LOCAL 560, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS (COUNTY CONCRETE CORPORATION)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 30, 2014

360 N.L.R.B. 1067 (N.L.R.B. 2014)

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1067
360 NLRB No. 125
Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and County Concrete Corporation. Cases 22–
CC–068160, 22–CC–071865, and 22–CC–001522
May 30, 2014
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HIROZAWA
AND JOHNSON
At issue in this case is whether the Respondent Union,
Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by unlawfully
enmeshing two neutral employers in its area standards
dispute with the Charging Party, County Concrete Cor-
poration (County or County Concrete). We agree with
the judge that the Union violated the Act, but only as set
forth below.1
I. OVERVIEW
In the spring of 2011, the Union was engaged in an ar-
ea standards dispute with County Concrete, claiming that
County was underpaying its drivers, thereby depressing
the wages of all similar workers in the local area. The
Union engaged in picketing and other actions in support
of its position.

1 On February 15, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Lauren Esposito
issued the attached decision. The Charging Party filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief. The Acting General Counsel filed a letter brief in response to the
Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the
decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has
decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only to
the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
Case 22–CC–001522 was initially resolved by an informal settle-
ment agreement. In this proceeding, the consolidated complaint alleged
that the allegations in Cases 22–CC–068160 and 22–CC–071865 con-
stituted breaches of the settlement agreement, and the General Counsel
asserted it was entitled to a default judgment according to the terms of
the settlement agreement. At the parties’ request, the judge severed
Case 22–CC–001522 and submitted it to the Board for further proceed-
ings on the General Counsel’s Motion for Default Judgment, where it
remains pending before us. The Charging Party’s request for enhanced
remedies in the present case depends, in part, on our decision in the
severed case, and we shall rule on the request in the subsequent deci-
sion. As discussed below, in this decision, we find the Union engaged
in only one unlawful telephone conversation. At present, an expansion
of the judge’s recommended remedy is not justified.
The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility find-
ings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing the findings.
We have substituted a new notice in accordance with our decision in
Durham School Services, 360 NLRB 694 (2014).
On April 26, 2011, to further publicize the dispute, the
Union sent a letter to area construction industry employ-
ers and multiemployer associations. The letter stated that
the Union would comply with the relevant law governing
picketing and would target its picketing solely at County,
and not at neutral businesses. The complaint alleges that
the Union twice violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by threat-
ening to picket neutral masonry contractors Sharp Con-
crete Corporation (Sharp) and Macedos Construction
LLC (Macedos), with the intent of coercing them to
cease doing business with County. As discussed below,
we agree with the judge that the Union unlawfully
threatened Sharp in a November 2011 telephone conver-
sation. We reverse, however, the judge’s finding that the
Union unlawfully threatened Macedos during a Decem-
ber 2011 telephone conversation.
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act prohibits labor organ-
izations from threatening, coercing, or restraining a neu-
tral employer with the object of forcing a cessation of
business between the neutral employer and the employer
with whom a union has a dispute.2 Section 8(b)(4) re-
flects the “dual congressional objectives of preserving
the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear
on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of
shielding unoffending employers and others from pres-
sures in controversies not their own.” NLRB v. Denver
Building Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). In
determining whether union conduct constitutes lawful
primary activity directed against the offending employer
or unlawful secondary activity directed against a neutral
employer, where the primary and neutral employers per-
form separate work on the same premises, the Board in
Sailors Union (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547,
549 (1950), established four criteria which, if met, pre-
sumptively indicate valid primary activity.3 However,
even though a union may be in compliance with the
Moore Dry Dock standards, its conduct will be found

2 Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it unlawful for a union to:
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . .
where . . . an object thereof is . . .
(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with
any other person . . . Provided, That nothing contained in this clause
(B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlaw-
ful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
3 The four criteria are that (a) the picketing is strictly limited to
times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employ-
er’s premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is
engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited
to places reasonably close to the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses
clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer. See, e.g., Team-
sters Local 315 (Santa Fe), 306 NLRB 616, 624–625 (1992), enfd. sub
nom. NLRB v. General Truck Drivers Local 315, 20 F.3d 1017, 1021–
1022 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 513 U.S. 946 (1994).
1068 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unlawful where there is independent evidence that the
union had an unlawful secondary objective to enmesh the
neutral employer in the primary dispute. Electrical
Workers Local 441 (Rollins Communications), 208
NLRB 943, 944 (1974), remanded 510 F.2d 1274 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), reconsidered and affd. 222 NLRB 99 (1976).4
To make that determination, the Board examines the en-
tire course of conduct engaged in by the union. Id.5
Applying these standards, the Board has found it un-
lawful for a union to make a statement to a secondary
employer requiring it to take “specific affirmative action”
as a condition for the union not engaging in picketing.
See Rollins Communications, supra at 944. In contrast,
the Board has held that a union may lawfully inform neu-
tral businesses that the union will stop picketing the
common site if the work is performed by a contractor
that pays area standards. In Carpenters (Douglas Co.),
322 NLRB 612, 612 (1996), for example, the Board
found it lawful when the neutral general contractor
asked, “[W]hat it would take to resolve this,” and the
union responded, “[T]o have a prevailing wage contrac-
tor do the work.” The union then “noted that [the primary
employer’s] owners also controlled an employer which
met area standards.” Id. at 613. The Board held that such
statements “can reasonably be construed simply as a de-
scription of the . . . dispute with [the primary], which
could end the dispute by paying prevailing wages and
benefits.” Id.
The central question in this case is whether the Union
went beyond explaining and publicizing the dispute and
its intent to engage in lawful primary picketing, and in-
stead threatened neutral employers to cease doing busi-
ness with County.
III. FACTS
Our determination of whether the Union violated the
Act as alleged relies on three key pieces of evidence: (1)
the Union’s letter publicizing its area standards dispute
with County and providing Moore Dry Dock assurances;
(2) a recorded telephone conversation between officials
of Sharp and the Union; and (3) testimony concerning a
telephone conversation between officials of Macedos and
the Union.
1. The Moore Dry Dock assurances in the Union’s let-
ter.

4 It is unnecessary to find that the sole object of picketing is unlaw-
ful; it is sufficient that the union possess an unlawful object. General
Service Employees Union Local 73, 239 NLRB 295, 303 (1978).
5 See also Electrical Workers Local 38 (Andy Frain, Inc.), 221
NLRB 1073, 1074 (1975) (8(b)(4)(ii)(B) (analysis properly considers
the context in which allegedly unlawful statements are made).
After summarizing the campaign against County, the
Union’s letter states, in part:
So that there can be no claim of confusion or assertion
of misunderstanding of any future conversations with
Local 560 Business Agents, Local 560 advises that all
“threats to picket” are made with, and actual picketing,
will be conducted in accordance with, Moore Dry Dock
Standards for Picketing at a Secondary Site, as indicat-
ed below . . . [reciting legal standard]. . . .
Local 560 does not seek to enmesh your company in its
dispute with County Concrete. Whichever redi-mix
company you decide to utilize, we recommend pru-
dence be taken to determine what rates of pay and ben-
efits the Company pays its drivers.
If you have any questions in regard to the meaning of
the Moore Dry Dock Standards, you should contact the
National Labor Relations Board or your own counsel.
Because of previous claims of improper statements be-
ing made by Local 560 Business Representatives, Lo-
cal 560 Business Representatives are under instruction
that they shall not add to, supplement, or explain this
letter to any contractor, and you are specifically advised
that any such statements are not operative or authorized
such that they may not be claimed to be made against
Local 560’s interests.
The letter is dated April 26, 2011, but the evidence demon-
strates that the Union widely disseminated the letter during
the area standards campaign. Both Sharp and Macedos re-
ceived the letter.
2. The telephone conversation between Sharp and the
Union.
In the fall of 2011, Sharp was working at a construc-
tion site at St. Peter’s College in Jersey City, New Jersey.
Sharp’s president, John Domingues, attended a meeting
arranged by the Hudson County Building Trades Council
regarding the project. At the meeting, the contractors
were told that the Union’s president, Tony Valdner, had
not been able to attend, and everyone was asked to call
him later.
Domingues then returned to his office, accompanied
by a representative of County, and telephoned Valdner.
Unbeknownst to Valdner, Domingues and Sharp record-
ed the conversation. The complete transcription of this
conversation is as follows:
JOHN DOMINGUES OF SHARP CONCRETE: Hi Tony,
this is John from Sharp Concrete.
UNION PRESIDENT TONY VALDNER: Yes. Hi, how are
you?
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1069
DOMINGUES: Good.
VALDNER: What can I do for you?
DOMINGUES: Pat told me to give you a call and just
touch base with you. We are doing the concrete over
at St. Peter’s in Jersey City.
VALDNER: Right.
[Inaudible]
[According to the uncontested testimony of
Domingues, at this point Valdner asked Domingues
“who [Domingues] planned on using for a supplier
on that project, and [Domingues] said County Con-
crete.”]
VALDNER: County Concrete is no good.
DOMINGUES: They are no good.
VALDNER: No good. No good. I will be putting a
picket line against you . . . an informational picket
line. They are non-union. They don’t pay the area
standards.
DOMINGUES: Okay.
VALDNER: They don’t pay the area standards. Before
you run into a problem. Alright? You have Eastern,
you have Weldon, you have Colonial, you have Ser-
vice.
DOMINGUES: Okay.
VALDNER: You have Crane Concrete out of Milise-
vik. Colonial is out of Newark. Eastern is out of Jer-
sey City. [Inaudible.]
DOMINGUES: I am going to do this, only because I
went in with County’s price. They have done a cou-
ple of jobs with us.
VALDNER: Right.
DOMINGUES: I am going to call County and I will
have them give you a call. I thought they were un-
ion.
VALDNER: No they are not union and they don’t pay
the area standards. . . . They have been torn off a lot
of jobs, John. They don’t pay the area standards. We
went before the Labor Board and we can picket the
jobs. I will send you a letter and everything that my
lawyer wrote up. They are not good. They don’t pay
the area standards and that’s what I will picket them.
Area standards.
DOMINGUES: Okay. I am going to call my salesman
over there if that’s okay and I will have him. . . . .
VALDNER: That’s fine with me. He’s union and this
and that. I’m telling you. I will put up an informa-
tional picket line and the trades won’t cross it. And
I’m not doing anything wrong by doing that. The
Labor Board told me that I can do that. Okay, sir?
DOMINGUES: Okay, my man. I will let you know.
VALDNER: Bye-bye.
DOMINGUES: Thanks.
After the conversation ended, Valdner faxed Domingues a
copy of the April 26 letter.
3. The telephone conversation between Macedos and
the Union.
In December 2011, Macedos began working at a con-
struction site for Novartis in East Hanover, New Jersey.
Numerous meetings were held at which the Union in-
formed the contractors and subcontractors on the project
of the area standards dispute between the Union and
County. The Union distributed its Moore Dry Dock letter
at these meetings, and Macedos received copies.
At the meetings, the Union also explained that the dis-
pute could be resolved if either County’s drivers were
paid area standard wages or if another contractor, whose
drivers were paid area standard wages, was selected to
supply the concrete. Notwithstanding the Union’s state-
ments, Macedos used County as its concrete supplier.
In late December, when Macedos’ general superinten-
dent, Antonio Vieira, heard that “there was talk that [the
Union was] going to picket the job” in early January, he
called Union Agent Joe DiLeo. Vieira asked why the
Union would be picketing, and DiLeo stated that “Coun-
ty would have to pay the [union area standard] wages or
else he would picket the job.” Vieira said that he needed
to use County because the concrete was already pur-
chased, and asked the Union not to picket. DiLeo re-
sponded that, if Vieira did not want the Union to picket,
Vieira “would have to get somebody else because Coun-
ty is not paying the wages.” DiLeo then mentioned the
names of other suppliers that were paying area standards.
Vieira asked why the Union was singling out Macedos,
when another contractor on the same job was also using
County. DiLeo stated that the other contractor had agreed
not to use County again on that job.
Vieira then asked what County would have to pay to
meet area standards. DiLeo answered “an extra $15 an
hour.” Vieira and DiLeo then discussed whether Mace-
dos could make up the difference by paying the drivers
extra. They discussed whether Macedos would have to
pay extra for the whole day, or only the time on site, and
whether Macedos would or could make payments to the
Union’s benefits funds. DiLeo said he would have to
check with his boss about those issues.6 DiLeo then as-
sured Vieira that “if the guys were paid the right amount,
it wasn’t a problem.”
Vieira and DiLeo also discussed whether it would be
feasible to obtain another supplier. Vieira was worried

6 On direct examination, Vieira suggested that DiLeo flatly refused
to allow Macedos to make up the difference. But on cross-examination,
Vieira clarified that DiLeo was actually saying that he would have to
check with his boss about how Macedos could make up the difference
in the area standards.
1070 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that concrete suppliers would “take advantage” of him by
charging high prices if he was “bidding a job out last
minute.” DiLeo said, “[H]e would talk to the suppliers
[to get them to] do the right thing.”
Vieira said he would have to think about it over the
weekend. DiLeo told him to “get back to us by Tuesday
or else we’re picketing.” On Tuesday, DiLeo called
Vieira and said that he had asked another supplier and
“they haven’t heard from [Macedos].” Vieira responded
that Macedos was still considering its options. A few
weeks later, on January 18, 2012, the Union engaged in
picketing that is not alleged to be unlawful.
IV. ANALYSIS
The judge found that there was sufficient independent
evidence of the Union’s unlawful intent to coerce both
Sharp and Macedos to cease doing business with County
to establish that the Union violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
in both telephone conversations. We agree that the Union
unlawfully threatened Sharp, but reverse the judge’s
finding that the Union unlawfully threatened Macedos.7
1. There is sufficient independent evidence of an un-
lawful intent to coerce Sharp.
The telephone conversation between Domingues and
Valdner contains direct evidence that the Union’s threats
to picket the common worksite were made with an un-
lawful secondary objective to force or require Sharp to
cease doing business with County Concrete. We con-
clude that the Union violated the Act based on all of the
circumstances including Valdner’s explicit statements.
Union President Valdner made statements to Sharp
President Domingues that we consider admissions of the

7 Member Johnson would adopt the judge’s findings, for the reasons
she gives, that statements made by the union representatives in both
telephone conversations violated Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). In his view, there
is no legally material difference in the threats made by the Union’s
representatives during the two conversations, as both conversations
demonstrate independent evidence of unlawful secondary object. He is
not persuaded by his colleagues’ characterization that DiLeo “apparent-
ly did not care whether Macedos ‘ceased doing business with County.’”
DiLeo clearly explained to Vieira that the only reason County was
allowed on the job for another contractor was that the contractor prom-
ised the Union that it would not use County in the future. That state-
ment is anything but a mere explanation of the nature of the primary
dispute—it is direct evidence of unlawful intent. Member Johnson
observes that his colleagues fail to consider that after DiLeo gave
Vieira the names of union-approved ready-mix companies and then
learned that Vieira did not follow up with them, DiLeo called Vieira
back and again threatened to picket the job. In contrast to his col-
leagues, Member Johnson recognizes that the judge explicitly credited
Vieira’s unrebutted testimony that DiLeo insisted that Macedos termi-
nate its agreement with County and engage a supplier that had a con-
tract with the Union in order to avoid picketing. Considering all the
evidence in its totality, and in accord with the judge, Member Johnson
would find that the Union unlawfully threatened Macedos, as it did
Sharp.
Union’s unlawful intent. Valdner told Domingues that he
would be “putting a picket line against you”—referring
to Sharp itself, rather than County. Valdner reaffirmed
this secondary intent when he additionally cautioned
Domingues that “before you run into a problem” you
should consider these other concrete suppliers instead. In
so stating, Valdner made clear that the threatened picket-
ing was specifically aimed at neutral employer, Sharp.
NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d 551, 556 (9th
Cir. 1988) (“We would be less sympathetic had Local
433 told [the neutral] ‘we will picket you,’ and then
claimed that it was referring only to an intention to picket
[the primary].”). It is quite clear from this conversation
that the “problem” that Sharp would “run into” was a
secondary boycott of Sharp’s business: “I’m telling you.
I will put up an informational picket line and the trades
won’t cross it.” (Emphasis added.) The only discernible
purpose for making this statement was to coerce Sharp to
cease doing business with County. Although Valdner
later stated that he would picket “them” (meaning Coun-
ty), this is not an ambiguity or contradiction that under-
mines the Union’s expressed intent to picket Sharp. A
picket can have multiple targets, including both Sharp
and County. As long as any one of those targets is a neu-
tral, the picket is unlawful. See Rollins Communications,
supra; Sheet Metal Workers Local 7 (Andy J. Egan Co.),
345 NLRB 1322, 1323 (2005).
The Union asserts that it should be immune from the
statements made by Valdner, because it had complied
with Moore Dry Dock by notifying employers of its pri-
mary object in the April 26 letter. But the threats to pick-
et in the telephone conversation nonetheless are unlaw-
ful, even though the Moore Dry Dock standards were met
because Valdner expressly admitted the Union’s addi-
tional intention to picket a neutral business.
The April 26 letter expressly assures companies that
there will be no effort to enmesh neutrals, and, on its
face, conforms to the law. The letter disclaims any con-
trary statements by the Union’s agents, and assures neu-
trals that the Union is taking steps to control the danger
of unlawful threats and picketing.
In this case, however, the lawful purpose stated in the
letter was not only directly contradicted by the very per-
son who signed the letter, the union president himself, it
was in fact used offensively against the neutral, to further
the Union’s effort to coerce Sharp to cease doing busi-
ness County Concrete:
We went before the Labor Board and we can picket the
jobs. I will send you a letter and everything that my
lawyer wrote up. . . . I will put up an informational
picket line and the trades won’t cross it. And I’m not
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1071
doing anything wrong by doing that. The Labor Board
told me that I can do that. Okay, sir?
When the signatory of the letter makes a direct threat to
picket a neutral, and raises the specter of economic harm to
the neutral, the threat is only amplified by the inaccurate
assertion that the Union has the backing of the Board and
will transmit the letter to prove it.
On exceptions, the Union argues, among other things,
that the recorded telephone conversation was a “set up”
by County and Sharp. This defense lacks merit. Although
Sharp technically placed the call, it was Valdner who
actually initiated the conversation by asking attendees at
the Trades Council project meeting to contact him.8 Even
if Sharp had “carefully planned and devised to be threat-
ened,” the unlawful threat was nonetheless made by “an
experienced union official” and “[t]here is no indication
that [the employer] planted the seeds of unlawful conduct
in an otherwise innocent mind.” Service Employees Lo-
cal 87 (Trinity Maintenance), 312 NLRB 715, 748 fn.
100 (1993), enfd. 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 1996); see also
Times-Herald Record, 334 NLRB 350, 354 (surreptitious
recordings admissible), enfd. 27 Fed. Appx. 64 (2d Cir.
2001).9

8 The dissent suggests that “Domingues’ only reason for recording
the conversation was the hope that Valdner would misstate the letter’s
carefully drafted contents.” We find it easily as likely that Domingues
recorded the conversation because he expected to be unlawfully threat-
ened, and wanted to have proof.
9 Member Hirozawa would not find the violation. In his view,
Valdner’s statements during the telephone conversation with Sharp
President Domingues did not negate or modify the Union’s expression
in its April 26 letter of an intent to apply pressure against the primary
employer, County.
There is no dispute that the letter unequivocally declared that lawful
objective and that Domingues had received the letter. Valdner’s state-
ment during the conversation that the Union would picket “them”—
meaning County—and his reference to County’s “jobs” and an “infor-
mational picket line” also expressed the Union’s lawful, primary aim.
Valdner’s remark that “the trades” would not cross a picket line was a
prediction, not a threat; he could control whether his union would pick-
et, but not what others would do in response. The absence of unlawful
intent is further evidenced by Valdner’s reference to the Union’s April
26 letter and his faxing it to Domingues immediately upon the close of
the conversation. Considered in light of the Union’s entire course of
conduct and Valdner’s repeated assertion of the Union’s legal rights,
his one statement that the Union will picket “you” was, at worst, a
layperson’s flawed articulation of sophisticated legal concepts. See
Rollins Communications, supra, 208 NLRB at 944; see also NLRB v.
Ironworkers Local 433, supra, 850 F.2d at 556–557 (picket “you” or
“picket the job” statements derive meaning “from the context of the
entire conversation,” including “express[] advising” of lawful objec-
tive).
Member Hirozawa does not dispute the admissibility of the record-
ing of the conversation between Valdner and Sharp President
Domingues. He does, however, observe the obvious, namely that
Domingues’ only reason for recording the conversation was the hope
that Valdner would misstate the letter’s carefully drafted contents.
Under all of these circumstances, we find that the Un-
ion violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in its telephone con-
versation with Sharp.
2. There is insufficient evidence of an unlawful intent
to coerce Macedos.
The telephone conversation with Macedos does not ev-
idence an unlawful intent.
Unlike its conversation with Sharp, the Union’s con-
versation with Macedos is notable for lacking any refer-
ence to establishing a picket line “against Macedos” or
mention of the crossing of picket lines. When Macedos
Superintendent Vieira directly asked Union Agent DiLeo
why the Union would be picketing, DiLeo stated, “Coun-
ty would have to pay the [union area standard] wages or
else he would picket the job.” Statements concerning
picketing “the job” are consistent with primary picketing
at the worksite. See Ironworkers Local 433, 850 F.2d at
556.
DiLeo expressed no interest in whether Macedos
“ceased doing business” with County. When Vieira
asked whether Macedos could continue doing business
with County and avoid having a picket line at the com-
mon site by “making up the difference” and paying the
County drivers extra, DiLeo did not reject the idea, and
was concerned only with pragmatic questions probing
whether such payments would actually meet the area
standards. DiLeo was unsure about these details, and
informed Vieira that he would have to check with his
boss. But the bottom line was that “if the guys [a]re paid
the right amount, it [i]sn’t a problem.”
We are satisfied that the only concern expressed by
DiLeo was whether area standards were met. This is a
textbook illustration of a lawful, primary objective for
area standards picketing. Unlike in Rollins Communica-
tions, supra, DiLeo did not demand that Macedos “take
specific affirmative action” to avoid the pickets; rather,
the “choice of action” was left up to Macedos. 208
NLRB at 944. DiLeo merely explained the Union’s law-
ful intent that it would picket if and only if area standards
were not met. Those comments, in conjunction with the
Union’s Moore Dry Dock letter, establish that the Union
did not threaten Macedos. DiLeo said nothing in the con-
versation to undermine the clear statement in the letter
that the sole purpose of the picketing was primary.10

10 Chairman Pearce acknowledges that the Sharp and Macedos con-
versations share at least two significant similarities: (1) in both conver-
sations the Union gave a neutral company the names of alternative
concrete suppliers; and (2) both contractors were provided a letter
assuring them that the Union’s intent was primary and that Moore Dry
Dock would be followed. Although his colleagues would rely primarily
on one or the other of these two points to either forbid or permit both
1072 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In finding a violation, the judge relied primarily upon
DiLeo’s response to Vieira’s questions about the feasibil-
ity of changing contractors. DiLeo provided the names of
suppliers which paid area standards, and, when Vieira
expressed concerns that he might be “taken advantage”
of, DiLeo offered to help Vieira communicate with these
suppliers to ensure that Macedos obtained a fair
quote. During the conversation, Vieira asked DiLeo why
the Union was singling Macedos out, when another con-
tractor on the same job was also using County. DiLeo
stated that the other contractor had agreed not to use
County again on that job.
It is clear, however, that Macedos was reaching out to
the Union to ask how it might be able to avoid the picket-
ing. As the Board noted in Electrical Workers Local 38,
221 NLRB 1073, 1074 (1975), when a statement of this
sort “was made in reply to a question” from a neutral, it
is less likely to indicate an unlawful union intent. Fur-
ther, as stated above, and contrary to our dissenting col-
league, the Union was merely explaining the nature of
the primary dispute rather than trying to coerce Macedos
into ceasing doing business with County. Similarly,
DiLeo’s call to Vieira a few days later merely sought to
determine whether County would be at the jobsite—
otherwise he could not picket. Nothing in the followup
call demonstrated any distinctly secondary motive.

conversations, the Chairman would find, in context, that these conver-
sations are very different.
With Sharp, both points were used to intimidate and threaten the
neutral. First, the alternative suppliers were listed together with a warn-
ing that the neutral would “run into a problem” and that the pickets
would be placed against “you” if the neutral did not switch. In this
context, it is clear that the Union was providing the names of alterna-
tive contractors in an effort to convince the neutral to cease doing busi-
ness with County. Second, with Sharp, the union president pointed to
the letter solely to prove his claim that he can lawfully harm the neu-
tral; as the signator of the letter, he directly contradicted its assurances
that there was no secondary intent.
Conversely, with Macedos, both points were used merely to explain
the dispute. On the first point, Macedos had reached out to the Union
and, without prompting, had claimed that it was impossible to switch
contractors. Unions can lawfully answer such claims by giving infor-
mation to the neutral about which contractors meet area standards. The
question demonstrates only Macedos’ apparent fear of a secondary
impact—a fact which reflects nothing on the Union’s intent. See Car-
penters (DWA Trade Show & Exposition Services), 339 NLRB 1027,
1028, 1030 (2003). Second, in contrast to Sharp, with Macedos the
Moore Dry Dock letter was not accompanied by any “predictions”
about the kind of trouble the picketing would cause the neutral employ-
er, or any statements of a secondary intent. In this context, there is no
reason to doubt the letter’s plain statement of an exclusively primary
purpose.
In this way, the Chairman finds that the two conversations provide a
study in contrast and aptly illustrate the difference between statements
of an unlawful secondary intent, and statements which focus on the
lawful primary dispute.
In sum, Vieira was calling in an apparent effort to con-
vince the Union not to engage in lawful primary picket-
ing at the common worksite. When he asked the Union
not to picket, the Union offered lawful reasons why it
was planning to picket anyway. And, when Vieira
pressed further and pleaded impossibility, the Union re-
sponded by explaining the realistic options that Macedos
had available if it did not want the Union to picket Coun-
ty at the jobsite. As DiLeo stated, if Vieira wanted to
avoid picketing at the jobsite he “would have to get
somebody else because County is not paying the wages.”
This is an accurate statement of fact drawn ineluctably
from the very nature of area-standards picketing at a
common worksite under Moore Dry Dock, and does not
establish an unlawful intent.11
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We have amended the judge’s conclusion of law to de-
lete paragraph 4 and reletter the subsequent paragraph.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Local
560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Kenvil,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a) and add
paragraph 1(b).
“(a) Threatening Sharp Concrete Corporation with
picketing, where an object thereof is to force or require
Sharp Concrete Corporation to cease doing business with
County Concrete Corporation, or any other person.
“(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing Sharp Concrete Corporation, or any other person,
where an object thereof is to force or require them to
cease doing business with County Concrete Corpora-
tion.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
“(b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Sharpe Concrete Cor-

11 We also reject the judge’s alternative rationale for finding the
Macedos’ violation, i.e., that the Union violated the Act by making an
“unqualified threat” which did not include Moore Dry Dock assurances.
See Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Coors Distributing), 268
NLRB 475, 478 (1983) (citing cases), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Butchers
Union Local 506, 753 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1985)(mem.). Like the judge,
we are aware that the “unqualified threat” doctrine has been rejected by
some reviewing courts. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 15 v.
NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 434–436 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Plumbers Local 32 v.
NLRB, 912 F.2d 1108, 1110–1111 (9th Cir. 1990). But we have no
need here to address those decisions or the doctrine’s continuing vitali-
ty, as the Moore Dry Dock assurances set forth in the Union’s April 26
letter comply with the doctrine.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1073
poration, if willing, at all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten Sharp Concrete Corporation
where an object thereof is to force Sharp Concrete Cor-
poration to cease doing business with County Concrete
Corporation, or any other person.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce Sharp Concrete Corporation, or any other person,
where an object thereof is to force or require them to
cease doing business with County Concrete Corporation.
LOCAL 560, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS
The Board’s decision can be found at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/22-CC-068160 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of
the decision from the Executive Secretary, National La-
bor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C., 20570 or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Laura Elrashedy, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
Paul A. Montalbano, Esq. (Cohen, Leder, Montalbano &
Grossman, LLC), for the Respondent.
Brian P. Shire, Esq. (Susanin, Widman & Brennan, P.C.), for
the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LAUREN ESPOSITO, Administrative Law Judge. Based upon
charges in Cases 22–CC–01522 and 22–CC–068160, filed on
November 12, 2010, and November 3, 2011, respectively, and
upon a charge in Case 22–CC–071865, filed on January 4,
2012, and amended on February 13, 2012, an order consolidat-
ing cases, consolidated complaint, and notice of hearing issued
on April 26, 2012. The complaint alleges that Local 560, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 560 or Respondent),
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations
Act (the Act) by threatening to picket Torcon Construction Co.,
Century 21 Construction Co., J Fletcher Creamer and Sons,
Inc., Terminal Construction Co., Macedos Construction, LLC,
and Sharp Concrete Corporation at various jobsites with an
object of forcing or requiring the foregoing entities and other
persons to cease handling, dealing with the products of, and
doing business with County Concrete Corporation (County
Concrete or the Charging Party), in furtherance of the Union’s
dispute with County Concrete. Respondent filed an answer
denying the material allegations of the complaint.
On or about June 13, 2012, the Acting General Counsel (the
General Counsel) filed a motion to transfer Case 22–CA–01522
to the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) for further
proceedings, for summary default judgment and for the issu-
ance of a Decision and Order of the Board, pursuant to Sections
102.24 and 102.50 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations (GC
Exh. 2). The General Counsel’s motion is granted, and Case
22–CA–01522 is severed and transferred to the Board for fur-
ther proceedings.
This case was tried before me on June 13, 2012, in Newark,
New Jersey.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent admits in its answer and I find that at all material
times the Charging Party has been a corporation with an office
and place of business in Kenvil, New Jersey, and has been en-
gaged in supplying ready-mix concrete and related construction
materials to various employers in the State of New Jersey.
Respondent admits and I find that the Charging Party is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent further admits and I
find that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
1. The parties’ operations and the relevant projects
County Concrete Corporation manufactures and sells ready-
mix concrete, crushed sand, and gravel for construction pro-
jects, and also maintains retail yards where it sells landscape,
masonry products, mulches, and other items on a wholesale and
retail basis. John C. Crimi is County Concrete’s president and
majority stockholder. John Post is the Company’s vice presi-
dent of sales.
As of April 2011, County Concrete employed approximately
50 to 60 drivers. Until January 2001, all of County Concrete’s
employees except for sales and management were represented
by Local 863, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Ac-
cording to Crimi, the Company was informed in January 2001
that the employees would henceforth be represented by Local
408, International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Local 408 appar-
ently represented the bargaining unit employees until it dis-
claimed interest in January 2009. At that point, Local 863 pre-
1074 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vailed in a card check certification conducted by Monsignor
Gilchrest. Contract negotiations between County Concrete and
Local 863 have been ongoing since then, with the last negotiat-
ing session having taken place in May 2011, but the parties
have not reached a collective-bargaining agreement.
Sharp Concrete Corporation (Sharp Concrete or Sharp) does
concrete work, foundation, slabs, and masonry, using concrete
and materials supplied by other businesses. John Domingues
owns and manages the Company. According to Domingues,
Sharp Concrete had entered into an agreement with County
Concrete whereby County Concrete would provide the neces-
sary materials for Sharp Concrete’s projects, whenever it was
feasible to do so. Domingues testified that for over 10 years
Sharp Concrete had used concrete supplied by County Concrete
on its projects on a regular basis.
Macedos Construction, LLC (Macedos Construction or
Macedos) is another firm which performs concrete work on
construction projects. Antonio Vieira is the Company’s general
superintendent. Vieira testified that each year Macedos Con-
struction generally purchases concrete from County Concrete
for two or three projects. Macedos Construction has a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with Local 560.
The instant case involves two construction projects which
were ongoing during the fall of 2011. The first is a new Stu-
dent Center being built at St. Peter’s College in Jersey City,
New Jersey. This is a seven-story concrete and masonry build-
ing; construction began in mid-November 2011 and is continu-
ing. Sharp Concrete was engaged to do the concrete founda-
tions, slabs, and masonry on the project. Torcon Construction
is the general contractor. The second project is a group of three
office buildings and a precast parking garage which is being
built for Novartis in East Hanover, New Jersey. Macedos Con-
struction is the concrete contractor for the parking garage com-
ponent of the project, and had arranged to obtain the concrete it
intended to use from County Concrete. Work on the garage
began in September 2011, and Macedos began its work on the
project in December 2011. Turner Construction is the con-
struction manager on the Novartis project.
John C. Crimi and John Post of County Concrete testified at
the hearing for the General Counsel, as did John Domingues of
Sharp Concrete and Antonio Vieira of Macedos Construction.
Paul Parmentola, vice president and construction executive at
Turner Construction, also testified pursuant to a subpoena is-
sued by the General Counsel. Respondent did not present any
witnesses.
2. The dispute between Local 560 and County Concrete
Since at least the spring of 2011, Local 560 has been en-
gaged in a dispute with County Concrete, contending that
County Concrete has failed to pay its employees area standards
wages and benefits. On April 26, 2011, Anthony Valdner,
Local 560’s president, sent a letter to the Building Contractors
Association of New Jersey, the Associated General Contractors
of New Jersey, the Utility and Transportation Contractors As-
sociation, and a number of individual firms describing its dis-
pute with County Concrete and related activities Local 560
might possibly undertake. The letter states as follows:
Dear AGC, BCA, UTCA and Independent Construction Con-
tractors and Subcontractors:
Local 560, IBT is currently involved in efforts to pro-
tect area standards of wages and benefits paid to drivers in
the redi-mix concrete delivery industry.
County Concrete Corporation is attempting to serious-
ly undermine redi-mix delivery area standards. Though
County Concrete Corporation has a collective bargaining
relationship with Local 863, I.B.T., the parties have been
without a contract for over a year due to County Con-
crete’s offer of substandard wages and benefits. County
Concrete has attempted to have Local 863 decertified
through a petition at the NLRB. The County Concrete
employees overwhelmingly voted to continue their mem-
bership in and representation by Local 863. Unfortunate-
ly, County Concrete has not gotten the message that its
employees are demanding to be paid area standards and
are willing to go out on strike to compel County Concrete
to pay area standard wages and benefits in similar fashion
as other unionized redi-mix drivers. Drawing upon Con-
crete’s history of intransigence, it is not expected any time
soon that they will reach agreement on economic terms for
a contract, and strike[s] and picketing may be expected.
While County Concrete and Local 863 continue to seek to
resolve their differences, Local 560 will not stand action-
less as County Concrete continues to operate at substand-
ard wages and economic benefits, with affect to destroy
area standard wages and economic benefits.
Local 560 recently settled with the National Labor Re-
lations Board a claim brought by County Concrete. The
settlement specifically provided acknowledgement by the
NLRB, as well as County Concrete, that by agreeing to
settle the charge, Local 560 did not admit it engaged in
any conduct that was in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act. You as a company executive understand
that it is often a wiser and more prudent course to settle
legal claim[s] rather than pursue costly and time consum-
ing litigation.
The settlement does not in any manner limit Local 560
from engaging in an energetic campaign focused against
County Concrete which will have the object to protect the
area standards of wages and economic benefits earned by
area redi-mix drivers. This campaign has several different
facets, one of which includes area standards picketing.
So that there can be no claim of confusion or assertion
of misunderstanding of any future conversations with Lo-
cal 560 Business Agents, Local 560 advises that all
“threats to picket” are made with, and actual picketing,
will be conducted in accordance with, Moore Dry Dock
Standards for Picketing at a Secondary Site, as indicated
below:
1. Picketing will clearly disclose that the dispute
is with County Concrete Corp. for its failure
to pay Area Standards.
2. Picketing will be conducted at times County
Concrete is “engaged in its normal business”
at the Secondary Site.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1075
3. Picketing will be conducted at times County
Concrete is “located” or “present” on the
Secondary employer’s site.
4. Picketing will be limited to places reasonably
close to the sites of the dispute, with due re-
gard to reserve gates and property access.
Local 560’s energies and vigorous activities will be
persistent and will continue until County Concrete Corp.
commences to pay its redi-mix drivers Area Standards
when making deliveries in Local 560 geographic territory.
Local 560 does not seek to enmesh your company in
its dispute with County Concrete. Whichever redi-mix
company you decide to utilize, we recommend prudence
be taken to determine what rates of pay and benefits the
Company pays its drivers.
If you have any questions in regard to the meaning of
the Moore Dry Dock Standards, you should contact the
National Labor Relations Board or your own counsel. Be-
cause of previous claims of improper statements being
made by Local 560 Business Representatives, Local 560
Business Representatives are under instruction that they
shall not add to, supplement, or explain this letter to any
contractor, and you are specifically advised that any such
statements are not operative or authorized such that they
may not be claimed to be made against Local 560’s inter-
ests.
Respectfully,
Anthony Valdner
President
The evidence establishes that this letter was widely dissemi-
nated. Crimi testified that he had seen it, and had discussed the
area standards issue with Jack Macedos of Macedos Construc-
tion on numerous occasions during the past 2o years. Parmen-
tola testified that he had heard about the letter from Nordic
Concrete, which had provided a copy to him, and that he had
also discussed the area standards dispute with James Martins of
Macedos Construction. Post also testified that he was aware of
the letter and had discussed it with Parmentola.
General Counsel stipulated at the hearing that Local 560 was
involved in an area standards dispute with County Concrete.1
3. Facts relevant to the St. Peter’s College project
and Sharp Concrete
Domingues and Post testified that on November 1, 2011,
they attended a meeting arranged by the Hudson County Build-
ing Trades Council regarding the Student Center project at St.
Peter’s College. Domingues was invited to attend the meeting
by Roy Porter, the superintendent for Torcon Construction, the
general contractor on the project. Domingues in turn invited
Post to attend. Representatives from other contractors on the
project and from the Building Trades Association were present
as well. Each person attending the meeting introduced them-

1 The General Counsel did not stipulate that Local 560’s activities
were solely motivated by a permissible area standards notification
objective, as Respondent claims in its posthearing brief (Tr. 44).
selves and explained their organization’s role of on the project.
Repre-sentatives of contractors identified the suppliers and
subcontractors they would be using on the project to the Build-
ing Trades Council. Toward the end of the meeting, Pat, a
representative of the Building Trades Association, told the
group that Anthony Valdner of Local 560 had not been able to
attend, and asked everyone to call Valdner later. Pat gave out
Valdner’s phone number, and the meeting ended.
Domingues and Post then returned to Domingues’ office to-
gether and called Valdner. Domingues recorded this conversa-
tion, which proceeded as follows:
DOMINGUES: Hi Tony, this is John from Sharp Con-
crete.
VALDNER: Yes. Hi, how are you?
DOMINGUES: Good.
VALDNER: What can I do for you?
DOMINGUES: Pat told me to give you a call and just
touch base with you. We are doing the concrete over at St.
Peter’s in Jersey City.
VALDNER: Right.
[Inaudible.]
VALDNER: County Concrete is no good.
DOMINGUES: They are no good.
VALDNER: No good. No good. I will be putting a
picket line against you . . . an informational picket line.
They are non-union. They don’t pay the area standards.
DOMINGUES: Okay.
VALDNER: They don’t pay the area standards. Before
you run into a problem. Alright? You have Eastern, you
have Weldon, you have Colonial, you have Service.2
DOMINGUES: Okay.
VALDNER: You have Crane Concrete out of Milisevik.
Colonial is out of Newark. Eastern is out of Jersey City.
[inaudible.]
DOMINGUES: I am going to do this, only because I
went in with County’s price. They have done a couple of
jobs with us.
VALDNER: Right.
DOMINGUES: I am going to call County and I will have
them give you a call. I thought they were union.
VALDNER: No they are not union and they don’t pay
the area standards. They have no signed contract with
863. For over 2 years I have been battling them with 863.
They have been torn off a lot of jobs, John. They don’t
pay the area standards. We went before the Labor Board
and we can picket the jobs. I will send you a letter and
everything that my lawyer wrote up. They are not good.
They don’t pay the area standards and that’s what I will
picket them. Area standards.
DOMINGUES: Okay. I am going to call my salesman
over there if that’s okay and I will have him . . . .
VALDNER: That’s fine with me. He’s union and this
and that. I’m telling you. I will put up an informational
picket line and the trades won’t cross it. And I’m not do-

2 These companies all have contractual relationships with the Union.
1076 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing anything wrong by doing that. The Labor Board told
me that I can do that. Okay, sir?
DOMINGUES: Okay, my man. I will let you know.
VALDNER: Bye-bye.
DOMINGUES: Thanks.3
Valdner later faxed Domingues a copy of his April 26, 2011
letter regarding the area standards dispute with County Con-
crete.
Domingues testified that he later called Roy Porter of Torcon
Construction, described his conversation with Valdner, and
asked Porter whether he should continue to use County Con-
crete. According to Domingues, Porter said no, and told
Domingues that he had to speak with his office. Porter told
Domingues that he needed to submit another concrete supplier
as soon as possible, because they could not lose time on the job.
Domingues testified that instead of County Concrete he ob-
tained the concrete for the St. Peter’s College job from Service,
a supplier suggested by Valdner during their conversation
whose employees are represented by Respondent.
4. Facts relevant to the Novartis Project and
Macedos Construction
Work on the Novartis project in East Hanover began in April
2011. In September or October 2001, Dave Critchley, presi-
dent of the Morris County Building Trades Association, ar-
ranged for a meeting between Paul Parmentola of Turner Con-
struction and Valdner regarding the outstanding dispute be-
tween Local 560 and County Concrete. At that point the last of
the project’s four buildings was not yet ready for concrete work
to begin, and Macedos Construction had not selected a concrete
supplier. Parmentola testified that he met Valdner for the first
time at this meeting. According to Parmentola, Valdner told
him that Local 560 had an issue with County Concrete’s failure
to pay its drivers area standards wages and benefits. Valdner
also gave Parmentola a copy of Local 560’s April 26, 2011
letter to the employer associations and independent firms.
Subsequently, in mid-December 2011, another meeting re-
garding Local 560’s dispute with County Concrete was called
by the Morris County Building Trades Association. Parmentola
attended this meeting with Bill DiPasquale, also from Turner
Construction, Critchley, Valdner, another Local 560 representa-
tive named Joe, and Lou Candora, also from the Building
Trades Association.4 Parmentola testified that at this meeting
Valdner again described Local 560’s dispute with County Con-
crete, contending that County Concrete’s drivers were not being
paid area standards wages. Valdner said that he wanted to
bring the issue to Parmentola’s attention. The participants then
discussed two possibilities—ensuring that the County Concrete
drivers were paid a higher wage in line with area standards
wages and benefits, and engaging a company other than County
Concrete provide the concrete for the remainder of the Novartis

3 This account of Domingues and Valdner’s conversation was taken
from the transcript prepared by the General Counsel and in evidence as
GC Exh. 3(b). No party has raised any objection to the accuracy of the
transcript, which is consistent with the recording of the conversation
(GC Exh. 3(a)) in all material respects.
4 Several of these names are spelled phonetically.
project. Parmentola testified that Valdner said that a company
other than County Concrete would pay the drivers are standards
wages, but could not recall Valdner mentioning any specific
company. Valdner stated that the dispute could be resolved if
County Concrete’s drivers were paid area standards wages or if
another company, whose drivers were paid area standards wag-
es, was selected to supply the concrete. Valdner stated that if
the dispute was not resolved Local 560 could engage in infor-
mational picketing. At this meeting, Valdner also provided
Parmentola with another copy of his April 26, 2011 letter.
Antonio Vieira testified that Macedos Construction began
working on the Novartis project in late December 2011, with
County Concrete delivering the concrete as per the agreement
between the companies. Vieira testified that after Macedos
began work, his superintendent on the job told him that Local
560 intended to picket the job on the Tuesday after New Year’s
Day. Vieira then called Joe DiLeo of Local 560 and left him a
message. Vieira testified that when DiLeo called him back,
Vieira asked why Local 560 intended to picket. DiLeo told
Vieira that if County Concrete did not pay Local 560 wages the
union would picket the job. Vieira responded that Macedos had
to use County Concrete at that point, because the materials (a
special colored concrete, stone and sand) had already been
purchased for the job, there had been months of mockups and
other preparation, and everything was ready for the work to
begin. DiLeo told Vieira that Macedos had to get another con-
crete supplier, because County Concrete was not paying area
standards wages. DiLeo suggested specific concrete suppliers
which would pay their employees the appropriate wages, in-
cluding Eastern, Weldon, and Clayton. DiLeo told Vieira that
if he did not use a concrete supplier that paid the appropriate
wages, Local 560 would picket the job the next day.
Vieira then asked DiLeo why Local 560 was picking on
Macedos, when County Concrete was supplying concrete for
Nordic Construction on the Novartis project. DiLeo responded
that Nordic had agreed that it would not use County Concrete
again on its jobs. DiLeo then said that County Concrete would
have to pay an extra $15 per hour to meet the Local 560 wage
rates. Vieira responded that Macedos needed to use County
Concrete because of all the time and money already invested
with them in the project, and suggested to DiLeo that Macedos
pay the difference between the County Concrete and Local 560
wage rates. DiLeo refused, saying that County Concrete had to
pay the difference because the additional amounts would be
contributed to benefit funds, and reiterated that if County Con-
crete did not pay the appropriate wage rates, Macedos had to
use a different contractor. Vieira then told DiLeo that Macedos
would need time to bring in a different concrete supplier, and
asked whether Macedos could begin the job with County Con-
crete until they made the necessary arrangements with another
company. DiLeo responded that if Macedos didn’t find a dif-
ferent concrete supplier Local 560 would picket the job, but
said that he would ask whether Macedos could use County
Concrete until they made the necessary arrangements with an-
other supplier. Vieira also told DiLeo that he was concerned
that another concrete supplier would take advantage of Mace-
dos given the last-minute nature of the situation. DiLeo re-
sponded that he would speak to another concrete supplier and
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1077
“get them to do the right thing” if Macedos chose them. Vieira
said that they had to think about the situation over the weekend,
and DiLeo responded that if he did not hear from Macedos on
Tuesday the Union would picket.5
Vieira testified that on the next Tuesday DiLeo called him.
DiLeo told Vieira that he had spoken to Eastern, one of the
alternative suppliers he had suggested, and Eastern had reported
that they had not heard from Macedos. Vieira said that Mace-
dos was still thinking about their options and deciding what
they were going to do. Vieira then contacted Macedos’ attor-
ney.
Local 560 did apparently picket the Novartis jobsite begin-
ning on January 18, 2012. There is no allegation in this case
that the January 2012 picketing was unlawful.
III. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. General Principles and the Positions of the Parties
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits labor organizations and their
representatives from threatening, coercing, or restraining any
person engaged in commerce, “where an object thereof is forc-
ing or requiring any person to cease doing business with any
other person.” It is well settled that an unlawful secondary
objective need not be the sole motivation for the union’s con-
duct; so long as an unlawful object exists, prohibited conduct in
furtherance of that objective violates Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
See, e.g., General Service Employees Local 73 (Allied Security,
Inc.), 239 NLRB 295, 303 fn. 3 (1978). In addition, the Board
has held that an “unqualified” threat to picket a neutral employ-
er’s jobsite where the primary employer is also working vio-
lates Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), absent assurances that picketing
will be conducted in accordance with the standards articulated
in Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB
547 (1950).6 Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342
NLRB 740, 749 (2004), enfd. 251 Fed. Appx. 101 (3d Cir.
2007); Ironworkers Local 433 (United Steel), 280 NLRB 1325
fn. 1, 1331–1333 (1986), enf. denied 850 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.
1988); see also Teamsters Local 456 (Peckham Materials), 307
NLRB 612, 619 (1992) (discussing cases). However, even
compliance with the Moore Dry Dock standards does not pre-
clude a finding of unlawful picketing where there is independ-
ent evidence of a secondary objective. Teamsters Local 126
(Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc.), 200 NLRB 253 (1972).
The General Counsel and the Charging Party contend that
Local 560 violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) when Valdner threat-
ened Domingues of Sharp Concrete during their November 1,
2011 phone conversation, and when DiLeo threatened Vieira of
Macedos Construction during their phone conversation on or
about December 30, 2011. The General Counsel and the
Charging Party argue that the record contains sufficient inde-

5 DiLeo did not testify at the hearing.
6 Under Moore Dry Dock, picketing at a common situs must be
strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the
secondary employer’s premises, the primary employer must be engaged
in its normal business at the situs, the picketing must be limited to
places reasonably close to the situs of the dispute, and the picketing
must clearly disclose that the dispute is with the primary employer. 92
NLRB at 549.
pendent evidence of Local 560’s secondary objective to estab-
lish that Valdner and DiLeo’s statements were threats violating
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). However, the General Counsel further
contends that even if no additional evidence of secondary ob-
jective existed, Valdner and DiLeo’s threats to picket were
unqualified by affirmative assurances that picketing would
comply with Moore Dry Dock standards, and were therefore
unlawful.7
Respondent Local 560 argues that Valdner and DiLeo’s
statements were not unlawful threats of picketing. Local 560
argues that its April 26, 2011 letter, which discussed picketing
in the context of the Moore Dry Dock standards, effectively
qualified Valdner and DiLeo’s statements to Domingues and
Vieira, so that the statements themselves were not unlawful.
Local 560 further argues that the Board should revisit and ulti-
mately reject the principle that a union representative’s threat to
picket generates a presumption, whether rebuttable or not, that
the union will engage in unlawful secondary activity absent an
affirmative assurance that picketing will be conducted in ac-
cordance with Moore Dry Dock standards. Local 560 contends
that the Board should abandon this presumption, citing the
opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit in Sheet Metal
Workers Local 15 v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 419, 434–436 (2007), and
of the Ninth Circuit in Journeymen Local 32 v. NLRB, 912 F.2d
1108, 1110–1111 (1990), both of which rejected it. The Gen-
eral Counsel also argues that the presumption should be aban-
doned based upon the opinions of the District of Columbia and
Ninth Circuits in these cases.
B. Local 560 Violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by
Threatening Sharp Concrete and Macedos
Construction with Picketing, with the Object of
Forcing or Requiring them to Cease Doing
Business with County Concrete
I find that Local 560 violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by
threatening Sharp Concrete and Macedos Construction with
picketing in furtherance of an unlawful secondary objective—
forcing or requiring both companies to cease doing business
with County Concrete, with whom Local 560 had an area
standards dispute. I find that the record contains adequate evi-
dence of a secondary motivation to determine that the state-
ments were unlawful, without recourse to the presumption that
unqualified threats to picket, without assurances of compliance
with Moore Dry Dock standards, violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
1. Valdner’s statements to Domingues regarding
the St. Peter’s College jobsite
The evidence establishes that Valdner unlawfully threatened
Domingues with picketing in furtherance of a secondary objec-
tive during their conversation on November 1, 2011. After
determining that Domingues intended to use County Concrete
as Sharp’s supplier for the St. Peter’s College job, Valdner

7 The Charging Party also asserts that Local 560 violated Sec.
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by picketing at the Novartis jobsite in early January 2012.
However, the consolidated complaint does not contain any allegations
of unlawful picketing, and the General Counsel does not assert that
Local 560 violated the Act in this manner. As a result, I decline to
make any findings or conclusions on this issue.
1078 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
immediately stated that he would be “putting a picket line
against you.” The “you” in Valdner’s statement clearly refers
to Sharp, and not to County Concrete. While mentioning area
standards issues, Valdner also told Domingues that County
Concrete was “not union,” and suggested alternative suppliers
which have contractual relationships with the Union. Valdner
went on to inform Domingues that he would “put up an infor-
mational picket line and the trades won’t cross it.” It is clear
from has statements that Valdner intended to convey to
Domingues that his only means of avoiding picketing which,
according to Valdner, would bring a halt to work at the site,
was to select a concrete supplier which had a contractual rela-
tionship with the Union in lieu of County Concrete. This con-
stitutes significant evidence of an unlawful secondary objec-
tive. See General Service Employees Local 73 (Allied Securi-
ty), 239 NLRB at 30–307 (business agent’s statement that
“there were about 80 security firms that met area standards in
the phone book” during conversation with neutral representa-
tive regarding “possible picketing” evidence of unlawful objec-
tive); Electrical Workers Local 369 (Garst-Receveur Construc-
tion Co.), 229 NLRB 68, 72–73 (1977), enfd. 609 F.2d 266 (6th
Cir. 1979) (union agent’s statement that “[i]f the job was run
100 percent union and then if [the primary employer] is off this
job, then everything can be cleared up” sufficient to establish
unlawful secondary objective). The evidence establishes, of
course, that Valdner referred to informational picketing and the
area standards nature of the Union’s dispute with County Con-
crete. However, given Valdner’s clear requirement that
Domingues select another, unionized, concrete supplier or face
a picket line which, according to Valdner, “the trades won’t
cross,” these allusions are ineffective to immunize his overall
remarks from a finding of prohibited secondary motivation.
I further find that Respondent’s April 26, 2011 letter regard-
ing its compliance with Moore Dry Dock standards during fu-
ture picketing is insufficient to establish that Valdner’s remarks
were in fact permissible. Although the evidence establishes
that Valdner faxed a copy of the letter to Domingues after their
November 1, 2011 conversation, the law is clear that subse-
quent or concurrent compliance with Moore Dry Dock stand-
ards is insufficient to excuse otherwise unlawful activity where
there is direct evidence of a secondary objective. See, e.g.,
Service Employees Local 254 (Women & Infants Hospital), 324
NLRB 743 (1997) (evidence regarding compliance with Moore
Dry Dock standards during picketing irrelevant in light direct
evidence of secondary objective); General Teamsters Local 126
(Ready Mixed Concrete), 200 NLRB at 254–255 (compliance
with Moore Dry Dock standards “does not immunize a union’s
picketing and other conduct” where record evidence reveals a
secondary objective). As a result, the April 26, 2011 letter
providing assurances that any picketing of County Concrete
will be conducted in compliance with Moore Dry Dock stand-
ards does not establish that Valdner’s unrebutted statements to
Domingues, which clearly evince a prohibited secondary objec-
tive, were lawful.
In addition, as argued by the General Counsel, the April 26,
2011 letter is insufficient under the relevant case law to operate
as a repudiation of Valdner’s unlawful threats of picketing. As
the General Counsel notes, repudiation must be “timely, unam-
biguous, specific in nature to the coercive conduct and free
from other proscribed legal conduct.” Passavant Memorial
Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978) (internal quotations
omitted). In addition, the repudiation must be publicized ade-
quately and contain assurances that no future coercion or inter-
ference will occur, and there must be no additional proscribed
conduct after publication. Passavant Memorial Area Hospital,
237 NLRB at 138–139. Although Respondent’s April 26, 2011
letter was disseminated, it does not explicitly repudiate any
specifically identified wrongdoing, and in fact contains lan-
guage stating that Respondent does not admit to any violation
of the Act.8 See Holly Farms Corp., 311 NLRB 273, 274–275
(1993), enfd. 48 F.3d 1360 (4th Cir. 1995) (alleged repudiation
of unlawful wage increase ineffective where respondent did not
“admit to any wrongdoing”). Indeed, the April 26, 2011 letter
is not even specific to any particular jobsite, project, or state-
ment of Respondent’s representatives. In addition, DiLeo’s
unlawful threat to Vieira regarding Macedos Construction’s
activities at the Novartis jobsite, as discussed below, establishes
additional proscribed conduct after the April 26, 2011 letter
was sent to Domingues on or about November 1, 2011. As a
result, I find that Valdner’s faxing the April 26, 2011 letter to
Domingues was insufficient to “cure” the unlawful threat
Valdner made earlier.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that Valdner threat-
ened Domingues on November 1, 2011, with picketing with the
prohibited secondary objective of forcing or requiring Sharp
Concrete to cease doing business with County Concrete. I
therefore find that Respondent’s threat to Domingues violated
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
2. DiLeo’s statements to Vieira regarding the
Novartis jobsite
I likewise find independent evidence sufficient to establish
an unlawful secondary objective with respect to DiLeo’s state-
ments to Vieira in late December 2011 regarding Macedos
Con-struction’s activities at the Novartis jobsite. I credit
Vieira’s unrebutted testimony that DiLeo insisted that Macedos
terminate its agreement with County Concrete and engage a
supplier which had a contractual relationship with the Union in
order to avoid picketing at the jobsite. General Service Em-
ployees Local 73 (Allied Security), 239 NLRB at 306–307;
Electrical Workers Local 369 (Garst-Receveur Construction
Co.), 229 NLRB at 72–73. At least one of the contractors sug-
gested by DiLeo was also mentioned by Valdner to Domingues
during their November 1, 2011 conversation, discussed above.
In addition, after Vieira asked DiLeo why Local 560 was spe-
cifically targeting Macedos when other contractors on the
jobsite were using County Concrete, DiLeo responded that
those other contractors had agreed not to use County Concrete
in the future. Finally, when Vieira expressed concern about

8 Specifically, the April 26, 2011 letter states that Local 560 “did
not admit it engaged in any conduct that was in violation of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act” in connection with the settlement of a previous
unfair labor practice charge filed against it by County Concrete, and
asserts that statements made by Local 560’s representatives regarding
the letter “may not be claimed to be made against Local 560’s inter-
ests.”
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 560 (COUNTY CONCRETE CORP.) 1079
finding another supplier on such short notice, DiLeo offered to
contact them and get them to “do the right thing for Macedos.”
All of these statements evince a prohibited secondary object of
forcing or requiring Macedos to cease doing business with
County Concrete.
The events which took place after Vieira and DiLeo’s initial
conversation also evince an unlawful secondary objective on
Respondent’s part. According to Vieira’s unrebutted testimo-
ny, DiLeo next called him after hearing from one of the alter-
nate suppliers he had suggested that Vieira had not yet contact-
ed them, and threatened again to picket the jobsite. In fact,
when Vieira went ahead and used County Concrete, Respond-
ent did so. Overall, the evidence is more than sufficient to
establish that DiLeo’s remarks were made with the unlawful
secondary objective of forcing Macedos Construction to cease
doing business with County Concrete. As a result, DiLeo’s
statements during his conversation with Vieira constituted an
unlawful threat to picket in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
3. Valdner and DiLeo’s statements were unqualified
threats to picket in violation of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
As discussed above, there is adequate independent evidence
of a secondary objective based upon the content of the conver-
sations and the surrounding circumstances to determine that
Valdner and DiLeo’s statements to Domingues and Vieira vio-
lated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). However, even without additional
evidence of a secondary motivation, I would find that the
statements were unqualified threats to picket, devoid of assur-
ances that Respondent would comply with the Moore Dry Dock
criteria, and therefore unlawful on that basis as well. See Elec-
trical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB at 741,
752; Iron Workers Local 433 (United Steel), 280 NLRB at 1325
fn. 1, 1333. I am aware, of course, that the District of Colum-
bia and Ninth Circuits have disavowed the Board’s presump-
tion that threats of picketing are unlawful unless accompanied
by affirmative assurances that such picketing will comply with
the Moore Dry Dock requirements. These circuits have con-
cluded that the presumption “is without foundation in the Act,
relevant case law or any general legal principles,” and have
found that the Board’s holdings in such cases were “irrational
and beyond the Board’s authority.” Journeymen Local 32, 912
F.2d at 1110, quoting NLRB v. Iron Workers Local 433, 850
F.2d 551, 557 (9th Cir. 1988); Sheet Metal Workers Local 15,
491 F.3d at 435. Nevertheless, the presumption constitutes
existing Board law which I am required to apply. See Electri-
cal Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB at 740, 752;
see also Laborers Local 79 (JMH Development), 354 NLRB
158 (2009). In addition, for the reasons discussed in section
III,(B),(1) above, I would not find Respondent’s April 26, 2011
letter sufficient to rebut the presumption. As a result, even if
the record did not contain independent evidence of a secondary
objective, I would find that Valdner and DiLeo’s statements
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as unqualified threats to picket
Sharp Concrete and Macedos Construction.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by threatening Sharp
Concrete and Macedos Construction, on November 1, 2011,
and in late December 2011, respectively, with picketing, with
the secondary objective of forcing the companies to cease doing
business with County Concrete.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. County Concrete Corporation, Sharp Concrete Corpora-
tion, and Macedos Construction, LLC, are employers and per-
sons engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Local 560, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening to picket Sharp Concrete Corporation at
the St. Peter’s College jobsite with an object of forcing or re-
quiring Sharp Concrete Corporation to cease doing business
with County Concrete Corporation on November 1, 2011, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
4. By threatening to picket Macedos Construction, LLC at
the Novartis jobsite with an object of forcing or requiring
Macedos Construction, LLC, to cease doing business with
County Concrete Corporation on or about December 30, 2011,
Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
5. The above-described unfair labor practices affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7), and
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered
to cease and desist therefrom and post appropriate notices to
effectuate the Act’s purposes.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]