01A23213
05-29-2003
Maria C. Anguiano, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area) Agency.
Maria C. Anguiano v. United States Postal Service
01A23213
May 29, 2003
.
Maria C. Anguiano,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Southwest Area)
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A23213
Agency No. 4G-780-0068-01
Hearing No. 36OA18279X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal
is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,
the Commission affirms the agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether complainant was discriminated
against on the bases of her sex (female) and race (Caucasian) when,
allegedly, the agency violated complainant's medical restrictions by
requiring her to work more than six hours per day.
BACKGROUND
Complainant, a Customer Service Supervisor, EAS-15, at the Downtown
Station in San Antonio, Texas, filed a formal complaint on January
2, 2001. On March 21, 2001, the agency issued an �Amendment/Partial
Acceptance/Dismissal of Complaint,� dismissing some of complainant's
claims for untimely contact of an EEO Counselor and for failure to state
a claim. The agency accepted for investigation the following claims: (1)
from May 31, 2000, to January 2, 2001, complainant's medical restrictions
were violated when she was required to work more than six hours per day;
and (2) on unspecified dates, complainant was docked two to three hours
of sick leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) even though she
worked more than four hours.<1>
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). Prior to the hearing, complainant submitted
a letter, dated January 29, 2002, requesting to amend her complaint to
include a claim of hostile work environment. On March 22, 2002, the
AJ issued an �Order Denying Complainant's Request to Amend Complaint
and Stating Issues� to be decided. The AJ concluded that the hostile
work environment claim proposed by complainant was untimely. The AJ
conducted a hearing on March 24, 2002, and following the hearing, the
AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination.<2>
The AJ concluded that management articulated a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for its action, namely, that complainant was
never required, ordered, or coerced to work more than six hours per day.
The AJ further concluded that complainant did so voluntarily of her
own volition. The AJ did not find evidence of pretext in this case.
The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant contends, among other things, that the AJ
erred when he did not rule on the claim of hostile work environment.
Complainant also contends that the AJ rejected her crucial witnesses to
her case. Complainant alleged that those witnesses were the nurses who
would have testified regarding the numerous occasions that complainant was
indeed physically unable to return to work; her supervisor nevertheless
instructed her to return to work; did not believe that she was ill;
and insisted that she work beyond her restrictions.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
In general, claims alleging disparate treatment are examined under the
tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must first establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that
a prohibited reason was a factor in the adverse employment action.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency must articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action(s). Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). After the
agency has offered the reason for its action, the burden returns to the
complainant to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
agency's reason was pretextual, that is, it was not the true reason or
the action was influenced by legally impermissible criteria. Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253; St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and
that the AJ's decision referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. Assuming arguendo that complainant established prima facie cases
of race and/or sex discrimination, the Commission finds that the agency
has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
The Commission also finds that complainant failed to present evidence
that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons were false
and a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note
that complainant merely argued that even though that her supervisor had
medical documentation limiting her work hours to no more than 5 hours
to 6 �, he mandated her to work well past 8 hours. The record reveals
that management never required or ordered complainant to work over six
hours. The evidence shows that complainant worked over six hours and on
weekends voluntarily. Therefore, we concluded that complainant failed
to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated by
discriminatory animus toward complainant's race or sex. We discern no
basis to disturb the AJ's decision.
We further conclude that the AJ has the authority to limit the number
of witnesses where testimony would be repetitious. Therefore, the AJ
did not erred when he denied complainant's request to have some of her
witnesses testify at the hearing.
Finally, under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., complainant's claim of harassment must fail. See Enforcement
Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 6 (March 8, 1994).
A prima facie case of harassment is precluded based on our findings that
complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the
agency were motivated by his race or sex. See Oakley v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's
final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 29, 2003
__________________
Date
1Complainant withdrew claim (2) at the hearing.
2The AJ identified complainant's race as Hispanic. However, complainant
identified her race as Caucasian.