0120062457
11-28-2007
Mario R. Iglehart, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Mario R. Iglehart,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01200624571
Agency No. 1G-787-0004-052
Hearing No. 360-2005-00232X
DECISION
Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's final action dated February
3, 2006, finding no discrimination with regard to his complaint. In his
complaint, dated October 7, 2004, complainant, a Mail Processing Clerk,
PS-05, at the agency's General Mail Facility (GMF) in Austin, Texas,
alleged discrimination based on race (Black), color (brown), sex (male),
age (DOB: 8/9/63), disability (chronic sinusitis), and in reprisal for
prior EEO activity when:
(1) On September 16, 2004, the agency failed to provide him with training
opportunities;
(2) On October 8, 2004, his request for a reasonable accommodation was
denied; and
(3) On November 2, 2004, his request for a change of schedule was denied.
Upon completion of the investigation of the complaint, complainant
requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On January
31, 2006, the AJ issued a decision without holding a hearing, finding no
discrimination. The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
The Commission finds that grant of summary judgment was appropriate,
as no genuine dispute of material fact exists. In this case, the AJ
determined that, assuming arguendo that complainant had established a
prima facie case of discrimination, the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for the alleged actions.
With regard to claim (1), the agency stated that complainant never sought
training as a dock expediter. The AJ noted that there is no evidence in
the record to show that complainant sought training but that his request
was denied. The AJ further noted that there was no evidence presented
that it was management's practice to inform employees that such training
was available, as opposed to requiring interested individuals to take
it upon themselves to inform management of their interest in training.
With regard to claim (3), the AJ indicated that complainant claimed
that he had received custody of his daughter during the upcoming
Christmas holidays, and that he submitted a request for a change of
schedule because, "With a change of schedule [his] girlfriend could
watch her at night," but management failed to respond. The AJ stated
that complainant's acting supervisor, supervisor and the GMF's acting
manager each denied that s/he had ever received complainant's request.
The acting supervisor during the relevant time period at issue indicated
that she did not have information about the alleged request nor did she
deny the request. On appeal, complainant does not dispute this argument.
With regard to claim (2), the AJ noted that complainant, who had chronic
sinusitis resulting from an extreme sensitivity to mold, alleged that
the agency failed to accommodate this disabling condition by reassigning
him on November 2, 2004, from the Austin GMF to the San Antonio GMF.
The AJ also noted that complainant previously filed an EEO complaint on
November 6, 2002, which alleged, among other things, that the agency had
failed to accommodate his sinusitis by removing visible mold over the
registry cage where he worked. On August 17, 2005, the same AJ issued
a decision finding disability discrimination regarding the November 6,
2002 reasonable accommodation claim.3 The AJ, in the instant matter,
found that at the time of the alleged incident, complainant was rotating
duties and was no longer confined to the registry cage over which visible
mold had been growing. The acting manager stated that he did not grant
or deny complainant's reassignment request; rather, the acting manager
forwarded the request to the District Reasonable Accommodations Committee
(DRAC). The AJ pointed out that the DRAC then tried to gather medical
information from complainant but complainant did not quickly cooperate
in the process.
The AJ stated that complainant also acknowledged that during the
relevant time period at issue, he was informed that the reason he
was not transferred to San Antonio was that San Antonio's GMF had the
same climate and atmosphere as the center in Austin where he worked.
The AJ also added that in mid-July 2005, complainant notified the AJ
and the agency that he was now employed by the agency in Falls Church,
Virginia.4 Based on the foregoing, the AJ found, and we agree, that
complainant failed to demonstrate that the San Antonio GMF constituted a
better work environment for him with regard to his sinusitis due to lower
level of mold in the workplace. Complainant has not shown how a transfer
to San Antonio GMF would have accommodated his disability. Therefore,
complainant failed to show that a transfer to San Antonio GMF was a
reasonable accommodation for his disability.
After a review of the record, the Commission agrees with the AJ that
complainant failed to rebut the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the alleged incidents. Assuming (without deciding)
that complainant was an individual with a disability, the Commission
agrees with the AJ that complainant failed to show that he was denied
a reasonable accommodation or that any agency actions were motivated
by discrimination.
Accordingly, the agency's final action is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
11/28/2007
__________________
Date
1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the
above referenced appeal number.
2 It is noted that the instant complaint was also referred to as Agency
No. 1G-787-0008-04 before an EEOC Administrative Judge.
3 The record indicates that the agency issued a final order dated October
11, 2005, adopting the AJ's decision. In EEOC Appeal No. 0120060533
(March 30, 2007), the Commission affirmed the AJ's decision.
4 On appeal, complainant admits that he accepted this new position
in Virginia on June 13, 2005. It is noted that complainant made a
typographical error by indicating 2004, instead of 2005.
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0120062457
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036