Lourdes Sherwood, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 22, 2006
01a62198 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 22, 2006)

01a62198

09-22-2006

Lourdes Sherwood, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Lourdes Sherwood v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01A62198

.

Lourdes Sherwood,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A62198

Agency No. 200P-0664-2005102876

DECISION

Complainant, a Civilian Pay Technician, GS-7, filed a formal EEO complaint

in which she claimed that the agency discriminated against her on the

bases of her race (Asian-American) and in reprisal for her previous EEO

activity under Title VII when she was issued her mid-year performance

review. The record shows that a memorandum dated May 17, 2005, concerning

the mid-year review, discussed concerns the Supervisor, Processing and

Records/Payroll had about the way complainant was handling customers.<1>

The agency accepted the complaint and conducted an investigation.

Thereafter, the agency notified complainant of her right to elect either

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or a final action issued

by the agency. Complainant requested an immediate final action without

a hearing. On January 12, 2006, the agency issued a final action wherein

it determined that no discrimination occurred. According to the agency,

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case under the alleged

bases. With regard to complainant's claim of race discrimination, the

agency determined that complainant failed to identify similarly situated

non-Asian employees who received more favorable treatment than she

received at the mid-year performance review. As for complainant's claim

of reprisal, the agency noted that complainant's supervisor was unaware

of complainant's most recent EEO activity, initiated in May 2004, as he

had only supervised complainant since October 2004. The agency further

stated that a retaliatory motive could not be inferred as a full year had

passed since complainant's most recent EEO activity. Assuming arguendo,

that complainant had established a prima facie case, the agency stated

that complainant failed to adequately attend to the needs of the customers

in numerous instances. The agency stated that in an effort to assist

complainant in improving her performance, management provided her with

copies of the only materials available, a record of the relevant e-mails.

The agency determined that it articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its mid-year review of complainant's performance. The agency

determined that complainant offered no evidence to establish pretext.

On appeal, the agency asserts that complainant's supervisor indicated

that the memorandum was just for complainant's information and would not

be included in her official personnel file. According to the agency,

certain customers expressed concern about the manner in which complainant

responded to their payroll issues. The agency states that complainant's

supervisor advised complainant of these concerns in an attempt to assist

her in improving her performance. The agency states that complainant

received copies of the e-mail communications upon which her supervisor

based the mid-year performance review. The agency argues that the e-mail

messages from complainant's customers were relevant and supported her

supervisor's decision to issue the memorandum addressing the customer

service concerns. In conclusion, the agency asserts that such evidence

fails to reveal any discriminatory animus.

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case claiming

discrimination is a three-step process as set forth in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973), and its progeny.

For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step

normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,

need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,

the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions

were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department

of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990).

We will assume, arguendo, that complainant has established a prima facie

case of discrimination on the bases of race and reprisal. Next, we shall

consider whether the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. The agency stated that complainant received a

supervisory memorandum with her mid-year performance review that advised

her of numerous customer complaints about her performance on the telephone

and in person. According to the agency, numerous employees had reported

their dissatisfaction with complainant's performance in her handling of

their payroll concerns. The agency stated that it provided complainant

with copies of the only materials that were available as part of an effort

to assist her in improving her performance. The Commission finds that the

agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.

We find that complainant failed to refute the agency's stated reasons

for its actions. Complainant argues that the memorandum, mid-year

performance review and the insufficient information provided by the

agency constituted harassment. We find that the alleged actions are not

of sufficient severity or pervasiveness to constitute harassment and

that such actions were not motivated by discrimination. Therefore,

we find that complainant was not subjected to harassment on the bases

of her race and reprisal.

Complainant has not shown that the agency's stated reasons for issuance of

the memorandum and mid-year performance review were pretext. Complainant

has not refuted the agency's position that her job performance reflected

significant customer service deficiencies. Complainant also has not shown

that the agency denied her access to any information within its possession

that would have been of assistance to complainant in improving her job

performance. We find that complainant failed to show by a preponderance

of the evidence that she was discriminated against on the bases of her

race or reprisal.

The agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which

to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 22, 2006

__________________

Date

1The memorandum states that it will not be

placed in complainant's Official Personnel File.