge plate.” Appeal Br. 3. Claim
1 requires the wireless transmission of the association signal to be
interrupted such that charging of the battery is stopped in response to
receiving a detection signal which is output in response to an object being
“in a vicinity of the charge plate.”6 Id. at Claims App. 1.
The Examiner relies on the combination of Melocik and Watanabe to
teach interruption of transmission of an association signal, and on the
combination of Melocik and Obayashi to teach a sensor detecting an object
in the vicinity or near a charge plate. See Final Act. 5–6.
Watanabe discloses that the power source side ID is sent repeatedly
over a predetermined time period X1, then pauses, then is sent repeatedly
over a predetermined time period X2, then pauses, and so on. Watanabe
¶ 71, Fig. 5. The control portion of the hybrid vehicle-side battery charge

6 Claim 10 requires interruption of the repeated transmission [of the
association signal] while a detection signal is outputted while an object is
near the charge plate. Appeal Br. (Claims App. 2).
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

9
monitoring device detects interruption of reception of the power source side
ID corresponding to the pauses, and does not proceed to the next step of
transmitting the vehicle side ID until it again detects the power source side
ID. Watanabe ¶ 72. Therefore, the vehicle side ID is interrupted.
Obayashi teaches sensors 71–74 mounted on the periphery of a
vehicle that detect where a living body enters a predetermined detection
range D2. Obayashi ¶ 70. Detection of a living body during the charging
process triggers limiting or restriction of the power supply to prevent the
effects of an electromagnetic field on the living body. Obayashi Abstract,
¶¶ 96, 97. As one example, Obayashi indicates that the power could be
restricted to an output of half of a normal value. See Obayashi ¶¶ 97, 106.
However, one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention
reasonably would have read the reference to include restricting power such
that charging is stopped. Moreover, Obayashi also teaches that charging
may be stopped in a non-contact type power supply device using
electromagnetic induction if a foreign body is detected in the high-frequency
magnetic field. Obayashi ¶¶ 11, 13. A living body at the periphery of a
vehicle or a foreign body generating heat due to its presence within a high-
frequency magnetic field are both in the vicinity of, or near, the charge plate,
which the application shows as just behind the front bumper of a vehicle.
See ’442 App., Fig. 1.
Numerous arguments by Appellant fail because they are based on
attacking a reference individually where the rejection is based upon
teachings of a combination of references. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800
F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Each reference cited by the Examiner
must be read, not in isolation as Appellant does, but for what it fairly teaches
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

10
in combination with the prior art as a whole. See id. Because Appellant
attacks individual references, rather than the combined teachings of the
references, the following arguments do not persuade us that the Examiner
reversibly errs.
Appellant contends that Melocik’s modulator/demodulator 90 “is not
a controller and does not meet the limitations of Applicant’s claimed
controller.” Appeal Br. 3. Appellant argues that construing the claimed
controller to encompass Melocik’s modulator/de-modulator is so broad as to
be unreasonable, thus does not fall within the requirement of the broadest
reasonable construction consistent with the specification. Id. at 4–5.
The Examiner relies on a combination of Melocik, Watanabe, and
Obayashi for disclosure of the controller and its functions. See Final Act. 3–
6. Melocik’s modulator/demodulator qualifies as a controller (without the
specific functionality claimed) at least for the reasons explained in the
Answer. See Ans. 3–4. For the controller functions in the claims, the
Examiner relies on Watanabe and Obayashi, not on Melocik’s
modulator/demodulator. See Final Act. 5–6; Ans. 2–4. Therefore, in
arguing that Melocik does not disclose the claimed controller, Appellant
improperly attacks Melocik individually, ignoring the Examiner’s findings
regarding Watanabe and Obayashi. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
Appellant’s argument regarding the broadest reasonable construction of the
claimed controller also is based on limiting the controller to that disclosed in
Melocik, ignoring the controller functions that the Examiner identifies in
Watanabe and Obayashi. See Appeal Br. 4–5.
Appellant argues that Melocik’s sensor delivers a signal representing
the battery state of charge, and does not output a signal while an object is
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

11
near the charge plate. Appeal Br. 5. This argument, however, attacks a
reference (Melocik) individually, and ignores the Examiner’s reliance on
Obayashi as disclosing foreign object detection sensors, discussed supra.
See Final Act. 5–6.
Appellant contends that Watanabe lacks any disclosure that a signal
provided from a sensor detecting an object results in non-performance of
transmission of vehicle ID (step S22 in Watanabe Fig. 3). Appeal Br. 6.
The Examiner relies on Obayashi, not Watanabe, as disclosing foreign
object detection sensors and a control device that detects the presence of
foreign objects. See Final Act. 5–6. Our discussion of Obayashi, supra,
supports the Examiner’s finding.
Appellant argues that Watanabe does not disclose wirelessly
transmitting an association signal. Appeal Br. 6. It need not. The Examiner
relies on Odachi and Melocik for disclosing wireless two-way
communication. Ans. 4–5.
Finally, Appellant contends that Melocik discloses wired
communication and the rejection does not provide a proper motivation or
rationale for substituting Odachi’s wireless communications. Appeal Br. 7.
Melocik discloses that a charging station bumper includes a third wire
coil and a vehicle bumper includes a fourth wire coil, which provide two-
way communication between the station and the vehicle. Melocik Abstract,
5:21–24. The third and fourth coils need carry only signal current, not
charging current. Melocik 5:34–36. The vehicle has circuitry including
means for sensing the state of charge of the battery and producing a charging
current signal in response to the send state of charge, and delivering the
signal to the fourth coil. Melocik 5:39–43. These means form a
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

12
bidirectional inductive communication link between the charging station and
the vehicle. Melocik 5:48–50. Melocik, thus, discloses wireless
communication.
In addition, Odachi teaches wireless transmission of a vehicle ID to
the ground wireless receiver in an apparatus for charging a battery of an
electric vehicle. Odachi, Abstract, 10:39–42. The Examiner concludes that
a skilled artisan would have implemented Odachi’s wireless transmission in
Melocik’s apparatus as modified for the benefit of flexibility and easy
installation. Final Act. 7. We read the Examiner’s rationale as referring to
easy installation of communication between a vehicle and a charging station.
Substituting Odachi’s wireless communications into Melocik’s
apparatus is merely substituting one known element for another to yield
predictable results. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401
(2007). “Express suggestion to substitute one equivalent for another need
not be present to render such substitution obvious.” In re Fout, 675 F.2d
297, 301 (CCPA 1982). The Examiner’s explanation of the reasons a person
of ordinary skill in the art would have had to combine the teachings of
Melocik and Odachi is sufficient when an allowance is made for “the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
We sustain the rejection of claims 1, 10, and 14.
Obviousness rejection of claims 2–9 and 11–13
The Examiner rejects claims 2–9 and 11–13 over Melocik in view of
Wechlin, Watanabe, Odachi, Obayashi, and Dibben. Final Act. 7–9.
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

13
Appellant argues that the claims are patentable at least based on their
dependence from claims 1 and 10. Appeal Br. 7. For the reasons given
above, this argument is not persuasive.
Appellant also argues that the Examiner’s reliance on Dibben and
Wechlin is misplaced. Id. Specifically, with regard to Dibben, Appellant
argues that (1) Dibben discloses a detection unit that is part of a charging
station, but claim 1 requires that a vehicle (not a charging station) have a
sensor; (2) Dibben’s detection unit does not operate to repeatedly transmit an
association signal to a vehicle controller; and (3) Dibben’s detection unit or
assessment unit does not operate to interrupt the association signal in
response to receipt of the detection signal to stop charging of a battery. Id.
at 7–8.
All of Appellant’s arguments in the paragraph above are directed to
claim limitations that are taught by the combination of Melocik, Watanabe,
Obayashi, and Odachi, as discussed above in relation to the rejection of
claim 1. Appellant makes no arguments countering the Examiner’s findings
related to the limitations in the dependent claims. See generally id.
Therefore, Appellant argues for patentability over Dibben individually,
ignoring the teachings of the combined references. As explained in our
discussion on claim 1, such attack on a reference individually where the
rejection is based upon teachings of a combination of references does not
support nonobviousness. See Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
With regard to Wechlin, Appellant argues that the reference fails to
cure the deficiencies noted elsewhere in the Appeal Brief, and contends that
the rejection relies on Wechlin as disclosing the sensors that transmit the
claimed association signal. Appeal Br. 8.
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

14
Although Wechlin is included in the heading of the Final Office
Action for the rejection of claims 2–9 and 11–13, the Examiner does not rely
on Wechlin for any disclosure. See Final Act. 7–9.
We sustain the rejection of claims 2–9 and 11–13.
Rejection of Claims 14–17
Claims 14–17 are method claims. Appeal Br. (Claims App. 3). After
setting forth the rejection of claims 2–9 and 11–13,the Examiner finds that
independent method claim 14 and its dependent claims 15–17 merely recite
steps of using the elements of the device “as disclosed above.” Final Act. 9.
The Examiner thus finds that the claimed methods “would be inherent in
view of the device as disclosed by Dibben and Wechilin [sic].” Id.
We sustain the rejection of claim 14 for the reasons given above with
respect to the rejection of claim 1. Claims 15–17 depend from claim 14 and
are not argued separately. Therefore, we also sustain the rejection of claims
15–17.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 10, 14 § 103(a) Melocik, Watanabe, Obayashi, Odachi 1, 10, 14
2–9, 11–13 § 103(a)
Melocik, Watanabe,
Odachi, Obayashi,
Dibben
2-9, 11–13
Appeal 2018-009112
Application 13/553,442

15
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Basis Affirmed Reversed
14–17 § 103(a)
Melocik, Watanabe,
Odachi, Obayashi,
Dibben
14–17
Overall
Outcome
1–17
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED