Mark Richard. Jamison

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 19, 2019

13623531 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 19, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/623,531 09/20/2012 Mark Richard JAMISON COF5028 (029424.000705) 1529
150308 7590 08/19/2019
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP/CAPITAL ONE
600 Peachtree St., NE, Suite 5200
Atlanta, GA 30308
EXAMINER
ZIEGLE, STEPHANIE M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
4134
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/19/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
chris.forstner@troutmansanders.com
patents@troutmansanders.com
sara.rogers@troutman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MARK JAMISON
____________

Appeal 2017-008287
Application 13/623,531
Technology Center 4100
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, TARA L.
HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAWFORD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–15, 17, and 18. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
THE INVENTION
Appellant claims a system and method for providing balance transfers.
(Spec. ¶ 2, Title.)

1 Capital One Financial Corporation is the real party in interest. (Appeal Br.
3.)
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Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A method for providing mobile balance transfers, comprising:
receiving, over a network from a mobile device equipped
with a camera, data associated with a balance transfer
application, wherein the data is electronically extracted from a
captured image of an account statement using one or more
computer processors, wherein the account statement is
associated with a first credit account and indicates at least an
account balance for the first credit account, wherein the captured
image is obtained from a digital photograph of the account
statement taken by the mobile device’s camera;
determining a balance transfer offer based on the received
data using the one or more computer processors, wherein the
received data includes the account balance for the first credit
account;
providing, over a network using the one or more computer
processors, the balance transfer offer to the mobile device,
wherein the balance transfer offer is associated with a second
credit account that will have an opening balance of at least the
account balance for the first credit account; and
receiving, over a network, an acceptance of the balance
transfer offer from the mobile device.

THE REJECTION
Claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will sustain the rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–8, 10–15, 17, and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
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applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine
whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. . . . If so, . . . then
ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” .
. . To answer that question, . . . consider the elements
of each claim both individually and “as an ordered
combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a
patent-eligible application. . . . [The Court] . . .
described step two of this analysis as a search for an
“‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself.”
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(internal citations omitted).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Federal Circuit has
explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims,
considered in light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character
as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” See Enfish, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement
in relevant technology or on a process that qualifies as an “abstract idea” for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36.
In so doing we apply a “directed to” two prong test: 1) evaluate
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the claim recites a
judicial exception, evaluate whether the judicial exception is integrated into

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a practical application. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 51–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).
The Examiner determines that the claims are directed to a method and
system for providing balance transfers, which is similar to the basic concept
of comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify options
and using categories to organize, store, and transmit information and
processing information through a clearinghouse, all of which have been
found by the courts to be an abstract idea. (Final Act. 14; Ans. 3.) The
Examiner also determines that the steps of the claims could be performed
through the use of organized human activities. (Ans. 3.)
We agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to comparing
new and stored information and using rules to identify options and using
categories to organize, store, and transmit information and processing
information through a clearinghouse. This is an example of concepts
performed in the human mind as mental processes because the steps of
receiving, analyzing, modifying, and storing data mimic human thought
processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with
paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the
human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611
(Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089,
1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
In this regard, the Specification states that the present invention
relates to methods and systems which provide customers or potential
customers with balance transfer offers. (Spec. ¶ 3.) Claim 1 recites
“receiving . . . data associated with a balance transfer application,”
“determining a balance transfer offer based on the received data,” “providing
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. . . the balance transfer offer,” and “receiving . . . acceptance of the balance
transfer offer.” As such, the claim steps essentially recite determining
whether to provide a balance transfer offer based on data in a balance
transfer application. The action of deciding whether to make a balance
transfer offer is basically determining whether to offer credit based on
information in an application and is, therefore, a process that can be
performed in the human mind.
In addition, the method of claim 1 relates to a commercial practice of
deciding whether to offer credit and is, therefore, a certain method of
organizing human activity. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims recite judicial exceptions,
i.e., a mental process and a certain method of organizing human activity.
We find no indication in the Specification, nor do Appellant directs us
to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke
any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
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claimed invention integrates the abstract idea into a “practical application,”
as that phrase is used in the revised Guidance. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea.
The Examiner finds that the claims do not include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception. The Examiner finds that the limitations in the claim that are in
addition to the abstract idea are the network, mobile device, camera, one or
more computer processors and non-transitory computer readable medium.
These computer components, according to the Examiner, are claimed to
perform their basic functions of storing, retrieving, processing, and
displaying data through the program that enables the execution of the
abstract idea and are the mere instruction to implement the abstract idea on a
computer. (Final Act. 19.)
The Specification supports this finding of the Examiner. The
Specification states that the mobile device and the computer processor may
be a smart phone, wireless phone, a Personal Digital Assistant, a desktop
computer, laptop computer, server, or other computer or any combination
thereof, thereby indicating that the mobile device and computer processer
claimed are off the shelf computer components that are conventional,
well-understood, and routine. (Spec. ¶ 30.) The camera is disclosed as an
external or internal camera that is included in the computer processor or
mobile device. (Spec. ¶¶ 30, 39, 40.) The network is disclosed as a fiber
optic network, a satellite network, a wireless LAN, a Global System for
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Mobile Communications, a Personal Communication Service, a Personal
Area Network, Wi-Fi, etc., indicating that the network is a conventional,
well-understood and routine network. (Spec. ¶ 29.) As such, we agree with
the Examiner that the recitation of the mobile device with camera, computer
processor, and network in claim 1 are recitations of generic computer
components.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the
analysis at Alice step two.
[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea
“while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough
for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological
environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while
adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply
combines those two steps, with the same deficient
result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an
abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition
cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion
accords with the preemption concern that
undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of
“additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]
itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (alterations in original) (internal citations
omitted).
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Instead, “the relevant question is whether the claims here do more
than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea . . . on a
generic computer.” Id. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to retrieve, select, and apply decision criteria to data and modify
the data as a result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of
the most basic functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
trading industry. See Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’
‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any
general purpose computer without special programming”). In short, each
step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a
particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract.” SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1022
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately.
The claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the mobile device, computer processors or network. As we stated above, the
claims do not affect an improvement in any other technology or technical
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field. The Specification spells out different generic equipment and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of
information access under different scenarios. (See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 30, 39, 40.)
Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than
instructions to apply the abstract idea of information access using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.
We are, thus, in agreement with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed
to a judicial exception that is not integrated into a practical application and is
therefore directed to an abstract idea and that the claim does not include
substantially more than the abstract idea.
We have reviewed all the arguments (Appeal Br. 13–26; Reply Br.
3–10) Appellant has submitted concerning the patent eligibility of the claims
before us that stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We find that our
analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments, which
have been made. We specifically note that we have analyzed what claim 1 is
“directed to” according to the Guidance and, therefore, have addressed the
arguments of Appellant related to this issue. However, for purposes of
completeness, we will address various arguments in order to make individual
rebuttals of same.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that there is no substantial, concrete evidence that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea. Whether a claim is directed to
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patent-eligible subject matter is an issue of law. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Although evidence
may be helpful when facts are in dispute, there is no requirement that an
Examiner provide evidentiary support before a conclusion can be made that
a claim is directed to an abstract idea. See Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First
Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(explaining “it is also possible, as numerous cases have recognized, that a
§ 101 analysis may sometimes be undertaken without resolving fact issues”).
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because the claims recite a particular solution to a problem in a particular
way to achieve a desired outcome and that the Examiner ignores the
requirements of the individual steps of the claims. (Appeal Br. 23.) In
making this argument, Appellant analogizes the claims to the claims in
McRO, Inc. d/b/a Planet Blue v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837
F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and the claims in Enfish (822 F.3d at 1335)
(Appeal Br. 25.)
In regard to McRO, Appellant argues that claim 1 employs rules or a
specific means and method that enables a technological improvement over
existing remote data capture systems to provide more efficient mobile
balance transfers. (Appeal Br. 26.)
