Macon Textiles, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 30, 1948

80 N.L.R.B. 1525 (N.L.R.B. 1948)

In the Matter Of MACON TEXTILES, INC. and TEXTILE WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA, CIO
Cam No . 10-C-2057.-Decided December 30, 1948
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On May 15, 1947, Trial Examiner John H. Eadie issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices,' and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that
the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (3) of the Act as alleged in
the complaint, by discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment of Frank Wesson, Hubert Parten, Mattie Lee Meadows,
Effie Dennis, and Pebble Shelnut, and recommended that the com-
plaint be dismissed as to them. Thereafter, the Respondent and the
Union filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and supporting
briefs. The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied,
inasmuch as the record and briefs, in our opinion,2 adequately present
the issues and positions of the parties.
On November 10, 1947, the Respondent filed with the Board a
Motion to Dismiss, in which it alleged that the Union and its parent
organization, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), had
not complied with the filing requirements of Section 9 (f), (g), and
(h) of the Act, as amended, and contended therefore that the Board
should not proceed further with the cage. The Board has held on
similar facts that the failure of the parent organizations (AFL and
CIO) to comply with the filing requirements of the Act does not affect
1 The provisions of Section 8 (1) and ( 3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which the
Trial Examiner found the Respondent had violated , are continued in Section 8 (a) (1) and
8 (a) (3) of the Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.
2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three -man panel
consisting of the undersigned Board Members . [ Chairman Herzog and Members Houston
and Reynolds.]
80 N. L. R. B., NO. 238.
1525
1526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Board's adjudicatory powers.3 The Board has also ruled that
non-compliance of a charging union does not preclude adjudication
of an unfair labor practice case in which the complaint issued before
August 22, 1947; 4 in any event, it appears that the Union is now in
compliance. The Respondent's motion to dismiss is therefore denied.
In its exceptions and brief, the Respondent contends that the Trial
Examiner erred in overruling in certain respects the Respondent's
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, and in granting the motion of
counsel for the Board to amend the complaint at the hearing. As
to the first contention, the record reveals that a Bill of Particulars
was served on the Respondent in reply to its Motion, and that, al-
though the Respondent objected to the alleged incompleteness of the
Bill, no motion for a further bill was made. As to the second con-
tention, the Board's Rules and Regulations provide for amendment
of the complaint at the hearing.5 In regard to both contentions, the
Respondent appeared at the hearing, participated fully in the pro-
ceeding, examined and cross-examined witnesses, was afforded full
opportunity to introduce evidence, and, as previously indicated, filed
a brief with the Board. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the
Respondent has not been prejudiced or surprised by the Trial
Examiner's rulings. We find the Respondent's contentions in this
respect to be without merit. The Board has reviewed the other
rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner,
insofar as they are consistent with this Decision and Order. In its
exceptions and brief, the Respondent contends that the Trial Exam-
iner did not consider all the evidence bearing on certain incidents
and that as to those incidents the Trial Examiner's findings are in
some respects biased and prejudicial. We find no merit to these con-
tentions. The failure of the Trial Examiner to detail completely
all conflicts in the evidence does not mean, as the Respondent infers,
that this conflicting evidence was not considered. $ Indeed the Trial
Examiner stated in the Intermediate Report that his findings are
based upon the record as a whole. Moreover, we have independently
considered all the evidence and, while we do not agree entirely with the
8 Matter of Northern Virginia Broadcasters , Inc., 75 N. L R. B. 11.
4 Matter of Marshall and Bruce Company, 75 N. L. R. B 90
0 See Section 203 17 , National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 5,
which is substantially the same as Section 203.13 of Series 4, in effect at the time of the
hearing in this matter.
6 See N. L. R. B. v. Texas Mining d Smelting Company, 117 F. (2d) 86 , 87 (C. A. 5).
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1527
Trial Examiner's resolution of all issues, we are satisfied that his
findings were made on the basis of all the available evidence and that
there is nothing in the record indicating bias and prejudice by the
Trial Examiner.
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion 7
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent violated
Section 8 (1) of the Act by the following preelection and election day
conduct, more fully set forth in the Intermediate Report: (a) the
circulation of the July 15, 1946, letter promising employees certain
economic benefits; 8 (b) the July 23 speeches of General Manager
Barnes containing certain promises of benefits; (c) Barnes' remarks
and actions of September 3, the day before the election; (d) the state-
ments and activities of Overseers Jolly and Martin; s and (e) the re-
fusal to admit employees Parten and Armon Guyton to the polling
place on the day of the election. Unlike the Trial Examiner, how-
ever, we do not find that the Respondent, by participating in the post-
election celebration or by Barnes' speech at that time, violated the
Act. The demonstration and speech, even though celebrating a
victory over the Union, were expressions of opinion 10 not violative of
the Act. 11
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the notice dated
August 23, 1946, outlining certain working rules and encompassing
rules against solicitation, is not per se violative of the Act, but that the
discriminatory application of the rules by the Respondent against
known union adherents was unlawful. We do not, however, agree
with the Trial Examiner's finding that a later notice dated December
12, is per se violative of the Act. The December 12 notice apparently
refers to the August 23 notice and must therefore be read as if the sub-
4 The Intermediate Report contains certain minor misstatements or inadvertencies, none
of which affects the correctness of the Trial Examiner 's ultimate conclusions . Accord-
ingly, we note the following corrections : The Cedartown plant is not owned or operated
by the Respondent , but is, like the Respondent , a subsidiary of the same parent organiza-
tion. And the union hall, and not the union office , is on Cherry Street in Macon, Georgia.
s The Trial Examiner found that this announcement of economic benefits violated the
Act because it was made in answer to organizational campaign claims of the Union. How-
ever , we do not believe the illegality of such an announcement necessarily turns on whether
or not it is made in answer to union claims . Rather , we believe it sufficient , as we here
find, that the announcement was calculated directly to affect the decision of employees on
the issue of union representation . See Matter of Hudson Hosiery Company, 72 N. L. R. B.
1434, 1437.
0 We do not , however, rely upon the conversation Martin had with employee Samuel
Mitchell sometime during July. Martin's inquiries and remarks made at that time consti-
tute protected free speech.
1° See Matter of The Hills Brothers Company, 67 N. L. R B 1249, 1255.
11 Section 8 (c) of the amended Act states that the "expressing of any . . . opinion
. whether in written , printed, graphic, or visual form shall not constitute . . . an
unfair labor practice. .. .
1528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
stantive content of the earlier notice were wholly incorporated therein.
Viewed in this light, the December 12 notice prohibits union and other
solicitations only during actual working hours, and is therefore a
valid limitation on union activity. There is no evidence in the record
as to the application of this later notice.
3. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
violated Section 8 (1) of the Act, by inducing the resignation of cer-
tain rank-and-file employees from the Union. This finding is based
on the activity of various supervisors and of certain non-supervisory
employees, viz: Seagraves, Ikner, Rutledge, and Toney. Among other
things, the Respondent contends that the evidence is insufficient to
attribute the activities of these non-supervisors to the Respondent.
We find no merit to this contention.
Indicative of the Respondent's connection with the anti-union
activity of these non-supervisors are the following circumstances :
(a) on July 23, 1-946, following General Manager Barnes' speech, Rut-
ledge and Toney also addressed remarks to the Respondent's em-
ployees; (b) Rutledge circulated the anti-union petition with the
Respondent's knowledge; (c) Overseer Connally told employee Swann
that Rutledge could get him out of the Union; (d) Seagraves was
the Respondent's representative at the preelection conference; (e) on
September 3, Ikner was goaded by Barnes to attack union organizer
Geiger; (f) on the day of the election, Ikner at the direction of
Barnes acted as gateman at the Respondent's mill where the polls
were located; 12 and (g) Seagraves, Ikner, and Toney attended the
post-election celebration at which time Barnes stated that Seagraves
had won a victory over the Union.
The foregoing circumstances, viewed in the light of the entire record
and especially the fact that these non-supervisors and certain super-
visory personnel pursued parallel courses of action in their anti-union
activity, convince us that the Respondent instigated, encouraged, and
approved the anti-union activity of the non-supervisors and made it
appear to all employees that these non-supervisors were acting for and
in behalf of management.
4. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
by instigating and participating in the surveillance of union meet-
ings violated the Act. In excepting to this finding, the Respondent
points out that the union meeting hall was located on a main thorough-
fare and that it was mere coincidence when persons, for whose activ-
ities we have found the Respondent responsible, were in the vicinity
of the hall at the time meetings were conducted. However, we view
as persuasive evidence of illegal surveillance the fact that many of
the Respondent's employees were interrogated concerning union ac-
12 At the time of the election Ikner was regularly employed as a fixer.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1529
tivities shortly after attending union meetings which, according to
the credited testimony of the same employees, were under observa-
tion of the Respondent's supervisors or of Ikner, Seagraves, Toney,
or Rutledge.
B. The discrimination
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent
discriminated as to the hire and tenure of employment of Armon
Guyton, Coleman Meadows, Dorothy Guyton, Arlo Meadows, Al-
phonso Clark, Evander Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young,
Ella Middleton, W. G. Guyton, Hubert D. Meadows, and James W.
Wesson. The Trial Examiner also found, and we agree, that the
Respondent discriminatorily laid off Elzie Ray Bussell, James O.
Freeman, and Floyd Shelton. 113
(a) As to Armon Guyton,14 Coleman Meadows, Arlo Meadows,
Alphonso Clark, Evander Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young,
Ella Middleton, Elzie Ray Bussell,15 and Floyd Shelton,16 we adopt
the Trial Examiner's findings, as detailed in the Intermediate Report.
(b) Dorothy Guyton: The Respondent contends that Dorothy Guy-
ton quit her job. Guyton testified that on August 10, 1946, she ob-
tained permission from Overseer Hulsey to take 2 weeks' leave of
absence to get married, but that it was understood that if she failed
to marry, she was to report back to work in 2 weeks. She did marry.
We are not persuaded by Hulsey's testimony that a condition was
allegedly attached to Guyton's returning to work. Rather, we be-
lieve, as the Trial Examiner found, that Guyton received the more
plausible unconditional 2 weeks' leave of absence.
While the record is not wholly clear as to why Guyton extended
her leave of absence to 3 weeks, we find that matter of no consequence
for in refusing to return Guyton to her job on September 1, 1946,
Hulsey made no reference to that fact. Instead, according to the
credible testimony of Guyton, he merely stated that there was no
work available for her. Shortly thereafter, however, when Guyton
endeavored to get her old job back, Hulsey stated that he had work
for her, "if you pull out of that mess you are in." This remark, in
the light of Hulsey's prior threat to Guyton (upon learning of her
union membership) that the Respondent would discharge all mem-
is As shall hereinafter appear, we do not agree with the Trial Examiner that Floyd Shel-
ton was discriminatorily discharged ; accordingly , we agree with the Trial Examiner's find-
ing, as they relate to Floyd Shelton , only insofar as they pertain to his discriminatory
lay-off.
14 In adopting the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Armon Guyton, we do not rely upon the testimony of Effie Dennis.
15 Our finding in regard to Elzie Ray Bussell is in no way dependent upon testimony ad-
duced concerning the dispossessory notices served upon Bussell , discussed in some detail
in the Intermediate Report.
11 See footnote 13, supra.
1530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
bers of the Union, convinces us that the real reason for refusing to
return Guyton to her job on September 1, was her union membership.
Accordingly, we find that Dorothy Guyton was discriminatorily dis-
charged on September 1, 1946.17
(c) W. G. Guyton: The Respondent contends that it legitimately
refused to hire Guyton on or about October 18, 1946, because of his
past conduct in December 1945, at which time Guyton was discharged
for the improper possession of a key to one of the Respondent's mill
gates. However, we credit Guyton's testimony, as did the Trial
Examiner, that Plant Superintendent Durkee stated that he no longer
held the key incident against Guyton, but that he could not in any
event employ Guyton until he got his "family straightened out."
Guyton replied, in substance, that as his children, Armon and
Dorothy,," were adult married people he could not interfere in their
activities. In view of the fact that the record reveals conclusively
that Durkee was aware that Armon and Dorothy were members of
the Union, we find that Durkee's remark to Guyton referred to their
union activities, and that Guyton was refused employment because
he refused to enjoin Armon and Dorothy to leave the Union. Accord-
ingly, we find that the Respondent refused to hire Guyton in violation
of Section 8 (3) of the Act."'
(d) Hubert D. Meadows: We agree with the Trial Examiner that
the Respondent discharged Hubert Meadows in violation of Section
8 (3) of the Act. However, we do not share the Trial Examiner's
intuition that "Meadows acted as Martin undoubtedly expected" on
the day of his discharge at the time Martin was weighing Meadows'
cans. Nor do we share the Trial Examiner's doubt as to why Hobbs
reweighed the cans into which Meadows deposited yarn, for the record
shows that Hobbs, as section man, was supposed to check the weight
of the cans.
(e) James 0. Freeman: On the night of August 26, 1946, Freeman
reported to work. Overseer Dye detected alcohol on Freeman's breath
and sent him home that night, telling him to report to work as usual
on the following night. However, when Freeman reported on the
night of August 27, Dye laid him off for 2 weeks. The Respondent
IT In making this finding, we do not agree with the Trial Examiner that the circumstances
surrounding Guyton's discharge amount to a constructive discharge ; nor do we in any
manner rely upon the hearsay testimony of Dorothy Guyton concerning Hulsey 's alleged
statements to Dorothy Guyton's mother.
" The Trial Examiner, apparently through inadvertence , referred to Dorothy as Guyton's
daughter -in-law. We have already found that both Armon and Dorothy Guyton were dis-
criminatorily discharged.
19 Board Member Reynolds does not concur in this finding of discrimination, because he
is not convinced that the Respondent's refusal to hire W. G. Guyton was motivated by any
other reason than Guyton 's conduct in the past , namely the improper possession of, and
the refusal to return , a key to the mill gates.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1531
contends that Freeman was disciplined for coming to work intoxicated
on the night of August 26, 1946.
Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we agree with the Respondent
that the evidence supports its contention that Freeman was properly
disciplined on August 26. Like the Trial Examiner, however, we
find no merit in the Respondent's contention that the 2-week lay-off
meted out on August 27 was for cause. On that very night, according
to Freeman's credible testimony, Dye stated that he had heard that
Freeman was trying to organize the weave shop in the mill, and that
unless Freeman was a "square shooter" with him, he would not give
Freeman any more work. Dye then told Freeman that he was being
laid off for 2 weeks. These statements of Dye, immediately preceding
disclosure to Freeman of his 2-week lay-off, and the fact that Freeman
had already been disciplined on the evening of August 26, convince
us that the lay-off was intended to discourage Freeman's activities in
behalf of the Union. Therefore, we find that the Respondent laid off
James O. Freeman from August 27 to September 9, 1946, in violation
of Section 8 (3) of the Act 20
(f) James W. Wesson: The Trial Examiner found, and we agree,
that on or about September 9, 1946, the Respondent discriminatorily
demoted and decreased the rate of pay of James W. Wesson and that it
constructively discharged him in violation of the Act on or about
October 16, 1946. We are not persuaded by the testimony of several
Respondent witnesses that Wesson was demoted because, commencing
about June 1, 1946, numerous complaints had been made concerning his
work. The record shows that Wesson was given an individual in-
crease in pay on August 14, 1946, and there is no contention that these
alleged complaints multiplied between that date and the date of Wes-
son's demotion. However, on September 8, 1946, the day before his
demotion, Wesson was elected president of the Union. Plant
Superintendent Durkee congratulated Wesson on having been elected
president immediately after notifying Wesson of his demotion on
September 9, 1946. These circumstances cogently support the Trial
Examiner's finding that Wesson was discriminatorily demoted.
Wesson was unable to perform satisfactorily the job to which he had
been demoted as the working conditions on the new job were impairing
his health. Confronted by this situation which was induced by the
Respondent's discriminatory conduct, Wesson, rather than subject his
health to further impairment, was forced to quit. Accordingly, we
20 In making this finding we do not rely upon the testimony of Freeman relative to his
conversation with Hambrick on September 22, 1946 . Nor, as shall hereafter appear, do
we attach any significance to Hambrick 's activities in regard to the discharge of employee
Schrimshire. Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to consider the Trial Examiner 's finding,
which we do not adopt , that Hambrick was "one of the group of anti-union employees
and that the Respondent instigated and was responsible for his actions."
1532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
agree with the Trial Examiner that Wesson was constructively dis-
charged in violation of the Act. However, we do not believe, as the
Trial Examiner found, that the Respondent deliberately planned to en-
danger Wesson's health, thereby forcing his resignation.
2. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8 (3) of the Act, by terminating the em-
ployment of Oscar F. Teet, Margie N. Rider, Mary Sue Sargent, E. H.
Schrimshire, C. L. Williams, Floyd Shelton, and Ernest F. Wynn.
We shall, therefore, dismiss the complaint as to their discharges.
(a) Oscar F. Teet: The Respondent contends that Oscar Teet was
discharged on August 13, 1946, for inefficiency, and more particularly
for failure to fix a loom on the night of August 12. The record shows
that Teet did in fact fail to fix the loom in question, and that as a result
of this omission considerable imperfect material was turned out during
the following shift. Teet in his testimony defended his action on the
ground that in his opinion the loom was in need of a major overhaul
and that it was not his duty to perform such an overhauling job.
However, we are unable to accept Teet's excuse because of his further
testimony that a few days before August 12 he was specifically in-
structed that he was to perform all types of overhauling jobs. Al-
though the discharge of Teet followed suspiciously close on the heels
of a union meeting held at his home, on the basis of the foregoing and
the entire record in the case, we are nevertheless constrained to dis-
agree with the Trial Examiner and we find that Teet's discharge was
for cause.
(b) Margie N. Rider: Rider was discharged by the Respondent on
August 20, 1946, allegedly for repeated absenteeism and inefficiency
in her work. The Trial Examiner agrees that Rider's "attendance
record was bad for a considerable period of time prior to her dis-
charge," but he discounts the seriousness of this fact by finding that
the Respondent "did not see fit to discipline or reprimand her for her
absences until it knew that she was a member of the Union." The
record does not support such a finding of disparate treatment after
Rider joined the Union. To the contrary, the only testimony which
pointedly dates the time of reprimands for Rider's absences discloses
that some months before Rider joined the Union, she had been laid off
because of absenteeism and had been returned to her job after promis-
ing more regular attendance.
In view of the foregoing, we do not believe that Overseer Martin's
remark to Rider, noted in the margin'21 either of itself or in conjunc-
21 "well, Marjorie , if I let you stay on, some of the rest of them will be thinking they
can do the same thing . Guess I'd better let you go home tonight."
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1533
tion with Martin's other remarks detailed in the Intermediate Report,
justifies an inference that the discharge of Rider was in the nature
of retaliatory action for her refusal to withdraw from the Union
or for her membership therein. Accordingly, contrary to the Trial
Examiner , we find that Rider was discharged for her absences.
(c) Mary Sue Sargent: The record shows that Sargent entered the
Respondent's employ about August 1945; that she joined the Union
on July 23, 1946; that Rutledge and Seagraves solicited Sargent's
resignation from the Union about August 7, 1946; and that during
her employment she worked under Overseer Tracey. On Friday,
August 23, 1946, Sargent was absent from work allegedly because of
illness. When she returned on the following Monday, Tracey insisted
that, before returning to her job, Sargent submit a doctor's certificate
to verify the excuse. As Sargent had not consulted a doctor, she was
unable to produce the certificate, and thereupon left the Respondent's
employ. In view of the prior solicitation of Sargent by the Respond-
ent's agents, and in view of the fact that Sargent had not previously,
under similar circumstances, been required to produce a doctor's cer-
tificate, the Trial Examiner found Tracey's insistence that a doctor's
certificate be furnished as indicative of an illegal motive.
The testimony of both Sargent and Tracey summarized their con-
versation of Monday, August 26, as well as other events occurring
during their employment relationship. In addition, Tracey's testi-
mony covered happenings subsequent to August 26, which were not
commented upon by Sargent. Their respective stories conflict on some
points, but the conflict exists on matters which we deem inconsequen-
tial. Nevertheless, the Trial Examiner relies exclusively on the testi-
mony of Sargent for his detailed account of their last conversation
and of the events preceding it. It may be that by utilizing only Sar-
gent's testimony, the Trial Examiner intended without so stating, to
credit the testimony of Sargent and discredit in its entirety that of
Tracey.22 However, as in our view the testimony of Sargent and
Tracey is neither mutually exclusive nor irreconcilable, we believe that
in this instance an explicit credibility ruling is not only desirable but
is also necessary to bind the Board.23 Therefore, we do not treat the
Intermediate Report as having passed upon the credibility of Overseer
Tracey.
We have reviewed the entire testimony of Overseer Tracey, and we
are impressed by her forthrightness. Accordingly, we credit the fol-
22 See footnote 3 in the Intermediate Report.
"Because a Trial Examiner has the opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses
who aie testilying, it is the established policy of the Board to attach great weight to his
credibility findings and it will not overrule them unless they clearly appear to be unreason-
able. Matter of Eastern Coal Corporation, 79 N. L R. B. 1165.
1534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lowing uncontroverted testimony of Tracey : Tracey testified that at
the time Sargent left her job, she told Tracey "to go to hell"; that
shortly thereafter Sargent sent word to Tracey that she would like
her job back; that Tracey said Sargent could return to her job if she
would apologize for using abusive language; and that Sargent never
did return. We view this conditional offer of reinstatement reasonable
under the circumstances of this case, and of sufficient weight to offset
any inference of illegal motive on the part of Tracey at the time Sar-
gent left the Respondent's employ. We therefore find that Sargent
voluntarily quit her job, and was not, as found by the Trial Examiner,
constructively discharged by the Respondent in violation of Section
8 (3) of the Act.
(d) E. H. Sc/trimshire: The Trial Examiner found that the Re-
spondent planned the events of the night of September 22, 1946, which
led to Schrimshire's discharge, so as to create an "opportunity" to
discharge him for his union activity. We do not agree . As found
by the Trial Examiner, when Schrimshire reported for work at 11: 00
p. m., on the night of September 22, the nightshift overseer (Halsey)
advised him that it would be unnecessary to clean up the "mess"
Schrimshire found on his job. However , we are unable to agree with
the Trial Examiner that Schrimshire's contact with the day-shift
overseer (Jolly) shortly before the close of the shift that night was
planned by the Respondent. According to the uncontradicted testi-
mony of Jolly, which is supported by that of employee Dover, Schrim-
shire, on the morning of September 23, requested Dover to bring Jolly
to his place of work before the beginning of the day shift. The rec-
ord shows that after Jolly approached Schrimshire's machine, an
argument over the latter's failure to clean up the "mess" started; then
a physical altercation ensued, which in our opinion was provoked by
Schrimshire. Schrimshire was immediately thereafter discharged.
In these circumstances we are not convinced, despite evidence in the
record of the Respondent's antipathy toward Schrimshire because of
his union activities, that the discharge was violative of the Act .24
(e) C. L. jilliams: The Respondent contends that it discharged
Williams on October 1, 1946, for "inefficiency and carelessness on the
job resulting in repeated instances of damage to valuable materials."
Williams testified that he had been warned about "stuck yarn" about
3 weeks before he was discharged, and that he had been responsible
for "stuck yarn" on the day he was discharged. The Trial Examiner
nevertheless concludes that, in view of Williams' 41/2 years of satis-
factory service in the employ of the Respondent, and in view of Wil-
24 See Matter of Colonial Life Insurance Company of America, 76 N. L. R. B. 653.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1535
liams' union activities, "stuck yarn" was insufficient cause for discharge
unless the Respondent "was looking for an excuse to discharge him
because of his adherency to the Union."
The record, however, does not establish the fact that the Respondent
was looking for an excuse to discharge Williams. When Overseer
Martin told Williams to get his time on October 1, before doing so
Williams went to General Overseer Lee and asked him for another
job. Lee offered him a job in the weave room. Williams refused
the job because of insufficient experience. He was then given his
time. There is no contradictory evidence on the point, and we there-
fore credit Williams' testimony. This offer of another job appears
to refute the conclusion of the Trial Examiner that the Respondent
was looking for an excuse to discharge Williams. Accordingly, we
find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Williams was discharged
for cause.
(f) Floyd Shelton: The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent
laid off Shelton from August 23 to September 3, 1946, and discharged
him on November 14, 1946, because of his membership in and activities
on behalf of the Union. As hereinbefore stated, we adopt the Trial
Examiner's findings relative to the discriminatory lay-off. We do
not, however, adopt the Trial Examiner's finding that Shelton was
discriminatorily discharged in violation of the Act, for the following
reasons.
Shelton for a number of years worked as a doffer in the Respondent's
mill. On November 14, 1946, by forcing stuck bobbins off the spindles,
Shelton caused damage to the spindles amounting to approximately
$40. Shelton was then immediately discharged. Shelton testified
and the record shows that when bobbins stuck on the spindles, it was
customary for the doffer to call the fixer whose duty it was to pry the
bobbins off. Although he had done so on at least one other occasion,
Shelton did not call the fixer when the bobbins stuck on November
14. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Shelton violated a
company rule and was directly responsible for the damage to the
spindles. Unlike the Trial Examiner we cannot condone Shelton's
actions nor can we hold that damage to the Respondent's property is
insufficient justification for discharge, even if we are to assume that
the Respondent was responsible in the first instance for the bobbins
being stuck. We find therefore, as contended by the Respondent, that
Shelton was discharged for cause.
(g) Ernest F. Wynn: We disagree with the Trial Examiner's find-
ings that the Respondent constructively discharged Wynn on Septem-
ber 20, 1946, in violation of the Act. Overseer Connally had replaced
Overseer Martin as Wynn's immediate supervisor shortly before Sep-
tember 20, 1946. On the latter date, Wynn complained to Overseer
1536 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Martin, saying that he might have a fight with Connally because
Connally was forcing extra work on him. Martin suggested that
Wynn quit and "let this thing blow over." Wynn quit. The Trial
Examiner found, in effect, that as Martin made no offer to ease Wynn's
plight, Wynn's only choice was to leave the Respondent's employ or
to submit to further discriminatory harassment by Connally. How-
ever, at no time, including September 20, 1946, did Wynn indicate to
Overseer Martin that his job was so impossible that he had no alterna-
tive but to resign. In the absence of this fact, it cannot be said that
Martin, by his suggestion that Wynn quit, seized the occasion of Wynn's
complaint against Overseer Connally as an opportunity to force
Wynn's resignation. Under these circumstances, and in view of the
fact that Wynn had voluntarily left the Respondent's employ on
three prior occasions, we do not believe that Wynn was unlawfully
coerced by the Respondent into terminating his employment status on
September 20, 1946.11
3. For the reasons stated in the Intermediate Report, we agree with
the Trial Examiner that the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (3)
of the Act by discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of em-
ployment of Frank Wesson, Hubert Parten, Effie Dennis, and Pebble
Shelnut. We shall therefore dismiss the complaint as to these em-
ployees.
4. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent did not dis-
criminatorily discharge Mattie Lee Meadows.
Meadows joined the Union on July 22, 1946. In the middle of
August of the same year, she attended a union meeting which was
under the surveillance of Rutledge 26 About the same time, Rutledge
came to the Meadows' home stating that he was in a position to get
people out of the Union. From the time Meadows entered the Re-
spondent's employ in February 1945, until August 27, 1946, she had
worked steadily. Between August 27 and September 9,1946, Meadows
was on several occasions kept off her job by the Respondent, allegedly
because of a lack of work, although on those occasions her machines
were operated by employees from another shift. We agree with the
16 Board Member Houston would agree with the Trial Examiner that Wynn was con-
structively discharged because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union
for the following reasons. Wynn was a member of the Union and one of its most active
adherents , being elected secretary -treasurer on September 8, 1946. Wynn testified credibly
that at various times during the month of August , Overseer Martin threatened to make
Wynn's work more difficult because of his union membership , and warned Wynn that all
members of the Union would be run off the job. As detailed in the Intermediate Report,
pursuant to the threat , Wynn was unduly burdened with extra work. When Wynn com-
plained to Martin, Martin suggested he quit Under these circumstances , Member Houston
would find that Wynn was left no alternative but to quit, as he did, or to submit to the
Respondent 's discriminatory practices
2' Rutledge is one of the four nonsupervisors for whose illegal activities we have found
the Respondent responsible.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1537
Trial Examiner that these occasional lay-offs were prompted by the
Respondent's knowledge of Meadows' union membership.
On September 9, 1946, without obtaining permission, Meadows did
not report for work as she was away from town. Her son, Arlo
Meadows, credibly testified that on September 9 he explained the rea-
sons for her absence to Overseer Martin. On September 17, when
Meadows returned to her job, she was not permitted to work, on the
ground that she had quit. The Trial Examiner concludes that the
failure of Meadows to obtain permission to be off from September 9
to September 17, justified the Respondent's refusal to return Meadows
to her job. We do not agree.
The Trial Examiner's finding attaches controlling weight to
Meadows' failure to obtain permission to be absent. We do not be-
lieve that Meadows' omission in this respect warrants such overriding
significance, for the record does not establish that the Respondent
treated as quit or discharged an employee who remained away from
work without permission. Rather, the testimony of General Overseer
Lee and General Manager Barnes shows that the Respondent deemed
it sufficient that an employee gave notice of absence, doubtless realiz-
ing that it was not possible to obtain permission in advance for all
absences. As stated above, Arlo Meadows notified Overseer Martin
that his mother would not report to work on September 9 as she was
away from the city.
Under these circumstances, when Meadows returned to her job on
September 17, she was still an employee of the Respondent and en-
titled to work. No valid reason for refusing to return her to work
appears, for the record discloses that there was no shortage of work
at the Respondent's mill during the time in question. Accordingly,
in view of the Respondent's prior discriminatory lay-offs of Meadows
and as the evidence conclusively shows that the Respondent intended
to rid itself of the services of all members of the Meadows family be-
cause of their adherence to the Union, 27 we find that the Respondent
on September 17, 1946, discriminatorily discharged Mattie Lee
Meadows in violation of Section 8 (3) of the Act 28
Concluding Findings
In making the above findings of discrimination in violation of Sec-
tion 8 (3) of the Act, we have not relied upon the scope and character
of the Respondent's over-all unfair labor practices. In those cases
27 We have already found that the Respondent unlawfully discharged Coleman, Arlo, and
Hubert Meadows, sons of Mattie Lee Meadows.
28 Board Member Reynolds would find, as did the Trial Examiner , that the Respondent
was justified in believing that Mattie Lee Meadows had quit her job and that the Re-
spondent 's refusal to return her to work after her unauthorized absence was not dis-
criminatory.
1538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
where it appears that adherence to or association with the Union was
responsible for the discrimination, we have found violations of the
Act; on the other hand, where it appears that the Respondent's course
of conduct was not a result of union activities, we have not found
violations of the Act. We therefore do not adopt any of the content
of the second paragraph of that section of the Intermediate Report
entitled "Concluding Findings."
Remedy
We have found that the Respondent violated the Act by promising
its employees economic benefits should they refrain from joining the
Union, by threatening them with economic reprisals should they join
the Union, by enjoining them to resign from the Union, by interro-
gating its employees with respect to their union membership and ac-
tivities, by interfering with Board-conducted elections, by threatening
union organizers and agents, by surveillance of union meetings, and
by penalizing its employees in regard to their hire, tenure of employ-
ment, and conditions of employment. The Trial Examiner also
found similar violations of Section 8 (1) and (3) of the Act. How-
ever, his recommended order did not contain any provision directed
particularly at such violations. We are of the opinion, upon the
entire record, that the commission in the future of such acts of inter-
ference and of other unfair labor practices may be anticipated from
the Respondent's conduct in the past.29 We shall therefore order
that the Respondent cease and desist from such conduct, and from
in any other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its em-
ployees in Section 7 of the Act.
We have found that the Respondent constructively discharged
Alphonso Clark, Evander Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, and J. 0.
Young, four Negro employees. In its brief, the Respondent contends
that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to order the rein-
statement of these employees; rather the Respondent contends rein-
statement of these employees would precipitate a walk-out of white
employees in view of the known hostility of the latter employees to-
ward the four discharged employees. We have carefully considered
all the evidence in the record and believe that the Respondent's con-
tention is without merit. The evidence conclusively shows that the
discriminatory treatment of these employees arose because of their
union membership. As employees, therefore, Alphonso Clark, Evan-
der Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, and J. 0. Young, are entitled to the
protection of the Act. Protection can be afforded and the policies of
the Act can be effectuated, we believe, only by the reinstatement of
these employees.
29 N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U. S 426.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1539
Having reversed the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent
did not discharge and refuse to reinstate Mattie Lee Meadows in vio-
lation of the Act and his failure to recommend that the Respondent
offer her reinstatement , we shall order our customary remedy in such
circumstances , excluding from back pay the period between the date
of the Intermediate Report and our Order herein.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Macon Textiles,
Inc., and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of
America, CIO, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by
laying off, discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its employees, or
in any other manner discriminating in regard to any term or condition
of their employment;
(b) Interrogating employees in any manner as to their union activi-
ties or membership;
(c) Offering benefits to employees to refrain from joining, or to
abandon membership in, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, or
any other labor organization;
(d) Threatening discharge or adverse changes in working condi-
tions, including withdrawal of privileges or the disparate application
of working rules, in the event its employees join a union :
(e) Engaging in surveillance of employees in any manner as to their
union activities;
(f) Interfering with the organizational activities of union agents
by threats of physical violence;
(g) Interfering with the conduct of Board-directed representation
elections; and
(h) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Instruct its employees that it will not permit any group of
employees to exclude other employees from its mill property for the
purpose of discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf of,
817319-49-vol 80-98
1540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Textile Workers of America, CIO, or any other labor organization,
and that physical assaults and threats of physical violence by any
group of employees against their fellow employees for the purpose
of discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf of, said labor
organization, or any other labor organization, will not be permitted
in the mill or on mill property at any time, and take effective action
to enforce these instructions;
(b) Offer Mattie Lee Meadows, Armon Guyton, Dorothy Guyton,
Arlo Meadows, Coleman Meadows, Alphonso Clark, Evander Bud
McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young, Ella Middleton, Hubert D.
Meadows, and James W. Wesson immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges;
(c) Offer W. G. Guyton immediate employment at its mill at
Macon, Georgia, consistent with his experience and skill, with all
rights of seniority and other privileges that would have accrued had
he been employed by the Respondent on October 18, 1946;
(d) Make whole Mattie Lee Meadows, Armon Guyton, Dorothy
Guyton, Arlo Meadows, Coleman Meadows, Alphonso Clark, Evander
Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young, Ella Middleton, Hubert D.
Meadows, James W. Wesson, Floyd Shelton, Elzie Ray Bussell, James
0. Freeman, and W. G. Guyton for any loss of pay they may have
suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by payment to
each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount which he or she
normally would have earned as wages during the periods from the
date of the discrimination : (1) to the date of Respondent's offer of
reinstatement in the case of Armon Guyton, Dorothy Guyton, Arlo
Meadows, Coleman Meadows, Alphonso Clark, Evander Bud Mc-
White, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young, Ella Middleton, Hubert Meadows,
and James W. Wesson, (2) to the date of the Respondent's offer of
employment in the case of W. G. Guyton, (3) to the date the dis-
crimination ended in the case of Floyd Shelton, Elzie Ray Bussell,
and James O. Freeman, and (4) to the date of the Intermediate Re-
port herein, and from the date of the Decision and Order herein to
the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement in the case of
Mattie Lee Meadows, less their net earnings during said periods;
(e) Post at its mill at Macon, Georgia, copies of the notice attached
hereto, marked "Appendix A." 30 Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after
being signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it
"In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted in the Notice, before the words, "A Decision and Order" the words,
"A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1541
for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; and
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply therewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the Respondent (1) discharged Oscar F. Teet, Margie N. Rider, Mary
Sue Sargent, E. H. Schrimshire, C. L. Williams, Floyd Shelton,
Ernest F. Wynn, Frank Wesson, Hubert Parten, and Effie Dennis, and
(2) refused to hire Pebble Shelnut, in violation of Section 8 (3) of
the Act, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA, CIO, or any other labor organization, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL NOT permit any group of employees to exclude other
employees from the mill, nor will we permit any physical assault
or threats of physical assault in the mill or on mill property, for
the purpose of discouraging membership in, or activities on behalf
of, any labor organization. If necessary, disciplinary action will
be taken to enforce this rule.
WE WILL OFFER to the employees named below immediate and
full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privi-
leges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of
pay suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Armon Guyton
Coleman Meadows
Alphonso Clark
Evander Bud McWhite
Bennie Stone
Dorothy Guyton
Arlo Meadows
J. O. Young
Ella Middleton
Hubert D. Meadows
Mattie Lee Meadows
James W. Wesson
1542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILT, OFFER to W. G. Guyton immediate employment con-
sistent with his experience and skill, with all rights of seniority
and privileges that would have accrued but for the discrimination,
and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the
discrimination.
WE WILL MAKE whole the employees named below for any loss
of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Elzie Ray Bussell
Floyd Shelton
James 0. Freeman
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
above-named union or any other labor organization. We will not
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment against any employee because of member-
ship in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization.
MACON TEBTILEs, INC.,
Employer.
Dated----------------------- By ---------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Gerald P. Leicht, for the Board.
Mr. Wallace Miller, Sr., and Mr. Wallace Miller, Jr., of Macon, Ga ., for the
respondent.
Mr. R. E. Starnes, of Macon , Ga., for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon an amended charge duly filed by Textile Workers Union of America,
CIO, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board , herein called
the Board , by its Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia),
issued its complaint dated November 5, 1946 , against Macon Textiles, Inc.,
herein called the respondent , alleging that the respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8 (1) and ( 3) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and notice of
hearing were duly served on the respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices , the complaint , as amended at the
hearing,' alleges in substance that the respondent (1) on or about the respective
date listed opposite each name, discharged
1 Counsel for the Board moved to amend the complaint so as to allege the discriminatory
discharges of "Fred Shelton" and Effie Dennis . At the hearing Shelton gave his name as
Floyd Shelton . Further motions were made so as to add the name of W. T. Hambrick to
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1543
Oscar F. Teet________________________________ August 13, 1946
Margie N. Rider_____________________________ August 20, 1946
Armon Guyton_______________________________ August 22, 1946
Mary Sue Sargent---------------------------- August 26,1946
Coleman Meadows ---------------------------- August 28, 1946
Dorothy Guyton______________________________ September 1, 1946
Frank Wesson -------------------------------- September 2, 1946
Hubert Parten_______________________________ September 4, 1946
Arlo Meadows -------------------------------- September 5, 1946
Alphonso Clark ------------------------------- September 9, 1946
Evander Bud McWhite------------------------ September 9, 1946
Bennie Stone--------------------------------- September 9, 1946
J. 0. Young__________________________________ September 9, 1946
Mattie Lee Meadows__________________________ September 18, 1946
Ella Middleton_______________________________ September 18, 1946
Ernest F. Wynn______________________________ September 20, 1946
E. H. Schrimshire---------------------------- September 22, 1946
C. L. Williams-------------------------------- October 1, 1946
Hubert D. Meadows --------------------------- October 16, 1946
Floyd Shelton________________________________ November 14, 1946
Effie Dennis-------------------- -------------- November 27, 1946
and since said dates failed and refused to reinstate them ; (2) laid off Elzie Ray
Russell from August 23 to September 9, 1946, and from September 18 to September
30, 1946, Floyd Shelton from August 23 to September 3, 1946, and James 0.
Freeman from August 26 to September 9, 1946; (3) on or about September 9,
1946, demoted and decreased the rate of pay of James W. Wesson, and on or
about October 16, 1946, discharged him and since said date has failed and refused
to reinstate him; (4) thereby discriminated against the above-named employees
for the reason that they joined and assisted the Union and engaged in other
concerted activities; (5) refused employment to Pebble Shelnut on or about
August 30, 1946, and to W. G. Guyton on or about October 18, 1946, for the reason
that it believed that they either had joined the Union or would do so if employed ;
and (6) by these acts, and from on or about June 1, 1946, through certain of its
supervisory employees and certain of its employees whose action it instigated
and condoned, by engaging in other specified activities hostile to the Union and
the concerted activities of its employees, interfered with, restrained, and coerced
its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
On or about November 30, 1946, the respondent filed an answer wherein it
admitted certain allegations of the complaint as to the nature and extent of
its business , but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Macon, Georgia, from December
3 to 17, 1946, inclusive, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated
by the Chief Trial Examiner . The Board and the respondent were represented
by counsel and the Union by its representative. All parties participated in the
hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties.
At the close of the Board's case, the respondent moved separately to dismiss
certain allegations of the complaint. The motions were denied. At the con-
the list of employees alleged in the complaint to be anti -Union for whose actions the re-
spondent was responsible , and to allege that a rule posted by the respondent on or about
December 12, 1946, was violative of the Act . All of the above motions were granted.
1544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
elusion of the evidence, counsel for the Board moved to conform the complaint
to the proof as to non-substantive matters. The motion was granted without
objection. Although offered an opportunity to do so, none of the parties presented
oral argument before the undersigned. The parties were advised at the hearing
that they might file briefs and/or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, or both, with the undersigned. The respondent has filed a brief and
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.'
'Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Macon Textiles, Inc., is a Georgia corporation having its principal office and
place of business in Macon, Georgia, where it is engaged in the manufacture of
men's and boys' suitings and yarns.
In the course and conduct of its business, and in the operation of its Macon
plant, the respondent causes large quantities of materials to be purchased and
transported in interstate commerce from, into and through States of the United
States other than the State of Georgia to its plant, and causes large quantities
of its finished products to be sold and transported in interstate commerce from
its plant to, into and through States of the United States other than the State
of Georgia.
During the year immediately preceding the issuance of the complaint herein,
finished products processed at its plant were sold in an amount valued in excess
of $1,000,000, of which approximately 90 percent was sold and transported from
its plant to consumers located in States other than the State of Georgia. During
the same period the respondent purchased raw materials and supplies for use
at its plant in an amount valued in excess of $1,000,000, of which approximately
90 percent was shipped to the plant from points outside the State of Georgia.
At the hearing the respondent admitted that it is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Textile Workers Union of America, CIO. is a labor organization which admits
to membership employees of the respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES'
A. Interference, restraint, and coercion
1. Events prior to the election
It appears that organization of the respondent's employees was commenced
by the Union about May 1946. The Union's campaign was directed by R. E.
Starnes, a sub-regional director of the Union. In the beginning Starnes dis-
2 The respondent 's "proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" are in brief form
and are not separately numbered or otherwise distinguishable. Accordingly, the under-
signed is unable to make separate rulings upon them, but adopts such of them as are con-
sistent with the findings and conclusions herein, and rejects all others.
3In making the findings herein the undersigned has considered and weighed the entire
evidence. It would needlessly burden this report to set up all the testimony on disputed
points. Such testimony or other evidence as is in conflict with the findings herein is not
credited.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1545
tributed circulars to the employees and solicited them to join the Union. After
a number of employees had joined, solicitations were carried on by the employees
themselves. With some few exceptions, it appears that solicitations by em-
ployees were carried on away from the plant or at the plant during their free
time.
At some time prior to July 15, 1946, the respondent, in answer to one of the
Union's circulars, notified its employees that it would not accept a "closed
shop." By letter to its employees. dated July 15, the respondent again answered
some of the Union's contentions and notified them that work on each shift
would be stopped for 30 minutes, with pay, on July 23 so that the respondent
could answer all "questions" of employees pertaining to the Union. Starnes
sent a letter dated July 16 to the respondent in which he requested permission
to participate in the discussions to be held on July 23 so that he could present
the Union's contentions to the employees. His request was refused by the
respondent by letter dated July 22.
The respondent's letter of July 15 reads as follows :
Fellow Employee:
To correct any misunderstanding about our previous notice regarding
a closed shop in case of a union in this plant, we would like to explain
further : We stated that we would not accept a "Closed Shop." This simply
means that no matter what you may be told, You Will Not Have to Join a
Union at Any Time in Order to Keep Your Job. You will not have to pay
more if you don't join the union now, because you will never need to join
unless you wish to . Plainly told, you don 't need to be alarmed.
Our Cedartown employees have agreed to try a union. Never have we
made any difference in the wages in the two plants and we never will re-
gardless of a union. Frankly you would be very foolish to join any union
if that is what you believe is necessary to secure equal wages and privileges.
No contract at Cedartown has yet been signed, regardless of what you
have been told. If signed, what will Cedartown get that you haven't. Let's
go back to the most recent union flash item by item as they have stated it.
"70¢ per hour"-If you have worked here six months, your wages are
based on 700 per hour or more, exactly the same scale as our Cedartown
plant.
"Hours of Overtime"-You get paid overtime now in accordance with
government provisions.
"Union Security"-Sounds nice, but what does it mean? More money
in your pay check or 45¢ loss per week for union dues.
"Adjustment of Grievances by Arbitration"-We certainly hope and feel
that no one has ever been refused any just grievance.
"No Strikes"-We believe that neither you nor the company want any
strike.
"Leave of Absence for Sickness or Pregnancy"-To grant leave of absence
for such cases has been our established policy since we started business.
"Veterans Seniority"-Government ordered and gladly endorsed and given
by this company.
"Disabled Veterans"-We feel that they deserve every consideration and
shall do all in our power to see that they get it.
"$1,000 Insurance"-You are to get it, but plans have not been worked
out, so it was not announced. You will receive it officially in a week or so.
1546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"Vacations"-Our agreement of last year was the same as most union con-
tracts, namely: One week's pay or 201o for those employed one year. Actually
everyone received vacation pay on the same basis regardless of how long
they had worked, with a minimum of $5.00, and we have already announced
two weeks vacation or pay for those with over five years service, for next
year.
"Work Loads"-We never have expected more than a reasonable day's
work.
"Reporting Pay"-This very seldom happens, but if you come to work
without having been previously notified and there is no work for you, we see
no reason why you should not be given two hours reporting pay and we are
only too glad to grant it. If you start working, you will be given at least
four hours work. This is the meaning of "reporting pay."
"Downtime Pay"-It has always been our policy to pay this and means
that you will be paid for any hours caused by machine breakage.
The main thing all people are interested in as far as work is concerned is
how much they will make and how much they will be able to buy. This
question, as well as all union questions are so important to all of you that
on Tuesday, July 23rd, we are going to stop each shift for thirty minutes,
with pay, to answer any and all of your questions.
Very truly yours,
MACON TuXULES, INC.
From the context of the above letter it is clear that at least the "$1,000 In-
surance" and "Reporting Pay" had not been in effect prior to the date of the letter.
The announcement and granting of such benefits during the organizational cam-
paign of a Union would not be per se violative of the Act. However, in this in-
stance the respondent was answering claims of the Union and the announcement
of the granting of the benefits under such circumstances clearly was for the
purpose of discouraging employees from designating the Union as their bargain-
ing representative. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the respondent's
letter of July 15 constitutes interference within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of
the Act. `
As previously announced by the respondent, work was stopped on each of
the three shifts on July 23 and the employees were compelled to be present during
speeches given by D. W. Barnes, the respondent's general manager. During
these speeches Barnes stated in substance that if the employees wanted a union,
they should get one of their own "nationality" such as the "A. F. of L.11; that
the leaders of the Union were "5th columnists," "Communists," "Jews,"
"Yankees," "Dagos," and "thugs"; that there was no need for the employees to
join the Union as the respondent would give them the same benefits as plants
that were unionized gave to their employees ; that he was arranging to give the
employees free insurance and other benefits which employees of the "Cedartown
plant" received in their union contract ; ° that he "set down and let them organize
Cedartown," but that he was not going to do that with the Macon plant ; that
there was not going to be any closed shop; that if the employees joined the
Union, they would not have any bargaining rights and all bargaining "would
have to go through the union or through them Communists" ; and that he would
"fight" the Union if it took him 10 years and if he had to risk his life in keeping
4In the Matter of Hudson Hosiery Company, 19 LRRM 1288 , 72 N. L . R. B. 1434.
The record discloses that the respondent also owns or operates the above -mentioned
plant, and that the Union had secured a collective bargaining contract covering that plant.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1547
it out of the plant. At the conclusion of at least two of Barnes' speeches, em-
ployees B. T. Rutledge and J. E. Toney also made speeches to the employees.'
In these speeches, made while Barnes was present, they referred to their ex-
periences with strikes and the hardships caused to people involved in them. The
undersigned finds that the above statements of Barnes constitute interference,
restraint, and coercion.
At some time in July Overseer Charles Martin spoke to employee Samuel Mitch-
ell during working hours concerning the Union. ' Martin asked him if he had
heard anything about the Union. Mitchell replied that he had heard
a few people talking about it. Martin then said in substance that Mitchell
should not let people talk him into joining the Union and that if Mitchell had
"350 a week to throw away," Mitchell should give it to him. The undersigned
finds that Martin was referring to dues of the Union in this conversation.
About 2 weeks prior to September 4, Martin called Mitchell into his office
and asked him which way he was going to vote in the election. Mitchell an-
swered that he had not made up his mind. Martin then said that he wanted
Mitchell to promise that he would vote "for the Company" and that if he did, he
[Martin] would guarantee that Mitchell would be "taken care of." Mitchell re-
plied that he thought he would vote "for the Company." At the end of the con-
versation Martin requested Mitchell not to mention their talk to anyone.
At about 6 a. in. on September 4 before the election began, Martin approached
Mitchell at his place of work and asked him if he would vote "for the Company"
as he had stated at their previous conversation. Mitchell replied that he thought
he would vote as requested and Martin stated that he was "depending on it."
Early in August Martin called employee Hubert Owens into his office and
asked him if he was a member of the Union. Owens replied that he was but in-
dicated that he had not made up his mind if he was in favor of it. After Mar-
tin advanced several reasons why the Union would not benefit Owens, he told him
that he wanted to see Owens "come right on it" and that he wanted him "to think
it over." About 2 days before the election Martin again spoke to Owens. He
asked Owens if he had decided how he was going to vote. Owens replied that
he was still undecided. During the ensuing conversation Martin stated, "Well,
I want to see you come right in this thing and vote right" ; that "if the Union
organized the Negroes would have the same rights as the whites and they would
probably be working with you, and maybe tell you what to do"; that he had
seen "big shots" of the Union who ". . . weren't Americans. They must have
been Russians, or something, because they didn't look like American. They
didn't speak English" ; and, "I guess you know what will happen when the Union
loses the election. . . . You and your wife both are good workers. . . . I think
you want to work here and we want you to work here. I want you to come
right, vote right in this election." The following night Martin came to Owens'
place of work and asked him if he was going to "vote right." Owens replied
affirmatively and then asked Martin for a job "running the speeders." Martin
6 Toney is named in the complaint herein as Irwin J . Toner. In the testimony of a
number of witnesses he is referred to as Irving Toney. The above speeches of Rutledge
and Toney are mentioned at this time in order to show their close connection with Barnes
in the respondent's anti-Union campaign. Numerous other incidents which will be here-
inafter discussed conclusively show that the respondent, particularly through Barnes,
instigated, condoned and approved of the activities of a group of anti-Union employees,
including Rutledge and Toney.
° Mitchell was 16 years of age at the time of the hearing . It appears that he was a
"sweeper" at the time of the above conversation and those hereinafter related and that
Martin was his supervisor.
1548 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
then said that he would let Owens know later about the speeder job ; that if
Owens had lied about the voting, he would see Owens "again after the election" ;
and that Owens and his wife would be "taken care of." e
About 1 or 2 weeks before the election employee Voile Lovett had a conversa-
tion with his overseer, Milton Jolly. Jolly came to Lovett while he was working
and asked him how he felt about the Union. Lovett replied that he was in favor
of the Union. Jolly then stated, "I think you had better change your mind... .
I fired a man here last week for winding back a frame."' Finally Lovett told
Jolly that he was undecided as to what he would do and the conversation ended.
The day before the election Jolly again spoke to Lovett and asked him how he
was going to vote in the,election. Upon being told by Lovett that he was for the
Union, Jolly said, "I think you had better change your mind."
From the above statements and actions of Martin and Jelly it is clear
that the respondent sought to coerce its employees to vote against the Union,
attempted to bribe them by promises of better positions, threatened them with
discharge and otherwise interfered with the free determination by its employees
of a collective bargaining agent in an election conducted by the Board. Accord-
ingly, the undersigned finds that such statements and actions constitute interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion.
At about 11 p in on September 3, Starnes, E. P. Gieger, Carl Mahl, and C. H.
Gillman, representatives of the Union, went to the respondent's plant in order to
pass out handbills to employees during a change in shifts. Ernest F. Wynn and
Oscar F. Teet, pro-Union employees, were present during the distribution of the
handbills. While they were standing on the sidewalk in front of the plant and
distributing the handbills to employees, General Manager Barnes drove down the
street in his automobile. While traveling at about 30 miles per hour he drove it
partly up upon the sidewalk, apparently in an attempt to run them down. Starnes
called Barnes' attention to the fact that he had run his automobile up on the
sidewalk. Barnes replied to the effect that he generally ran over people who
stood around doing nothing. Barnes then asked for and received from Starnes
about 20 or 25 of the Union's handbills, which contained a sample of the ballot
to be used at the election but showing by a mark in the appropriate box the manner
in which to cast a vote for the Union. Barnes then marked with pencil the box
provided for a vote against the Union on each handbill. He distributed them to
employees, remarking, "This is the way to vote." A number of employees, in-
cluding R. S. Dye and Charles Martin, overseers, and Curtis Ikner, one of the
group of anti-Union employees, were standing inside of the plant gate. Barnes
ordered them to come out and help distribute the handbills which he had marked.
Thereafter, Barnes ordered Gieger off of the sidewalk, claiming that the respondent
owned it. Gieger moved into the street. When Gieger attempted to distribute
handbills, Barnes knocked his arms down and jumped back and forth in front of
him saying, "I can't touch you, but I can block you off." Barnes then ordered
the group of employees who had been or who were still inside of the gate to sur-
round Starnes and Gieger. Barnes thereupon said to Gieger, "That's a nice smile
you have got there . . . I ought to mash your face in, but I am not going to do it
At the time of the above conversations Owens' job was on "gill boxes." On the day
following his last conversation with Martin he operated the speeders and was assigned
permanently to the job about 3 weeks later. Further testimony concerning Owens' trans-
fer will be hereinafter related in connection with the discharge of employee Coleman
Meadows
9 In the above statement Jolly was referring to employee Armon Guyton who had been
discharged for winding back on a spinning frame, as will be hereinafter more fully discussed.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1549
because.... I'm going to let Ikner do that. He has been wanting to do it for
a long time, but we held him off." As Gieger was about to leave the plant in his
automobile, accompanied by Teet, Ikner invited Gieger to get out of his car and
"explain the CIO" to him. He further stated that Gieger did not have "brains
enough" to explain it. Gieger refused to get out of his car. In view of Barnes'
statement to Gieger, the undersigned is convinced and finds that Ikner, upon in-
structions from Barnes, was attempting by his remarks to provoke a fight with
Gieger.
The undersigned finds that the above statements and actions of Barnes on Sep-
tember 3 constitute interference, restraint, and coercion 1°
2. The election
On about August 12, 1946, the Union notified the respondent that a majority
of the employees had chosen it as their bargaining agent and requested recognition
as such . The respondent refused to recognize the Union unless certified by the
Board. Thereafter an agreement for a consent election was entered into, sched-
uling an election for September 4, 1946.
On September 3 a conference was held at the plant in order to establish a list of
eligible voters. This conference was presided over by William V. George, a Field
Examiner for the Board. Barnes, Mrs. Barnes, DeWitt Seagraves, one of the
group of anti-Union employees, and Legare Davis, the respondent's attorney,
represented the respondent at the meeting; and Starnes and employees Wynn
and E. H. Schrimshire represented the Union.
In the consent election agreement of August 26, 1946, it had been agreed by
the parties that all employees who appeared on the pay roll for the week ending
August 17 were eligible to vote. At the September 3 meeting the respondent pre-
sented an eligibility list purportedly prepared in accordance with the consent
election agreement. The representatives of the Union, however, claimed that a
number of eligible employees were not shown upon the respondent's list. At the
meeting the parties were not able to agree upon a list. It was then agreed that
all questionable employees would be permitted to enter the respondent's property
in order to vote and that such votes could be challenged by either party.
