Mark Fisher et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 2, 2020

15366810 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/366,810 12/01/2016 Mark FISHER HARM 0374 PUS1 5708
109676 7590 01/02/2020
Brooks Kushman P.C./Harman
1000 Town Center
Twenty Second Floor
Southfield, MI 48075
EXAMINER
HUBER, PAUL W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK FISHER, JAMES GARRETT, ARMANDO MARTINEZ,
and AN NGUYEN
Appeal 2019-000109
Application 15/366,810
Technology Center 2600
BEFORE DEBRA K. STEPHENS, CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant,1 Harman International
Industries, Inc., appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2,
5–10 and 13–18 (Final Act. 1). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Harman
International Industries, Inc (Appeal Br. 1).
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, the claims are directed to a wireless speaker
system. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1 An apparatus for a wireless speaker system, comprising:
a primary speaker, including:
a first transceiver configured to receive a first
wireless signal from a mobile device via a first interface
over a first frequency band, the first wireless signal
including audio data;
a second transceiver configured to receive
enrollment data from at least one secondary speaker and
to transmit a second wireless signal including the audio
data via a second interface over a second frequency band
in response to receiving enrollment data from the at least
one secondary speaker; and
wherein the primary speaker is configured to
playback an audio signal based on the received audio data.
REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Seydoux US 8,054,987 B2 Nov. 8, 2011
Mayman US 2013/0343568 A1 Dec. 26, 2013

REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 13–16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Mayman (Final Act. 2); and
Claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Mayman and Seydoux (id. at 5).

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We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to
make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived
(see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)).
OPINION
Anticipation: Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 13–16
Appellant contends their invention as recited in claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9,
10, and 13–16, is not anticipated by Mayman (App. Br. 3–6).2 In particular,
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding Mayman discloses “a second
transceiver configured to receive enrollment data from at least one
secondary speaker and to transmit a second wireless signal including the
audio data via a second interface over a second frequency band in response
to receiving enrollment data from the at least one secondary speaker,” as
recited in independent claim 1 (id.).
ANALYSIS
The Examiner finds Mayman discloses “second transceiver 200 [is]
configured to receive enrollment data 113 (e.g., ‘handshaking’ . . . procedure
which is executed by transmitting signals from a transceiver 300 of the
secondary speaker 112 to the transceiver 200 of the primary speaker 104)”
(Final Act. 2 (citing Mayman ¶¶ 23–24, 41)). The Examiner further finds
Mayman describes “to transmit a second wireless signal 114 including the

2 Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief and
Reply Brief for the positions of Appellant and the Final Office Action and
Answer for the positions of the Examiner. Only those arguments actually
made by Appellant have been considered in this decision. Arguments that
Appellant did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are
deemed to be waived (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2012)).
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audio data via a second interface over a second frequency band in response
to receiving enrollment data 113 from the at least one secondary speaker
112” (id. (citing Mayman ¶¶ 50, 52)).
Appellant asserts “the Examiner appears to equate the claimed first
transceiver with the detachable transceiver 510, and the second transceiver
with the transceiver 200[; however,] . . . these elements are part of separate
embodiments” (App. Br. 4–5). Additionally, Appellant contends Mayman’s
docking station 104 does not include first and second transceivers and even
if it did, Mayman’s handshaking fails to disclose the recited enrollment data
(id. at 5).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions. Mayman describes
a docking station located external to the docking station housing (Mayman
¶ 53; Fig. 5). Mayman further describes that “wireless techniques may also
be used to connect” the cradle 502 and docking station 500 using wireless
methodologies such as, for example, IR, RF, or laser (id. ¶ 54). Thus, the
docking station has a first transceiver to communicate with the cradle.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded these are two different, exclusive
embodiments; rather, the embodiments may work together.
As noted by the Examiner, Mayman discloses a built-in docking
station 106 of the primary speaker, a separate docking station 502 connected
to the primary speaker by wire 506, or a cradle for the mobile device
wirelessly connecting the mobile device to the primary speaker using a
separate transceiver 510 of the primary speaker (Final Act. 6 (citing
Mayman ¶ 54, Figs. 1, 5)). In particular, Figure 2 describes a docking
station and Figure 5 describes a docking station with a detachable
transceiver and media device cradle (Mayman ¶¶ 15, 18, 32, 53).
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Furthermore, Figure 5 is directed to locating “portions of a docking station .
. . external to the docking station housing” (id. ¶ 53). Mayman describes
wireless communication between portions of the docking station external to
the docking station and the docking station (id.). Mayman also describes
communication between remote speakers and the docking station (id. ¶¶ 39,
41).
Appellant next argues “the ‘handshaking’ appears to relate to various
audio playback related commands such as skip a track, etc. [but] is silent as
to the ‘handshaking’ being received at the second transceiver, within the
context of the claims” (App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 2). Appellant further contends
“[w]hile Mayman discloses transmitting audio signals to other speakers, it
does not do so ‘in response to receiving enrollment data from the at least one
secondary speaker’” (App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 2).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contentions. Claim 1 recites the
second transceiver “receive[s] enrollment data from at least one secondary
speaker and to transmit a second wireless signal . . . in response to receiving
enrollment data from the at least one secondary speaker.” Initially, we note
Appellant has not identified a definition of “enrollment data” in the
Specification (see App. Br. 2). The Specification does not describe
explicitly the term “enrollment data.” The Specification describes “[t]he
enrollment data may include the predefined frequency, as well as an
identifier unique to each speaker” (Spec. ¶ 42 (emphasis added)).
Mayman discloses the docking station transmitting and receiving
signals (Mayman ¶ 39). Mayman further describes the remote speaker 112
receives or transmits data to establish a wireless link, such as establishing a
link with the transceiver 200 in the docking station. Mayman further
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describes handshaking may be “executed by transmitting signals from the
transceiver 300 [of the secondary speaker 112]” (Final Act. 7 (citing
Mayman ¶ 41)). The Examiner determines:
As well known in the art, a handshaking procedure in
information technology, telecommunications, and related fields,
is an automated process of negotiation that dynamically sets
parameters of a communications channel established between
two entities before normal communication over the channel
begins. Thus, the secondary speaker 112 transmits handshaking
data 113 (“enrollment data”) to the primary speaker 104 before
the primary speaker 104 transmits the audio data to the secondary
speaker 112 over the communication link 114
(id.; see Reply Br. 3). We agree with the Examiner’s finding (see also Harry
Newton, Newton’s Telecom Dictionary 393 (21st ed. 2005) “construing
‘handshaking’ as ‘[t]he initial exchange between two data communications
systems prior to and during data transmission to ensure proper data
transmission’”; Microsoft Computer Dictionary 245 (5th ed. 2002)
“construing ‘handshake’ as ‘a series of signals acknowledging that
communication or the transfer of information can take place between
computers or other devices’”)). Appellant has not proffered sufficient
evidence or argument to persuade us handshaking should be construed other
than as would have been understood by an ordinarily skilled artisan at the
time of the invention. Thus, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the
interpretation and therefore find Mayman discloses data sent by the
secondary speaker to the transceiver during handshaking.
Additionally, although Mayman describes that the wireless signals
exchanged between the docking station and remote speaker may include data
that may affect the operations of the docking station (including selecting
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another song or changing a song play list), Mayman also discloses the
wireless signals exchanged include handshaking signals (Mayman ¶ 41).
We further note “enrollment data” does not preclude other data affecting the
operations of the docking station.
Mayman describes the transceiver in the secondary speaker (remote
speaker 112) may transmit or receive wireless signals from transceiver 200
(Mayman ¶¶ 40–41; Fig. 1). The transceiver 300 may then access audio
content included in a received wireless signal (id.). Thus, we agree with the
Examiner that handshaking data is transmitted to achieve the initial
connection between the docking station and the remote (secondary) speaker
112, as discussed above, and in response, the secondary speaker 112
receives audio data (Final Act. 2–3, 7; Mayman ¶¶ 39–40, 50–51; see also
Mayman ¶ 34 (discussing how the transceiver may comply with one or more
protocols such as client/server in which the server responds to request from
the client)). Mayman therefore discloses the transceiver in the docking
station, upon receiving the enrollment data (handshaking data) transmitting a
wireless signal including the audio data to the secondary speaker (Mayman
¶¶ 23–24, 32, 39, 40, 50–52; Figs. 1, 2).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Mayman discloses the invention as recited in independent claim 1.
Independent claims 9 and 14 and dependent claims 2, 5, 6, 10, 13, 15, and 16
were not separately argued, instead relying on the arguments set forth with
respect to claim 1 (App. Br. 6). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims
1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 13–16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for anticipation by
Mayman.

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Obviousness: Claims 7, 8, 17, and 18
Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 7, 8, 17, and
18, is not obvious over Mayman and Seydoux and particularly, that the
combined references do not teach “a mode switch for switching between a
primary mode where the first transceiver is configured to receive the audio
data from the mobile device and a secondary mode where the second
transceiver is configured to receive the audio data from the at least one
secondary speaker,” as recited in dependent claim 7 and commensurately
recited in dependent claim 17 (App. Br. 7–8).
According to Appellant, however, although Seydoux “discloses an
algorithm having various ‘modes of operation,’ . . . Seydoux fails to disclose
a ‘mode switch,’” within the context of claim 7 (App. Br. 7). Appellant
contends although Seydoux’s loudspeaker may be moved or switched off,
Seydoux discloses the speakers 10 having “an internal mode switch” (id.).
Initially, we note the claim does not recite that the mode switch is a
physical piece of hardware or that the switch must be performed by a
human. The Specification describes “a mode switch 158 for switching
between a primary mode . . . and a secondary mode” (Spec. ¶ 23). The
Specification further describes that the switch may be “a separate switch,”
“any type of switch such as a button, sliding switch, toggle, etc.” or “may,
additionally or alternatively, also be included in the display interface 125”
(id.). The Specification, however, uses “may be” for each example, and
Appellant’s Specification describes the mode switch in a non-limiting,
exemplary context. Furthermore, looking to the prior art, Seydoux describes
“the system is ergonomically simplified because its operation is highly
automated and the number of pushbuttons and other controls is reduced to
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the strict minimum” (Seydoux, col. 3, ll. 15–17). Therefore, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument that because Seydoux’s switch is
internal, it does not teach a “mode switch” or moreover, that an ordinarily
skilled artisan would not have found a mechanical or manually selected
mode switch obvious to implement in light of the teachings of Seydoux.
The Examiner relies on Mayman to teach “by relaying content (e.g.,
audio content or remote control commands), a wireless network may be
established among the remote speakers and the docking station” and thus,
Mayman, allows the second transceiver to transmit and receive audio (Final
Act. 5 (citing Mayman ¶¶ 39, 42, 47)). Mayman, thus, allows the second
transceiver to transmit and receive audio.
The Examiner further relies on Seydoux and in particular, on
Seydoux’s mode switching which “allow[s] any speaker within the wireless
network to perform the function of either receiving and playing the audio
signal directly from the source S or receiving and playing the audio signal
relayed by another speaker depending on the speaker[’]s position within the
network relative to the source S and other speakers” (Final Act. 5 (citing
Seydoux Figs. 1(c)–1(d))3).
Seydoux teaches speakers able to switch roles, i.e., the network head
loudspeaker R and a dependent loudspeaker L’ swap roles (col. 12, l. 48 –
col. 13, l. 14, Fig. 1d). In particular, Seydoux describes “the dependent
loudspeaker L’ sends to the network head R a ‘role swap request’. This

3 The Examiner cites to paragraphs 136–142 of Seydoux; however, the
printed patent of Seydoux does not have a “paragraph” format, but rather,
column and line numbers. Based on the findings, it appears these
paragraphs are column 13, line 46 to column 14, line 22. Appellant does not
indicate confusion; therefore, we determine this is harmless error.
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request . . . defines a new routing scheme so as to be able to broadcast audio
signal from the loudspeaker L’ instead of from the loudspeaker R” (id. at
col. 12, l. 65– col. 13., l 3; Fig. 1d). “[T]he loudspeaker L’ becomes the
‘host’ (i.e.[,] server, in the meaning of a client/server relationship),
becoming temporarily the network head, the loudspeaker R receiving data
(i.e.[,] being a client in the meaning of a client/server relationship) coming
temporarily from a dependent loudspeaker” (id. at col. 13, ll. 9–14, Fig. 1d).
Thus, Seydoux teaches a primary mode where the head loudspeaker R (and
therefore, a transceiver in the loudspeaker R) is configured to receive the
audio data from the source S, and a secondary mode where the head
loudspeaker R (and therefore, a transceiver in the loudspeaker R) receives
audio data from the loudspeaker L’ (a secondary speaker). We further agree
with the Examiner that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it
obvious to include an electronic mode switch for switching between the
modes (Ans. 4; Final Act. 5–6).
In light of these teachings, we determine the combination of Seydoux
and Mayman performs the function of switching between a primary mode
where the first transceiver is configured to receive audio data from the
mobile device and a secondary mode where the second transceiver is
configured to receive the audio data from the secondary speaker.
Appellant presents new arguments regarding motivation in the Reply
Brief. Appellant had an opportunity to raise the arguments in the Appeal
Brief, and has provided this record with no such showing of good cause for
not doing so. In the absence of a showing of good cause by Appellant, the
new arguments by Appellant are thus deemed waived (see 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.41(b)(2); see also Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Appl'ns S.A., 469
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F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir 2006) ("[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its
opening brief . . . is waived.") (Internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Mayman and Seydoux teaches, suggests, or otherwise
renders obvious the limitations as recited in dependent claim 7 and
commensurately recited claim 17, argued on the basis of claim 7.
Dependent claims 8 and 18, not separately argued. Therefore, we sustain the
rejection of claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness
over Mayman and Seydoux.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
More specifically,
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 13–16 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Mayman is affirmed; and
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 8, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Mayman and Seydoux is affirmed.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 5, 6, 9,
10, 13–16
102 Mayman 1, 2, 5, 6,
9, 10, 13–
16

7, 8, 17, 18 103 Mayman, Seydoux 7, 8, 17,
18

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Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 5–10,
13–18

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv)).
AFFIRMED