0120161729
08-11-2016
Marquis K.,1 Complainant, v. Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Agency.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Marquis K.,1
Complainant,
v.
Loretta E. Lynch,
Attorney General,
Department of Justice
(Federal Bureau of Investigation),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120161729
Agency No. 280FHQA5810462
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final decision (FAD) by the Agency dated March 18, 2016, finding that it was in compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
BACKGROUND
Believing that the Agency subjected him to unlawful discrimination, Complainant contacted an Agency EEO Counselor to initiate the EEO complaint process. On April 2, 2015, Complainant and the Agency entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the matter. The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Special Agent in Charge [CC] will meet with Supervisory Intelligence Analyst [IA] within 30 days of the execution of this agreement to discuss management and communication skills with subordinates.
(b) Upon the White Collar Crime Squad move into the swing space at GSA Center currently scheduled for May 15, 2015, [Complainant] will be assigned to the White Collar Crime Squad for no less than 120 days.
(c) After the 120-day temporary duty assignment to the White Collar Crime Squad, [Complainant] will complete a 60-day temporary duty assignment with the Integration Management Section of the Directorate of Intelligence.
(d) After completion of the 60-day temporary duty assignment to the Directorate of Intelligence, [Complainant] will return to the San Juan Division as the Collection Management Coordinator on the Central Strategic Coordinating Component (CSCC).
By email to the Agency dated November 3, 2015, Complainant alleged that the Agency was in breach of the settlement agreement, and requested that the Agency specifically implement its terms. Specifically, Complainant alleged that he learned that he not only had to complete "the 60 days TDY to HQ but also, [he has to] attend a CollMC training and obtain Certified Release Authority." Complainant stated that those requirements were not in the settlement agreement.
In its March 18, 2016 FAD, the Agency concluded it was not in breach of the agreement. The Agency noted that Complainant completed the temporary duty assignment (TDY) with the White Collar Crime Squad. The Agency stated that Complainant was offered the 60-day TDY with Integration Management Section of the Directorate of Intelligence, but that Complainant has "yet to participate in this opportunity." The Agency further stated that Complainant could not be assigned to CSCC until he completed the 60-day TDY with the Integration Management Section. The Agency noted that to the extent Complainant was expressing concern over additional training requirements not specified in the agreement, such training was imposed by the Agency, through the Directorate of Intelligence, not the San Juan Division where Complainant was employed.
The instant appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties. The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a contract between the employee and the Agency, to which ordinary rules of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, the record reflects that before Complainant could return to the San Juan Division as a Collection Management Coordinator, he had to complete the 60-day TDY with the Integration Management Section of the Directorate of Intelligence. The TDY was offered to him, but apparently Complainant has yet to accept the TDY. As such, the Agency is not in breach of the agreement.
Regarding the need for additional training after he is placed in the Collection Management Coordinator position, the agreement only required the Agency to put him in the position after he completes the 60-day TDY training. Once he is in the position, just like any other employee, he would be required to complete any training related to and required by the position.
The Agency's decision finding no breach is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0416)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
August 11, 2016
__________________
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
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