Lynn L. Cosentine, et al., Complainant,v.Tom Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 24, 2004
01A23856_r (E.E.O.C. Mar. 24, 2004)

01A23856_r

03-24-2004

Lynn L. Cosentine, et al., Complainant, v. Tom Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Agency.


Lynn L. Cosentine, et al. v. Department of Homeland Security

01A23856

March 24, 2004

.

Lynn L. Cosentine, et al.,

Complainant,

v.

Tom Ridge,

Secretary,

Department of Homeland Security,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23856

Agency No. I-99-C177

Hearing No. 310-A0-5072X

DECISION

Complainant, a Senior Special Agent, GS-13, at the agency's

Dallas, Texas District Office filed a class complaint of employment

discrimination alleging harm on the bases of sex (female), national

origin (Italian-American), age (52), and in reprisal for her previous

EEO activity. The agency forwarded the class complaint to an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ) for a certification determination, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(d)(1). The AJ, on November 7, 2001, denied

certification because the claim lacked commonality, typicality and

numerosity.<1> The agency, on June 6, 2002, informed complainant that

it would be processing the class complaint as an individual complaint.

The Commission deems the agency's decision to have effectively adopted

the AJ's decision denying class certification. The instant appeal is

from the agency's denial of class certification. For the reasons set

forth herein, the agency's decision is affirmed.

In her complaint dated September 16, 1999, complainant claimed class-wide

discrimination on the bases of sex, national origin, age, and reprisal,

when she was not interviewed and subsequently not selected for the

position of Deputy District Director, GS-1801-14, announced under MSP

II 99-255, and located in Dallas, Texas. Complainant stated that she

has been at the GS-13 grade level since 1982. In her brief to the AJ in

support of class certification, complainant asserts that �[t]he proposed

class includes all [W]hite, female [Immigration and Naturalization

Service] employees who sought promotions above the GS-12 level since

1990 but were not selected.�

The AJ found that the class complaint did not meet the commonality

requirement, because certification would require the evaluation of

numerous subjective decisions by agency officials in different parts of

the nation involved in different promotion actions. The AJ noted that

given the numerous varied positions within the agency and the requirements

for those positions, the criteria for selections will not be common.

The AJ stated that the request for certification presented no evidence

of an overall policy of discrimination. With respect to typicality, the

AJ found that complainant's claims are not typical of the class given

that no other specific individuals have been identified and because

three women and a man within complainant's age group were selected for

an interview for the Deputy District Director position. As for the

element of numerosity, the AJ found that this element was lacking since

complainant did not indicate the names of other employees who would

comprise the class. The AJ noted that a numerosity determination is

made based on the number of those allegedly injured when the complaint

is filed and does not take into consideration future class members.

The AJ found that the element of adequate representation was met.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A class complaint is a written complaint of discrimination filed on behalf

of a class by the agent of the class alleging that: (i) the class is

so numerous that a consolidated complaint of the members of the class

is impractical; (ii) there are questions of fact common to the class;

(iii) the claims of the agent of the class are typical of the claims

of the class; and (iv) the agent of the class, or, if represented, the

representative, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2). A class complaint may be dismissed

if it does not meet each of these four requirements, or for any of the

procedural grounds for dismissal set forth in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(d)(2).

The purpose of the commonality and typicality requirements is to ensure

that class agents possess the same interests and suffer the same injury

as the members of the proposed class. General Tel. Co. of the Southwest

v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1982). The putative class agent must

establish an evidentiary basis from which one could reasonably infer

the operation of an overriding policy or practice of discrimination.

Garcia v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal No. 07A10107 (May

8, 2003). Generally, this can be accomplished through allegations of

specific incidents of discrimination, supporting affidavits containing

anecdotal testimony from other employees who were allegedly discriminated

against in the same manner as the class agent, and evidence of specific

adverse actions taken. Id.; Belser v. Department of the Army, EEOC

Appeal No. 01A05565 (December 6, 2001) (citing Mastren v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930253 (October 27, 1993)).

Conclusory allegations, standing alone, do not show commonality. Garcia,

EEOC Appeal No. 07A10107 (citing Mastren, EEOC Request No. 05930253).

Factors to consider in determining commonality include whether the

practice at issue affects the whole class or only a few employees, the

degree of centralized administration involved, and the uniformity of the

membership of the class, in terms of the likelihood that the members'

treatment will involve common questions of fact. Garcia, EEOC Appeal

No. 07A10107 (citing Mastren, EEOC Request No. 05930253).

Although the claims need not be identical, typicality requires that

the class agent's claims must be sufficiently typical to encompass the

general claims of the class members so that it will be fair to bind the

class members by what happens with the agent's claims. Conanan v. Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation, EEOC Appeal No. 01952486 (January 13, 1998)

(citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156). The overriding typicality principle

is that the interests of the class members must be fairly encompassed

within the class agent's claim. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159, n.15; 160.

Complainant argues that her individual promotion discrimination

claim involves the same pattern of disparate treatment against the

class because her claim challenges the same methods used generally to

prevent White females from being selected for higher level positions and

managerial positions. According to complainant, the class claims focus

on nationwide promotion practices that are excessively subjective and

allow for the use of bias and stereotypes. Complainant contends that

the agency's Affirmative Employment Report for 2000-2001 supports the

commonality and typicality of her class complaint. Complainant states

that the Report identified the following four �problems/barriers� that

support the commonality and typicality of the class complaint: (1)

the agency lacks a training program to identify, develop, and promote

employees into the senior manager and executive ranks; (2) there

are no clearly defined career paths; (3) managers and supervisors are

generally not held accountable for performance in the area of diversity

and promotion of equal and fair access to job benefits; and (4) managers

are not aware of the standards to use in achieving a fully represented,

culturally diverse workforce.

The agency contends that because promotion decisions are made on a

decentralized office-by-office basis, the proposed class lacked the

necessary commonality to be certified. The agency stated that it

operates over 500 separate offices throughout the United States and

in fifteen foreign nations. The agency further states that its three

domestic geographical regions are broken down into 33 domestic and three

international districts. According to the agency, each district or sector

operates in a largely autonomous fashion. The agency states that each

district or sector has independent authority over promotions up to the

GS-12 level. The agency notes that regional and headquarters involvement

in promotions is generally reserved for promotions to positions GS-13 and

above. The agency argues that individualized proof of the discriminatory

intent of thousands of decision-makers would need to be shown in order

to show the existence of common questions of law or fact.

The agency asserts that complainant's claims are not typical of others

within her protected group with regard to the other applicants for the

Deputy District Director position. The agency notes that three of the six

individuals interviewed for the position were women and all six of the

individuals were 40 years of age or older. The agency further argues

that complainant's claim is markedly different from the class she seeks

to represent. The agency noted that there are varying qualifications and

duties for each of the more than 80 occupation series covered by Merit

Staffing Plan II, as well as the different positions within each series.

After examining the record, we concur with the ultimate determinations

of the agency and the AJ, and find that the requirements of commonality

and typicality have not been satisfied and that the class should not be

certified. Initially, however, we must note a flaw in a portion of the

AJ's analysis. The AJ stated that the agency relied upon a decentralized

office-by-office approach in making promotion decisions. That approach,

however, is only applicable to those decisions being made with regard to

positions at the GS-12 grade level and below. The putative class would

be comprised of individuals who sought promotions to positions at the

GS-13 grade level and above. Those promotion decisions were made in a

more centralized approach by the three regional offices and headquarters.

Nonetheless, we find that complainant has not identified any agency

policy that has the effect of discriminating against the class as a

whole. Complainant has made a generalized allegation of discrimination

that by itself is insufficient to establish commonality. See Garcia,

EEOC Appeal No. 07A10107. Complainant has failed to show how her claim

of not being interviewed and selected for a Deputy District Director

position possesses commonality with individuals in many different job

categories and different grade levels. The purported class would include

many different occupation series with different skill requirements and

different selection criteria. We further find that complainant has not

provided specific, detailed information, showing that other individuals

were personally affected by the agency's alleged discriminatory practices

and policies. Complainant's reliance on the four �problems/barriers�

set forth in the Affirmative Employment Report in the instant case is

insufficient to establish an evidentiary basis from which one could

reasonably infer the operation of an overriding policy or practice

of discrimination. The Commission finds that complainant has not

established that there is commonality among the purported class members.

As for typicality, we find that complainant has failed to show any type

of nexus between her individual claim and those claims of the purported

class. Complainant has not identified any other specific individuals in

the purported class. Complainant clearly focuses her class claim on the

basis of sex as she offers little in the way of argument or evidence to

establish that her class claim is typical of those sharing the other bases

of the complaint. Furthermore, complainant has not shown how her claim

is typical of the alleged non-promotions made for a myriad of positions.

We find that complainant's claim is not typical of the class that she

purports to represent.

We find that the agency and the AJ properly denied complainant's request

for class certification because the request for class certification

failed to meet the requirements of commonality and typicality. It is

therefore not necessary to make findings regarding numerosity and adequacy

of representation.<2>

The agency's decision to deny class complaint certification is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

March 24, 2004

____________________

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

1The decision was forwarded to the agency with a cover letter dated

April 18, 2002.

2The Commission notes that while the AJ found that reprisal can not

be used as a basis in class complaints, the Commission has held in

some circumstances that reprisal may state a valid basis in a class

complaint. See Ponder, et al. v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Appeal

No. 01A04411 (May 15, 2003) (citing Levitoff v. Department of Agriculture,

EEOC Appeal No. 01913685 (Mar. 17, 1992)). The class agent has failed,

however, to present adequate information to support certification of a

class allegation of reprisal in the instant matter.