Luis C. Sotomayor, Complainant,v.Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 18, 2012
0520110043 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 18, 2012)

0520110043

01-18-2012

Luis C. Sotomayor, Complainant, v. Tom J. Vilsack, Secretary, Department of Agriculture (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services), Agency.




Luis C. Sotomayor,

Complainant,

v.

Tom J. Vilsack,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture

(Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services),

Agency.

Request No. 0520110043

Appeal No. 0120102342

Agency No. APHIS-2009-00107

DECISION

Complainant timely requested reconsideration of the decision in Luis

C. Sotomayor v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 0120102342

(September 16, 2010). EEOC Regulations provide that the Commission may,

in its discretion, grant a request to reconsider any previous Commission

decision where the requesting party demonstrates that: (1) the appellate

decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact

or law; or (2) the appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405(b). For the following reasons, the Commission

reopens the previous decision on its own motion, VACATES the decision

in EEOC Appeal No. 0120102342 affirming the Agency’s dismissal of

Complainant’s complaint, and AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision

finding no discrimination.1

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether Complainant’s request met the

criteria for reconsideration; (2) whether the Agency properly dismissed

Complainant’s complaint for untimely filing of the formal complaint;

and (3) whether Complainant established that the Agency discriminated

against him on the basis of disability (general anxiety disorder) in

connection with a non-selection.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ) Technician, GS-0421-05,

at the Agency’s facility in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico.

On February 19, 2009, after completion of the EEO counseling process,

the Agency issued Complainant a Notice of Right to File (NRF). On March

9, 2009, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency

discriminated against him on the basis of disability (general anxiety

disorder) when, on November 3, 2008, he was not selected for the

Biological Laboratory Technician position, GS-0404A-06/07, advertised

under vacancy announcement number 24PQ-2008-0451. At the conclusion of

the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the

report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge. In accordance with Complainant’s

request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §

1614.110(b).

The final decision dismissed Complainant’s complaint pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2), due to the untimely filing of the formal

complaint. Specifically, the Agency found that Complainant’s March

9, 2009 formal complaint was untimely filed based on his February 19,

2009 receipt of the NRF.

Additionally, the final decision analyzed Complainant’s complaint

on the merits and concluded that he failed to prove that the Agency

subjected him to discrimination as alleged. First, the Agency found

that management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions; namely, Complainant applied for and was listed only on

the GS-06 certificate of eligibles issued by Human Resources, but the

Selecting Official (SO)2 chose a candidate from the GS-07 certificate

because he wanted a more experienced candidate who could “hit the

ground running” and eliminate the extensive case backlog.

Second, the Agency found that Complainant failed to show that

management’s reasons were a pretext for disability discrimination.

The Agency found that Complainant did not demonstrate that his

qualifications were observably superior to those of the Selectee.

The Agency noted that the Selectee’s combination of experience and

education placed her at the GS-07 level, the Selectee had undergraduate

and graduate degrees in Horticulture, and her application indicated that

she was “highly skilled” in most of the desired job categories.

Although Complainant asserted that the Selectee was pre-selected

because SO knew her stepfather, the Agency found that Complainant’s

assertions of possible favoritism did not support any concrete evidence

of disability-related animus connected to his non-selection.

On appeal, Complainant stated, “This is the culmination of a

track of discrimination against me denying training opportunities

and promotions.” Complainant submitted information about training

that management allegedly denied him, but gave to other employees.

Complainant did not address the Agency’s dismissal of his complaint.

The previous decision affirmed the Agency’s dismissal of Complainant’s

complaint, finding that Complainant did not offer adequate justification

to warrant an extension of the time limit for filing the formal complaint.

Specifically, the previous decision noted that Complainant did not deny

receiving the NRF on February 19, 2009, the date that it was issued.

ARGUMENTS ON RECONSIDERATION

In his request for reconsideration, Complainant argued for the first time

that he received the NRF on February 23, 2009, not February 19, 2009.

Complainant provided a U.S. Postal Service Track & Confirm email dated

September 24, 2010, which indicated that Certified Mail matching the label

number of the NRF was delivered to his zip code on February 23, 2009.

Complainant explained that he did not address the timeliness issue on

appeal because, at that time, he did not have an attorney who could call

to his attention those legal issues.

The Agency did not submit a brief or statement in response to

Complainant’s request.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Upon review, we find that Complainant’s request for reconsideration

fails to show that our previous decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law, or that it would have a

substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of

the Agency. We note that Complainant raised for the first time in

his request for reconsideration his claim that he received the NRF on

February 23, 2009 and not February 19, 2009. The Commission’s scope

of review on a request for reconsideration is narrow and a request for

reconsideration is not a second appeal to the Commission. See Equal

Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614

(EEO MD-110), at Ch. 9, § VII.A. (Nov. 9, 1999).

Nevertheless, upon our own motion and in the interest of fairness, we

reopen the previous decision and find, based on the record as it currently

stands, that Complainant’s March 9, 2009 filing of his formal complaint

should be deemed timely. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b)

provides that a complaint must be filed within 15 calendar days of

receipt of the notice of the right to do so. A closer examination of

the NRF should have revealed that it was mailed from Riverdale, Maryland

on February 19, 2009; and therefore could not have been received by

Complainant in Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico on the very same day. In the

absence of documentation from the Agency conclusively indicating when

the NFR was received by Complainant, we will accept his assertion that

he received the NRF on February 23, 2009. Based on Complainant’s

February 23, 2009 receipt of the NRF, the deadline for filing the formal

complaint was March 10, 2009. Accordingly, we VACATE our previous

decision affirming the Agency’s dismissal of Complainant’s complaint.

The Commission will now address the merits of Complainant’s complaint.

Standard of Review

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See EEO MD-110,

at Ch. 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review

“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to

the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,”

and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of

record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending

on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804

n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s

explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

519 (1993). At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion,

and it is his obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that

the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See Hicks, supra.

Assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case

of discrimination on the bases of disability, we find that the Agency

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

Specifically, SO attested that he decided to select only from the GS-7

certificate because, due to a significant backlog of over 100 cases,

he was looking for the candidate with the most expertise. In addition,

SO attested that he needed a candidate who could “hit the ground

running” and not require training. Further, SO attested that he did

not determine which candidates appeared on the different certificates, but

noted that Human Resources would have taken into account the candidates’

experience and education when issuing the certificates.

Because the Agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its actions, the burden shifts to Complainant to demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency’s reason was a pretext

for disability discrimination. In his affidavit, Complainant attested

that the only reason SO arbitrarily selected a candidate from the GS-07

certificate was to avoid selecting him because of his disability, even

though he was ranked first on the GS-06 certificate and had all the

necessary knowledge and experience. Specifically, Complainant attested

that SO knew he had the expertise to handle the backlogged cases without

the need for training because he was in charge of handling them from 2004

to 2007. In addition, Complainant attested that the Selectee had to be

trained in order to work on the backlogged cases. Finally, according

to the EEO Counselor’s Report, Complainant believed that the Selectee

was pre-selected for the position because she was the stepdaughter of

a good friend of SO’s.

Upon review of the record, we find that Complainant failed to show that

the Agency’s reason was a pretext for disability discrimination.

Beyond his bare assertions, Complainant has not produced evidence to

support his claims that SO selected a candidate from the GS-07 certificate

in order to discriminate against him on the basis of disability or that

the Selectee required training for the position.

In non-selection cases, a complainant may establish pretext by showing

that his qualifications are “plainly superior” to those of the

selectee. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th Cir. 1981).

We find that Complainant has failed to make this showing. According to

the vacancy announcement, the incumbent “performs a variety of duties

in a Plant Inspection Station/laboratory environment in support of the

PPQ Identification specialists (Identifiers) and assists them with

special projects in the disciplines of Entomology, Plant Pathology

and Botany.” Although Complainant had approximately six years of

experience as a GS-05 PPQ Technician compared to the Selectee’s one

year of experience as a GS-04 PPQ Technician, the record shows that the

Selectee had additional experiential and educational qualifications that

Complainant did not have. Specifically, our review of the Selectee’s

application reflects that she also had the following: (1) two years of

experience as a Laboratory Instructor for a plant-related undergraduate

course; (2) a Bachelor of Science in Horticulture; (3) a Master’s

degree in Horticulture; (4) coursework in Agricultural Entomology,

Botany, Biology, Chemistry, Genetics, Microbiology, and Pesticides; and

(5) a published thesis related to her Master’s degree in Horticulture.

In contrast, Complainant did not have other relevant work experience,

had a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration with a minor in

Personnel Management, and did not have any graduate education.

Complainant also argued that the Selectee was pre-selected for the

position because she was the stepdaughter of a good friend of SO’s.

While we are not convinced that pre-selection occurred, we note that we

have held that pre-selection, per se, does not establish discrimination

when it is based on the qualifications of the selected individual and

not on some protected basis. See McAllister v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

EEOC Request No. 05931038 (July 28, 1994). Because we find that

Complainant has failed to offer probative evidence demonstrating that

the Agency’s selection decision was based on a prohibited basis

under the Rehabilitation Act, we find that, even if the Selectee was

pre-selected, no discrimination occurred. Ultimately, the Agency has

broad discretion to set policies and carry out personnel decisions,

and should not be second-guessed by the reviewing authority absent

evidence of unlawful motivation. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259; Vanek

v. Dep’t of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05940906 (Jan. 16, 1997).

Accordingly, we find that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s

reason for his non-selection was a pretext for disability discrimination.3

CONCLUSION

After a review of Complainant’s request for reconsideration, the

previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission finds that

Complainant’s request fails to meet the criteria of 29 C.F.R. §�

�1614.405(b), and it is the decision of the Commission to DENY the

request. The Commission, however, has decided to reconsider the previous

decision on its own motion. The decision of the Commission in EEOC Appeal

No. 0120102342 is VACATED. The Agency’s final decision, with respect to

its finding of no discrimination, is AFFIRMED. There is no further right

of administrative appeal from that portion of our decision pertaining

to the timeliness of Complainant’s formal EEO complaint filing.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (revised)

With regard to that portion of our decision pertaining to the Agency’s

determination that it did not discriminate against Complainant on

the basis of disability (general anxiety disorder) in connection

with his non-selection for the Biological Laboratory Technician

position, GS-0404A-06/07, advertised under vacancy announcement number

24PQ-2008-0451, the Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the

decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written

request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (P0610)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right

of administrative appeal from the Commission’s decision. You have the

right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District

Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive

this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

“Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___1/18/12_______________

Date

1 The final decision both procedurally dismissed Complainant’s complaint

and addressed it on the merits.

2 SO was the Second Level Supervisor of Complainant and the Selectee.

3 To the extent that Complainant believes he has been subjected to new

incidents of discrimination, he is advised that he may seek EEO counseling

concerning such claims.

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0520110043

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0520110043