We are not persuaded that the claimed invention is analogous to the
claimed invention in McRO. The claims in McRO recited a “specific . . .
improvement in computer animation” using “unconventional rules that
relate[d] sub-sequences of phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets.”
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1302–03, 1307–08, 1314–15. In McRO, “the
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incorporation of the claimed rules, not the use of the computer,” improved
an existing technological process. Id. at 1314. In contrast to the claims in
McRO, Appellant’s claim 1 does not improve an existing technological
process. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (explaining that “the claims in Diehr
were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological
process”). Instead, claim 1 recites only a method of providing mobile
balance transfers by determining a balance transfer offer based on an
account statement and a balance transfer application. The claimed method
only uses a computer in its ordinary capacity to transfer and process data.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims are
analogous to those in Enfish (822 F.3d at 1337). (Reply Br. 3–4.) The
claims differ from those found patent eligible in Enfish, where the claims
were “specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer
database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337. The claims, thus, were “directed to a
specific improvement to the way computers operate” rather than an abstract
idea implemented on a computer. Id. at 1336. Here, by contrast, the claims
are not directed to an improvement in the way computers operate. Though
the claims recite a method that may accelerate the process of analyzing data
to make balance transfer decisions, the increases in speed stem from the
ordinary capabilities of a general purpose computer and, thus, “do[] not
materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject
matter.” Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.),
687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Instead, the claims are more
analogous to those in FairWarning, wherein claims reciting “a few possible
rules to analyze . . . audit log data” were found directed to an abstract idea
because they asked “the same questions (though perhaps phrased with
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different words) that humans in analogous situations detecting fraud have
asked for decades.” 839 F.3d at 1094, 1095. In the present claims, the
method recited asks the same questions regarding balance transfers as
analogous situations for determining whether to transfer balances.
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner by
Appellant’s argument that the specific features do not broadly cover all
means for providing balance transfers. (Appeal Br. 26.) While preemption
may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 701, 193 (2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt
all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-
commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). And, “[w]here a
patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter
under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
We do not agree with Appellant that the appealed claims necessarily
include significantly more than an abstract idea because of the recitation of
numerous specific features. (Appeal Br. 31.) Appellant argues that the
abstract idea articulated by the Examiner fails to account for the technical
solution that integrates disparate systems to efficiently generate and execute
a mobile balance transfer utilizing data electronically extracted from an
image of an account statement captured by a camera on a mobile device.
However, there is neither a modification to the underlying conventional
technology, nor is there a new technique claimed. In addition, claim 1 does
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not include recitations detailing any integration of disparate systems.
Instead, Appellant’s claims are directed to generic components, claimed at a
high level of generality, and lacking in implementation details and,
therefore, do not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea. Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(generic computer elements did not represent improvement in computer
technology, but rather were invoked merely as tools, and did not transform
the claims into significantly more than claims to abstract idea itself).
We are not persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner because the
claims recite elements that are not well-understood, routine, and
conventional. In support of this argument, Appellant calls our attention to
the recitation of claim 1 that are part of the abstract idea itself. (Appeal Br.
37.) The inquiry into whether the claim includes “significantly more” is an
inquiry directed to the elements of the claims that are in addition to the
abstract idea. As such, we agree with the Examiner, as detailed above, that
the additional elements in claim 1, e.g., the mobile device and processors
which are generic components are well understood, routine, and
conventional.
We do not agree with Appellant that the appealed claims are
analogous to the claims in BASCOM Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). (Appeal Br. 39.) More
particularly, Appellant contends that the appealed claims, like the claims in
BASCOM, solve a technology-based problem utilizing unconventional
integration of disparate systems. (Appeal Br. 41.)
In BASCOM, the Federal Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s
guidance for determining whether the claims recite an inventive concept
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set forth in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 550 U.S. 208,
220–266 (2014).
In Alice, the Supreme Court explained that, under the second step of
the patent-eligibility analysis, “the relevant question is whether the claims
here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract
idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer.” 573 U.S. at 225.
The Supreme Court also provided examples of claims that represent more
than instructions to implement an abstract idea on a generic computer, such
as claims that purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself and
claims that effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.
Id. at 225–26.
Turning to BASCOM, the Federal Circuit held “[t]he inventive
concept described and claimed in the ’606 patent is the installation of a
filtering tool at a specific location, remote from end-users, with
customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” 827 F.3d at 1350.
In determining this feature to be an inventive concept, the Federal Circuit
explained that the remote location of a filtering tool having customizable
user-specific filtering features provides the filtering tool both the benefits of
a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server and
is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering content. Id. at
1350–51. Notably, the Federal Circuit specifically determined that “the
claims may be read to ‘improve[] an existing technological process.”’ Id. at
1351 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 223). There is insufficient evidence in the
record before us that the claimed subject matter reflects an asserted
improvement over prior technology.
Appellants also argue that the appealed claims are similar to those in
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Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir.
2016))). (Appeal Br. 41–42.) Specifically, Appellant argues that the claims
recite an unconventional technological solution notwithstanding the generic
components used. We disagree that the claims here resemble the claims in
Amdocs. There, the claims concerned network components “arrayed in a
distributed architecture” that “collect[ed] and process[ed] data close to its
source,” and thereby “enable[d] load distribution” and reduced network
congestion (see Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1291–92, 1300, 1303, 1306). In
Amdocs, the term “enhance” refers “to apply a number of field
enhancements in a distributed fashion” (Amdocs, 761 F.3d at 1338–40) and
“this distributed enhancement [is] . . . a critical advancement over the prior
art” (Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300) and, as such, Amdocs’ claims “entail[] an
unconventional solution (enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a
technological problem (massive record flows which previously required
massive databases)” and “improve the performance of the system itself.” Id.
at 1302.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit decided Amdocs’ claims satisfied
Mayo/Alice step two because they: (1) “entail[ed] an unconventional
technological solution . . . to a technological problem” that required generic
computer components to “operate in an unconventional manner to achieve
an improvement in computer functionality”; or (2) “recite[d] a technological
solution to a technological problem specific to computer networks—an
unconventional solution that was an improvement over the prior art” (id. at
1299–06).
In contrast to Amdocs, the claims here do not achieve an improvement
in computer functionality. Appellant does not describe an advance in
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hardware or software that, for example, causes a computer itself or a
database itself to operate faster or more efficiently. Appellant does not
address the operation of a computer itself or a database itself. The claims
here do not recite a technological solution to a technological problem
specific to computer networks, e.g., because Appellant’s claims do not
require unconventional network configurations or components. Rather,
Appellant’s claims require generic computing components connected to one
another.
We also do not agree with Appellant that the claims are similar to the
claims in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir.
2014). (Reply Br. 6–7.) In DDR Holdings, the Court evaluated the
eligibility of claims “address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors
that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet
hyperlink protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host’s
website after ‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.”
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. There, the Court found that the claims were patent
eligible because they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink typically
functions to resolve a problem that had no
“pre-Internet analog.” Id. at 1258. The Court cautioned, however, that not
all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for a
patent. Id. For example, in DDR Holdings, the Court distinguished the
patent-eligible claims at issue from claims found
patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See DDR, 773 at 1258–59 (citing
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16). As noted there, the Ultramercial claims
were “directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution
that was previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before.”
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Id. at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 714). Nevertheless, those
claims were patent-ineligible because they “merely recite[d] the abstract idea
of ‘offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement,’ along
with ‘routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a
request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and
use of the Internet.’” Id. (quoting Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715–16).
Appellant’s asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible
in Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings.
The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited “providing [a] . . . media
product for sale at an Internet website;” “restricting general public access to
said media product;” “receiving from the consumer a request to view [a] . . .
sponsor message;” and “if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query.” Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellant’s asserted
claims recite receiving, analyzing, modifying, and transmitting data between
a mobile device and a computer processor. This is precisely the type of
Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
In view of the foregoing, we will sustain the rejection as it is directed
to claim 1. We will sustain the rejection of the remaining claims for the
same reason.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting the appealed claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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DECISION
The decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED