Local 1104, Communications Workers

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 6, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 114 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

114 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Local 1104, Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO (New York Telephone Company) and
Wellington G. Rigby
Local 1101 , Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO and New York Telephone Company.
Cases 29-CB-1347-3 and 29-CB-1426
June 6, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On December 28, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
John P. von Rohr issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding . Thereafter, the General Counsel and
the Respondents filed exceptions and supporting
briefs and the Charging Parties filed answering briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondents Locals 1101 and
1104, Communications Workers of America,
AFL-C 0, their officers, agents, and representatives,
shall take the action set forth in the said recommend-
ed Order.
i The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently found that Rigby's
employment by the Company began in 1968 ; the correct date is 1948.
Similarly, the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently found that member-
ship had been denied to employees who "refused to cross the picket line,"
AUD, last par . of sec. E. He clearly intended to find that membership had
been denied to employees who crossed the picket line and his Decision is
hereby corrected accordingly . We also note that, although the Administra-
tive Law Judge refers to his observation of the witnesses, there were no
witnesses and no issues involving credibility.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN P. voN ROHR, Administrative Law Judge: Upon
charges, duly filed, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board , by the Regional Director for
Region 29 (Brooklyn, New York) issued complaints,
consolidated in this proceeding, against Local 1101 and
Local 1104, Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO , herein called the Respondents or the Unions,
alleging that they had engaged in certain unfair labor
1practices in violation of Sections 8(b)(IXA) and (2) of the
Act.' Respondents filed an answer denying the allegations
of unlawful conduct alleged in the complaint . Pursuant to
notice, a hearing was held before me in Brooklyn, New
York, on October 24 and 25, 1973. Briefs were received
from the General Counsel , the Respondents and the
Charging Parties on December 3, 1973, and they have' been
carefully considered. Upon the entire record in this case,
and from my observation of the witnesses , I I hereby
make the following: i
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
New York Telephone Company, also referred to in the
complaint as Telco, is a New York corporation maintain-
ing its office and principal places of business in the City
and State of New York where it is engaged in providing
'telephone communication and related services . During the
year preceding the issuance of the complaint, Telco derived
gross revenues from its operations in excess of $500,000.
During the same period it purchased goods and material
valued in excess of $50,000 from points and places located
outside the State of New York. The parties concede, and I
find, that New York Telephone Company is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Locals 1101 and 1104 , Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The facts in this case are essentially undisputed.2 The
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is the
collective-bargaining representative for employees in a
i The complaint in Case 29-CB-1347-3 issued on January 31, 1973, and
was based on a charge filed on October 17, 1972. A complaint and an
amended complaint in Case 29-CB- 1426, issued on March 27, 1973, and
October 12 , 1973, respectively. The charge in this case was filed on
February 2, 1973.
2 The facts pertinent to the background of this case , as well as other facts
relative to the issues herein, are principally set forth in Local 1101 and Local
1104, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Case 2-CB-5172, et
,at. the transcript and exhibits of which the parties have agreed to stipulate
as part of the record in the instant proceeding . Administrative Law Judge
Benjamin K. Blackburn issued his decision in this proceeding on
September 4, 1973 (JD-537-73). In setting forth the background and other
factual matters herein, I have borrowed freely from the facts, which are
uncontested , as set forth in Judge Blackburn's Decision as well as from
those set forth in the brief submitted by Charging Party New York
Telephone Company. Respondent 's beef does not include any detailed
statement of facts , presumably because they are not in material dispute.
211 NLRB No. 18
LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
number of separate bargaining units in the Bell system,
including the New York Telephone Company. The
Respondent locals are constituent locals of their CWA
parent, Local 1101 having jurisdiction over Suffolk
County, New York,and Local 1104 over Nassau County,
New York. These are located in the New York City
metropolitan area and thus are "downstate," as distin-
guished from various "upstate" locals.
In 1971, as in the past, CWA and the Bell System
bargained nationally on a pattern basis, the Western
Electric Company and the Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company having been selected as the pattern
makers . Negotiations with these parties began in the spring
of 1971 and were expected to set the pattern for settlements
with the other Bell System Companies . These negotiations
resulted in a nationwide telephone strike which began on
July 14, 1971, and ended on July 21, 1971.
CWA's contract with New York Telephone Company
having an expiration date of July 28, 1971, the parties to
this agreement began negotiations for a new contract on
July 6, 1971. The union bargaining committee consisted of
two representatives of Local 1101, the president of Local
1106, and representatives of Locals 1107, 1122, and 1126,
and was chaired by Don Sanchez, CWA's director and
chairman of its bargaining committee . Following meetings
on July 7 and 9, Sanchez canceled a meeting scheduled for
July 13 so that the bargaining committee members could
return to their home locals in New York State to carry out
their duties in connection with the nationwide strike
scheduled to begin the next day. Negotiations resumed on
July 14 and continued to July 18. On July 14, 2000
employees of the approximately 39,000 unit employees of
New York Telephone reported to work.
The national negotiations resulted in an agreement on
July 18, 1971, subject to ratification by employees on a unit
basis . The CWA national executive board thereupon
terminated the strike and directed all members to return to
work on July 21 pending results of the ratification vote.
The New York locals, however, including the Respondent
Locals in this proceeding, opposed the settlement agree-
ment and remained on strike.3
On August 19,197 1, the New York Telephone Company
resumed negotiations with the CWA. On August 26, CWA
formally authorized the strike of the New York locals
which then was continuing in effect. A new contract
between CWA and the New York Telephone Company
was finally ratified on February 16, 1972, and the New
York strike was terminated on February 18, 1972.
During the course of the strike , employees of New York
Telephone Company, in varying numbers and at various
times , including those hereinafter named, reported for
work and crossed picket lines . Some employees resigned
from the Union before returning to work while other were
never members of the Union.
Prior to the latest (1972) contract, the collective-bargain-
ing agreements between CWA and Telco contained only a
maintenance of dues provision. However, the agreement of
February 1972 for the first time contained a so-called
3 Three upstate CWA locals returned to work in compliance with the
CWA national board directive.
115
"agency shop" provision . The language of this clause
provides as follows:
33.01 Each regular employee shall , as a condition of
employment, pay or tender to the Union amounts
equal to the periodic dues applicable to members for
the period beginning 30 days after hire or 30 days after
February 17, 1972, whichever occurs later, until the
termination of this collective bargaining agreement,
except that an employee may terminate this condition
of employment by giving a written individual notice to
the Company and the Union of such termination by
certified or registered mail, return receipt requested,
and postmarked between July 8, 1974 and July 17, 1974
both dates inclusive.
B. The Allegation That Respondent Local 1101
Unlawfully Sought the Discharge of Employees for
Failure to Pay Dues, While Denying Them Union
Membership
The facts concerning the above allegations are brief and
not in dispute. Thus, the parties stipulated that during the
month of July 1972, the following employees applied for
membership in Respondent Local 1101 pursuant to the
agency shop clause in the contract:
Mary Semanicki Tyrone Hecker
Guiseppe Arrigo Alice Allen
C. Clumysun Anthony Perillo
Leon Pantin William Haydak
Onkar Singh Donald MacMillan
J. R. Swart Carl Bryan
Clarence Meekins John Schreiner
Frank Fyall Nelson Phitts
Joseph Fiumano John Munday
Wun Yee Poon John Martinez
Frederick Brown Lala Jones
Remo Bellioli Douglas Goodman
Theodore Braithwaite Mary Myhalko
Eugene Sullivan W. Jurevyszyn
Gordon St. Louis
It is further undisputed that each of the above employees
signed check-off cards authorizing the Company to deduct
union dues from their pay. However, as Respondent
concedes, on or about August 18, 1972, the membership
applications of each of the above employees were rejected
solely because they refused to participate in the strike and
had crossed the picket lines established by Local 1101.4
Finally, it is undisputed that upon denial of membership,
the above employees refused to tender amounts equivalent
to union dues to Local 1101, whereupon this Respondent,
on or about December 4, 1972, requested the Company
that they, and each of them, be discharged under the
agency shop provision of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
Concerning all the foregoing, the complaint in Case
29-CB-1426 substantially alleges that Respondent Local
1101 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by demanding
4 Respondent's answer admits the allegation in the complaint that the
denial of membership occurred on or about August 18, 1973.
116 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that the New York Telephone Company, on or about
December 4, 1972, discharge the above-named employees
for failure to pay dues, under the agency shop provision of
the contract , following its rejection of their applications for
membership because they crossed Respondent 's picket line
during the strike against the Company from July 1971 to
February 1972.
As a starting point in deciding the issue presented above,
I think it well to first cite the applicable provision of the
Act. Thus, Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization:
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee in violation of subsection
(a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or terminated on some ground other than
his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, which set forth the require-
ments of lawful union -security agreements , in relevant
counterpart makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer by discrimination in regard to the hire or tenure
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization:
(B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons
other than the failure of the employee to tender the
periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of requiring or retaining membership.
Recognizing the obvious difference between a union
security agreement, and an agency shop agreement both
the General Counsel and the Respondents cite the case of
N.L.R.B. v. General Motors Corporation, 373 U. S. 734
(1963), in support of their respective positions concerning
the alleged violations herein . However, the Supreme
Court's decision in that case, as I read it, in essence goes no
further than to hold that an agency shop is a permissible
form of union security under the Act. Other than that, and
apart from any far-reaching arguments which can be made
only by citing certain dicta taken out of context from the
whole , I fail to see where the General Motors decision,
supra, has any material bearing upon the issue presented in
the present case.
More to the point, the General Counsel urges that the
instant proceeding is analagous to issues presented and
decided in Local 4186, United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO (McGraw Edison Company), 181 NLRB 992
(1970), and Communications Workers of America, Local
9505, AFL-CIO (The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company), 193 NLRB 83 (1971). In the McGraw Edison
case the union denied an employee the right to attend
union meetings and to hold office for a period of 1 year for
the reason that he previously had filed a decertification
petition with the Board. When the employee thereupon
refused to pay dues, the union, under a valid union-
security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement,
threatened to seek his discharge. Under these facts the
Board held that "a labor organization violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) by invoking, or threatening to invoke a lawful
union-security clause to enforce payment of dues by a
member whose membership has been significantly im-
paired because he filed a decertification petition." In so
finding, the Board first made it clear that it was not dealing
with the union 's internal right to discipline a member
because he filed a decertification petition, but rather that it
was the insistence of payment of dues upon penalty of
discharge while membership was impaired that constituted
the unlawful conduct. The Board further stated:
However, Respondent's insistence upon Blaine's con-
tinued payment of dues during periods when his rights
as a member were significantly reduced constituted a
continuing form of coercion tending to operate as a
serious restraint upon access to Board processes. The
Union's insistence upon Blaine 's payment of dues, on
pain of discharge , cannot be considered as disassociat-
ed from the suspension of membership rights resulting
from his decertification activity. We see no justifica-
tion, either in the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) or in
considerations of a labor organization's need for self-
preservation , for the steps taken against Blaine. The
threat to enforce the union-security clause while
continuing the sanctions against Blaine was hardly
necessary to preserve the Union's existence as an
institution , nor could it be viewed as a noncoercive
form of internal discipline which would have no
discouraging effect upon a member's decision to invoke
the Board's representation procedures.
The Pacific Telephone case , supra, involved substantially
the same factual situation as McGraw Edison, except that
the employees there involved had been disciplined by
expulsion from the Union, rather than by impairment of
membership privileges , for having filed a decertification
petition . In addition to finding an 8(bXl )(A) violation, the
Board in Pacific Telephone found that the union violated
Section 8(b)(2) of the Act for in fact having demanded the
employer to discharge the employees under the union-shop
provision of the contract.
Returning to McGraw Edison, the Board found it
unnecessary to pass upon the essentially related question
presented in the instant case and specifically noted as
follows:
As our decision in this case is based on the coercive
steps taken as a result of filing a decertification
petition, we need not pass on whether a labor
organization violated 8(b)(1)(A) through enforcement
of a union security clause against a member whose
membership was impaired for reasons unrelated to
seeking access to board decertification processes.
Passing upon this point, as I now must, and for the
moment restricting this view to a union-security situation, I
find there are compelling reasons for extending the Board's
holding in McGraw Edison and Pacific Telephone to apply
to situations where membership is denied or impaired
because of employees' exercise of rights guaranteed them
under Section 7 of the Act. Thus, it is hardly necessary to
LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
cite authority for the proposition that a primary function
of the Board has been to protect Section 7 rights. It is
equally clear that the refusal of employees to cross a picket
line during a strike is one of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7. Accordingly, if the Board deems it necessary to
protect the right of "providing unimpeded access to its
procedures and remedies," as it stated in McGraw Edison, I
would find that, in effectuating the policies of the Act, the
Board is equally obligated to protect the rights of
employees arising under Section 7 of the Act. It follows,
therefore, and I would hold, that a labor organization
violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by
invoking a lawful union-security clause to enforce payment
of dues where employees have been denied umon member-
ship for exercising a right (crossing a picket line during a
strike) guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Assuming the validity of the premise as aforesaid, the
issue further presented is whether this principle should be
extended to an analagous situation, but involving the
enforcement of an agency shop rather than union shop
provision. For the reasons stated below, I am persuaded
that this question should be answered in the affirmative.
To begin with, it is hardly open to question that an
agency shop arrangement provides a labor organization
with a lesser form of union security than does a lawful
union-shop arrangement . In fact, and as is apparent from
the facts in the General Motors case, supra, the very concept
of an agency shop arrangement originated with a labor
organization and was intended to be utilized as a device to
protect labor organizations against "free rides" in states
where otherwise lawful union-security arrangements are
prohibited by right-to-work laws. Accepting, then, the
undeniable fact of the agency shop being a "less severe
form of union security arrangement"5 than the union shop,
it surely would be anomalous to hold that, under
equivalent circumstances , a labor organization should be
invested with greater rights to enforce the collection of
dues as a condition of employment under an agency shop
agreement . Further, since it is well settled that under a
union shop an employee has the option to refrain from
becoming a union member , as long as he tenders his dues,6
a similarly anomalous result would be reached if this
option no longer would be available to an employee under
an agency shop situation.
In short, I think it contrary to all common sense and the
mandate of the Act to allow the Union here to selectively
choose its membership while at the same time retaining the
right to insist upon payment of dues as a condition of
employment. This, as has been discussed above, it could
not do under the more stringent form of a union-shop
arrangement.
Accordingly, and in view of all the foregoing, I find that
by demanding the discharge of the above-named employ-
ees for failure to pay sums equivalent to union dues, after
General Motors, supra
s Thus, in Union Starch & Refining Co, 87 NLRB 779, enfd. 186 F.2d
1008 (C.A. 7), cert. denied`342 U. S. 815, the Board stated:
If the union imposes any qualifications and conditions for membership
with which he is unwilling to comply , such an employee may not be
entitled to membership , but he is entitled to keep hisjob Throughout
the amendment to the Act , Congress evinced a strong concern for
117
having denied them union membership because they
crossed the picket line , Respondent Local 1101 violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
C. The Case of Wellington G. Rigby (Local 1104)
Except for the factual differences discussed below,
Rigby's case is not unlike the cases of the employees
discussed above.
Rigby has been in continuous employ of New York
Telephone Company since July 6, 1968. He became a
member of Respondent Local 1104 in May 1969 and
remained a member until July 7, 1971, at which time he
resigned his union membership in accordance with the
collective-bargaining agreement then in effect. Rigby did
not work during the strike referred to in the preceding
section herein, but returned to work after the strike had
been settled. Thereafter, in the spring of 1972, Rigby
engaged in organizing activities on behalf of the Teamsters
Union. On or about July 20, 1972, at which time he had
ceased his activities upon behalf of the Teamsters, Rigby
applied for membership in Respondent Local 1104. At the
same time he executed a dues checkoff card, authorizing
the Company to deduct membership dues from his wages.
It is undisputed that on September 5, 1972, Respondent
Local 1104 rejected Rigby's application for membership
solely on the ground that he had engaged in organizational
activities on behalf of a rival union, i.e., a Teamster local.?
Thereafter, upon Rigby's refusal to tender amounts of
money equivalent to union dues under the agency shop
provision of the contract, Respondent Local 1104 request-
ed the New York Telephone Company to terminate his
employment for failure to pay the agency shop fee.
Just as the employees who crossed the picket line were
engaged in the exercise of a Section 7 right, Rigby's
participation in organizational activities on behalf of the
Teamsters Union was a right also protected by Section 7 of
the Act. Accordingly, and for all the reasons set forth in
the preceding Section, I find that Respondent Local 1104,
by seeking the discharge of Rigby for failure to pay the
agency shop fees, after having denied his membership for
engaging in organizing activities on behalf of a rival union,
violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
E. The Allegation That Respondent Local 1101
Violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by Denying Membership
to Employees Who Crossed Its Picket Line
Apart from the allegations pertaining to Respondent's
request that employees be terminated for failure to pay the
equivalent of union dues, the General Counsel further
contends that the denial of membership to the employees
previously named herein (exclusive of Rigby) was itself
protecting the individual employee in a right to refrain from union
activity and to keep his job even in a union shop. Congress carefully
limited the sphere of permissible union security and even in that limited
sphere accorded the union no power to affect the discharge of
nonmembers except to protect itself against "free rides "
7 Respondent's answer states that on September 2, 1972, Rigby
"reiterated his earlier request for admission to umon membership."
118 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unlawful because the basis for such denial was their
crossing of Respondent 's picket line during the strike.8
Conceding that Respondent 's denial of membership to
these employees would not violate the Act if the strike was
lawfully called , the particular basis for this contention is
premised on the further allegation that CWA and Local
1101 engaged in the strike without meeting the notice
requirements of Section 8(d) of the Act. Insofar as the
latter allegations are concerned , this issue has been raised
and litigated in Local 1101 and Local 1104, Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO (New York Telephone
Company, et al.) Cases 2-CB-5172, 2-CB-5141, et al., in
which Administrative Law Judge Benjamin K. Blackburn
issued his decision on September 4, 1973 (JD-537-73). For
the reasons stated therein , I agree with and adopt the
findings , and accordingly herein find , that Respondent
Local 1101 engaged in the strike (which commenced on
July 14, 1971, and continued to on or about February 17,
1972) without meeting the requirements of Section 8(d) of
the Act .9
It is now well established that, notwithstanding the
proviso to Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act which confers
upon labor organizations the right to prescribe their own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership, a union may nonetheless commit an unfair
labor practice if it takes certain disciplinary action against
members for the purpose of enforcing union rules which
are violative of the Act or of public policy. Thus, in
upholding the Board 's finding that expulsion from the
Union for filing charges with the Board violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) the Supreme Court, in N.L.R.B. v. Industrial
Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America,
AFL-CIO and its Local 22, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), stated
"Section 8(b)(l)(A) assures a union freedom of self-
regulation where its internal affairs are concerned. But
where a union rule penalizes a member for filing an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board , other considerations
of public policy came into play."
In a later case, Scofield [Wisconsin Motor Corp.] v.
N.LR.B., 394 U.S. 423 ( 1969); the Supreme Court
elaborated further with the following:
Under this dual approach, Section 8(b)(1) leaves a
union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which
reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy
Congress has embedded in the labor laws, and is
reasonably enforced against union members who are
free to leave the union and escape the rule. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Since the Respondent here engaged in a strike without
complying with the provisions of Section 8(d) of the Act,
thus clearly impairing a policy which Congress has
embedded in the labor laws, I find that Respondent's
action in denying membership to employees who refused to
cross the picket line during the strike in question
8 I find no merit to Respondent's contention that the allegation here at
issue is barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. The alleged violation here was
Respondent's denial of membership to the employees , which occurred on or
about August 18, 1972. This was well within the period covered by the
charge herein , which was filed on February 2, 1973.
9 The parties involved having been previously served Administrative
Law Judge Blackburn's decision , I see no need to further burden Board
constituted restraint and coercion within the meaning of
Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act.10
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the
employer described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in unfair
labor practices violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2)
of the Act, I shall recommend that they cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. New York Telephone Company is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondents Local 1101 and 1104, Communication
Workers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By requesting the discharges of the employees
heretofore named in this Decision unless they paid
amounts equal to periodic dues, while simultaneously
denying them union membership because they crossed
Respondents' picket line, Respondent Local 1101 re-
strained and coerced these employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act and by
attempting to cause New York Telephone Company to
discriminate against these employees in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, is engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2)
of the Act.
4. By requesting the discharge of Wellington G. Rigby
unless he paid amounts equal to the periodic dues, while
simultaneously denying him union membership because he
engaged in organizational activities on behalf of another
labor organization, Respondent Local 1104 restrained and
coerced Rigby in the exercise of rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act and by attempting to cause New York
Telephone Company to discriminate against him in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, is thereby engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
5. By denying union membership to employees for
crossing a picket line established by Respondent, Respon-
dent Local 1101 restrained and coerced employees in the
costs and duplication processes by hereto attaching a copy of that decision.
10 Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 1170 (Rochester
Telephone), 194 NLRB 872. For related cases see also Local 12419, District
50, United Mine Workers of America (National Grinding Wheel Company,
Inc.), 176 NLRB 628: Glaziers Local Union No. 1162 (Tusco Glass, Inc.), 177
NLRB 393; International Molders' and Allied Workers Union, Local No. 125
(Blackhawk Tanning Co., Inc.), 178 NLRB 208.
LOCAL 1104, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
thereby engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
On the basis of the above findings of fact , conclusions of
law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of
the Act, I issue the following:
ORDER"
Local 1101, Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, its officers,! agents, [and representatives shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Requesting the discharge of employees pursuant to an
agency shop contract unless they pay amounts equivalent
to periodic dues while simultaneously denying them union
membership for crossing a picket line established by
Respondent.
(b) Denying membership to employees for crossing a
picket line during a strike called by the Respondent
without first complying with the provisions of Section 8(d)
of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon tender of periodic dues and initiation fees,
offer union membership to the following employees whom
Respondent previously denied membership because they
crossed the picket line during the strike beginning on July
14, 1972, and e'.tding on February 18, 1972:
Mary Semanicki Tyrone Hecker
Guiseppe Arrigo Alice Allen
C. Clumysun Anthony Perillo
Leon Pantin William Haydak
Onkar Singh Donald MacMillan
J. R. Swart Carl Bryan
Clarence Meekins John Schreiner
Frank Fyall Nelson Phitts
Joseph Fiumano John Munday
Wun Yee Poon John Martinez
Frederick Brown Lala Jones
Remo Bellioli Douglas Goodman
Theodore Braithwaite Mary Myhalko
Eugene Sullivan W. Jurevyszyn
Gordon St. Louis
(b) Post at its offices, and meeting halls copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix A."12 Copies of said
notices on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative shall be posted immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced,or covered by any other material.
(c) Additional copies of the Appendix A shall be signed
119
by the representative of the Respondent union and
forthwith returned to the Regional Director for Region 29.
These notices shall be posted, the New York Telephone
Company willing, in all places where notices to its
employees are customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Respondent Local 1104, Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents,and representatives
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Requesting the discharge of employees pursuant to an
agency shop contract unless they pay amounts equivalent
to periodic dues while simultaneously denying them
membership because of their activities in support of
another union.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix B."13 Copies of said
notices on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 29, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(b) Additional copies of Appendix B shall be signed by
the representative of the Respondent Union and forthwith
returned to the Regional Director for Region 29. These
notices shall be posted, the New York Telephone Company
willing, at all places where notices to its employees are
customarily posted.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
11 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 .48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions , and Order , and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes
12 In the event the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing An Order of the National Labor Relations Board "
13 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
120 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT request the discharge of employees
pursuant to an agency shop contract unless they pay
amounts equal to our periodic dues while simultane-
ously denying them union membership for crossing a
picket line during a strike.
WE WILL, upon their tender of union dues and
initiation fees, offer membership to the below-named
employees whom we have previously denied member-
ship for crossing a picket line during our strike against
the New York Telephone Company which ended on
February 18, 1972 , in which we participated without
having first afforded the Company a timely opportuni-
ty to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(d) of the
Act.
Mary Semanicki
Guiseppe Arrigo
C. Clumysun
Leon Pantin
Onkar Singh
J. R. Swart
Clarence Meekins
Frank Fyall
Joseph Fiumano
Wun Yee Poon
Frederick Brown
Remo Bellioli
Theodore Braithwaite
Eugene Sullivan
Gordon St. Louis
Tyrone Hecker
Alice Allen
Anthony Perillo
William Haydak
Donald MacMillan
Carl Bryan
John Schreiner
Nelson Phitts
John Munday
John Martinez
Lala Jones
Douglas Goodman
Mary Myhalko
W. Jurevyszyn
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
LOCAL 1101,
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 16
Court Street , 4th Floor , Brooklyn, New York 11241,
Telephone 242-596-3535.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT request the discharge of employees
unless they pay amounts equal to our periodic dues,
while simultaneously refusing them union membership
because they have engaged in activities upon behalf of
another union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
LOCAL 1104,
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS
OF AMERICA , AFL-CIO
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 16
Court Street-4th Floor, Brooklyn , New York 11241,
Telephone 212-596-3535.