Mark Carlson et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 26, 2019

14260169 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/260,169 04/23/2014 Mark Carlson 080083-0907099 4617
66945 7590 07/26/2019
KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP/VISA
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
NORMAN, SAMICA L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/26/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte MARK CARLSON, SURENDRA KESHAN, and
PATRICK FAITH1
____________________

Appeal 2018-003141
Application 14/260,169
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOYCE CRAIG, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final
rejection of claims 20–45, which are all claims pending in the Application.
Appellants have canceled claims 1–19. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Visa U.S.A. Inc.
App. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
Appellants’ disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
payment transactions. Spec. ¶ 3.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 20, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal:
20. A method of conducting a transaction, the method
comprising:
receiving, by a server computer and from an access
device, an account identifier, wherein the access device
interacts with a merchant server;
after receiving the account identifier, transmitting, by the
server computer, a challenge question to the access device or
the another communication device, wherein the challenge
question relates to information associated with historical
interactions using the account identifier;
receiving, at the server computer, a challenge answer
from the access device or the another communication device in
response to the challenge question, and from a consumer;
after receiving the challenge answer from the access
device or the another communication device, creating, by the
server computer, an artificial PAN;
transmitting, by the server computer, the artificial PAN
to the merchant server;
receiving an authorization request message from the
merchant server comprising the artificial PAN;
determining the account identifier from the artificial
PAN;
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forwarding the authorization request message comprising
the account identifier to an issuer computer associated with an
issuer of the account identifier;
receiving, by the server computer that created the
artificial PAN, an authorization response message from the
issuer computer; and
forwarding, by the server computer, the authorization
response message to the merchant server.
App. Br. 16 (Claims App’x).
Rejection on Appeal
Claims 20–45 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–4.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 6–14) and our discretion
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of the patent-
ineligible subject-matter rejection of claims 20–25 and 27–45 on the basis of
representative claim 20. Remaining claims not argued separately stand or
fall with the respective independent claim from which they depend.2
Appellants have argued claim 26 separately. See App. Br. 14.

2 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
In addition, when Appellants do not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.3
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014)
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we
first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental

3 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four
statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the patent-eligibility
inquiry under § 101.
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economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191); “tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores”
(id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853)));
and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v.
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is
now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and
mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under
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this guidance we must, therefore, ensure at step one that we articulate what
the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step-one
inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance in the Federal Register
concerning the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter
“Revised Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-
07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf).
Under the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes);4 and

4 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 1” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(i)”).
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).5
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.6
See Revised Guidance.
ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 20–25 and 27–45 Under 25 U.S.C. § 101
Step 1
Claim 20, as a method (process) claim, recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue
before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without
significantly more.
Prima Facie Case?
Appellants contend the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case
of patent ineligibility because “the Examiner fails to explain why the alleged

5 Referred to as “Revised Step 2A, Prong 2” in the Revised Guidance
(hereinafter “Step 2A(ii)”).
6 Items (3) and (4) continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the
Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
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abstract idea is similar to a previous abstract idea identified by the courts.”
App. Br. 6.
We disagree. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that “the prima
facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of
the burden of production.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
The Examiner satisfies the burden of establishing a prima facie case
under 35 U.S.C. § 132 by setting forth a rejection in a sufficiently articulate
and informative manner. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2011). If the Examiner “adequately explain[s] the shortcomings . . . the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie case with evidence
and/or argument.” Hyatt, 492 F.3d at 1370. The Final Office Action
adequately explained the § 101 rejection. See Final Act. 2–4. The Examiner
applied the Alice analytical framework and apprised Appellants of the
reasons for the § 101 rejection under that framework. Appellants have not
responded by alleging a failure to understand the rejection. To the contrary,
Appellants clearly identify the abstract idea identified by the Examiner. See
App. Br. 6–7.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner has failed to set
forth a prima facie case of patent ineligibility.
Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?
The Examiner determined that claim 20 recites comparing and
formatting information for transmission, which is “simply the organization
and manipulation of data which can be performed mentally and is an idea of
itself.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner determined the claimed concept is
similar to other concepts that have been identified as abstract by the courts,
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such as the conversion of numerical information (Benson) and organizing
information thorough mathematical correlations (Digitech).7 Final Act. 3.
We evaluate whether claim 20 recites an abstract idea based upon the
Revised Guidance. We conduct our review for abstractness de novo.
The Specification provides context as to what the claimed invention is
directed to. In this case, the Specification discloses that the invention is for
“handling and/or authorizing payment requests by a consumer for a
transaction.” Spec. ¶ 10.
Claim 20 recites, in pertinent part,
after receiving the challenge answer from the access device or
the another communication device, creating, by the server
computer, an artificial PAN;
. . .
determining the account identifier from the artificial PAN;
App. Br. 16 (Claims App’x).
These limitations recite mental processes that can be carried out in the
human mind or practicably by pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely
mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
For example, one can create an artificial primary account number in the
human mind or with pen and paper. One can also determine an account
identifier from the artificial PAN, mentally or with pen and paper.

7 Benson, 409 U.S. 63; Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging,
Inc., 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Thus, under Step 2A(i), we agree with the Examiner that claim 20,
under our Revised Guidance, recites a judicial exception of mental processes
and, thus, an abstract idea.
Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application?
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) in
which we determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into
a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are
any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s);
and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination
to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical
application.
The additional limitations are the “receiving,” “transmitting,” and
“forwarding” steps recited in claim 20. None of the additional limitations
integrates the recited mental processes into a practical application because
receiving and transmitting or forwarding information between systems does
not add a meaningful limitation to conducting a payment transaction.
“Information as such is an intangible.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also id. at 1355 (noting
claim requirement of “‘displaying concurrent visualization’ of two or more
types of information” was insufficient to confer patent eligibility). The
“receiving,” “transmitting,” and “forwarding” steps are mere instructions to
apply the method to a generic computer. Considering the additional
elements both individually and as “an ordered combination,” the functions
performed by the computer system at each step are purely conventional.
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Each additional element does no more than require a generic computer to
perform a generic computer function. See Ans. 8.
Appellants’ reliance on DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773
F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (App. Br. 10) is misplaced, as the recited claims
do not improve the recited computer. In DDR, the claims at issue involved,
inter alia, “web pages display[ing] at least one active link associated with a
commerce object associated with a buying opportunity of a selected one of a
plurality of merchants” (claim 1 of US 7,818,399). DDR, 773 F.3d at 1250.
The Federal Circuit determined that the claims in DDR are patent eligible
under step one of the Alice test because “the claimed solution is necessarily
rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically
arising in the realm of computer networks.” Id. at 1257. Specifically, the
Federal Circuit decided that the claims addressed the “challenge of retaining
control over the attention of the customer in the context of the Internet.” Id.
at 1258. We find the rejected claims are dissimilar to DDR’s web page with
an active link, and the Specification does not support the view that the
computer-related claim elements are unconventional or used in an
unconventional manner. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 12, 30, 144.
Moreover, Appellants’ processing of payment transactions does not
appear to provide any “technical solution to a technical problem” as
contemplated by the Federal Circuit in DDR and Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016). See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a).
Thus, on this record, Appellants have not shown eligibility under the
guidance of Manual of Patent Examining Procedure Section 2106.05(a)
(“Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any Other
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Technology or Technical Field”) or Section 2106.05(e) (“Other Meaningful
Limitations”). Nor do Appellants advance any arguments in the Brief(s) that
are directed to the Bilski machine-or-transformation test, which would only
be applicable to the method (process) claims on appeal. See MPEP §§
2106.05(b) (Particular Machine), 2106.05(c) (Particular Transformation).
Therefore, we conclude the abstract idea is not integrated into a
practical application, and thus, the claim is directed to the judicial exception.
Step 2B – “Inventive Concept”
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, as we
conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we
must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to
determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of
the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs
of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(quoting Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353).
In applying step two of the Alice analysis, we “determine whether the
claims do significantly more than simply describe [the] abstract method”
and, thus, transform the abstract idea into patentable subject matter.
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We
look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the claims that
constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims eligible for
patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at
221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-understood,
routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79.
Evaluating representative claim 20 under step 2 of the Alice analysis,
we conclude it lacks an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea of
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transferring funds into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea.
Such a conclusion comports with case law. In Mortgage Grader, the
Federal Circuit held that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of
“anonymous loan shopping.” Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan
Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016). With respect to the
inventive-concept inquiry, the Federal Circuit noted that “the claims ‘add’
only generic computer components such as an ‘interface,’ ‘network,’ and
‘database.’ These generic computer components do not satisfy the inventive
concept requirement.” Id. at 1324–25; see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26
(“[T]he claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an
instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some
unspecified, generic computer.”); DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (“[A]fter Alice,
there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does
not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”); buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims
merely reciting a computer are not patent eligible where “[t]he computer
functionality is generic—indeed, quite limited: a computer receives a
request for a guarantee and transmits an offer of guarantee in return. There
is no further detail. That a computer receives and sends the information over
a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Courts have recognized that receiving or transmitting data over a
network is well understood, routine, and conventional. Intellectual Ventures
I LLC v. Symantec, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (utilizing an intermediary
computer to forward information); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d 607, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (using a telephone for image
transmission); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363
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(Fed. Cir. 2015) (sending messages over a network); buySAFE, 765 F.3d at
1355 (computer receives and sends information over a network); MPEP
§ 2106.05(d).
As evidence of the conventional nature of the recited “server
computer,” “merchant server,” “issuer computer,” and “access device” in
method claim 20 (and “server” in system claim 30), the Specification
discloses:
the term ‘server’ can refer to a computing system of one or
more computers and network inputs and/or outputs that act as
portals for a local network to a larger (wider) network, such as
the Internet.
Spec. ¶ 12.
The Specification further describes:
A server may be any computer device that is connected to the
communication channels provided. As used herein, the term
merchant may be used interchangeably with a merchant server.
Similar communications involving the acquirer and issuer may
also use a server.
Id. ¶ 30. The Specification further describes that “FIG. 11 shows typical
components or subsystems of a computer apparatus.” Id. ¶ 144; Fig. 11.
With regard to the recited “access device,” the Specification
describes:
The access devices 34 according to embodiments of the
invention can be in any suitable form. Examples of access
devices include point of sale (POS) devices, cellular phones,
PDAs, personal computers (PCs), tablet PCs, handheld
specialized readers, set-top boxes, electronic cash registers
(ECRs), automated teller machines (ATMs), virtual cash
registers (VCRs), kiosks, security systems, access systems, and
the like.
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Id. ¶ 127.
The generic computers described in the Specification are well
understood, routine, and conventional, at least because the Specification
describes the computers in a manner that indicates they are sufficiently well
known that the Specification does not need to describe the particulars of
such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. See Berkheimer
Memo8 § III.A.1; Spec. ¶¶ 12, 30, 127.
Thus, because the Specification describes the additional elements in
general terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim
limitations may be broadly but reasonably construed9 as reciting
conventional computer components and techniques, particularly in light of
Appellants’ Specification, as quoted above.
We conclude the claims fail the Step 2B analysis because claim 20, in
essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along with no
more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using
the computer-based elements.

8 Robert W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.), USPTO 3 (2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF) (explaining
that a specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that
indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the
specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional
elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well
understood, routine, and conventional).
9 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as
understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account
whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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With respect to this step of the analysis, Appellants argue the
Examiner has not shown that a sequence of certain claim limitations is
conventional. App. Br. 13–14. The sequence of steps identified by
Appellants, however, is a mix of abstract limitations and additional
elements. And, as explained above, the additional elements identified by
Appellants are no more than “well-understood, routine, conventional
activity.”
Therefore, because claim 20 fails under both the Step 2A and Step 2B
analyses, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claims
20 and 30, and grouped claims 21–25 and 27–45, which fall therewith.

Rejection of Claim 26 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellants argue dependent claim 26 separately. App. Br. 14.
Dependent claim 26 limits claim 20 by reciting “wherein the artificial PAN
is valid for a limited time.” Id. Appellants argue the limitation recited in
claim 26 “clearly constitutes ‘significantly more,’ as it provides the added
advantage of making the artificial PAN temporary in nature.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. The artificial PAN
in claim 20 is abstract information and part of the abstract idea discussed
above. The further limitation of claim 26 does not change our analysis.
Thus, for the reasons discussed above for claim 20, we conclude claim
26 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Accordingly we sustain the
Examiner’s § 101 rejection of dependent claim 26.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 20–45.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED