Local 1575, ILA

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 21, 1976

227 N.L.R.B. 471 (N.L.R.B. 1976)

LOCAL 1575, ILA 471
Local 1575, International Longshoremen 's Association
and Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.
Local 1994, International Longshoremen 's Association
and Puerto Rico Marine Management , Inc. Cases
24-CP-52 and 24-CP-53
December 21, 1976
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MURPHY AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND PENELLO
On March 24, 1976, Administrative Law Judge
Richard L. Denison issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and
the Charging Party each filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the. provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to
the extent consistent herewith.
The consolidated complaint alleges that the Res-
pondents violated Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act by
threatening to picket Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment, Inc. (herein PRMMI), with an object of forcing
PRMMI to recognize and bargain with the Respon-
dents at a time when the Office and Professional
Employees International Union, Local 402, AFL-
CIO (herein Local 402), was the' lawfully recognized
representative of the employees involved.
The basic issue in this case is whether PRMMI is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act or whether it shares exemption from
coverage of the Act with Puerto Rico Marine
Shipping Authority, an instrumentality of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico. The parties stipulated that
the jurisdictional question be resolved by Cases 24-
CC-195 and 24-CP-51. That case, National Maritime
Union of America, AFL-CIO (Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc.), 227 NLRB 20 (1976), held that
PRMMI was not exempt. For the 'reasons stated
therein, we find that PRMMI is an employer,engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act and shall
assertjurisdiction herein.
I
The Charging -Party has requested oral argument. This request is hereby
denied as the record , the exceptions , and the brief adequately present the
issues and the positions of the parties
The Charging . Party also has filed a motion to remand to the Admimstra-
tive Law Judge to reopen the hearing for the purpose of conducting an
evidentiary hearing. Although no witnesses testified at the hearing herein, the
pleadings and stipulations of the parties form a sufficient basis for resolving
the issues in this proceeding. Accordingly, the motion is dented.
227 NLRB No. 5
The parties stipulated that the factualallegations of
the complaint are true, to receipt of relevant con-
tracts, and to certain facts. The basic facts are set
forth by the Administrative Law Judge. Briefly,
PRMMI had a management contract to operate Sea
Land Services, whose office clericals and dispatchers
were represented by Local 402. Maritime Transporta-
tion Management of Puerto Rico (herein MTM) had
a management contract to operate Trans-American
Trailer Transport, Inc., whose office clericals and
dispatchers were represented by Respondents.
MTM'S management"contract was terminated as of
September 30, 1975, as were its bargaining agree-
ments with Respondents. Respondents then demand-
ed that PRMMI hire all- MTM office clericals and
dispatchers and that Respondents continue to repre-
sent these employees. In furtherance of their de-
mands, Respondents threatened to picket PRMMI.
Pursuant- to agreement with Local 402 and Respon-
dents, PRMMI hired all former MTM office clerical
employees and dispatchers.
The Administrative Law Judge correctly states that
to find a violation it- -Bust,-be established (1) that
PRMMI at- all pertinent times has lawfully 'recog-
nized Local 402 as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of employees in question; (2) that a question
concerning representation could not properly be
raised; and (3) that the threat to picket was for the
purpose of securing recognition or bargaining. Para-
grah 17 of the complaint states that an object of
Respondents' actions was "to force and require
PRMMI to recognize and bargain with [Respon-
dents] as the collective bargaining representative of
the office clerical employees and dispatchers of
PRMMI." Paragraph 19 of the complaint states that
"PRMMI has, in accordance with the Act, lawfully
recognized [Local 402] as the representative of the
office clerical employees and dispatchers of PRMMI
for collective bargaining purposes" at pertinent times.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded, how-
ever, that a question concerning representation could
be raised and dismissed the complaint. In doing so he
relied on certain language in paragraph 16 of the
complaint, which reads:
Pursuant to agreement by PRMMI, OPEIU
and Respondents, PRMMI has employed -since
October 1, 1975, all of the former MTM office
clerical employees and, dispatchers, without repre-
Office and Professional Employees International Union, Local 402, AFL-
CIO, is a Party in Interest herein. The International has filed a motion to
remand to the Administrative Law Judge for receiving additional evidence.
The International states that the hearing was defective because it did not
receive notice thereof and did notparticipate therein. Local 402, the Party in
Interest, however, was notified of the hearing and, through a representative,
participated in the hearing. Accordingly, the motion is denied as the
International has not shown that it was prejudiced.
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sentation by any labor organization, but Respon-
dents continue to demand under threats described
in paragraphs 14 and 15, above, the right to
represent them, notwithstanding PRMMI's recog-
nition of, and contract with, OPEIU covering such
employee classifications.
The Administrative Law Judge specifically relied on
the words "without representation by any labor
organization" to find that a question concerning
representation could be raised. However unfortunate
the choice of words in paragraph 16,2 the context,
further statements in the complaint, and stipulations
by the parties make clear that no question concerning
representation can be raised. Paragraph 16 of the
complaint describes PRMMI's actions in response to
Respondents' threats and demands and that Respon-
dents continued their threats. Paragraph 19 of the
complaint states, as indicated above, that Local 402 is
recognized as collective-bargaining representative.
The paragraph also succinctly states that "a question
concerning the representation of such employees
under Section 9(c) of the Act could not appropriately
be raised at the time of [Respondent's] conduct." At
the hearing the parties stipulated as follows:
Paragraph 3, that Maritime Transportation Man-
agement of Puerto Rico dispatcher employees
were and still are claimed to be represented by
Respondent Local 1575, International Longshore-
men's Association, and Respondent Local 1994,
International Longshoremen's Association repre-
sented Maritime Transportation Management of
Puerto Rico office clerical employees and still
claims to represent them.
On the other hand, such employee classifications
employed by the Charging Party, Puerto Rico
Marine Management, Inc., were and are represented
by the following labor organization, Office and
Professional Employees International Union Local
402, AFL-CIO.
When Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.
took over the former Maritime Transportation
Management of Puerto Rico employees in such
classifications, Respondent's Locals 1575 and
1944, International Longshoremen's Association
claimed and continued to claim such classifica-
tions. [Emphasis supplied.]
The parties have clearly stipulated that the employees
in question were and are represented by Local 402.
The parties have also stipulated to the facts in the
complaint, including paragraph 19. Specifically, with
the exception of the conclusionary allegations of the
complaint (par. 20 and 21) and of the allegation that
PRMMI is an employer within the meaning of the
Act, Respondents withdrew their denials to the
complaint, admitted the same, and stipulated that
factual findings may be predicated upon the same.
For these reasons, we find that no question concern-
ing representation could properly be raised.
Accordingly, we find that Respondent has violated
Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act and shall order it to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., is, and
has been at all times material herein, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 1575, International Longshoremen's As-
sociation; Local 1994, International Longshoremen's
Association; and Office and Professional Employees
International Union, Local 402, AFL-CIO, are labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By threatening to picket Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc., with an object of forcing or
requiring PRMMI to recognize and bargain with
Respondents as the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of PRMMI's office clerical employees and
dispatchers at a time when PRMMI lawfully recog-
nized Office and Professional Employees Internation-
al Union, Local 402, AFL-CIO, as the collective-
bargaining representative of such employees, and a
question concerning representation could not be
raised under Section 9(c) of the Act, the Respondents
have engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondents,
Local 1575, International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion, and Local 1994, International Longshoremen's
Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, their officers,
agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from threatening to picket,
picketing, or causing to be picketed Puerto Rico
Marine Management, Inc., with an object of forcing
or requiring Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.,
to recognize and bargain with Respondents as the
2 Counsel states that the words were meant to say that former MTM for what it purports to be-counsel's explanation . We do not, of course, base
employees were not required to pay dues to Local 402 . We mention this only our findings on counsel's statement since it is not evidence
LOCAL 1575, ILA 473
collective-bargaining representative of office clerical
employees and dispatchers employed by Puerto Rico
Marine Management, Inc., at a time. when Puerto
Rico Marine Management, Inc., has lawfully recog-
nized Office and Professional Employees Internation-
al Union, Local 402, AFL-CIO, as the collective-
bargaining representative of such employees, and a
question of representation may not be raised under
Section 9(c) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at their offices, meeting rooms, and hiring
halls in Puerto Rico copies of the attached notice
marked, "Appendix." 3 Copies, of said notice, in
English and Spanish, on forms provided by the
Regional Director, for Region 24, after being duly
signed by the Respondents' representative, shall -be
posted by the Respondents immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondents to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 24
signed copies of the Appendix for posting by Puerto
Rico Maine Management, Inc., in places where
notices to employees are customarily posted, if the
Company is willing to do so.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 24, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps Respondents have taken to comply
herewith.
MEMBER PENELLO, dissenting:
For the reasons stated in my dissent in National
Maritime Union off America,AFL-ClO(PuertoRicoMa-
rine Management, Inc.), 227 NLRB 20 (1976), I would
find PRMMI to be exempt from the coverage of the
Act. Accordingly , I would dismiss the complaint in its
entirety.
3 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the -United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity
to give evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
found that we violated the National Labor Relations
Act and ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten to picket, picket, or
cause to be picketed Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment, Inc., with an object of forcing or requiring
Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., to recog-
nize and bargain with us as the collective-bargain-
ing representative of office clerical employees and
dispatchers employed by that Company at a time
when Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.,
lawfully recognizes Office and Professional Em-
ployees International Union, Local 402, AFL-
CIO, as the collective-bargaining representative of
such employees, and a question of representation
may not be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act.
LOCAL 1575 -
INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION
LocAL 1994,
INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD L. DENISON, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard at Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, on December 18,
1975. An order consolidating cases, complaint and notice of
hearing issued on November 18, 1975, alleging that the
Respondent, Local 1575, International - Longshoremen's
Association (hereafter referred to as Local 1575), and Local
1994, International Longshoremen's Association (hereafter
referred to as Local 1994), violated Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the
Act by threatening to picket the Charging Party, Puerto
Rico Marine Management, Inc. (hereafter referred to as
PRMMI), an object of which was to force and require
PRMMI to recognize and bargain with Respondents as the
collective-bargaining representative of PRMMI's office
clerical employees and dispatchers, at a time when PRMMI
had lawfully recognized the Office and Professional Em-
ployees International Union (hereafter referred to as
OPEIU), as the representative for said employees, and at a
time when a question concerning representation with
respect to these employees could not be raised under
Section 9(c) of the Act.
The facts concerning the alleged violations of the Act are
not in dispute, since at the hearing the parties entered into a
stipulation in connection with which the Respondents
withdrew their answer denying the factual allegations of the
complaint. Respondents continue to deny the commission
of any unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and,
in addition, continue to deny that PRMMI is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act. Additionally, with respect to the
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
jurisdictional issue, it was stipulated that this precise
question had been litigated in National Maritime Union of
North America, AFL-CIO (Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment, Inc.), Cases 24-CC-195 and 24-CP-51, currently
pending before Administrative Law Judge Paul Bisgyer,
and that the Board's decision concerning thejunsdictional
question in that case by dispositive of that issue in this case.
[227 NLRB 20 (1976).]
All parties were afforded a full opportunity to participate
at the hearing. Oral argument was waived. The briefs, filed
by the General Counsel, the Charging Party, and the
Respondents, have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
As admitted by Respondents , PRMMI is, and has been at
all times material herein, a corporation duly organized, and
existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware.
PRMMI maintains its principal office and places of
business at Puerto Nuevo , San Juan , Puerto Rico , where it
is, and has been at all times material herein , continuously
engaged in providing management services and related
services for ocean, common-carrier freight transportation
for Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, a public
corporation established in June 1974 by the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico . During the past year , a representa-
tive period, PRMMI , in the course and conduct of its
business operations , performed services valued in excess of
$500,000 , of which services valued in excess of $50,000 were
performed in, and for various enterprises located outside,
Puerto Rico . I find that the Charging Party, PRMMI, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (2), (6), and (7) of the Act.'
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The parties stipulated, and I find, that Local 1575 and
Local 1994 each are and have been at all times material
here in labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act. It is also found, based upon the stipulated
facts set forth below in section III of this Decision, that the
OPEIU also is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Stipulated Facts
Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority (herein called
PRMSA), is and had been at all times material herein a
public corporation established in June 1974 by the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico for the purpose of providing
ocean common -carrier freight transportation between
Puerto Rico and the United States mainland , and for said
purpose it acquired certain facilities of private commercial
carriers engaged in such transportation, including Sea Land
Services (herein called Sea Land), and Trans-American
Trailer Transport, Inc. (herein called TTT). PRMSA, in
i In the event that the Board finds, on the basis of the record in National
Maritime Union of North America, AFL-CIO (Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment, Inc), Cases 24-CC-195 and 24-CP-51, currently pending before
Administrative Law Judge Paul Bisgyer, that PRMMI is not an employer
turn, entered into management service contracts with
PRMMI on July 1, 1974, and with Maritime Transporta-
tion Management of Puerto Rico (herein called MTM), on
September 26, 1974, for exclusive operation of the Sea Land
and TTT acquisitions, respectively. PRMMI and MTM, in
turn, took over the office clerical employees and dispatch-
ers previously employed by Sea Land and TTT, respective-
ly, at the facilities here involved.
The Sea Land office clerical employees and dispatchers
had been historically represented by Office and Profession-
al Employees International Union, Local 402, AFL-CIO
(herein called OPEIU), and PRMMI recognized OPEIU as
their exclusive bargaining representative, entering into
adoption of an existing lawful and valid OPEIU contract
effective until November 9, 1975. The TTT employees in
such classifications taken over by MTM, on the other hand,
were represented by Local 1994 (office clericals) and Local
1575 (dispatchers), which were Locals recognized by MTM
and are parties to bargaining contracts with MTM covering
such employees, effective by the terms thereof until April
11, 1978.
On August 21, 1975, MTM gave written notice to Locals
1994 and 1575 that PRMSA intended to cancel the MTM
management contract as of September 30, 1975, and to
consolidate all management under PRMMI, in which event
the bargaining contracts between MTM and said Locals
would terminate . On September 3, 1975, MTM further
notified said Locals that its management contract had in
fact been canceled by PRMSA, that MTM would cease
operations as of September 30, 1975, and that bargaining
contracts with said Locals were terminated as of the latter
date.
Commencing on or about August 21, 1975, and continu-
ing on various dates thereafter, Locals 1994 and 1575 made
demands upon PRMMI that it hire all of the office clerical
employees and dispatchers employed by MTM, and that
Locals 1994 and 1575 continue to represent such employ-
ees, notwithstanding coverage of the office clerical employ-
ee and dispatcher classifications by the PRMMI-OPEIU
contract described above. In furtherance of these demands,
meetings were held in Respondent's main office on August
21 and 28, September 3 and 4, and October 1, 1975,
between PRMMI officials and Respondents. At these
meetings Respondents' agents , Guillermo Ortiz, Sr. and Jr.,
president and vice president, respectively, of Local 1575
and advisors of Local 1994, threatened that unless PRMMI
complied with their demands Local 1994 office clerical
employee members would picket PRMMI at PRMMI
premises in Puerto Nuevo, and Local 1575 stevedoring and
other members would honor such picketing by refusing to
perform services for PRMMI.
Pursuant to agreement by PRMMI, OPEIU, and Re-
spondents, PRMMI has employed since October 1,1975, all
of the former MTM office clerical employees and dispatch-
ers, without representation by any labor organization, but
Respondents continue to demand the right to represent
them, notwithstanding PRMMI's recognition of, and
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act,
I would then find that PRMMI is not an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act in this case. [227
NLRB 20 (1976)1
LOCAL 1575, ILA 475
contract with, OPEIU -covering such employee classifica-
tions. Locals 1994 and 1575, at the time they engaged in the
conduct described above, were, not, and are not now
currently, certified as the representative of any office
clerical employees or any dispatchers employed by
PRMMI.
B. Contentions of the Parties
In his brief the General Counsel contends that on the
basis of the Waterway Terminals case,2 Respondents' threat
to picket PRMMI for a recognitional object violated
Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act.
Respondents contend that when PRMMI took over the
operations formerly performed by MTM, it also inherited
MTM's contractual obligation to Respondents. It is further
contended that there is no evidence that OPEIU is now the
majority representative of the employees in the classifica-
tions in issue here.
C. Discussion and Conclusions
In urging that a violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act
be found, the General Counsel, in his brief, relies entirely
on the Board's decision in Waterway Terminals. As suc-
cinctly stated in Waterway, in order for the General
Counsel to prevail in this proceeding it must be established
that (1) PRMMI at all pertinent times has lawfully
recognized OPEIU as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of the office clerical employees and dispatchers in
question; (2) that a question concerning representation
could not properly be raised under Section 9 of the Act at
the time Respondents threatened to engage in picketing
PRMMI; and (3) that the threat to picket PRMMI was for
the purpose of securing recognition for Respondents or
requiring PRMMI to engage in collective bargaining with
Respondents with respect to wages, hours, or terms or
conditions of employment of PRMMI's office clerical
employees and dispatchers. Respondents admit that
OPEIU has been the lawfully recognized exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining agent of the PRMMI office clerical employ-
ees and dispatchers formerly employed by Sea Land at its
facilities, but maintains that it should continue to represent
the former MTM employees who worked at the facilities
formerly owned by TTT. Respondents also admit that they
threatened to picket PRMMI unless PRMMI hired all of
the former MTM office clerical employees and dispatchers
and unless Respondents continued to represent these
employees.
Despite considerable similarities between the Waterway
case and the instant matter, I find that the facts involved
herein render these two cases distinguishable. As analyzed
by the Board in Teamsters Local Union No. 676 (Shell
Chemical Company, a Division of Shell Oil Company), 199
NLRB 445,446 (1972):
Thus, in Waterway Terminals, the respondent labor
organization demanded as the price for withholding
picket an arrangement whereby its members would
effect a mass displacement of the employees at Water-
way who were represented by another labor organiza-
tion. As the Trial Examiner pointed out in that case:
Viewed realistically, the immediate objective of
Respondent's demands and the inevitable conse-
quence of Waterway's acquiescence would have
been the establishment of [Respondent] as the
dominant voice in the representation of 60 or 70
employees affected by the change.
In the instant case, however, Respondents were not
seeking to substitute themselves as exclusive collective-
bargaining representative for any of the employees of
PRMMI represented by the OPEIU at the former Sea Land
facilities. Rather, Respondents demanded that the former
MTM office clerical employees and dispatchers who had
worked at the former TTT facilities be employed by
PRMMI and that Respondents, who had previously been
the lawful representative of these employees, continue as
their exclusive representative. Keeping in mind this distinc-
tion, I note a further significant factual distinction here
which I find to be dispositive of the instant proceeding. The
stipulated facts here show that pursuant to an agreement
between PRMMI, the OPEIU, and the Respondents
PRMMI has employed, since October 1, 1975, all of the
former MTM office clerical employees and dispatchers,
without representation by any labor organization. Thus it is
clear that since October 1, 1975, the office clerical employ-
ees and dispatchers in question have been working without
any of the benefits of any collective-bargaining agreement.
Whether this October 1, 1975, arrangement entered into by
all the parties in this matter was simply a convenient device
to, in effect, obtain what amounts to an advisory opinion
from the Board concerning the merits of this dispute, while
at the same time maintaining industrial peace, is not
revealed in the record. In any event, the Act provides other
more appropriate means of resolving such questions short
of denying the affected employees access to representa-
tion.3 Nevertheless, it is clear that one of the prerequisites
to a finding of an 8(b)(7)(A) violation is that a question
concerning representation could not properly be raised. I
find and conclude that, under the circumstances discussed
above, a question concerning representation may be
properly raised. Accordingly, I find and conclude that the
General Counsel has not proven that the Respondents
violated Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Puerto Rico Marine Management , Inc., is, and has
been at all times material herein , an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act 4
2 International Longshoremen 's and Warehousemen 's Union Local No. 8 Service, Inc.), 185 NLRB 163 (1970), in which the Board talks of instability in
(Waterway Terminal Company), 193 NLRB 477 (1971). the bargaining relationship as permitting a question concerning representa-
3 Cf. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 2, AFL-CIO (Farmer & Sipes Inc tion to be raised.
d/b/a Rain -Flow of Kansas City), 201 NLRB 568 (1973), and Local Union No 4 In the event the Board should find in National Maritime Union of North
42, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (R & E Asphalt America, AFL-CIO (Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.), Cases 24-CC-
(Continued)
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Local 1575, International Longshoremen's Associa- 3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(7)(A) of the
tion, Local 1994, International Longshoremen's Associa- Act, as alleged in the complaint.
tion, and Office and Professional Employees International [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from pubh-
Union, Local 402, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations cation.]
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
195 and 24--CP-51, that PRMMI is not an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act, I would then conclude that PRMMI is not an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2 (2),(6), and (7)
of the Act