On September 4, election day, voting took place in the morning, but not in the
afternoon as scheduled, having been discontinued by the Board's agent at the re-
quest of the Union. The place selected for voting was in a building on the re-
spondent's property, which was accessible only through the main gate. During
the morning voting session the respondent locked this gate and stationed there
employee Curtis Ikner who was instructed by A. S. Durkee, plant superintendent,
to admit known employees only and four other persons whose ballots the respond-
ent expected to challenge. At least two persons who presented themselves as
prospective voters during the morning hours, namely, Hubert Parten and Armon
Guyton, were refused entrance to the respondent's property. The former was
denied admission by Durkee and the latter by Ikner.'1 The respondent did not
inform either the Board's agent or the Union that it was refusing prospective
voters admittance to the polling place.
The record discloses that both Parten and Guyton worked for the respondent
during the week ending August 17. The undersigned finds that the respondent,
by refusing admittance to the polling place within the plant to prospective
10 Further conclusions as to interference will be hereinafter set forth.
Durkee testified that he advised Parten that he would "probably" be allowed to votA if
Starnes would call him ( Durkee) and that Parten agreed to speak to Starnes.
1550 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
voters, interfered with the free determination of a collective bargaining agent
by its employees and thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees.
On the night of September 4, at about 10: 30 p. in., a demonstration presided
over by Barnes was held in the street immediately in front of the respondent's
plant. The participants were celebrating what they deemed to have been a
victory over the Union in the election. Among those present were Barnes, his
wife, DeWitt Seagraves, Curtis Ikner, J. E. Toney and Overseers Dye and Martin.
A bonfire was lit and they danced in a circle around the fire, singing or yelling
that they were "burning the CIO out of Macon." Seagraves shot a pistol into
the ground and the plant whistle was blown. A number of employees attracted
by the noise watched the celebration ; but it appears that few, if any, participated.
Barnes spoke to those assembled, stating in substance that he was "kind of
lonely" the night that Starnes had come to the plant ; that he would fight Starnes
or "the rest of them" if they again came to the plant ; that the Union would not
organize the respondent's plant ; that the Union was "out of Macon to stay" ;
that if the employees would "all stick" to him, there would be "a vacancy on
Cherry Street by Friday night" ; 1' that Seagraves had won a "victory" over the
Union ; and that if they did not believe him, they could ask Seagraves and he
would tell them "all about it." '9
The undersigned finds that the respondent, by holding the above celebration
and by Barnes' statements, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees."
3. Resignations from the Union ; the respondent's rules against solicitation
It does not appear that the respondent had any written rule against solicita-
tions on the respondent's time and property prior to August 23, 1946. On that
date the following notice was posted:
There has been so much talking off the job the past few weeks that pro-
duction has suffered and we are obliged to post this notice that if anyone
is seen talking away from his job, he will be subject to discipline and dis-
charge. This takes effect immediately and will be strictly enforced.
We do not want to take away the smoking privilege but unless so many
stop ganging in the toilets, we will have to stop it. If you use this privilege
right, it will not be stopped.
Respondent posted another notice dated December 12, 1946, as follows :
In spite of a previous notice, some employees are still going around urging
other employees to join the Union. So much so that we have had complaints.
This kind of talk on the job is illegal and will not be tolerated. Any more
will be grounds of immediate discharge.
While the evidence shows that known adherents of the Union were carefully
watched by the respondent's supervisors for violation of the above rule and in
some cases were unreasonably required to remain at their place of work during
working hours, it conclusively appears that respondent's supervisory employees
and the anti-Union employees heretofore mentioned were permitted without
12 The office of the Union in Macon was located on Cherry Street. The undersigned finds
that Barnes was referring to this fact in the above statement
Is Barnes' reference to Seagraves is a further indication that the respondent instigated
the actions of the anti-Union group of employees.
14 In the Matter of The S Frieder & Sons Company, 62 N. L. R. B. 880; enforced, 155 F.
(2d) 266 (C. C. A. 3).
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1551
restraint to solicit employees during working hours in the plant to resign from
membership in the Union. The anti-Union employees also solicited employees to
sign an anti-Union letter hereinafter mentioned in the plant during working time.
The supervisory employees involved in these solicitations were Joseph Lee, a
general overseer, and Overseers Dye, Martin, Hulsey, and James Connally. The
anti-Union employees involved in the solicitations were Seagraves, Rutledge,
Toney and Ikner. The solicitations by the anti-Union employees in many in-
stances occurred when supervisory employees were present. Although the
solicitations required a considerable amount of the working time of the anti-
Union employees, nevertheless no pay was deducted from their wages for the
time involved. The above-described anti-Union solicitations commenced shortly
after Barnes' speech on July 23 and continued up and until about the time of
the hearing herein.
Numerous written resignations from the Union were introduced in evidence.
The evidence conclusively shows that they were prepared by persons other than
the employees signing them, that they were merely signed by the employees
involved, and that they were sent by registered mail to the Union without
expense to the employees.
A number of the Board' s witnesses testified credibly to these solicitations.
Since the evidence is cumulative in nature, the undersigned is not setting forth
all the testimony in this connection but sets forth below some few examples.
Marjorie Rider testified credibly that shortly after July 23 and the day after
first being approached by his wife, Seagraves came to Rider's place of work and
stated, "I heard you wanted to get out of the Union . . . Well, go by the office
out there, the boss's office, and you might have to do a little writing, but .. .
you can get out."
Armon Guyton testified credibly that at some time after July 23, Toney came
to his place of work in the spinning room and stated that the employees of a
plant located at Athens, Georgia, were "having a pretty tough time" because of a
strike and that Guyton should resign from the Union. About one half hour
after Guyton's conversation with Toney, Joseph Lee came to Guyton, slapped
him on the shoulder, and said that he had heard that Guyton had changed his
mind about the Union. From the above facts the undersigned finds that Toney
had reported to Lee the outcome of his conversation with Guyton.
Employee Ernest Wynn testified and the undersigned finds that about August 9
he had a conversation with Overseer Martin in the latter's office ; that during
this conversation, Martin stated that Wynn had himself and Martin on the spot
because of his membership in the Union; that although he liked Wynn, he would
have to make it "hard" for him because, "You know what Barnes said about the
CIO" ; that Wynn had better resign from the Union ; and that the Union was
going to cut Martin's throat 16
Employee James Freeman testified credibly that Rutledge came to him while
he was working and solicited him to sign his name to an anti-Union letter ;
that he refused to sign the letter ; that when Rutledge then reported to Over-
seer Dye with the letter, the two went into the latter's office ; that Rutledge
that night solicited all the employees present to sign the letter although he
16 Wynn had further conversations with Martin, substantially of the same nature as the
above. Wynn also testified credibly that after his conversation with Martin , Martin called
into his office and talked to about two employees each night . Employee Arlo Meadows
also testified credibly to the effect that Martin called him into his office several times and
requested him to resign ; and that Martin in his argument against the Union, told Meadows
that if the Union successfully organized respondent 's plant , colored employees would be
working side by side with white employees.
1552 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
himself did not work on that shift ; and that Dye was present during the solici-
tations. This letter was strongly anti-Union and was addressed to the editor
of a Macon newspaper. The newspaper published the letter on about October
21, 1946. The undersigned finds that the respondent was aware of the con-
tents of the letter prior to its being published and that solicitation of the
employees to sign said letter took place with the full knowledge, consent, and
approval of the respondent.
Conversations between employee Armon Guyton, Toney, and Overseer Joseph
Lee have been heretofore related. Guyton further testified credibly that Over-
seer Hulsey told the employees one night that they would no longer be per-
mitted to leave their work in order to smoke or to go to the coca cola wagon.
Employee Elmer Schrimshire also had a conversation with Overseer Hulsey in
which Hulsey told him that he could not do any talking while on the job. Prior
to his conversation with Hulsey, he had been solicited by Rutledge to resign
from the Union and by reason thereof, Schrimshire had lost about 2 hours from
his work. Schrimshire, who worked partly on a production basis, protested
this loss of time to Hulsey and requested that he be paid for it. When Hulsey
claimed that it was not the respondent's fault that he had lost time, Schrim-
shire replied that he thought it was the respondent's fault since he understood
that the solicitation took place in Rutledge's "line of business with the com-
pany." Hulsey not only did not deny Schrimshire's contention, but agreed to
pay him for the time lost. Schrimshire thereafter complained to Hulsey a num-
ber of times concerning the solicitations of the anti-Union group of employees,
but nothing was done by the respondent to stop or impede these activities.
Schrimshire, however, when he attempted to engage in conversation an em-
ployee near his place of work, was immediately stopped by Hulsey who said,
"... just too much talking going on in here, and we are cutting it
out." is
On about August 22, employees Wynn and W. T. Hambrick, one of the anti-
Union employees, were called into Overseer Martin's office who showed them
some rules which stated that they could not talk to any other employees dur-
ing work, that they could not go to the rest room if another employee was there,
that they could not leave the room at any time between starting and quitting
time, and that they could not go out of the room for lunch. Martin told Wynn
that be would be discharged if he broke any of these rules." Thereafter, Ham-
brick did not abide by any of the rules. His violations of them at times oc-
curred in the presence of Martin but he was not reprimanded by the latter.
Wynn however was watched carefully by Martin for any violation of the rules
and was warned by him whenever he attempted to speak to another employee.
Employee Samuel Swann had James Connally for his overseer for 4 hours of
his shift. At some time prior to September 4, Connally asked Swann if he
belonged to the Union. Swann replied affirmatively and Connally asked him why
he did not resign, stating, "I could get Mr. Rutledge to get you out." Swann
replied to the effect that he did not want to resign from the Union. Later the
same day or shortly thereafter, Swann was called into the office by Martin and
Connally. Swann had been talking to another employee and Martin told him
that he could not talk to other employees at any time. The above-mentioned
"The evidence indicates that Guyton and Schrimshire were prohibited from talking prior
to the posting of the rules set forth above.
17 Wynn testified that he had never seen these rules posted. It appears from his testi-
mony that the rules were for the special benefit of "section" men. Both Wynn and Ham-
brick were section men.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1553
rule dated August 23 had been posted prior to this conversation, and Martin
referred to the fact that he could discharge Swann for talking. Thereafter,
Swann told Connally that he would resign from the Union and Connally said
that he would ask Rutledge to prepare the resignation, which the latter did.
As has been shown above, solicitations of employees to resign from the Union
were made not only by the anti-Union employees but also by the overseers.
Except in a few instances all such solicitations occurred during working time.
Those made by the anti-Union employees on many occasions took place in view
of supervisory employees. The facts concerning the solicitations against the
Union conclusively show that the respondent's overseers and the anti-Union
group of employees were working together and that the respondent instigated
and had full knowledge of the activities of the latter.
While the above-mentioned rule dated August 23 is not per se violative of
the Act since it merely prohibits an employee from "talking away from his
job," apparently having reference only to working time, the undersigned finds
that the discriminatory application of such rule against the adherents of the
Union does constitute interference. Members of the Union were unreasonably
restricted in their movements about the plant during working hours and were
carefully watched and reprimanded for any slight infraction of the rule. On
the other hand, the record is replete with evidence showing that the anti-Union
employees had complete freedom in roaming around the plant and talking to
and soliciting employees. For example, this is shown by the above-related
facts concerning Rutledge's solicitations on the anti-Union letter during the
presence of Dye. Such solicitations took place long after the posting of the
rule on August 23.
As stated above, another notice dated December 12, 1946, was posted in the
respondent's plant. Per se, this notice is violative of the Act since it does not
clearly distinguish working time from free time, and prohibits employees from
"urging other employees to join the union," without likewise enjoining solici-
tations against the Union. The fact that this notice refers to a previous
notice, apparently the rule posted on August 23, does not, in the undersigned's
opinion, lessen its effect, particularly in view of the fact that the rule dated
August 23 was discriminatorily applied against the members of the Union.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the notice dated December 12, 1946,
constitutes interference, restraint , and coercion.
4. Surveillance of Union meetings
A number of the Board' s witnesses testified credibly to the effect that when
they attended meetings of the Union at its office on Cherry Street in Macon,
they saw either some of the respondent's overseers or the anti-Union group of
employees standing around the entrance to the Union hall, parked nearby in
automobiles or riding up and down the street in automobiles. For example,
Charlie Williams testified that he attended two meetings of the Union, that
on the first occasion he saw Ikner and Rutledge and that at the second meeting
he saw Plant Manager Barnes in his automobile parked in front of the en-
trance to the Union hall. Other witnesses testified that they saw Toney and
Seagraves and Overseers Connally, Martin, and Suits ; and that in each instance
they were either standing in the immediate vicinity of the entrance or riding
or parked in automobiles on the street. It definitely appears that the above
overseers and the anti-Union employees were working together in maintaining
surveillance of the Union meetings in order to ascertain which employees were
1554 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
members of the Union. This is clearly shown from the facts related above in
connection with the solicitation of employees to resign from the Union. Fur-
ther facts concerning surveillance of the Union meetings will be hereinafter
related in connection with the discharges of employees.
The undersigned finds that surveillance of the Union's meetings was instigated
by the respondent and took place with its full knowledge, approval, and participa-
tion, and that such action constitutes interference, restraint, and coercion.
Concluding Findings
The entire facts relating to interference have not been set forth above. A
number of other findings of interference, restraint, and coercion will be herein-
after related and found in connection with the discharges. Some other credible
evidence showing interference on the respondent's part is not related herein for
the reason that the undersigned believes it to be cumulative.
The undersigned is convinced and finds that the respondent instigated the
anti-Union activities of Rutledge, Ikner, Seagraves, and Toney. This is clearly
shown by the close association and parallel action of Barnes and the supervisory
employees heretofore mentioned, with these individuals in the anti-Union cam-
paign1e Further facts in this connection will be hereinafter shown in discussing
the discharges. The undersigned finds that the respondent was responsible for
their actions and statements"
Accordingly, it is found that by and through its officers, supervisory employees,
and anti-Union employees named above whose activities it instigated, authorized,
and approved, the respondent has engaged in a campaign to restrain and coerce
its employees in their organizational activities ; has disparaged, vilified, and
expressed disapproval of the Union and its representatives ; has interrogated its
employees concerning their union affiliations ; has urged and threatened its em-
ployees to refrain from assisting, becoming members of, or remaining members
of the Union ; has kept meetings of the Union under surveillance ; has sought to
incite violence against the Union's organizers ; has attempted to prevent distribu-
tion of union literature and campaign material ; has offered economic benefits
to induce employees to refrain from becoming or remaining members of the
Union ; has refused admittance to the voting place within the plant to prospective
voters during an election conducted by the Board ; and has discriminatorily ap-
plied a rule prohibiting solicitations against members or adherents of the Union.
Therefore, the undersigned finds that the respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act.
B. The discharges, lay-offs, and refusals to hire
Oscar F. Teet: Teet was employed by the respondent from about October 1945
until discharged on August 13, 1946. He worked as a loom fixer in the weave
room on the third shift under Overseer R. S. Dye. The hours of the shift were
from 11 p. in. to 7 a. m.
Teet joined the Union on August 9 but was active in its behalf for about a
month prior thereto. For the most part his activities consisted of soliciting em-
ployees to join the Union.
International Association of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 72.
Further findings in this respect concerning W. T. Hambrick will be hereinafter related
in connection with the discharges.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1555
At about sometime in July, Teet had a conversation with Dye in the presence
of several other employees, including J. O. Freeman. Dye started the conversa-
tion by telling the employees present about a strike in North Georgia in which
a union was involved. He mentioned the difficulty that the employees of that
plant encountered in attempting to get back to work and said that the superin-
tendent told the employees that he would put them back to work upon condition
that they wear for 6 weeks a yellow stripe on their shirts. Teet told Dye that if
he had been one of the employees he would have told the superintendent "to just
go to the devil." Dye replied that in such case Teet would have been unable to
return to work. About 2 weeks before Teet was discharged, he was called into
Dye's office. Dye told Teet that he understood that he was in favor of the Union ;
that he was surprised at him for being on the "wrong side" ; that there was a
future in the plant for a loom fixer if he remained on the "right side of the fence" ;
that Teet would have to get out of the Union if he expected to continue in the
respondent's employ ; and that Teet was working against the respondent. Teet
replied that he was not working against the respondent ; that he was not on the
"wrong side" ; and that he had never belonged to a Union. Teet did tell Dye,
however, that he was in favor of the Union: 0
The undersigned finds that Dye's remarks to Teet constitute interference, re-
straint, and coercion.
Teet rented a house which was owned by the respondent and which adjoined
the plant property. On the afternoon of August 13 a meeting of the Union was
held on Teet's front porch which faced the plant. About 10 or 12 persons were
present at the meeting. During the meeting Dye came outside the plant and
looked over towards Teet's house Gieger, a representative of the Union as re-
lated above, was present at the meeting and motioned to Dye in such a way as to
indicate that lie should come and join the meeting. Dye immediately re-entered
the mill. That night Teet reported for work shortly before 11 p. m. and he found
Dye waiting for him. In the presence of Zena Floyd, a weaver, and the two
loom fixers who worked on the second shift or the one preceding Teet's, Dye
accused Teet of not fixing one of Mrs. Floyd's looms on the previous night. Teet
denied the charge. After further conversation between the two as to whether
or not Teet had fixed the loom in accordance with Dye's orders, Dye discharged
Teet.
The respondent claims that Teet was discharged "for inefficiency on his job
as a loom fixer." The undersigned finds that Teet was discharged on August
13, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union.21
Margie N. Rider: Rider worked for a short period of time for the respondent
in 1944. She was rehired in January 1946 as a winder on the third shift under
Overseer Martin. She joined the Union on June 17, but it does not appear that
she was particularly active in its behalf. Shortly after Barnes' speech on July
23, Martin came to her while she was working and asked her how she liked
Barnes' speech. Rider replied that she liked the speech but that "I think Mr.
Barnes made his speech too late because most all of us are already in the union."
The following day Martin again spoke to Rider, saying, "Did I understand you
to say whether you was in the union or not?" When Rider replied affirmatively,
20 Since Teet did not join the Union until August 9, it appears that he was not a member
of the Union at the time of this conversation,
21 The undersigned will hereinafter discuss in more detail his conclusions and findings
with respect to Teet and other employees against whom the undersigned finds the re-
spondent discriminated.
817319-49-vol. 80-99
1556 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Martin replied, "I don't see what you are in there for any way." With this
remark Martin ended the conversation.
The undersigned finds that the interrogation by Martin of Rider concerning her
union affiliations constitutes interference.
Shortly after her last conversation with Martin, Seagraves approached Rider
at her place of work and said that he understood she wanted to resign from
the Union. He told her that she could get out of the Union if she went to "the
boss's office" and did "a little writing." Rider replied that she would think
about it.
On August 19, Rider was ill and was unable to report for work. She requested
another employee to advise Martin and also phoned the respondent' s watchman.
When Rider reported for work on August 20, she discovered that her time-card
was not in the rack. She reported this fact to Martin who asked her why she
had stayed away from work the previous evening, She told him that she had
been sick and that she had sent word to him by other employees. He denied that
he had been so advised. Martin then said, "'Well, can I trust you to tell you
something and you won't tell nobody? . . . Why don't you get right about this
thing? . . . This union. Why don't you come out of it? I don't see what
you are in it for anyway. I don't believe you would be in it if wasn't for
where you are staying." 22 After further conversation, Martin said, "Well, Mar-
jorie, if I let you stay on, some of the rest of them will be thinking they can do
the same thing. Guess I'd better let you go home tonight." Rider complained
about what she thought to be a one night lay-off and that it would mean the
loss of 2 days' wages. She then stated, "I wish we would get a Union up
here." The following day Rider called Martin and asked him whether or not
she should report for work that night. He replied, in substance, that he had
"checked up on it," and that she was discharged.
Respondent contends that Rider was discharged "for continuously laying out
and inefficiency in her work." In her testimony, Rider admitted that she was
irregular in her work; that she was often absent from work; that there were
times when she was absent for 2 or 3 consecutive days; and that Martin had
previously complained to her concerning her absences.
The undersigned finds that the respondent discriminatorily discharged Margie
N. Rider on August 20, 1946. It appears that Martin did nothing to investigate
Rider's claim of being sick, or that she had sent word to him that she would
be absent. Although her attendance record was bad for a considerable period
of time prior to her discharge, the respondent did not see fit to discipline or
reprimand her for her absences until it knew that she was a member of the
Union. It is true that Martin "complained" about her absences but he did not
warn her that she would be discharged. However, in view of Martin's remarks
concerning the Union, the undersigned is convinced that Rider was not dis-
charged because of her absences but because of her membership in and refusal
to withdraw from the Union.
Mary Sue Sargent: Sargent was employed by the respondent about August of
1945 as a "hurler" in the "weave shop" under Overseer Sara Tracey. She joined
the Union on July 23 and was thereafter active in the solicitation of employees.
About 2 weeks after July 23, Rutledge solicited Sargent while she was at work
to resign from the Union. Sargent refused. The following day Seagraves also
solicited Sargent's resignation from the Union while she was at work. Sargent
again refused.
22 By this statement Martin was referring to the fact that Rider boarded at the house
of James Wesson, one of the most active employees on behalf of the Union.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1557
On or about August 21, Tracey transferred Sargent to sewing, a job involving
harder work than burling and a decrease in wages. Sargent protested to Tracey
concerning this transfer. Although Tracey at the time claimed that Sargent's
burling work was not good, she had not previously complained to her in this
respect. On Friday, August 23, Sargent was absent from work due to illness
and notified the respondent's office that she would not be present that day.
When she reported for work on Monday, August 26, Tracey told her that it
would be necessary for her to obtain a doctor's certificate certifying that she
had been ill, and that she had found out that Sargent had not been ill. Sargent
told Tracey that she had been sick during the day; that she did not have a
doctor ; that she had not left her house until the evening ; and that Tracey was
trying to get a reason to discharge her because she was a member of the Union.
Tracey denied any attempt to discharge Sargent because of her membership but
asked her why she had joined the Union. Sargent replied that she thought the
Union was a good thing and that she had joined it because she thought it would
bring "the bosses down a notch or two." Tracey then repeated that Sargent
would have to get a doctor's certificate before she could return to work, to which
Sargent answered that she was not going to get one since she had never before
been required to do so.
The respondent contends that Sargent was not discharged and that she quit of
her own accord when she refused to obtain a doctor's certificate.
Since Sargent informed Tracey that she did not obtain the services of the
doctor on the day that she was sick, the undersigned is of the opinion that the
respondent constructively discharged Sargent on August 26, 1946, because of her
membership in and activities on behalf of the Union, and so finds." If she
had not so informed Tracey, then the undersigned's findings might be otherwise.
Having this knowledge, Tracey still insisted that Sargent obtain the necessary
certificate before she could return to work, knowing that it would be impossible
for Sargent to do so. Moreover, it appears that Sargent had not been required
to produce such certificates after previous absences24
Armon Guyton: Guyton was employed off and on by the respondent for about
3 or 4 years prior to his discharge on August 23, 1946. He worked as a doffer on
the third shift under Overseer Hulsey. He joined the Union on June 15, and
thereafter solicited employees to join.
Shortly after July 23, J. E. Toney, one of the group of anti-Union employees,
solicited Guyton while he was at work to resign from the Union. During the
conversation, Guyton did not commit himself one way or the other. About 30
minutes after his talk with Guyton, General Overseer Lee came to him and said
that he had heard that Guyton had changed his mind about the Union. Guyton
replied in substance that he had not made up his mind.
Hulsey discharged Guyton at about 2: 30 a. m. on August 23, 1946, claiming
that he had been "winding back" on a spinning frame. Guyton denied the charge.
Hulsey first suggested that Guyton quit, but when Guyton refused, Hulsey stated,
"Well, I'll have to let you go anyway."
About 1 week after Guyton was discharged, Overseer Jolly had a conversation
with employee Voile Lovett. During the conversation Jolly asked Lovett how
he felt about the Union. Lovett told him that he was a union man. Jolly then
replied, "I think you had better change your mind. . . . I fired a man here last
28 In the Matter of National Linen Service Corp , 48 N L it. B. 171.
24 The evidence discloses that the respondent had no uniform requirement that employees
furnish doctors ' certificates . It appears that at times such certificates were required and
at other times were not.
1558 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
week for winding back a frame." When making this remark Jolly did not name
the employee discharged but pointed out the spinning frame upon which Guyton
had worked.
Respondent contends that Guyton was discharged "for misconduct and for
unnecessary destruction of valuable materials."
In his testimony Guyton admitted that prior to his discharge he at times had
wound back on frames but denied doing so on the night he was discharged."S
F. E. Dennis, the spinner upon whose frame Guyton was alleged to have wound
back, testified credibly that the frame had not been wound back at any time that
night ; that the frame was stopped and Guyton was doffing it when he was dis-
charged ; and that the frame thereafter ran until the end of the shift. This
testimony indicates that this was the first time the frame in question had been
doffed during that shift and that since it was near the end of the shift when be
doffed it, it would have been unnecessary for Guyton to wind back on it as it
would have continued to run for some time after the change in shifts. The evi-
dence indicates that it was the custom of doffers to wind back the frames in the
above manner. Guyton testified credibly that he had not previously been warned
about this practice.
The undersigned finds that Armon Guyton was discharged on August 23 be-
cause of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union.
Coleman Meadows: Meadows was employed by the respondent about July of
1944. He operated "slubblers" and his overseer was Martin. He joined the
Union on July 20. Thereafter Meadows attended two Union meetings. At one
meeting Rutledge was standing near the entrance to the Union hall and at the
other Overseer Connally was sitting in an automobile nearby.
On about August 23, Martin came to Meadows while he was working and
questioned him about the Union. Meadows replied that he did not know any-
thing about it. Martin then said that Meadows need not lie since he knew
that Meadows belonged to the Union and that he [Martin] had the names of all
the employees who belonged to it. Thereafter Martin watched Meadows care-
fully and did not permit him to smoke or rest as often as he had done previously.
On August 27, at the start of the third shift when Meadows reported for work,
Martin told him that he would have to lay him off that night as his frame was
not going to run. The next day Martin called Meadows and told him that he
need not report for work as he did not need him. On August 29, Meadows re-
ported for work but Martin told him that he had nothing for him to do. Meadows
replied that he had to have work or he would have to leave the respondent's
employ. Martin thereupon wrote out a separation slip, stating that he did not
have a thing against Meadows but that he "just got hooked up with the wrong
damn mess."
The respondent contends that Meadows quit his job.
Arlo Meadows, Coleman Meadows' brother, testified credibly that at some
time after August 30, Martin called him into his office and requested him to
resign his membership in the Union. During this conversation Martin stated
that if Coleman Meadows would resign from the Union, he would reinstate him
to his old position. Employee Ernest Wynn testified credibly that he worked
zs It appears that doers wound back frames at or shortly after the beginning of a shift
in order to avoid doffing the frames towards the close of the shift. The process of winding
back keeps the frame running for a longer period of time, but causes a waste of time and
material due to snarling if the frame is wound back improperly.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1559
on the same shift as did Coleman Meadows and that on the first night that
Meadows was laid off his machine was run by another employee.
It has been previously related that Hubert Owens, prior to the election on
September 4, was solicited by Martin to vote against the Union. During their
conversations, Owens said that he would like the "speeder job" which had been
run by Coleman Meadows, and Martin indicated that Owens and his wife "would
be taken care of" if they voted against the Union in the forth-coming election.
At about the same time, Connally succeeded Martin as overseer on the third
shift since Martin was changed to another shift. On about the day after the
election, Connally came to Owens and told him the speeder job was open if he
wanted it. Owens replied that he did not want the job if he had to lose as
much time on it as Coleman Meadows had, Connally replied, "Do you know
why the Meadows boy lost time, why he was sent out? . . . Well, I will tell you,
... he was deep in this union and bragged about it, so Mr. Martin worked him
in such a way that he just got mad and quit . . . You won't lose any time on
your speeder job . . . I told Martin I thought you voted right ..."
The undersigned finds that the respondent constructively discharged Coleman
Meadows on August 28, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on
behalf of the Union.
Dorothy Guyton: Guyton was employed by the respondent for about 3 years
prior to her termination of employment on September 1, 1946. She worked on
the third shift under Overseer Hulsey. She joined the Union on June 19. At
some time after June 19, as she reported for work she was reading a handbill
which had been distributed by representatives of the Union as she had entered
the plant. Hulsey asked her if she was paying any attention to the Union, and
stated, "Well, you know, we fire any of them that joins the CIO." Guyton replied
that he had better fire her then since she was a member of the Union.
The undersigned finds that the above remarks of Hulsey constitute interference.
On August 10 Guyton asked Hulsey for a 2 weeks' leave of absence for the
reason that she was going to get married. He told her that she could have the
time off and that her job would be waiting for her when she got back. Guyton
got married, but returned to Macon at the end of 1 week, at which time Guy-
ton's mother asked Hulsey when Guyton should report for work. Hulsey sent
word to Guyton that she should report to him 2 weeks from that time. On Sep-
tember 1 Guyton reported to Hulsey and asked for her job. Hulsey stated that
no work was available for her. It appears that another female employee was
hired by Hulsey on that same day to take Guyton's place. At some time in
October Guyton met Hulsey at the plant gate and in the ensuing conversation
Hulsey stated that he had work for her, ". . . if you pull out of that mess you
are in." 2° Guyton told him that under those conditions he could keep the job.
Guyton has not worked for the respondent since August 10.
The respondent contends that Dorothy Guyton quit her job.
The undersigned finds that the respondent constructively discharged Guyton
on or about September 1, 1946, because of her membership in and activities on
behalf of the Union.
Frank Wesson: Wesson was employed by the respondent for about 7 or 8
years prior to entering the Army in January 1942. He was reemployed by the
respondent on or about April 1946, and operated frames on the third shift under
Overseer Martin. He joined the Union on June 9, and thereafter attended
"The undersigned finds that Hulsey by this remark referred to Guyton 's membership
in the Union.
1560 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
meetings of the Union, two or three of which were under surveillance by Sea-
graves, Connally, and Ikner.
On or about June 12, Overseer Jolly told Wesson that he would have to lay
him off for one week and that he should talk to Lee about it. Wesson reported
to Lee who confirmed that he was to receive a one week lay-off. As Wesson
was about to leave, Lee said, "Wait a minute. I want to talk to you . . . What
do you think about this union? . . . Well, I can tell you all about the union
... Its nothing but a bunch of big shots to sit up and smoke cigars.
I noticed two or three of you all belong to the union . . . It won't amount to
anything ... You know when we was oversees (sic) together, we went a lack-
ing for a lot of strikes the union had pulled." Lee then asked Wesson how
he felt about the Union and Wesson replied to the effect that he had not made
up his mind. Lee thereupon revoked the order for Wesson's lay-off.
The undersigned finds that the above remarks of Lee constitute interference.
Immediately prior to the above conversation, Wesson was a frame operator.
Thereafter he was transferred into the "card room" and operated "cards,"
also on the night shift. About July 8 Wesson was transferred to "dumping
yarn" on the first shift. He was transferred to the first shift at his own request
for the reason that he did not like to work on the third shift. It appears that
he had quit his job for the same reason on or about April 6, but was rehired
by the respondent in May. Wesson worked at the dumping yarn job for a few
days or until July 10. On that date, he told Lee that the job was too "heavy" for
him, and that he would have to quit work until Lee found another job for him.
Lee replied by telling him that he would send for him in a few days and put
him on another job. Lee did not thereafter notify Wesson that another job
was available on the first shift, and it does not appear that Wesson returned
to the plant to apply for work either on the first or the third shifts.
The respondent contends that Wesson voluntarily left its employ.
The undersigned finds that the respondent did not discriminatorily discharge
Wesson. The only evidence that might possibly support the Board's contention
of constructive discharge is the testimony of Wesson that at the time he was
transferred to the first shift an "inspecting" job was open and that this job was
filled by an employee who previously had had the dumping yarn job. Wesson
further testified that he had not had any experience as an inspector. The un-
dersigned feels that since Wesson had been transferred to this shift at his own
request without first ascertaining the kind of job that was open, there is no
showing that he had been discriminated against by placing him on a job which
involved heavy work. Under the circumstances, he should not have quit his
job and at least should have applied for his old position on the third shift. If
that position or its equivalent had been open on July 10, and the respondent
had refused to transfer him, then the undersigned's findings might be otherwise,
especially in view of the threatened lay-off on or about June 12 and Lee's re-
marks at that time. Moreover, there has been no showing by the Board that any
positions on the first shift for which Wesson could have qualified were open
after July 10.
Hubert Pat-ten: Parten worked for the respondent in 1940. Thereafter he
was in the Army and on his discharge was reemployed about May 1946. He
operated cards on a shift from 5 p. m. to 3 a. m27 His overseers were Lee, Jolly,
and Hulsey. Parten joined the Union on June 15.
37 It appears that there were only two shifts in the card room.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1561
At some time in July or August Parten had a conversation with Hulsey con-
cerning the Union. Hulsey asked Parten how he felt about the Union and
Parten replied to the effect that he was in favor of it, as were a majority of
the employees.
Some few days prior to September 4, Parten asked both Jolly and Hulsey for a
2 week leave of absence. The request was granted. In his conversation with
Hulsey when the question was brought up by Parten as to whether or not he
would be discharged,28 Hulsey insisted that he was not being discharged and
that he had the privilege to come back and apply for a job. Hulsey also agreed
that he had the right to vote in the election on September 4. As has been pre-
viously related, Plant Superintendent Durkee refused Parten the right to enter
the plant and vote on election day. At the end of the 2 weeks leave of absence or
about September 9, Parten returned to the plant and asked Jolly for work.
Jolly replied that there was no work available for him and that he should see
Lee about it. Parten left the plant without seeing Lee and did not thereafter
return.
The respondent contends that Parten was laid off for the reason that his job
had ended.2B
The undersigned finds that the respondent did not discriminatorily lay off
or discharge Parten. Parten testified, in substance, that he asked for a leave
of absence as he knew that a lay-off was imminent. The Board has failed to
prove that any positions were available for Parten when he applied for work on
or about September 9. Moreover, when Parten talked to Jolly on that date,
the latter suggested that he see Lee. This Parten failed to do. Under the
circumstances, the undersigned does not feel that the facts are sufficient to sub-
stantiate any inference of discrimination.
Arlo Meadows: Meadows was employed by the respondent in July 1945. When
he was first employed he did not have any textile experience and was tried out
for a short period of time on a "yarn job." It was found that he was too slow
for this job and he was transferred to sweeping. He worked on the third shift
under Overseer Martin. He joined the Union on August 17. On about or
shortly after August 30, during working hours, Martin called Meadows into
his office. Martin stated that if the Union successfully organized the plant,
colored persons would be working beside the white persons. During the con-
versation Martin requested that Meadows resign from the Union and that if
Arlo Meadows' brother, Coleman Meadows, would likewise resign, he would
give the latter back his old job 80 Arlo Meadows replied that he was going to
stay in the Union. The following day Martin came to Meadows and again
asked him if he had changed his mind about the Union. Meadows replied that
he had not.
The undersigned finds that the above statements of Martin constitute inter-
ference, restraint, and coercion.
Some few days prior to September 9, Meadows attended a meeting of the Union.
On September 9 when he reported for work, Meadows was discharged by Martin
in the presence of Overseer Connally, who claimed that Meadows had failed "to
lay up some roping" the preceding night or some few nights before that. Mead-
28 It appears that Parten would have received a lay-off at about this time or shortly there-
after, by reason of the fact that the respondent 's cards were about to be altered in a
plant-wide program for a change from cotton to wool.
29 The evidence indicates that by reason of the change from cotton to wool some few
positions in the respondent's plant were eliminated.
30 As has been previously related, Coleman Meadows was discharged on about August 27.
1562 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ows denied the charge and claimed that he had laid up the roping every night
just before the end of the shift. At the start of the conversation Martin asked
Connally if Meadows' work was satisfactory. Connally at first replied that his
work was satisfactory but upon further question by Martin, stated that it was
not, and then claimed that Meadows had failed to lay up the roping. Martin
then stated that he was discharging Meadows because he was "too slow for
the job."
The respondent contends that Meadows was discharged "for gross inefficiency
on his job."
The undersigned finds that Arlo Meadows was discriminatorily discharged on
September 9, 1946. In view of Martin's remarks in his two conversations with
Meadows on about or shortly after August 30, the undersigned concludes and
finds that he discharged Meadows because of his unsuccessful attempt to solicit
Meadows' resignation from the Union.
Alphonso Clark, Evander Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young: The em-
ployment of all of these colored persons was terminated on September 9, 1946,
under similar circumstances. Accordingly, the undersigned for the purposes of
clarity finds it convenient to discuss their cases jointly. All four of these em-
ployees worked on the first shift.
Young was in the respondent's employ for about 4 years prior to September 9.
He worked as a "spearer" in the cloth room under Overseer Sara Tracey. He
joined the Union on July 12. Thereafter, Ikner accused him of belonging to the
Union and Young denied it. Ikner threatened him if he did not satisfactorily
prove that he was not a member of the Union or if he did not resign therefrom.
After further threatening statements and actions by Ikner, Young complained to
Durkee. Durkee thereafter in the presence of Young told Ikner to leave Young
alone. Ikner replied, "Well, I still say we ain't going to have no goddamn CIO
here. It's going to be nothing but a knock down and drag out." Durkee did
not reprimand Ikner for this statement."
Stone was employed by the respondent about 13 months prior to September 9.
He assisted James Wesson as a machine overhauler. He joined the Union on
July 2. At some time after July 2, Rutledge spoke to Stone on two occasions
about the Union. Rutledge solicited Stone's resignation from the Union but
Stone denied that he was a member. Overseer Connally also questioned Stone
as to whether or not he belonged to the Union. When Stone replied that he did
not belong to the Union, Connally said , "Well, don't join it if you ain't joined it.
Don't join it."
Clark was employed by the respondent as a floor cleaner for about 2i years
prior to September 9. He joined the Union on July 14.
McWhite, also a floor cleaner, was employed for about 2 years prior to Sep-
tember 9. He joined the Union on July 12. Rutledge, while working, solicited
McWhite's resignation from the Union, and McWhite signed the resignation
prepared by Rutledge.
On Sunday, September 8, all four of the above employees attended a meeting
of the Union at the Union's afore-mentioned office on Cherry Street in Macon.
Overseer Suits rode up and down the street in an automobile in front of the
entrance to the Union hall while the employees were entering. The following
morning, September 9, Young met Suits at the plant and Suits asked him as to
where he had seen Young the previous day. Young told Suits that Suits had
seen him entering the Union hall.
ti In his conversation with Young, Durkee told him in substance that an employee's
union affiliations would not affect his employment.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1563
Stone's regular hours were from 7 a. m. to 5 p. in. At about 2: 15 p. m., on
September 9, General Overseer Lee came to Stone and told him that thereafter
he would work with a Mr. Rivers instead of James Wesson. Lee then went
to Toney, one of the group of anti-Union employees, and engaged him in
conversation. About 10 minutes later, Overseer Jolly came to Stone and told
him that Lee had ordered that Stone punch out at 3 p. in. instead of 5 p. in.
'Stone objected but punched out at 3 p. in. as ordered. When he got to the
plant gate, a number of employees gathered there blocked his exit. Among
those present were Seagraves, Ikner, Toney, and another employee identified
by Stone as Early Hobbs' Seagraves ordered Stone to go get his clothes and
his money as he was no longer being permitted to work at the respondent's plant.
Since they would not permit him to leave the plant property, Stone went to see
Durkee in his office. Stone explained the situation to Durkee and Durkee said,
"Well, are you quitting?" Stone replied that he did not want to quit. Durkee
;asked Stone which men had refused to permit him to leave the plant and had
ordered him to get his money. Stone pointed out to Durkee the men standing
at the gate.93 Durkee then told Stone in substance that he could not fire him
without cause ; that he would guarantee him that nothing would happen to him
while on the plant property; but that he did not know what would happen to
Stone when he went outside the gate, since "I ain't got nothing to do with
what is outside the gate." Stone thereupon again went to the gate and told
Seagraves that Durkee would not fire him. Seagraves replied that he had better
go get his money and clothes and not return to the plant, saying, "If you do,
something might happen to you." Another unidentified employee said, "Let's
get him." Ikner said, "No, don't get him now, let him come back and get his
money, too." 34 Stone thereupon left the respondent's property and never re-
turned. During the whole episode Durkee did not leave his office or speak to
any of the employees gathered about the gate, although it conclusively appears
that some of them were standing there while they were supposed to be at work.
Young, Clark, and McWhite thereafter and on the same day were run off of
the respondent's property in the same fashion as was Stone. Young, who
customarily quit work at 4: 30 p. in., was alone and Clark and McWhite, whose
shift ended at 5 p. in., were together. Rutledge was also present when Young
attempted to go through the gate. Young testified credibly that while he was
at the gate, Durkee and Overseers Baker, Jolly, Lee, and Suits were looking out
of the office window. When Young reported to Durkee, Durkee was smiling
and asked Young if he would take his money then or come back after it. Young
replied that he would rather take his money with him as he was afraid
to come back to the plant. Durkee then went out of the office and talked to
the men at the gate. When he came back he told Young that he could not do
anything with the men at the gate as he was "scared" of them himself. When
he made this statement, Durkee was laughing and smiling. He said that he
could protect Young so long as he was on the respondent's property, but not
away from it. Young then asked for protection while he left the plant. Durkee
31 Testimony of a number of employees indicates that the group of anti-Union employees
was more numerous than alleged in the complaint herein. The name of Hobbs was men-
tioned in the testimony in some few incidents . The undersigned makes no finding in this
respect, however , since there is no allegation in the complaint in this regard , and further
since the matter was not fully litigated at the hearing.
33 The gate was within some few feet of the entrance to Durkee 's office.
34 Stone testified credibly to the above conversations with Durkee and the group of anti-
Union employees . He further testified credibly that Durkee laughed during his conversa-
tion with him.
1564 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
refused this, stating that the men at the gate would not bother him provided
that he got his money. Young then got his money and was permitted by the men
at the gate to leave after some further threatening actions on their part. Clark
and McWhite were threatened and left the respondent's employ in similar fashion,
excepting that Durkee in their case did not leave the office to speak to the men
at the gate.
The respondent contends that these four employees quit their jobs.
The undersigned finds that the respondent constructively discharged Young,
Stone, Clark, and McWhite on September 9, 1946.36 As has been previously
found, the respondent instigated and condoned the activities of this group of
anti-Union employees and was responsible for their statements and actions.
All of the above-related facts concerning these four employees are uncontradicted
In the record, possibly excepting some minor details. These facts, in the under-
signed's opinion, further conclusively prove the close connection between the
respondent and the group of anti-Union employees in the campaign against the
Union. Although their high-handed actions took place in front of Durkee's eyes,
he did nothing to stop them or to alleviate the fears of the four colored employees
involved. In fact, the undersigned is convinced and finds that under all the
circumstances the expulsion of these employees from the respondent's property
was deliberately planned jointly between the respondent and the anti-Union
employees. This is indicated by reason of the fact that Lee ordered Stone to
quit at 3 p. in. instead of 5 p. in. In this connection it is noteworthy that Lee
had a conversation with Toney immediately prior to giving this order. In this
manner it was arranged that the colored employees would not reach the gate in
a group, but arrived there singly or in pairs.
The respondent called the anti-Union employees and some of their wives as
witnesses. In defense of their actions they all testified to the effect that they
became incensed with the colored employees because they had suddenly, and
shortly before September 9, become accustomed to "rubbing against" white
women while at their work. The undersigned does not credit these witnesses.
McWhite, as a witness, appeared to the undersigned to be a very old Negro who
was meek and mild in his manners and certainly not the sort of person capable
of committing the actions charged against him. The undersigned finds that
these four employees were discharged because of their membership in and
activities on behalf of the Union.
Mattie Lee Meadows: Meadows was employed by the respondent from about
February of 1945. She operated a "doubler" on the third shift under Overseer
Martin.
She joined the Union on July 22. About the middle of August, Meadows
attended a meeting of the Union in the company of her three sons, Coleman,
Hubert, and Arlo Meadows. Rutledge was in the near vicinity of the entrance
to the Union hall when they entered. At about this time Rutledge came to
Meadows' house and talked to her and her children about the Union 98 In sub-
stance Rutledge's conversation was to the effect that the Union would not help
the employees and that he was in a position to help get people out of the Union.
On or about August 28, Meadows reported for work and Martin laid her off
for the night. Prior to this time Meadows had received steady work. The next
day he called her and told her that she need not come in for work that night.
She again reported for work on the following Tuesday or September 3, but was
36 See footnote 23, supra.
as It Is not clear from the record whether Rutledge came to the house before or after
the meeting of the Union.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1565
told that there wasn't any work available. She reported again on September 4,
and Martin again claimed that he did not have any work for her. At this time,
Martin told her to report for work on Thursday. It appears that on August 28,
and thereafter, Meadows' machine was operated by an employee or employees
of the second shift. As instructed, Meadows reported to the plant on Thursday,
and worked that night and Friday night. Meadows did not report for work on
Monday, September 9, as she went to Florida to visit a relative. Arlo Meadows
reported this fact to Martin when he was discharged on September 9. She again
reported for work on September 17 and found that her time card was not in the
rack. Overseer Connally told her that she could not work if she did not have
a time card and advised her to see Lee. The following day she talked to Martin
who told her in effect that she was no longer an employee since she did not
advise him that she would be absent ; that Arlo Meadows did not give him any
message on September 9; and that she would have to see Lee before she could
go to work. She then spoke to Lee who claimed that she had quit ; and that
Meadows' services were no longer needed. He further stated that Martin claimed
that he did not receive any message that she would be absent. Meadows has
not worked for the respondent since her conversation with Lee.
The respondent contends that Meadows quit her job.
The undersigned is convinced and finds that Martin laid off Meadows com-
mencing on August 28, and thereafter, because of her membership in and activi-
ties on behalf of the Union, and that these lay-offs constitute interference, re-
straint, and coercion 87 The evidence conclusively shows that the respondent
intended to rid itself of the services of the whole Meadows family because of
their adherence to the Union. In the case of Mattie Meadows, the respondent's
plan is clear. Martin intended to give her frequent lay-offs so as to force her
to quit. This was the respondent's procedure in the case of Coleman Meadows.
Nevertheless, she did absent herself for over one week without first obtaining
permission ; and sending word that she would be absent did not cure her
omission in this respect. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the respond-
ent did not discriminatorily discharge Mattie Lee Meadows.
Ella Middleton: Middleton, a colored employee, was employed by the respond-
ent for about 3 years prior to her termination of employment on or about Sep-
tember 18, 1946. She was employed both as a "winding machine" operator and
as a sweeper.
She attended a meeting of the Union in August which was under surveillance
by Rutledge. The following day, while at work, Rutledge spoke to her and stated
that he had seen her at the meeting. He further stated that "they" could do
without her services if she did not resign from the Union. Middleton denied that
she was a member of the Union. The following day Overseer Suits called Middle-
ton into his office. He asked her if she was a member of the Union and she ad-
mitted that she was. Suits then stated, in substance, that although Middleton
was a good employee they could do without her services ; that there was not go-
ing to be any union ; that they knew all employees who were members of the
Union ; that they were going to discharge everybody connected with it ; and that
employees would "starve to death" when they did not have jobs ; and that Rut-
ledge would help Middleton to resign from the Union. Middleton replied that
she would see Rutledge and resign from the Union. The next day Suits said to
Middleton, "I thought you were going to get Mr. Rutledge to write that letter for
37 The undersigned does not find the lay-offs to be violative of Section 8 (3) of the Act
for the reason that it was not so alleged in the complaint.
1566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
you?" Middleton replied that she wrote it herself." About 2 weeks later or on
September 18, Middleton was laid off by Suits and another employee was assigned
to her job. Since that date, although she has applied to the respondent for work,
she has not been reemployed.
The respondent contends that Middleton was laid off "in the interest of reduc-
ing cost of operations."
The undersigned finds that the above remarks of Suits and Rutledge to Middle-
ton constitute interference, restraint, and coercion.
Under all the circumstances the undersigned finds no merit in the respondent's
contentions and finds that the respondent discharged Middleton on September 18,
1946, because of her membership in and activities on behalf of the Union.
Ernest P. Wynn: Wynn was in the respondent's employ from about 1944 until
September 20, 1946. He worked as a section man or a fixer on the third shift
under Overseer Martin. He joined the Union on June 15, and was one of the most
active employees in its behalf. He was elected "financial secretary-treasurer"
of the Local of the Union on September 8.
About August 9, Wynn had a conversation with Martin in his office concerning
the Union. In substance, Martin told him that as much as he liked him he
would have to "make it hard" for him because of his Union membership and
that Wynn had better resign from the Union as his membership had himself and
Wynn "on the spot." Wynn replied to the effect that he was going to remain
in the Union. On August 21, Martin again spoke to Wynn concerning his Union
membership. In this conversation Martin requested that Wynn resign from the
Union and stated that there would not be any Union as all of its members
"would be runnel off." Wynn again refused to resign from the Union and Martin
said, "Fate, I have warned you now. You had better come out of the CIO."
On August 22, as has been previously related, Martin called Wynn and
Hambrick into his office and showed them some new rules limiting their freedom
in the plant. Thereafter Martin watched Wynn carefully for any violation of
the rules.
On September 4, Wynn acted as an observer for the Union at the election. For
the next 2 weeks following the election Wynn found "messes" on his job at the
beginning of the shift, apparently left by the section men on the preceding shift.
Wynn protested these conditions to Martin and told him that by reason thereof
he could not do all the work he was supposed to do in 8 hours. Martin laughed
and said, "you understand that, what that's for." " On one occasion Wynn
found a piece of emory cloth stuck in a gear and it required 2 hours and 15 min-
utes for him to fix the machine. The emory cloth was placed in the gear in such
a way that it could not have got there by accident. Overseer James Connally
had replaced Martin as overseer on the third shift during this time and he was
the person who advised Wynn that something was wrong with the machine.
The undersigned finds that the above remarks of Martin to Wynn constitute
interference, restraint, and coercion.
On September 20, Wynn told Martin that in view of the extra work that Con-
nally was putting upon him and the conditions under which he was working,
he would have trouble with Connally if he remained in the respondent's em-
ploy. Martin suggested that he quit his job and "let this thing blow over," and
that later on he would give him another job. Wynn agreed. It does not appear
8 Middleton did not resign from the Union.
as The undersigned finds that by this remark Martin was referring to Wynn's refusal to
resign from the Union.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1567
that Wynn has since sought employment from the respondent , or that the re-
spondent has offered him another job.
The respondent contends that Wynn quit his job.
The undersigned finds that the respondent constructively discharged Wynn on
September 20, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the
Union. From the above statements and actions of Martin it is clear that the
respondent intended to make Wynn 's job so intolerable that he would resign his
position . As Martin had warned him, Wynn's job was made "hard" for him
following the election . He found "messes" on his job and the respondent's no-
solicitation rule was discriminatorily applied against him , so much so that he
was not permitted to go to the men's rest room if other employees were there.
Wynn put up with these conditions until he thought he could stand it no longer.
He then advised Martin, in substance , that he might have trouble with Connally
because of the extra work being put upon him. Martin suggested that Wynn
quit and did not offer to transfer Wynn to another shift; nor did Martin offer to
correct the discriminatory conditions . Under the circumstances , Wynn was
left no alternative but to resign , or submit to respondent ' s discriminatory
practices.
E. H. Schrimshire: Schrimshire was employed off and on by the respondent
for about 10 years and was last employed from about March 1946 , until he was
discharged on September 23, 1946. He was an operator of "roving frames" and
was employed on the second shift until some few weeks before his discharge when
he was transferred to the third shift under Overseer Hulsey. Overseer Jolly had
been his supervisor on the second shift.
He joined the Union on or about June 8, and about the same time he had a
conversation with General Overseer Lee. Lee told him that he had heard that
Schrimshire was "lined up with that Union ." Schrimshire denied the charge and
Lee then stated that he wished Schrimshire would not join the Union as there
was not "any good in it" and that the Union "was nothing but Communists."
The undersigned finds that Lee's remarks constitute interference , restraint,
and coercion.
As has been previously related, on or about August 21 Rutledge solicited
Schrimshire during work to resign from the Union and by reason thereof Schrim-
shire lost considerable production . Schrimshire protested this loss of production
to Hulsey , who authorized that Schrimshire be paid for it. Schrimshire also
protested to Hulsey concerning anti-Union solicitations in the plant during
working hours . Hulsey did nothing concerning this protest by Schrimshire, but
reprimanded Schrimshire whenever he found him talking to other employees.
Schrimshire was present at the conference on September 3 between representa-
tives of the Union and representatives of the respondent and helped Starnes
check the pay roll. That night when representatives of the Union were dis-
tributing handbills in front of the plant, as has been previously related, Plant
Manager Barnes referring to the Union 's handbills stated, "Give him two of
them," immediately after Overseer Dye had given Schrimshire and his wife one
of the handbills . Thereafter Barnes said to Schrimshire and other employees
present that he was not "firing or running off nobody on account of the union"
and that he could have discharged Schrimshire "a dozen times."
On September 4, Schrimshire was scheduled to act as an observer at the elec-
tion during the morning . Due to his wife's fears , Schrimshire asked Representa-
tive Gieger that he be released . Schrimshire reported for work at about 2:45
that afternoon . Ikner was at the gate and told Schrimshire that he could not
1568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
enter the property as he had received orders that Schrimshire was discharged.
Jolly then came to the gate and told Ikner to let Schrimshire in as Durkee wanted
to see him. Jolly then told Schrimshire that Barnes had given him orders to
lay Schrimshire off when he reported for work. Durkee thereafter told Schrim-
shire that he had been appointed to act as an observer for the Union and that
he should go to the polling place. Schrimshire obeyed Durkee's orders and
remained as an observer until about 4:30 p. m. He then asked Lee for his money
and Lee replied that he would get it for him. Sometime later Lee returned to
Schrimshire and told him to "just forget about that," and to return to work the
next day on the same job. Lee further stated that he thought "that was about all
over with anyway." The undersigned finds that by this remark Lee referred to
the Union and that Barnes ordered Schrimshire's discharge because of his
adherence to the Union.
As previously related, Schrimshire was transferred to the third shift some few
weeks before his discharge. On this shift his foreman was Hulsey. Thereafter
when he reported for work at the beginning of his shift he found his job "con-
tinuously messed up," that is, work which should have been done by other em-
ployees on the second shift was left for Schrimshire to do. Since Schrimshire's
wages were partly based on production, this condition meant a possible loss in
wages to him. He protested to Hulsey who told him to thereafter leave the
frames as he found them. On September 20 Overseer Jolly told Schrimshire that
he wanted him to oil and clean the "mantles" that night. Schrimshire did not
make any reply to Jolly. That night Hulsey also told Schrimshire to oil and
clean the mantles, and he performed the job as ordered.40 Schrimshire next re-
ported for work at 11 p. m on September 22. His machines had been left in
"bad shape" by the previous shift and he reported this to Hulsey. He told
Hulsey that he would "rather not" work that night and showed him the condition
of the machines. Hulsey told Schrimshire, "I will have the boxes emptied up
enough to run you tonight.... Just let the spindle frames go to in the morning.
Just leave them like they are. You needn't clean them up, either. They haven't
cleaned them up. You can leave them." 41 The next morning shortly before
7 a. m. Jolly came to Schrimshire's place of work and accused him of not cleaning
up the job. Schrimshire replied that the operator on Jolly's shift had left the
job in the same condition for him. Jolly denied this and Schrimshire accused
him of "lying." Jolly thereupon pulled out a pocket knife and Schrimshire held
his wrist and pushed him back so that he tripped and fell in the alley. Hulsey
then intervened and took the knife from Jolly. After the fight Hulsey discharged
Schrimshire.
The respondent contends that Schrimshire was discharged "for assaulting an
overseer while on the job."
40 The evidence indicates that it was not Schrimshire 's turn to clean the mantles and
that this was extra work put upon him, as he had oiled and cleaned them during the pre-
ceding week. This job required about 2 hours, was "messy," and involved a loss in
wages.
44 That night employee W. T. Hambrick came to Schrimshire and invited him to have a
drink of liquor. It appears that Hulsey only supervised part of the shift and was not
present during the entire night, so that no other overseer was present until 5 a. m. the
next morning. Schrimshire had heard that Hambrick had a book which contained the
names of employees who were to be discharged by the respondent and that this book con-
tained his own name. Hambrick showed him this book while they were drinking. During
their conversation Hambrick told Schrimshire that Barnes had made up the book. As
will be hereinafter related. Hambrick, at the instigation of the respondent, also provided
liquor for another employee who was laid off on that account.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1569
The undersigned finds that the respondent discharged Schrimshire on Septem-
ber 23, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union.
Under all the circumstances, it is clear that the respondent intended to discharge
Schrimshire whenever the opportunity presented itself. This is shown by
Barnes' order to Jolly to discharge him on September 4. Facts hereinafter re-
lated in connection with the lay-off of J. O. Freeman conclusively show that
Hambrick was one of the group of anti-Union employees and that at the respon-
dent's instigation Hambrick also offered liquor to Freeman. Although the facts
are not quite so clear in Schrimshire's case, the undersigned is convinced and
finds that Hambrick was acting in the same capacity on the night of September
22.'n At the start of the shift Schrimshire told Hulsey that he did not wish
to work that night because of the condition of his frames and Hulsey told him to
leave them as he found them. The fact that Jolly came immediately to Schrim-
shire's frames before the end of the shift, although he was not the overseer on
that shift, is more than coincidence, especially since Hulsey was present. The
undersigned is therefore convinced and finds that the respondent deliberately
planned the incident so as to have a reason for discharging Schrimshire.
C. L. Williams: Williams was employed by the respondent as a "yarn boy"
for about 41 years prior to his discharge on about October 1, 1946.` He also
at times acted as an oiler and an overhauler. Martin was his overseer.
Williams joined the Union on July 30. He subsequently attended two
meetings of the Union which were under surveillance by Barnes, Rutledge and
lkner. During working hours Rutledge unsuccessfully solicited Williams'
resignation from the Union.
On about October 1, Martin asked Williams to work two shifts or 16 hours
that clay. Williams refused to work the full 16 hours but did offer to work
4 hours overtime, reminding Martin that he had been absent due to illness the
previous week. Martin thereupon told Williams, "See me before you get out
at 3:00 o'clock." About 2:30 p.m. that same day Martin discharged Williams,
claiming that Williams was responsible for some "stuck yarns 44 Martin had
cautioned Williams about 3 weeks prior to his discharge against stuck yarn.
It appears that there had been considerable stuck yarn when Martin warned
Williams, but lie had not caused any of it up to and until the day of his discharge.
The respondent contends that it discharged Williams "for inefficiency and
carelessness on the job resulting in repeated instances of damage to valuable
material." -
At the hearing Williams admitted that he had caused the stuck yarn on the
(lay of his discharge" Notwithstanding this admission, the undersigned is
convinced and finds that the respondent discharged Williams on about October
1, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union. He
had worked steadily for the respondent for about 41/2 years prior to his discharge
and there were no complaints about his work during this period of time. If
he (lid in fact cause the stuck yarn on the day of discharge, it appears that this
42 The evidence indicates that Schrimshire accepted only a few drinks from Hambrick
that night.
"Williams also worked for the respondent for about 11/2 years at sometime prior to the
above mentioned period of employment.
44 The yarn was processed by steaming in buckets . " Stuck yarn" was caused by the pre-
mature use of buckets which were freshly painted.
96 The evidence indicates that Williams had received a half-promise that he would be re-
employed . His negotiations with the respondent in this connection were taking place at
about the time of the hearing herein and, as a witness , he appeared to the undersigned
to be hostile to the Board 's case.
1570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was his first mistake of any consequence. The undersigned does not believe that
the respondent would have discharged an old and satisfactory employee under
the circumstances, unless it was looking for an excuse to discharge him because
of his adherence to the Union. There is no showing that any other employee
was ever discharged under such circumstances.
Hubert D. Meadows: Meadows was employed by the respondent for 2 years
prior to his discharge on about October 16, 1946. He worked at various jobs
during his employ and at the time of his discharge he ran "gill boxes" on the
first shift under Overseer Martin.
Meadows joined the Union on July 22. He attended meetings of the Union
which were under surveillance by Connally, Ikner, Rutledge and Martin. On
July 23, Connally questioned Meadows about the Union and asked him if he
belonged to it. Meadows told him that he was a member. Shortly thereafter
Connally unsuccessfully solicited Meadows' resignation from the Union during
working hours. On about August 30, Meadows asked General Overseer Lee
about a job for his sister, Pebble Shelnut. During the conversation Lee asked
Meadows if he had changed his mind about the Union. Meadows replied that he
had not. Lee then stated that Meadows would not "get anywhere fighting the ones
[he] was looking to."
The undersigned finds that the above interrogation and remarks by Lee con-
stitute interference, restraint, and coercion.
On about October 15 employee Hobbs, a section man, re-weighed about 50 of
Meadows' "cans." ;e Hobbs found that one can had been incorrectly marked
to the extent of one ounce and he told Meadows to try to get the weights a litle
closer. At the end of Meadows' shift or about 2 p. in., both Hobbs and Martin
returned to Meadows' place of work and started to re-weigh his cans. Meadows
remained until about 3:10 p. in., during which time no incorrect weights were
found and he then left the plant. The following day at the start of the shift
Meadows was discharged by Martin who claimed that he and Hobbs had found
8 cans incorrectly weighed after Meadows had left the plant. Meadows denied
that his weights were incorrect and claimed that Martin was discharging him
because of the Union.
The respondent contends that Meadows was discharged "for inefficiency on
the job after repeated warnings to correct his practices."
The undersigned finds that the respondent discharged Hubert Meadows on
October 16, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the
Union. It is undisputed that Meadows had been instructed by the respondent
to be careful and exact in weighing the cans. However, except for Hobbs'
instruction on October 15, Meadows had not received any warnings or complaints
about his work prior to his discharge. The undersigned is convinced that
Meadows' discharge was deliberately planned by Martin because Meadows had
refused to disassociate himself from the Union. When Martin and Hobbs
started to weigh the cans at the end of the shift, Meadows acted as Martin
undoubtedly expected. He remained overtime for only about 10 minutes and
then left the plant when no incorrect weights were found. Martin, with Hobbs
4 Hobbs had been previously referred to in connection with anti-Union activities.
Meadows' job required that he weigh the cans and mark the correct weight on the outside
of each can It appeals that incorrect weights marked on the cans would affect the
weight of the material manufactured. It is not clear from the record just why Hobbs, a
section man or machine fixer, re-weighed Meadows' cans, except that Hobbs testified that
he was instructed to do so by Lee.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1571
as a convenient witness, then allegedly found eight cans incorrectly weighed.
Moreover, Hobbs admittedly was an anti-Union employee who solicited employees
to resign from the Union and was closely associated in other activities of the
group heretofore found to be anti-Union.
Floyd Shelton: " Shelton was employed by the respondent from about 1930
until he entered the Army. He was rehired by the respondent about April 1946,
after his discharge from the Army, and worked as a doffer on the first shift
under Overseer Jolly.
He joined the Union on June 9 and about 2 or 3 days later had a conversation
with Lee. Lee asked Shelton what he expected to get out of the Union. Shelton
replied that he did not know anything about the Union. Lee then said, "Well,
from what I have heard, you know quite a bit about it . . . you was overseas
and so was I . . . you know, we went a lacking for a lot of things on account
of these union strikes back in the states . . . if you wanted to work in a Union
Mill when you got out, . . . why didn't you go to a Union Mill? . . . You came
back here, . . . and we give you about the best job and the best shift we had.
I don't know why you want to work against us. You should have went to a
Union Mill instead of trying to organize this one."
The undersigned finds that the above remarks of Lee constitute interference.
On or about August 23, Shelton and employee Elzie Ray Bussell were called into
Lee's office. Lee told them that they were being laid off for one week. As to
the reason for the lay-off he stated, "There has been too much playing, slack
work up there." 48 Bussell denied that they had been playing and reminded Lee
that although he [Russell] did "play a good bit" when on the third shift, he had
not been reprimanded for it. Lee replied, "I am preferring the time today."
Concerning this charge of "playing," Shelton testified credibly that prior to this
lay-off there had been no complaints about his work. Shelton returned to work
on September 3.
For about 11/2 weeks prior to the above lay-off, Shelton encountered numerous
bobbins which were stuck to spindles on the frames that he was required to doff.
The stuck bobbins were usually confined to one frame and a different frame was
involved each day.49 The bobbins had been forcefully tamped down so that it
was necessary for a fixer to pry them off the spindles with a screw driver.
Shelton again encountered stuck bobbins during a period of about 11/2 weeks
prior to his discharge on November 14. On that date after doffing about 25
frames, Shelton again found a frame whose bobbins were stuck. He looked for
the fixer, I. G. Gandy,d0 and Overseers Lee and Jolly, but they were not present
in the spinning room. Shelton then forced the stuck bobbins off the spindles by
tapping them on the bottom with another bobbin. At about this time
Gandy appeared and asked him what had happened. Shelton told him that the
bobbins had been stuck. Gandy then reported this to Lee who sent for Shelton.
In substance, Lee told Shelton that he had bent the spindles and that he was
discharging him for that reason. Shelton replied that Gandy had known about
47 The complaint incorrectly names this employee as Fred Shelton.
48 Further evidence concerning this alleged "playing" will be hereinafter discussed in
connection with employee Russell
48 The respondent contends that the bobbins stuck because they were new. If the cred-
ible testimony had shown that an occasional bobbin on different frames had been stuck, the
undersigned would be inclined to accept the respondent 's contention . However, as related
above, the facts are otherwise.
B° It is noteworthy that Gandy was an observer for the respondent at the election on
September 4.
817319-49-vol. 80-100
1572 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the condition for over a week and that he had forced the bobbins off so as not to
leave the frame shut down 63
The undersigned finds that the respondent laid off Shelton from August 23 to
September 3, 1946, because of his membership in and activities on behalf of the
Union. In view of Lee's remarks to Shelton in June concerning the Union, Lee's
charge of "playing" as a reason for the lay-off does not sound plausible. More-
over, it has been heretofore found that the respondent discriminatorily applied its
rule against solicitations.
Considering the frequency and the manner in which the bobbins were stuck,
usually on one frame, the undersigned is convinced that they did not stick to
the spindles due to their newness, as contended by the respondent, but stuck
by reason of the fact that someone forcefully tamped them down on the spindles.
It may be argued that in such case Shelton did not lose any wages since he was
a doffer and was not paid on a production basis. Gandy, the fixer, did not lose
any wages because of the stuck bobbins as he also was paid on an hourly basis.
The only employee involved who might have suffered a loss in wages by reason of
the stuck bobbins was the frame operator who was paid on a production basis,
but with a guaranteed hourly rate. Provided that the fixer was present in
the spinning room when bobbins were stuck, the few minutes required to loosen
them from the spindles could not have caused but a negligible loss in wages to
the frame operator or spinner, if any. It is noteworthy that the frame involved
in Shelton's discharge was one of those operated by Mrs. Martin, wife of Overseer
Martin. Obviously, the stuck bobbins meant extra work for Gandy, since the
duties of his position required that he loosen them. Significantly, it does not
appear that either Gandy or Mrs. Martin complained about the frequency of
stuck bobbins. Insofar as Shelton was concerned, his job required that he keep
all of the frames under his jurisdiction in operation by immediately doffing them
when needed. Under such circumstances it is equally obvious that spinners
would have registered complaints to the overseer against Shelton if the latter
had permitted frames to remain idle for lack of doffing. In fact, Shelton testified
in substance, that when he was unable to locate either Gandy, Jolly, or Lee in
the spinning room, he attempted to loosen the stuck bobbins on his own initiative
due to the fear that he might be reprimanded for permitting the frame to stand
idle. Under all the circumstances, it appears that of the three employees in-
volved, Shelton stood to lose most by reason of the stuck bobbins. Without
considering the case as a whole, the undersigned would be inclined to find that
the respondent was justified for discharging an employee who caused damage
to equipment and parts approximating 40 dollars. Unquestionably Shelton
should have permitted the frame to stand idle until he located the fixer to loosen
the bobbins, even though his position might have been jeopardized thereby.
The undersigned also recognizes the possibility that Shelton may have attempted
to loosen the bobbins while in anger and by so doing negligently and carelessly
destroyed the spindles. This would be understandable due to the fact that
Shelton continuously found bobbins stuck on his job and that he thought they
had been purposely tamped down to annoy him and obstruct his work. The
undersigned is convinced and finds that someone at the instigation of the
"Shelton testified , in substance , that when he tapped the bobbins , a number of the
spindles had "slipped" from the frame , but that from all appearances they were not bent.
Considering the method employed by Shelton to force the bobbins off the spindles , lie un-
doubtedly bent or broke a number of them. In this connection Gandy and Lee testified
to the effect that 15 spindles on the frame in question had either been bent or broken.
The uncontradicted evidence shows that these spindles cost $2.60 each.
NE/CON TEXTILES, INC. 1573
respondent tamped down the bobbins deliberately for the purpose of causing
Shelton annoyance and his eventual resignation or discharge. It has been here-
tofore shown that the respondent employed like methods in connection with other
employees . The evidence conclusively shows that the respondent desired to
rid itself of the services of all adherents of the union , including Shelton. There-
fore, the undersigned is of the opinion that the respondent has no cause for
complaint over the destruction of its property in this instance , willfully or other-
wise, since the destruction resulted from the respondent's own wrongful actions.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the respondent discharged Floyd
Shelton on November 14, 1946, because of leis' membership in and activities on
behalf of the union.
Elzie Ray Bussell : °a Bussell was in the employ of the respondent for
about 16 months prior to the hearing herein. At first he was employed as a
doffer on the third shift under Overseer Jolly. He was transferred to the first
shift about December of 1945.
Bussell joined the Union on June 15 and thereafter actively solicited employees
for membership. At some time before the election Jolly told Bussell that he knew
of some persons who would be willing to bet Bussell that the Union would lose
the election. Bussell replied that he also would bet that the Union would lose."
At some time shortly prior to August 23, Bussell and Floyd Shelton went into
the plant, although it was not during their shift, in order to talk to some other
doffers concerning the Union. As has been previously related, both Shelton and
Bussell were called into Lee's office on August 23 and laid off by him for "play-
ing." It appears that by "playing" Lee was referring to the fact that Bussell
and Shelton had been in the plant while off their shift.64 Bussell reported for
work again on September 3, but received a further lay-off from Lee, who claimed
that Bussell had posted in the men's rest room a letter to the employees from
the respondent's Cedartown Plant employees, together with a card containing
Bussell's name, which notified employees of a Union meeting. Although Bussell
denied the charge and mentioned the fact that some one else could have put his
name on the card, lie was laid off by Lee until September 9.
Bussell acted as an observer for the Union at the election on September 4.
That same afternoon, a deputy sheriff served a dispossess notice on Bussell to
vacate the respondent's house which he occupied as
Bussell returned to work on September 9. Subsequently, when he was off
from work during one morning in order to go to the hospital, lie solicited employee
Stevens to join the Union. That afternoon Stevens came to Bussell while lie
was at work and spoke to him concerning membership in the Union. During
the conversation Bussell told this employee that the Union needed only seven
az Bussell was incorrectly named in the complaint as Russell.
sa The above conversation is recited only for the purpose of showing that Jolly suspected
Bussell of being a member of the Union. Bussell testified that he made the above reply
to Jolly in order to keep him from knowing that he was a member of the Union.
61 The respondent claims that employees are only permitted to enter the plant during
their own shift. The evidence conclusively shows, however, that the group of anti-Union
employees were not restricted in this respect. Accordingly, the undersigned rejects this
contention of the respondent as any justification for the lay-off of Shelton and Bussell.
The lay-off of Shelton has been previously related
15 The uncontradicted testimony shows that the dispossess notice was served by reason
of the fact that Bussell was behind in his rent for 1 week, which arrearage amounted to
90 cents. The dispossess action was still pending at the time of the hearing herein. Al-
though it appears that the respondent was and is using this method to coerce Bussell, the
undersigned makes no finding in this respect since it was not alleged in the complaint or
fully litigated at the hearing.
1574 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
more members to obtain a majority. About 5 minutes after the conversation,
Bussell was called into Lee's office. Lee stated that be had learned that the Union
needed only seven more members and that an employee had complained that Bissell
was bothering him on his job. Although Bussell told Lee that he had not gone
to Stevens' place of work and that the latter had come to his job, Lee gave
Bussell a further lay-off of 10 days, which was from about September 18 to
September 30.
The undersigned finds that the respondent laid off Elzie Ray Bussell from
August 23 to September 9 and from September 18 to September 20, 1946, because
of his membership in and activities on behalf of the Union. The discriminatory
application of the respondent's no-solicitation rule has been heretofore found
and fully discussed.
P. E. Dennis: Dennis was employed by the respondent for about 8 or 9 years
prior to her discharge on November 27, 1946. She worked as a spinner under
Overseer Hulsey.
She joined the Union on July 15, and thereafter went to its meetings. The
last meeting attended by her was in September or October and it was under
surveillance by Ikner, Rutledge, Toney, and Overseer Martin.
As has been related above, Armon Guyton was alleged to have wound back
on one of Dennis' frames. The day that Guyton was discharged Dennis took
some bobbins from the frame in question in order to retain proof that winding
back had not taken place. She did this after Hulsey had also taken several of
the bobbins. Two or three nights after Guyton's discharge, Hulsey questioned
Dennis as to what she had done with the bobbins. Dennis admitted taking two
bobbins because Hulsey had taken two.'" Prior to this conversation with Hulsey,
there had not been any complaints concerning Dennis' work. Thereafter, Hul-
sey complained to her about "mixing the waste," dropping waste on the floor
and "cutting off pieces." 67 There were about seven spinners on Dennis' shift
and Hulsey warned all of them about cutting off pieces. When he warned Den-
nis in this respect, she told him that she would be glad to stop the practice when
the rest of the spinners did.
When Dennis reported for work on November 27, Hulsey discharged her for
cutting off pieces. At the hearing Dennis admitted that she had been cutting
off pieces.
The undersigned finds that the respondent did not discriminatorily discharge
F. E. Dennis. Dennis had been warned by Hulsey on several occasions not
to cut off pieces and she had defied his orders, claiming that she would cease the
practice only if the other spinners did likewise. Dennis testified that the other
spinners were also cutting off pieces. However, it does not appear that any of
them defied Hulsey's attempts to stop it, or that any of these spinners were
caught by Hulsey after he issued his orders. In view of the uncontradicted
evidence as to the cost of the wool and the amount of loss occasioned by the
waste material, the undersigned is of the opinion that the respondent was making
a conscientious effort to stop this cutting off of pieces. While the respondent
se The above facts are related only for the purpose of showing that the respondent had
knowledge that Dennis was an active adherent of the Union.
sr The spinners were in the habit of cutting off roping before it ran out on the frames
in order to save time As noted above , spinners were partly paid upon a production basis
It appears that this cutting practice was carried over from the time when respondent
manufactured cotton material . After the change to wool, the respondent attempted to
stop the practice due to the high cost of the wool.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1575
undoubtedly desired to discharge Dennis because of her adherence to the Union,
nevertheless, the undersigned believes that an inference of discriminatory dis-
charge is unjustified, especially since Dennis defied Hulsey's orders and there-
after admittedly continued the practice.
James O. Freeman: Freeman was employed by the respondent since August
of 1945, as a weaver under Overseer Dye. He joined the Union on July 22, 1946.
About August 18 Freeman had several conversations with Dye concerning the
Union, during one of which, while expressing his opposition to the Union, Dye
stated that he had heard that Freeman had been elected as a "committeeman" of
the Union.
On or about August 26, employee W. T. Hambrick came to Freeman's home
with a pint of whiskey and offered Freeman a drink ^ After having several
drinks and prior to 6 p. m., they walked to the plant property and spoke briefly
to Dye That night when Freeman reported for work at about 11 p. m., Dye
asked Freeman if he had been drinking. Freeman admitted that he had had
some drinks during the "afternoon." Dye then said that he would have to lay
him off that night. Freeman accused Dye of sending Hambrick to his house
with liquor so that the respondent would have an excuse for laying him off.
Dye denied this and told Freeman to report to the plant the following night.
Freeman reported to the plant the next night as instructed and Dye told him that
he would have to give him a lay-off of 2 weeks. Freeman protested the lay-
off and stated that he had to have work in order to support his family. Dye
then stated that if Freeman did not "try to be a square shooter" with him, he
would not give him any more work, and that he had heard that Freeman had
stated at a meeting of the Union that he was going to make every effort in his
power to organize the weave shop. Freeman was thereafter laid off until
September 9.
The respondent contends that Freeman was "disciplined for coming to work
in a state of intoxication."
The undersigned is convinced and finds that the respondent laid off James O.
Freeman from August 26 to September 9, 1946, because of his membership in and
activities on behalf of the Union. It has been previously related that Hambrick
on or about the night of September 22, brought liquor into the plant and offered
some to employee E. H. Schrimshire. On that night and during working hours,
Hambrick and employee Burnard Potter left the plant and visited Freeman's
home. During his conversation with Freeman, Hambrick accused Freeman of
telling Schrimshire about the book containing the names of employees whom
Barnes had decided to discharge because of the Union. Freeman admitted that
he had warned Schrimshire. Hambrick then complained that he did not think
that Freeman would do such a thing considering the fact that they had been
such good friends. Hambrick then admitted to Freeman that the respondent had
sent him to Freeman's house on August 26 with whiskey, in order to have an
excuse to discipline Freeman. Hambrick further stated that the respondent
took this action because of Freeman's statement at a meeting of the Union to
the effect that he was going to organize the weave shop. Hambrick was also laid
off for drinking on about August 26, and it appears that he was discharged on
September 23 because of the drinking incident involving Schrimshire and Potter,
but was subsequently rehired. However, Potter testified credibly that Hambrick
"Prior to the times related herein , Freeman and Hambrick had been friends and had
often had drinks together . This was the first occasion , however, that Hambrick had
brought any liquor to Freeman's house.
1576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
told him that he had been paid by the respondent for these times when he was
laid off. For the above reasons, the undersigned finds that Hambrick was one
of the group of anti-Union employees and that the respondent instigated and was
responsible for his actions. Moreover, Freeman testified credibly that he had
only about one-half pint of whiskey prior to 6 p. in. on August 26, and that he sub-
sequently ate his dinner and slept for a while before reporting to work at 11 p. in.
Under all the circumstances, the undersigned does not find any merit in the re-
spondent's contentions.
James W. Wesson: Wesson was in the respondent's employ from about May of
1936 until about October 16, 1946. He was a general overhauler for about a
year prior to his termination of employment and had limited supervision over
an overhauling crew. Prior to the overhauling job he had acted as an overseer.
On the overhauling job, Wesson worked on the first shift under the supervision
of General Overseer Lee. Wesson joined the Union on July 12. Thereafter and
about the middle of August, he was called into the office of Plant Superintendent
Durkee. Durkee said, "I thought I knowed you, but, . . . I don't know whether
I do or not." Durkee then accused Wesson of having attended a meeting of the
Union on a previous Sunday evening. Wesson denied that he had been at the
meeting but finally admitted after questioning by Durkee that he was a member
of the Union. Wesson also expressed his opinion that people working in textile
mills should be unionized.
The undersigned finds that the above interrogation by Durkee concerning
Wesson's union affiliations constitutes interference.
At a meeting of the Union held on September 8, a local of the Union was
organized and Wesson was elected president thereof. The following day Wesson
was transferred by Durkee from overhauling to a job as fixer in the carding
room on the second shift. At the time Durkee told Wesson that the transfer
was due to the fact that Toney Desaulnier, who was in charge of the reconversion
of the respondent's machines from cotton to wool, did not want Wesson "on his
crew." This transfer involved a considerable cut in Wesson's wages, and in
addition was less desirable because it was on a night shift.
Working near the cards was a very dusty job and due to the dust Wesson
developed bronchial trouble.` After developing this bronchial trouble, Wesson
attempted to keep up his job but was required to take frequent sick leaves. At
times he was unable to work a complete shift and it appears at other times he
went to work when he should have remained in bed. He reported his condition
to Overseer Hulsey but it appears that the respondent did nothing to relieve the
situation. In fact it appears that Wesson was required to do more work than
was ordinarily assigned to a fixer. On September 28 Wesson was called into
Durkee's office and Durkee asked him the reason for his absenteeism. Wesson
replied to the effect that he was sick by reason of his work around the cards.
Durkee then said that they would have to get some one else to take Wesson's
place if he did not work "regular," and instructed him to come in to work the
following Monday night. Wesson worked the whole of the next week and
then, again, was absent on account of illness. Finally, he was again called
into Durkee's office on about October 16. Durkee suggested to Wesson, "Sup-
posing you just stay out until you do get able to work regularly." He then
told Wesson to stay out until about November 18, at which time he stated Wesson
should come back to the plant and "We will see." Wesson admitted to Durkee
that he was physically unable to work as a fixer in the card room and stated
w Wesson, as a witness, appeared to be a man of between 60 and 65 years of age.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1577
that he could not continue on that job. During the conversation Durkee did
not offer Wesson another job. As of the date of the hearing, Wesson had not
returned to the respondent 's plant and the respondent had not offered him another
job.
The respondent contends that it "... demoted James W. Wesson for ineffi-
ciency , but put him on another job with reduction in pay of only nine cents per
hour. At the time of the filing of this response this employee is on a four-week
sick leave at his own request."
The undersigned finds that the respondent on about September 9, 1946, demoted
and decreased the rate of pay of James W. Wesson, and constructively discharged
him on or about October 16, 1946, because of his membership in and activities
on behalf of the Union. It conclusively appears that the respondent was in need
of fixers or overhaulers during this change-over program from cotton to wool.
There had not been any complaints about Wesson's work prior to his transfer
to the fixing job. It is significant that his transfer took place the day after
Wesson was elected president of the Local of the Union. In fact, when Durkee
notified Wesson of the transfer on September 9, Durkee congratulated him upon
being elected president. The respondent could not help knowing that the fixing
job in the card room was seriously endangering Wesson's health, but nevertheless
it did not offer him any relief by transferring him to another job. It appears
that the respondent did everything possible to rid itself of Wesson 's services.
In view of Wesson's age and seniority , it would seem that the respondent at
least would have transferred him to a fixing job on the first shift and in a depart-
ment other than the card room, if the respondent had in fact decided that he was
too inefficient for the job of chief overhauler . The undersigned is therefore
convinced that the respondent deliberately planned to force Wesson's resigna-
tion, knowing that the combination of working on the night shift and the dust
in the card room would impair his health and eventually force him to resign.
Accordingly , the undersigned rejects the respondent 's contentions.
Pebble Shelnut: Shelnut was employed by the respondent office and on for about
3 years. She was last employed about 2 years prior to the hearing. It has
previously been related that her brother , Hubert D. Meadows , during a con-
versation with Lee about the Union , asked him concerning a job for his sister.
Lee told Meadows that he did not have any work available for Shelnut. This
conversation took place about August 30, 1946. About 1 week later Shelnut
asked Martin for work. Martin also told her that no jobs were open. On
about November 20 Shelnut asked Lee for work. He, in substance , told her
that nothing was available then but that she would be the next person hired.
As of the date of the hearing, Shelnut had not been hired by the respondent.
The Board contends that the respondent failed and refused to hire Shelnut
because it believed that she had joined or would join the Union, if employed.
In support of this contention , counsel for the Board urges that the respondent
knew that all of Shelnut's family belonged to the Union and had discharged
them for that reason. While the undersigned believes that there is considerable
merit to the Board 's contentions , he nevertheless is of the opinion that the facts
do not justify any finding of a discriminatory refusal to hire. There has been
no showing by the Board that other persons were hired by the respondent after
August 30 to positions for which Shelnut could have qualified. Accordingly, the
undersigned finds that the respondent did not discriminatorily refuse to hire
Pebble Shelnut on August 30, 1946, and thereafter.
W. G. Guyton : Prior to about December 20, 1945, Guyton was employed for
about 12 years as a fixer on the third shift. On that date he was discharged
1578 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by Durkee because he refused to give Durkee a key to one of the plant gates
which he had in his possession E0 At about the middle of October 1946, Guyton
asked Martin to see Durkee about getting back his job. Martin agreed. Some
few days later, on or about October 18, Guyton had another conversation with
Martin. At that time Martin stated, "He [Durkee] said he couldn 't do anything
about it as long as Armon and Dorothy was messed up in that. . . . He believed
you was." 6' The undersigned finds that by this remark Martin referred to the
fact that Armon and Dorothy Guyton were members of the Union. About 3
days after his conversation with Martin, Guyton went to Durkee's office and
asked him for a job. Durkee told Guyton that he could not do anything for
him until he got "right." Guyton asked Durkee what he meant by this state-
ment. In substance, Durkee replied that Guyton had been discharged for refusal
to give up the key to the plant gate ; and that although he did not "particularly"
continue to hold that against Guyton, he just could not see his way clear to em-
ploy him until he got his "family straightened out." Guyton then told Durkee
that he was unable to do as Durkee suggested since Armon and Dorothy Guyton
were adult married people over whom he had no control. The undersigned
finds that in making these remarks Durkee had reference to the fact that Armon
and Dorothy Guyton were members of the Union. As of the date of the
hearing, Guyton had not been offered employment by the respondent.
The undersigned finds that the respondent failed and refused to hire W. G.
Guyton on about October 18, 1046, and thereafter, for the reason that it believed
that he either had joined the Union or would, if employed, join and assist the
Union. The remarks of both Martin and Durkee are significant in this respect.
Moreover, the evidence conclusively shows that at the time mentioned herein
the respondent had open a position for which Guyton could have qualified. In
making the above finding the undersigned has duly considered the fact that
Guyton was discharged for cause in December 1945. His refusal to return the
key which was improperly in his possession amounted to insubordination. In
view of Martin's and Durkee's remarks to Guyton, however, the undersigned is
convinced that the respondent was willing to forgive Guyton for his actions in
that matter and to rehire him, provided that he got his family "straightened out."
Concluding Findings
From the evidence as a whole, it appears that the respondent did everything
in its power, short of ostensible discharge for adherence to the Union, to coerce
its employees to refrain from joining the Union or to resign from it. When
employees refused to disassociate themselves from the Union, their work was
made "hard" for them, and the respondent thereafter one way or another rid
itself of their services. In this campaign against the Union the respondent even
went so far as to threaten bodily harm to representatives and members of the
Union and to dangerously appeal to the base emotions of racial and religious
prejudices. The conduct of the respondent found above to be illegal did not
result from isolated instances of unfair labor practices committed by individual
foremen who may have been acting in accordance with their own convictions.
On the contrary, the evidence conclusively discloses an integrated plan of action
in which top management participated. The activities of these officers, together
eo The facts relating to Guyton 's discharge are commented upon herein only for the
purpose of background.
61 The facts relating to the discharges of Armon and Dorothy Guyton , son and daughter-
In-law of W . G. Guyton, have been previously related. They had been discharged prior to
the time of the above conversation.
XIACON TEXTILES, INC. 1579
with those of the supervisory employees and of the group of anti-Union employees,
are so interwoven as to be almost indistinguishable.
For these reasons and under all the circumstances, the undersigned has made
the above findings of discrimination. Standing alone, as isolated cases, the
undersigned might have been persuaded to recommend dismissal of some few
of the cases found. It is possible that the respondent may have been justified
in some of the lay-offs or discharges and that adherence to the Union may not
have unduly influenced the respondent's actions in such cases. However, if
such is the case, the scope and character of the respondent's unfair labor
practices make it impossible for the undersigned conscientiously to distinguish
further than he has done, these possible discharges or lay-offs for cause, from
those which were unquestionably of a discriminatory nature 6'
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring
in connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I,
above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Since it has been found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of Oscar F. Teet, Margie N. Rider, Armen Guyton, Mary
Sue Sargent, Coleman Meadows, Dorothy Guyton, Arlo Meadows, Alphonse
Clark, Evander Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. 0. Young, Ella Middleton,
Ernest F. Wynn, E. H. Schrimshire, C. L. Williams, Hubert D. Meadows, W. G.
Guyton, Floyd Shelton, and James W. Wesson. It will therefore be recom-
mended that the respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions 83 without prejudice to their
seniority and other rights and privileges.' It will be further recommended
that the respondent make them whole for any loss of pay they may have
suffered by reason of the respondent's discrimination against them by payment
to each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount he or she would have
earned as wages from the date of the discriminatory discharge, as found above,
to the date of the respondent's offer of reinstatement, less his or her net earn-
ings °6 during such periods.
It has been found that the respondent discriminatorily laid off Elzie Ray
Bussell, James 0 Freeman and Floyd Shelton. It will be recommended that the
respondent make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by
reason of the respondent's discrimination against them by payment to each
811V. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2).
"In accordance with the Board 's consistent interpretation of the term , the expression
"former or substantially equivalent position " is intended to mean "former position wher-
ever possible , but if such position is no longer in existence , then to a substantially equiva-
lent position ." See Matter of The Chase National Bank of the City of New York , San Juan,
Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 N. L R. B. 827.
14 In the case of James W . Wesson, "former" position means that which he held prior
to his discriminatory demotion and decrease in rate of pay on September 9, 1946.
66 See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company , 8 N. L. R . B. 440.
1580 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of them of a sum of money equal to the amount he would have earned as
wages during the period of his discriminatory lay-off as found above, less net
earnings during the said period "
It has been found that the respondent did not discriminate in regard to the hire
and tenure of employment of Frank Wesson, Hubert Parten, Mattie Lee Meadows,
Effie Dennis, and Pebble Shelnut. It will therefore be recommended that the
complaint be dismissed as to them.
It has also been found that the respondent has engaged in certain acts of
interference, restraint and coercion. It will be recommended that the respondent
cease therefrom. In view of the extensive nature of these unfair labor practices,
manifesting a determination generally to defeat and discourage self-organization
by its employees, and in order to effectuate the guarantees of Section 7 of the
Act, it will be recommended that the respondent be ordered to cease and desist
from in any manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record
in the case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONOLusioNs OF LAW
1. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the
employees named in Section V hereof, thereby discouraging membership in
Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, the respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the
Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
undersigned hereby recommends that the respondent , Macon Textiles, Inc.,
its officers , agents, successors and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of America, CIO,
or any other labor organization , by laying off, discharging or refusing to rein-
state any of its employees , or in any other manner discriminating in regard to
their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment ;
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the right to self -organization , to form labor organiza-
tions, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America , CIO, or any other
labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing , and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
66 See footnote 65, supra.
MACON TEXTILES, INC. 1581
2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer Oscar F. Teet, Margie N. Rider, Armon Guyton, Mary Sue Sargent,
Dorothy Guyton, Arlo Meadows, Coleman Meadows, Alphonso Clark, Evander
Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O. Young, Ella Middleton, Ernest F. Wynn,
E. H. Schrimshire, C. L. Williams, Hubert D. Meadows, W. G. Guyton, Floyd
Shelton, and James W. Wesson immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority
or other rights and privileges ;
(b) Make whole Elzie Ray Bussell, James O. Freeman, Oscar F. Teet, Margie
N. Rider, Armon Guyton, Mary Sue Sargent, Coleman Meadows, Dorothy Guyton,
Arlo Meadows, Alphonso Clark, Evander Bud McWhite, Bennie Stone, J. O.
Young, Ella Middleton, Ernest F. Wynn, E. H. Schrimshire, C. L. Williams, Hubert
D. Meadows, W. G. Guyton, Floyd Shelton, and James W. Wesson for any loss
of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them by
payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to an amount determined in the
the manner set forth in the section entitled, "The remedy," above ;
(c) Post at its plant at Macon, Georgia, copies of the notice attached hereto
marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Tenth Region, after being signed by the respondent's representa-
tive, shall be posted by the respondent immediately upon the receipt thereof, and
maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material;
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing, within ten
((10) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps
the respondent has taken to comply therewith.
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notifies said Regional Director
in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National
Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take the action
aforesaid.
It is further recommended that the allegations of the complaint with respect
to Frank Wesson, Hubert Parten, Mattie Lee Meadows, Effie Dennis and Pebble
Shelnut be dismissed.
As provided in Section 203.39 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 4, effective September 11, 1946, any party or
counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15) days from the date of service of
the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203.38 of said
Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington
25, D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth such
exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or
proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon,
together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any
party or counsel for the Board may, within the same period, file an original
and four copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Immediately
upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the party or counsel
for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other
parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director. Proof of service on the
other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as
required by Section 203.65. As further provided in said Section 203.39, should
1582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor
must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of
service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
JOHN H. EADIE,
Trial Eccaminer.
Dated May 15, 1947.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO,
or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
WE WILL OFFER to the employees named below immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice
to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make
them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Oscar F. Teet
Margie N. Rider
Armon Guyton
Mary Sue Sargent
Coleman Meadows
Alphonso Clark
Evander Bud McWhite
Bennie Stone
Dorothy Guyton
Ernest F. Wynn
J. O. Young
Ella Middleton
E. H. Schrimshire
C. L Williams
Hubert D. Meadows
W. G. Guyton
Floyd Shelton
James W. Wesson
Arlo Meadows
WE WILL MAKE whole the employees named below for any
suffered as a result of discrimination.
loss of pay
Elzie Ray Bussell
Floyd Shelton
James O. Freeman
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-
named union or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
against any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any
such labor organization.
Dated------------------------
MACON TEXTILES, INC.,
Employer.
By---------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
The notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.