Mark AspensonDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 8, 20212020006563 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 8, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/380,237 04/10/2019 Mark A. Aspenson P07759US2 2960 34082 7590 03/08/2021 ZARLEY LAW FIRM P.L.C. CAPITAL SQUARE 400 LOCUST, SUITE 200 DES MOINES, IA 50309-2350 EXAMINER SUTCH JR., NORMAN DONALD ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3684 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/08/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): crasmussen@zarleylaw.com emarty@zarleylaw.com kconrad@zarleylaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MARK A. ASPENSON ____________ Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, JAMES P. CALVE, and NINA L. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judges. MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–7. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed May 20, 2020) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed September 21, 2020), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 20, 2020) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed November 22, 2019). Appellant does not identify the real party in interest; therefore, we assume that the inventor, Mark A. Aspenson, is the real party in interest (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37 (c)(1)(i)). Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 2 CLAIMED INVENTION The Specification states, “[t]his invention is directed to a system for selling and distributing products and services and more particularly to a system that provides incentives to make sales and efficiencies in distributing product” (Spec. 1:10–12). Claim 1, reproduced below with bracketed notations added, is the sole independent claim and representative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A distribution and sales system, comprising: [(a)] a master entity that owns rights to various products and services and that has a controller with a processor connected to an electronic network; [(b)] a plurality of management tiers having different management responsibilities, territories, and ownership rights; [(c)] wherein ownership fees are paid by the plurality of management tiers and received by the master entity based upon the different responsibilities, territories, and ownership rights and the processor calculates roll back fees from the master entity and the master entity distributes the roll back fees to the plurality of management tiers based upon the different management responsibilities, territories and ownership rights; [(d)] a lowest management tier has a facility to distribute products and services to purchasing customers; [(e)] purchase/service orders are made through a remote computer connected to the processor of the master entity and the master entity processor determines whether an order is large, small, exclusive, non-exclusive and selects a distribution means based upon the determination; [(f)] where the processor of the master entity sends instructions to a manufacturer to deliver an ordered product to the lowest management tier closest to a location of a purchasing customer. Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 3 REJECTION Claims 1–7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. ANALYSIS Appellant argues claims 1–7 as a group (Appeal Br. 3–6). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 4 nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. at 217–18 (alteration in original). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019, for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).2 That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is, thus, a two-prong test. In Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next determine, in Step 2A, Prong Two, whether the claim as a whole integrates 2 The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) incorporates the revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020). Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 5 the recited judicial exception into a practical application, i.e., whether the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. Id. at 54–55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. Id. If the claim is determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, we next evaluate the additional elements, individually and in combination, in Step 2B, to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, i.e., whether the additional elements or combination of elements amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself; only then, is the claim patent eligible. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, in rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that the claims recite a system where a master entity . . . owns rights to various products and services; a plurality of management tiers have various characteristics; wherein ownership fees are paid by the plurality of management tiers and received by the master entity based upon the various characteristics and roll back fees from the master entity are calculated and distributed to the plurality of management tiers based upon the various characteristics; a lowest management tier has a facility to distribute products and services to purchasing customers; purchase/service orders are made and the master entity determines a distribution means based on the size of the order; the master entity sends instructions to a manufacturer to deliver an ordered product to the lowest management tier closest to a location of a purchasing customer[,] Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 6 i.e., commercial or legal interactions, which are a “certain method of organizing human activity” and, therefore, an abstract idea (Final Act. 6 (further observing that the claims are analogous to those in In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009), where “the court ruled that structuring a distribution and sales company is an abstract idea”)), and that the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application (id. at 6–7). The Examiner also determined that the claims do not include additional elements sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (id. at 7). Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A) We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Appeal Br. 3–4). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that claim 1 focuses on an abstract idea, and not on an improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification is titled “DISTRIBUTION AND SALES SYSTEM FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES,” and describes, in the Background section, that “[p]resently, most systems create a competitive environment Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 7 where sales individuals in the same organization compete against one another and are not rewarded financially for assisting other sales representatives. As a result, there is little incentive to assist others” (Spec. 1:13–16). The Specification describes that the distribution of products from the manufacturer to a customer also is often inefficient in that product is either shipped in less than full loads or a full load is directed to multiple delivery locations; the process additionally goes through multiple brokers, distributors, and sales personnel (id. at 1:17–19). The claimed invention is ostensibly intended to address these shortcomings by providing a system where all members benefit from the sale of a product or service, and where products are delivered more efficiently (Spec. 1:21–24). Claim 1, thus, recites a distribution and sales system comprising: (1) a master entity that owns the rights to various products and services, i.e., “a master entity that owns rights to various products and services and that has a controller with a processor connected to an electronic network” (limitation (a)); and (2) “a plurality of management tiers having different management responsibilities, territories, and ownership rights” (limitation (b)), “[the] lowest management tier [having] a facility to distribute products and services to purchasing customers” (limitation (d)). Claim 1 further recites that: (1) the management tiers pay ownership fees to the master entity and the master entity, in return, distributes roll back fees to the management tiers based on their respective management responsibilities, territories and ownership rights, i.e., wherein ownership fees are paid by the plurality of management tiers and received by the master entity based upon the different responsibilities, territories, and ownership rights and the processor calculates roll back fees from the master entity Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 8 and the master entity distributes the roll back fees to the plurality of management tiers based upon the different management responsibilities, territories and ownership rights (limitation (c)); and (2) the master entity receives purchase/service orders; selects a distribution means depending on whether an order is large, small, exclusive or non-exclusive; and instructs the manufacturer to deliver the ordered product to the lowest management tier that is closest to the purchasing customer’s location, i.e., purchase/service orders are made through a remote computer connected to the processor of the master entity and the master entity processor determines whether an order is large, small, exclusive, non-exclusive and selects a distribution means based upon the determination; where the processor of the master entity sends instructions to a manufacturer to deliver an ordered product to the lowest management tier closest to a location of a purchasing customer (limitations (e) and (f)). We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite marketing or sales activities or behaviors, e.g., fee-splitting arrangements between business entities, and are similar to structuring a distribution and sales company, which the court in In re Ferguson held is patent ineligible (Final Act. 6). Appellant argues that, in determining that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, the Examiner ignored “essential limitations of the claimed subject matter,” including “the necessary presence of a controller with a processor connected to an electronic network” and the required presence of a remote computer connected to the processor (Appeal Br. 3). Appellant maintains that “[t]he presence of these physical, non-human elements and their required configurations clearly move[s] the claimed subject matter into the realm of eligibility as the claimed subject matter goes well beyond Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 9 organizing human activity” (id.). Yet, the fact that a computer may be required is an insufficient basis to persuasively argue that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. Indeed, a substantially similar argument was expressly rejected by the Court in Alice. Thus, although the claimed invention in Alice involved a computer system acting as a third-party intermediary between two parties, Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 224, the Court held that “the claims at issue amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.” Id. at 225–26. See also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“the inability for the human mind to perform each claim step does not alone confer patentability. As we have explained, ‘the fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.’” (citation omitted)); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[N]ot every claim that recites concrete, tangible components escapes the reach of the abstract-idea inquiry.”). Appellant’s further argument, i.e., that the Examiner’s position is contradictory, is similarly unavailing (Appeal Br. 3). Appellant ostensibly maintains that the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed to a machine, i.e., that the claimed subject matter falls within one of the four categories of patentable subject matter, is contrary to the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, i.e., a method of organizing human activity. Yet, as described above, although 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 10 useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,” the Supreme Court has interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216. Thus, although a claim may be directed, for example, to a machine, i.e., one of the categories of patentable subject matter, the claim is nonetheless excluded from patent eligibility if the claimed subject matter is an abstract idea. We find no contradiction in the Examiner’s determination here that claim 1, although directed to a machine, recites marketing or sales activities or behaviors, i.e., one of “certain methods of organizing human activity” and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We also are not persuaded of Examiner error by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 includes additional elements that integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application (Appeal Br. 3–4). The 2019 Revised Guidance references MPEP, Ninth Edition (rev. Jan 2018) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ pac/mpep/old/mpep_E9R08-2017.htm) § 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e) in non-exhaustively listing considerations indicative that an additional element or combination of elements may have integrated a recited judicial exception into a practical application. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. In particular, the Guidance describes that an additional element may have integrated the judicial exception into a practical application if the additional element (1) reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field; (2) applies or uses the judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition; (3) implements the judicial exception with, or uses the Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 11 judicial exception with, a particular machine or manufacture integral to the claim; (4) effects a transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing; or (5) applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Id. At the same time, the Guidance makes clear that merely including instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely using a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea; adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception; or only generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment or field are not sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Id. Appellant argues here that the claimed subject matter includes elements and combinations of elements that impose meaningful limitations, such that the claimed subject matter is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception (Appeal Br. 4). Yet, Appellant misapprehends the controlling precedent to the extent Appellant maintains that claim 1 is patent eligible because there is no risk of preemption. Although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that drives [the exclusion of abstract ideas from patent-eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216, characterizing preemption as a driving concern for patent eligibility is not the same as characterizing preemption as the sole test for patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 12 Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 216). “[P]reemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. We also are not persuaded to the extent Appellant maintains that claim 1 is patent eligible because the abstract idea is implemented with, or uses a particular machine or manufacture, i.e., “a controller with a processor” and “a remote computer” (Appeal Br. 4). The Federal Circuit has recognized that the machine-or-transformation test,3 although not the only test, “can provide a ‘useful clue’” to patent eligibility under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 594). As such, satisfying either prong of that test may integrate an abstract idea into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 nn.27–28 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(b), (c)). At the same time, however, it is well settled that “whether a [recited] device is ‘a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a ‘machine’)’ is not dispositive.” ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 224). For a machine to impose a meaningful limit on the claimed invention, it must play a significant part in permitting a claimed method to be performed, rather than merely providing the generic environment in which to implement the recited abstract idea. Cf. Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 3 Under the machine-or-transformation test, a claimed process is patent eligible if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 13 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(b)(II) (citing Versata). Here, the controller, processor, and remote computer perform the latter role. As the Examiner observes, these elements are recited at a high level of generality ((Final Act. 6–7); they also are similarly described in the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. 2:13–14, 3:21–24). Rather than being tied to a particular machine, claim 1 merely implements an abstract idea using generic computer components, which is not enough for patent eligibility. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention.”); BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“An abstract idea on ‘an Internet computer network’ or on a generic computer is still an abstract idea”) (citation omitted). We also note that although Appellant asserts, “at a minimum, the claimed subject matter amounts to a narrow and practical application of structuring a distribution and sales company” (Appeal Br. 4), the relevant question under Step 2A, Prong 2 is not whether the claimed invention itself, i.e., structuring a distribution and sales company, is a practical application; instead, the question is whether the claim includes additional elements beyond the judicial exception that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Here, the only additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract idea are “a controller with a processor connected to an Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 14 electronic network”; and “a remote computer connected to the processor,” i.e., generic computer components. We conclude, for the reasons outlined above, that claim 1 recites a method of organizing human activity, i.e., an abstract idea, and that the additional elements recited in the claim beyond the abstract idea are no more than generic computer components used as tools to perform the recited abstract idea. As such, they do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)). Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step Two of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2B) Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework, whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether an additional element or combination of elements adds specific limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in the field (which is indicative that an inventive concept is present) or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 15 The Examiner determined here, and we agree, that the only additional elements recited in claim 1, beyond the abstract idea, are “a controller with a processor” and “a remote computer,” i.e., generic computer components (Final Act. 6–7) — a determination amply supported by, and fully consistent with the Specification (see, e.g., Spec. 2:13–14, 3:21–24). Appellant cannot reasonably maintain that there is insufficient factual support for the Examiner’s determination that these components are well-understood, routine, or conventional, where, as here, there is nothing in the Specification to indicate that the operations recited in claim 1 require any specialized hardware or inventive computer components or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than a generic computer component to perform generic computer functions, e.g., receiving, processing, and transmitting information. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“BSG Tech does not argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or in combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”). Appellant ostensibly maintains here that claim 1 provides an inventive concept because the claimed distribution and sales system provides an Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 16 improvement to a technological process (Appeal Br. 5–6). Citing page one of the Specification, Appellant asserts that it has identified a number of technological problems (i.e., the insubstantial incentive to assist others where sales individuals compete against one another in the same organization and are not rewarded financially for assisting other sales representatives; and the distribution problem that exists where products to a customer are shipped inefficiently in less than a full load or a full load is directed to multiple delivery locations), and that these problems “have a technological solution and are solved by the claimed distribution and sales system” (id. at 5). Appellant observes that the claimed system, as recited in claim 1, requires a plurality of management tiers having different management responsibilities, territories, and ownership rights and that “a processor calculates roll back fees from ownership fees paid based upon the different management responsibilities, territories and ownership rights (i.e., rules)” (Appeal Br. 5). Appellant argues that these rules solve “the technical problem where sales individuals who compete against one another in the same organization are financially rewarded for assisting other sales representatives and an incentive to assist others is provided” and that the system, in requiring that the processor of the master entity send instructions to a manufacturer to deliver an ordered product to the lowest management tier closest to a location of a purchasing customer, “provides a technological solution to the distribution problem where products to a customer are often shipped inefficiently either in less than full loads or a full load is directed to multiple delivery locations” (id. at 5–6). Appeal 2020-006563 Application 16/380,237 17 Appellant maintains that the claimed invention, thus, provides a technological improvement. But, we are not persuaded that providing an incentive for sales representatives to assist other sales representatives or that instructing a manufacturer to ship products to the distribution facility closest to a customer’s location is a technological improvement as opposed to an improvement to the abstract idea of structuring a sales and distribution operation, which is not enough for patent eligibility. See SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[P]atent law does not protect such claims[, i.e., claims to an asserted advance in the realm of abstract ideas], without more, no matter how groundbreaking the advance.”). We are not persuaded, on the present record, that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claims 2–7, which fall with claim 1. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–7 101 Eligibility 1–7 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation