Mark P. Spera, Jr.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 1, 2020

88673937 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 1, 2020)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: October 1, 2020
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
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In re Mark P. Spera, Jr.
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Serial No. 88673937
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Robert E. Purcell of The Law Office of Robert E. Purcell PLLC
for Mark P. Spera, Jr.

Joseph P. McCarthy, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 127,
Mark Pilaro, Managing Attorney.
_____
Before Taylor, Wellington, and English,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wellington, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Mark P. Spera, Jr. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark MYSOCIALS in standard characters1 for “online social networking services,
namely, offering a connection between persons for selectively sharing information

1 Applicant’s mark is presented in the application as “MySocials.” However, and as further
explained infra, because the mark is in standard character form it is the equivalent of an all
upper-case mark, MYSOCIALS. For ease of reference, we use the all capital lettering.
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regarding personal work background and history, career expertise and skills, and
other personal information” in Class 45.2
The Examining Attorney refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d),
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), based on a likelihood of confusion with the registered standard
character mark MY SOCIAL STOCK for services that include, in relevant part,
“providing social services, namely, on-line social networking services and information
in the field of personal development, namely, self-improvement, and self-fulfillment;
Internet-based social networking services; Online social networking services in the
field of achieving goals provided via a website; Providing on-line computer databases
and on-line searchable databases in the field of social networking” in Class 45.3
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant requested
reconsideration and appealed. The Examining Attorney denied the request for
reconsideration and the appeal resumed. The appeal is fully briefed.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the refusal to register.
I. Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of confusion is based on an analysis
of all the probative facts in evidence relevant to the factors set forth in In re E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”). See
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

2 Application Serial No. 88673937, filed October 30, 2019, under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), based on Applicant’s statement of his bona fide intent
to use the mark in commerce.
3 Registration No. 4759151 issued on June 23, 2015. The registration also covers computer
services in Class 42.
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We must consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See
In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
A. The Services
“[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the respective goods [and services] are
related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are
such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate from the same
source.’” Coach Servs. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713,
1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). In analyzing the second DuPont
factor, we look to the identifications in the application and cited registration. See
Stone Lion Capital Partners v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157,
1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d
937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood
of confusion as to a particular class if relatedness is established for any specified
service within that class in the application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun
Grp., 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981).
We find here that the services in the application and cited registration are legally
identical because they overlap in part. Registrant’s recitation of services broadly
covers “Internet-based social networking services,” and encompasses Applicant’s
“online social networking services” for “sharing information regarding personal work
background and history, career expertise and skills, and other personal information.”
See Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015) (where
the goods or services in an application or registration are broadly described, they are
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deemed to encompass all the goods or services of the nature and type described
therein).
Given that Applicant’s and Registrant’s services are, at least in part, legally
identical, the second DuPont factor therefore weighs strongly in favor of finding
confusion likely.
B. The Trade Channels and Classes of Consumers
Because the services are legally identical, at least in part, we must presume that
the trade channels and classes of consumers for those overlapping services are
identical. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(even though there was no evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of
consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining
likelihood of confusion); see also Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, 110 USPQ2d 1734,
1743 (TTAB 2014); Am. Lebanese Syrian Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health
Research Inst., 101 USPQ2d 1022, 1028 (TTAB 2011).
Accordingly, the third DuPont factor also weighs in favor of likely confusion.
C. Similarity of the Marks
We now compare the marks “in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression.” Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). “Similarity in any one of these elements
may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC,
126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812
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(TTAB 2014)). We assess not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-
side comparison, but rather whether their overall commercial impressions are so
similar that confusion as to the source of the services offered under the respective
marks is likely to result. Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1721; see also Edom Labs. Inc.
v. Lichter, 102 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2012).
Here, there are obvious visual and aural similarities between Applicant’s mark,
MYSOCIALS, and the registered mark, MY SOCIAL STOCK, given Applicant’s mark
is comprised of the first two terms of the registered mark. In addition, as the initial
terms of the registered mark, they are more likely to be noticed or remembered by
consumers. Palm Bay, 73 USPQ2d at 1692 (“Veuve” is the most prominent part of the
mark VEUVE CLICQUOT because “veuve” is the first word in the mark and the first
word to appear on the label); Presto Prods. Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d
1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“[I]t is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to
be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered”). The addition of the S
or pluralization of SOCIAL[S] in Applicant’s mark does very little to distinguish the
marks visually or aurally. We also point out that although Applicant’s mark is
presented in the application as “MySocial,” any mix of upper- and lower-case lettering
does not distinguish the marks because both marks are in standard character form
and thus may appear in any particular font style, like the mixed case lettering in
Applicant’s mark. See, e.g., Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (holding that the specific
font style of a mark cannot serve as the basis to distinguish it from a mark in standard
character form).
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In terms of the marks’ connotations and commercial impressions, our analysis is
based on a comparison of the entire marks, not just part of the marks. Stone Lion
Capital Partners, 110 USPQ2d at 1161; In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224
USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also Franklin Mint Corp. v. Master Mfg. Co., 667
F.2d 1005, 212 USPQ 233, 234 (CCPA 1981) (“It is axiomatic that a mark should not
be dissected and considered piecemeal; rather, it must be considered as a whole in
determining likelihood of confusion.”). Applicant, relying on this principle, urges that
the registered mark conveys a different meaning – namely, that “[t]he relevant public
would appreciate the overall term ‘social stock’ in the registered trademark as being
in reference to a category of corporate stock ownership, that is, owning an equity
interest in a corporation, and would further appreciate that the category is those
corporations that have a purpose of collective societal well-being and/or preservation
of the environment.”4
In support of his argument, Applicant points to Internet evidence he submitted
showing third-party use of the phrase “social stock exchange.”5 Based on this
evidence, Applicant concludes that “the natural perception by the public that the
social networking services associated with the registered mark ‘MY SOCIAL STOCK’
is devoted to listings of recommended corporations having a purpose of collective
societal well-being and/or preservation of the environment” and its meaning “to the

4 7 TTABVUE 3.
5 Evidence attached to Applicant’s response filed February 10, 2020.
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relevant public is that the associated services are directed toward a listing created by
the registrant or by the network of persons of recommended social stocks.”6
Applicant’s reliance on “social stock exchange” evidence, however, is misplaced
because the phrase “social stock exchange” does not appear to have anything to do
with social networking services, and the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating
otherwise.7 Instead, the phrase “social stock exchange,” as it is used in the online
articles and excerpts submitted by Applicant, refers to “trading platforms listing only
social businesses” and where “investors can buy shares in a social business just as
investors focused solely on profit would do in the traditional stock market.”8 The
listed entities are companies or organizations that make a “social impact” or have a
“social mission.”9 Perhaps the most in-depth paper discussing “social stock
exchanges” describes them as involving “Social impact investment” and “investments
intended to create positive social impact beyond financial return.”10

6 Id. at 3-4.
7 We also note that much of the evidence derives from non-US sources. For example, a lengthy
paper, titled “Social Stock Exchanges – Democratization of Capital Investing for Impact,” is
written by “Karen Wendt – Modul University [in Austria].” Applicant’s response filed
February 10, 2020, at TSDR p. 80. Thus, the level of exposure of US consumers to this
information may be limited, and the evidence thus has less probative value. Nevertheless,
we note in this same paper a discussion that “the first SSEs [social stock exchanges] have
come into existence in the [‘US’ and several other countries]….” Id. at 82. The paper also
describes a “US Mission Markets (MM)” as a social stock exchange that is “up and operating.”
Id. at 84.
8 From “The Rise of Social Stock Exchanges” Stanford Social Innovation Review online article
(www.ssir.org). Id. at 35-38.
9 Id.
10 Wendt. “Social Stock Exchanges – Democratization of Capital Investing for Impact.” Id. at
85.
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We determine the commercial impressions or connotations created by marks in
the context of the goods or services for which they will be encountered. See Coach
Servs., Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1600, aff’d 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713; Embarcadero
Techs. Inc. v. RStudio Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013). Thus, while “social
stock” may conjure a different meaning in the context of a social stock exchange, such
meaning is not conveyed in the context of the involved social networking services.
When the two marks, mySocials and MY SOCIAL STOCK, are viewed in
connection with online social networking services, they convey very similar
meanings. Both connote a personal (“my”) attachment to the (“social[s]” networking)
services. Applicant’s pluralization of the term SOCIAL[S] does not alter this meaning
but is likely to be understood as referring to more of a “social” presence or multiple
personal social networking accounts. The addition of the term STOCK in Registrant’s
mark also enhances the common meaning, such that consumers likely will perceive
Registrant’s entire mark as suggestive of the individual’s worth or how the individual
is regarded within the social networking service.11 In other words, although the
registered mark, MY SOCIAL STOCK, may take on an additional, slightly different
meaning, it nonetheless remains quite similar in terms of meaning and connotation
to Applicant’s mark.

11 We take judicial notice that the term “stock” is defined as “the estimation in which someone
or something is held.” Definition obtained from Merriam-Webster online dictionary
(www.merriam-webster.com), based on MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY,
ELEVENTH EDITION. The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of
Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imp. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703
F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed
format or regular fixed editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006).
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Ultimately, given the strong resemblance in sound and appearance, as well as the
marks’ overall similar connotations and commercial impressions, we find Applicant’s
mark is more similar than dissimilar to Registrant’s mark. Accordingly, this DuPont
factor also weighs in favor of likely confusion.
D. Weakness of the Common Element SOCIAL or MY SOCIAL
In his brief, Applicant argues “the term ‘social’ in the context of both the services
recited in Applicant’s application and in the registration is highly descriptive, as
evidenced by the use of that term in both of the recited services.”12 Applicant also
points to evidence of third-party registrations for marks containing the term SOCIAL
for social networking or related services.13 Applicant concludes:
[T]he highly descriptive nature of the word ‘social’ in the context of the
relevant services, the previously identified registered trademarks owned
by third parties, especially when considered together with third party
trademark uses revealed in [evidence submitted by Applicant],
demonstrate the extremely narrow scope of protection for the cited,
registered trademark. This evidence shows that both the owner of the cited
registration and the general, relevant public understand that even similar
trademarks with small differences can be used and registered without
causing a likelihood of confusion.

“In determining strength of a mark, we consider both inherent strength, based on
the nature of the mark itself, and commercial strength or recognition.” Bell’s Brewery,
Inc. v. Innovation Brewing, 125 USPQ2d 1340, 1345 (TTAB 2017) (citing
Couch/Braunsdorf Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458, 1476

12 7 TTABVUE 2.
13 Copies of the third-party registrations were submitted with Applicant’s response filed
February 10, 2020.
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(TTAB 2014)); see also In re Chippendales USA Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681,
1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength
(distinctiveness) and its marketplace strength (secondary meaning).”). “[T]he
strength of a mark is not a binary factor” and “varies along a spectrum from very
strong to very weak.” Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115
USPQ2d 1671, 1675-76 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). “The weaker [the
registrant’s] mark, the closer an applicant’s mark can come without causing a
likelihood of confusion and thereby invading what amounts to its comparatively
narrower range of protection.” Id. at 1676 (internal citations omitted). See also Palm
Bay Imps., 73 USPQ2d at 1693 (“Evidence of third-party use of similar marks on
similar goods [or services] is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and
entitled to only a narrow scope of protection.”). With regard to the sixth DuPont
factor, in particular, we consider evidence of the number and nature of similar marks
in use on similar services. DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567; Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v.
Edward Rose Senior Living, LLC, 122 USPQ2d 1030, 1033 (TTAB 2016).
We agree with Applicant to the extent that the term SOCIAL, by itself, is clearly
a conceptually very weak term when used in connection with the involved social
networking services. The term is used to describe an aspect of the services in the
recitations for the involved application and cited registration, and is a component of
several third-party registered marks covering social networking services.14

14 Copies of the registrations are of record (see Note 13).
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However, the combination of the terms MY and SOCIAL[S], which forms
Applicant’s mark and are the first two elements of the Registered mark, does not have
that same level of conceptual weakness. That is, the term “my social(s),” which
conveys a personal attachment to the social networking services, imparts a
connotation that is different from the term SOCIAL by itself. The prefix “my” makes
the marks more distinctive and less inherently weak.
The evidence also does not demonstrate that the shared term MY SOCIAL(S) is
commercially weak in the field of social networking services. In this regard, we
considered Applicant’s submission of copies of two third-party registrations for the
marks, MY SOCIAL CALENDAR and MYDOGGYSOCIAL, both covering social
networking services. We have also weighed the Internet evidence showing use of 8
marks that begin “MY SOCIAL . . .,” including use of the registered MY SOCIAL
CALENDAR mark.15 However, many of these third-party uses have little or no
probative value because they have no demonstrated relationship to social networking
services. For example, one website shows use of MY SOCIAL AGENCY by a UK-
based “full-service digital marketing agency.”16 Similarly, the website for MY
SOCIAL EVENTS touts itself as “the premier online parties and events listing
source” for persons “on vacation or just looking for something to around your area.”17
The website for MY SOCIAL GOODNEWS describes itself as “dedicated to sharing

15 Internet evidence of third-party use submitted with Applicant’s request for reconsideration
filed March 4, 2020 (4 TTABVUE).
16 4 TTABVE 86-91.
17 Id. at 93.
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news about social entrepreneurship, impact investing, philanthropy and corporate
social responsibility.”18 Two other websites only tangentially involve social
networking services, including MY SOCIAL STATE for a company that offers to “set-
up and launch most primary social media platforms to increase business exposure
and generate quality leads.”19 Or, MY SOCIAL BOOK, which is a website that offers
“printed products created from [buyer’s] Facebook and Instagram pictures.”20
Here, the third-party use evidence does not demonstrate extensive third-party use
of marks that begin with MY SOCIAL . . . in connection with social networking
services such that we can assume consumers are accustomed to distinguishing
otherwise similar marks. Simply put, the evidence before us is not the type or in
sufficient quantity to support such a finding of weakness. Cf. Juice Generation, 115
USPQ2d at 1672 n.1 (at least twenty-six relevant third-party uses or registrations of
record).
In sum, although the word SOCIAL is clearly weak in connection with social
networking services; we do not find the shared term MY SOCIAL[S] to be inherently
or commercially weak. Accordingly, we find the DuPont factor regarding weakness is
neutral in our likelihood of confusion analysis.

18 Id. at 43.
19 Id. at 29.
20 Id. at 73.
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II. Conclusion
Because Applicant’s and Registrant’s services are in-part identical, the channels
of trade and classes of consumers are presumed to overlap and the marks are overall
similar, confusion is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register Applicant’s mark is affirmed.