Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 25, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 966 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc. and Knitgoods Workers
Union Local 155, International Ladies Garment
Workers Union , AFL-CIO. Case 29-CA-3426
June 25, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On January 16, 1974, Administrative Law Judge
David E. Davis issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed
a brief in support of the Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent discharged the Ceballos family i in violation of
Section 8 (a)(3). We agree.
As indicated by our dissenting colleague, a thresh-
old and key issue with respect to this finding is
whether Respondent, prior to the discharges, had
knowledge of the dischargees' union activity, or at
least suspected them of such activity.2
The Administrative Law Judge's findings on this
issue are as follows:
It is undisputed that on May 29, 1973, Union
Organizers Aldrich and Quinones arrived at Respon-
dent's plant about 4:30 p.m. and distributed union
authorization cards to Respondent's employees as
they were leaving the plant by a stairway. Abelardo
testified that a woman came down the stairway while
he was talking with the union organizers, took a
union card from one of the organizers, and, after she
was told by Quinones that he was trying to organize
the employees, returned to the plant; that shortly
thereafter he saw Gelbord, Haas, and Herskovitz3
look out from a window on the second floor of the
i Abelardo Ceballos and his two sisters, Eucans Ceballos and Marta
Guerrero, and his girl friend, Luz Maria Villada
2 Our dissenting colleague states that knowledge of such activity is a
condition precedent to an 8 (a)(3) violation , but it is too well established for
citation that suspicion of such activity is also sufficient to support an 8(a)(3)
finding.
3 Respondent's president, secretary-treasurer, and forelady, respectively
4 Pursuant to the request of the Administrative Law Judge, he and both
counsel personally viewed and inspected the premises in issue The
Administrative Law Judge found that from his observation, when he stood
in this same position, he was able to clearly recognize persons looking out of
building; and that they observed the four employees
in question while they were talking with the union
organizers, and while they held union authorization
cards in their hands. According to Abelardo's
testimony, he was 1 or 2 feet away from the outside
steps leading to the entrance of the building, so that
he had a clear view of those in the window and could
recognize them.4 Guerrero supported Abelardo's
testimony in this regard, and it was stipulated that if
Eucaris and Villada were to testify that their
testimony would be similar to that of Abelardo and
Guerrero.
As opposing counsel could not agree on a stipula-
tion as to all facts with respect to Respondent's
premises, they each submitted reports to the Admin-
istrative Law Judge which were entered in evidence.
However, both reports and the Administrative Law
Judge's own observation agree on the crucial facts
that: (1) The ground in front of the outside stairway
at Respondent's plant is visible to an observer in
window No. 6 to a point 2 feet from the foot of the
stairway; and (2) conversely, window No. 6 is visible
to an observer on the ground standing 2 feet from the
foot of the stairway. Accordingly, the Administrative
Law Judge found it plain that Abelardo and the
others could be seen by Respondent's officials on
May 29, as Abelardo testified, and it is likewise
obvious that Abelardo and the others could plainly
see Respondent's officials from the point Abelardo
placed himself in his testimony (1 or 2 feet away
from the bottom of the steps).5 In conclusion,
therefore, on the basis of both counsels' reports and
his own observation of the premises and the
demeanor of the witnesses, the Administrative Law
Judge credits the testimony of Abelardo, Guerrero,
and Quinones that the Ceballos group was observed
by Respondent's officials on May 29 about 4:30
p.m., when Aldrich and Quinones were talking to the
Ceballos group at the bottom of the outside stairway.
And on the basis of this conclusion, he impliedly
finds that on May 29 Respondent acquired knowl-
edge, or at least a suspicion, of the dischargees' union
activity.
Our dissenting colleague concedes that the law
window No 6 of the plant.
5 As both counsels ' reports state that there is visibility from window No
6 to a point on the ground 2 feet away from the bottom of the steps, there
would certainly be visibility of a person of normal height even if he were
standing only 1 foot away from the bottom of the steps Our dissenting
colleague relies heavily on the further statement in Respondent 's report, "so
that a person standing within two feet of the stairway cannot be seen from
the window ." Unless the person had less height than a midget , this would be
a physical impossibility-as indicated, the height of a normally statured
person even standing only I foot from the staircase bottom would place him
in view of the officials at window No 6
211 NLRB No. 11I
LIZDALE KNITTING MILLS, INC.
applicable to credibility findings is that stated in
Standard Dry Wall Products,6 viz., that it is the
Board's established policy not to overrule an Admin-
istrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to cred-
ibility unless a clear preponderance of all of the rele-
vant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are
incorrect. As further stated by the Board in that case,
the demeanor of witnesses is a factor of consequence
in resolving issues of credibility, and as the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, but not the Board, has had the
advantage of observing the witnesses while they testi-
fied, it is our policy to attach great weight to an
Administrative Law Judge's credibility findigs inso-
far as they are based on demeanor. As indicated
above, the Administrative Law Judge in the instant
case based his credibility findings on the factual issue
in question in part on the demeanor of the witnesses,
which factor is to be given great weight. He also
based such findings on his own observation of Res-
pondent's premises, which in this situation is also
entitled to great weight, as the Board was unable to
do this. Further, as demonstrated above, the crucial
objective physical factors, as agreed to by opposing
counsel, support his credibility findings. Finally, as
further found by the Administrative Law Judge, and
discussed infra,on the very next day after the incident
discussed above, Respondent's forelady (one of the
window watchers of the union activity) unlawfully
threatened the employees involved with discharge if
they had signed union cards, which lends additional
objective support to the conclusion that knowledge
or at least suspicion, of such union activity was ac-
quired by Respondent on the previous day in the
window watching incident. Surely Respondent's fore-
lady did not "divine" such obvious knowledge, or
suspicion, of the employees' union activity on the
previous day. Thus, contrary to our dissenting col-
league, there is no evidence whatsoever to support a
reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's credibili-
ty findings with respect to this incident. Rather, a
clear preponderance of all the relevant objective evi-
dence, when added to his reliance on the demeanor
of the witnesses and his own physical observation of
Respondent's premises, convinces us that his credi-
bility resolutions on this incident were clearly cor-
rect.
In similar fashion, in whole or at least in part on
the basis of the demeanor of the witnesses, the
Administrative Law Judge made the following
additional credibility findings, and resulting findings
of violations of the Act:
1. He credits Abelardo's testimony that, on the
day following the initial union activity described
6 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enforced 188
F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951).
7 The Administrative Law Judge finds that this incident is sufficiently
967
above, Respondent's forelady, Herskovitz, threat-
ened Abelardo and his group with discharge if they
had signed union cards, and that by such conduct on
May 30 Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
2. There is no dispute that on the very next day,
May 31, Abelardo and his group were informed that
they were being laid off for lack of work. The
Administrative Law Judge credits Abelardo's testi-
mony that he protested to Gelbord that Gelbord had
hired a man on May 30 for the same job he was
doing, and had also hired other personnel during that
week; and Abelardo added that he knew the reason
they were being discharged was because they had
signed union cards. Gelbord conceded that he had
told Abelardo and his group that they had been laid
off because work was slow, but he then testified that
this was not factually true, and that the actual reason
was his suspicion that the group had been stealing
sweaters from Respondent. The Administrative Law
Judge does not credit Respondent's stated reasons
for the discharge either to the effect that work was
slow, or that the discharges resulted from its
suspicion that the group was stealing Respondent's
sweaters-the former was an admitted falsehood,
and the latter was only a suspicion, and the two
together represented "shifting" defenses which indi-
cate that both were pretexts.
3. On June 4, Quinones, Aldrich, and Chief
'Organizer Lewis accompanied the Ceballos group to
the plant in an attempt to secure the reinstatement of
the group. Upon entering the plant, Lewis handed his
business card to Gelbord and stated that as Gelbord
had discharged the group because of their union
activity, he was requesting their reinstatement. The
Administrative Law Judge credits the testimony of
Quinones that Gelbord refused to reinstate them,
saying that he would never "accept the Union," that
he would rather close down the shop, and that he
then refused to talk further with Lewis and tore up
Lewis' card. The episode ended when Herskovitz, in
the presence of other employees, ordered the union
organizers and the Ceballos group to leave the plant,
which they did. The Administrative Law Judge finds
that Herskovitz, by ordering the union representa-
tives to get out in the presence of other employees
when the union representatives were present on
legitimate business, engaged in coercive conduct.?
He also finds that the entire incident, including
Gelbord's conduct, demonstrates Respondent's ani-
mus toward the Union and its employees' union
activity.
4. As indicated above, the Administrative Law
Judge discredits Respondent's testimony that the
covered in the allegations of par. 8 of the complaint , and that it was fully
litigated . We disagree with the former, but agree with the latter as a basis for
adopting this finding.
968 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ceballos group was discharged for suspected thievery
of sweaters. He bases this credibility finding not only
on his analysis of the record and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom, but also upon his observation of
the witnesses. He concludes that this defense was
contrived as a pretext after the discharges, and that
the real reason for the discharges was the dischar-
gees' known, or suspected, union activity.
We agree, on the basis of the Administrative Law
Judge's credibility findings which are based in whole
or in part on the demeanor of the witnesses, and also
on the basis of the following facts and the inferences
to be drawn therefrom: (1) Respondent's acquisition
of knowledge, or at least suspicion, of the union
activity of the Ceballos group on May 29, the very
first day of such activity; (2) Respondent's unlawful
threat of discharge to the group if they had signed
union cards on the very next day, May 30; (3)
Respondent's discharge of the group on the very next
day, May 31; (4) the shifting reasons given for the
discharges, the first of which was admittedly untrue;
and (5) the coercive eviction of the union representa-
tives from the plant on June 4, and Gelbord's
statements just prior thereto that he would never
accept the Union but would rather close down the
shop, all of which constitute evidence of Respon-
dent's animus toward the Union and its employees'
union activity.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc.,
Brooklyn, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order.
MEMBER KENNEDY, dissenting:
For the reasons described below, I do not agree
with my colleagues' decision to adopt the opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge. I would dismiss the
complaint in its entirety.
The Administrative Law Judge's attitude towards
the parties in this case is reflected in the following
quotation from his Decision:
In my view, it is quite apparent that Respondent's
witnesses were participants in a cah ulated plan to
deceive the Administrative Law Judge assigned to
adjudicate this case.
It is unfortunate that the Administrative Law
Judge felt personally challenged by Respondent's
witnesses. It is unfortunate because I find nothing in
the record which supports such a challenge. More
unfortunate is the obvious impact which it had on his
Decision. It is clear to me that the violations found
are not derived from the record evidence, but from
the Administrative Law Judge's suspicions. I am
unwilling to adopt nis predilections tnat Respondent
violated the Act.
The conclusion reached by the Administrative Law
Judge is based upon his belief that the General
Counsel's witnesses were universally truthful while
Respondent's witnesses were not. This credibility
determination, in turn, is based in part upon the
Administrative Law Judge's inadequate and inaccu-
rate summary of the testimony, and in part upon his
belief that General Counsel's witnesses were "simple
people who are interested only in seeking redress of
their grievances. . . ."
I am mindful that an Administrative Law Judge's
decision to entirely credit the testimony of one
party's witnesses, while entirely discrediting the
opposing party's witnesses, is not sufficient, in and of
itself, to establish bias or partiality.8 Understand-
ably, the Board is reluctant to overrule an Adminis-
trative Law Judge's credibility resolutions unless a
clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect.9
It is true, however, that "[t]he Act commits to the
Board itself, not to the Board's [Administrative Law
Judge ], the power and responsibility of determining
the facts as revealed by a preponderance of the
evidence." 10 In my view, the Board cannot abdicate
its responsibility as the ultimate finder of fact when
objective matters of record fail to support the
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. As
described below, I am convinced that all of the
relevant evidence-including the testimony either
totally ignored by the Administrative Law Judge or
summarily dismissed by him without explanation
-preponderates against a finding that Respondent
violated the Act.
1. DISCHARGE OF THE CEBALLOS FAMILY
A. The Knowledge Finding
The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon-
dent discharged the Ceballos family'I on May 31,
1973, in reprisal for their support of the Union. He
found further that Respondent's knowledge of their
union activities was acquired on May 29 when three
management officials 12 observed the Ceballos family
8 E.g, Bachrodt Chevrolet Co, 186 NLRB 1035, fn 2, citing N L R B v 11 Abelardo Ceballos, his two sisters, Eucans Ceballos and Marta
Pittsburgh Steamship Co, 377 U S 656, 659 Guerrero, and his girl friend, Luz Maria Villada
8 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362 12 Hyman Gelbord (president), Imre Haas (secretary-treasurer), and Ella
(C.A. 3) Herskovitz (forelady)
10 Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, supra
LIZDALE KNITTING MILLS, INC.
being solicited by two union organizers in front of
the entrance to Respondent's plant. The General
Counsel agrees with Respondent that such an observa-
tion is a physical impossibility.
The structure of the entrance to Respondent's
plant is crucial. One enters the building through a
door located at the top of eight stair steps which run
adjacent to the side of the building. A roof
protruding from the building covers both the steps
and the door.
As found by the Administrative Law Judge,
Abelardo Ceballos testified that he and his relatives
were standing within 1-2 feet of the steps when they
were being solicited. According to one of the union
organizers , the Ceballos family was standing on the
steps during the solicitation. In either event, it is
undisputed that the employees were no further than 2
feet away from the steps while engaging in what the
Administrative Law Judge finds to be the union
activities which precipitated their discharge.
At the suggestion of the Administrative Law Judge,
an inspection was made of Respondent 's premises.
Thereafter, posthearing statements regarding the
physical condition of the premises were submitted to
the Administrative Law Judge by both Respondent
and the General Counsel. While these statements do
not agree in all respects , on two points they are in
complete accord-(l) the ground within 2 feet of the
stairs is not visible from the second story window
allegedly utilized by Respondent's officials, and (2)
the window in question is not visible to anyone
standing within 2 feet of the stairs.13 The reason: the
roof protruding over the stairs completely blocks the
view.14
Having requested the submission of such state-
ments , the Administrative Law Judge thereupon
completely ignores them . He chooses instead to find,
on the basis of his own observation, that "if one
stands on a chair looking out of window No. 6,15 one
has a clear view of persons standing on the bottom
two steps of the outside stairway." This finding is a
physical impossibility if Respondent and the General
Counsel are to be believed.
The Administrative Law Judge also distorts a
portion of Respondent's statement 180 degrees in an
effort to bolster his finding. The Administrative Law
Judge quotes from paragraph 1 of Respondent's
statement as follows: "The ground in front of the
outside stairway at Respondent's plant is visible to
13 The brief of the General Counsel to the Administrative Law Judge
(which was refiled with the Board) reinforced this crucial fact wherein it is
stated at p. 6: "9n fact it is possible to see within 2 feet of the outside of the
stairway from window # 6.
14 My colleagues contend in fn. 5 that it is possible to see someone
standing I foot away from the stairway because all humans have height. The
validity of this conclusion, of course, depends not only upon the height of
the individual involved, but also upon the angle formed by the roofline of
the protruding roof and the line of sight from window No. 6 to the outside
edge of the roof. Since there is no evidence on these matters, their
969
an observer in window No. 6 to a point two feet from
the front of the stairway." Accordingly, states the
Administrative Law Judge, Respondent "concedes"
that the employees who were standing within 2 feet
of the stairs could plainly see, and be seen, by
officials leaning out of window No. 6. That Respon-
dent meant precisely the opposite (i.e., that an
observer in the window could see everything but the 2
feet adjacent to the steps) is evident from the
remaining portion of paragraph 1 which the Admin-
istrative Law Judge chose not to quote-"so that a
person. standing within two feet of the stairway
cannot be seen from the window." I do not think this
Board should ignore the gross unfairness of such a
partial quote.
To summarize: In order to find that Respondent
had knowledge of the dischargees' union activities (a
condition precedent to an 8(a)(3) violation), the
Administrative Law Judge: (1) made findings of fact
which both Respondent and the General Counsel
agree are physical impossibilities, and (2) completely
distorted Respondent's statement by quoting only a
portion thereof. In my judgment, the Administrative
Law Judge's finding with respect to knowledge is not
only not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, but the method utilized in making that
finding casts serious doubt as to the legitimacy of his
other factual findings and conclusions of law in this
case.
B. Summary Rejection of Respondent's Defense
Respondent contends that the Ceballos family was
discharged because they were suspected of stealing
sweaters from the plant. The specifics giving rise to
this suspicion were described in the testimony of six
witnesses, two of whom were completely disinterest-
ed. The Administrative Law Judge failed to mention,
much less discuss, many of the specifics of Respon-
dent's defense. Instead he summarily rejected it as
'being "unworthy of the slightest credibility." Such a
general condemnation is not a satisfactory substitute
for an analysis of the evidence. .
In late March 1973, Abelardo Ceballos was
assigned the task of cleaning the plant on Friday
evenings after the other workers had left. He was
assisted in this task by his three relatives. It was also
in late March when Respondent first began experi-
encing sweater shortages.16 The losses continued
conclusion is pure speculation.
In any event, it is clear that both the General Counsel and Respondent
were aware of the "height factor ." In describing the visibility from windows
Nos. 5 and 6, the General Counsel refers to an observer "five feet tall" while
Respondent refers to an observer "of normal height."
15 Since the bottom of the window is located 5 feet from the floor, all
.agree that in order to see anything at all, one must stand on a chair and
,push the upper part of the body through the open window.
16 In In . 14 of his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge noted that
Respondent produced records at the hearing in support of this claim.
970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
through April and into May. On or about May 15,
Forelady Herskovitz decided to inspect all bags and
other containers being carried by employees leaving
the plant. At one point she observed two members of
the Ceballos family-Luz Maria Villada and Eucari-
as Ceballos-approaching the plant exit carrying a
paper grocery bag. When the employees noticed
Herskovitz, they stopped, reversed direction, and
proceeded into a dressing room. They emerged
shortly thereafter-without the bag-and left.
Respondent called as witnesses two employees who
were in the dressing room when Villada and Ceballos
entered. They testified that upon noticing the
abandoned bag, they made an attempt to catch
Villada and Ceballos but were unable to do so. The
bag was then given to Herskovitz who opened it and
discovered several of Respondent's sweaters. This
incident prompted Respondent to suspect the Cebal-
los family as the source of its losses. Accordingly,
their activities were closely monitored.
On Friday, May 25-an evening in which the
Ceballos family was scheduled to clean the plant-a
number of sweaters were carefully placed on a
packing table. When Respondent's president re-
turned from answering a telephone call, the sweaters
had been disturbed and it appeared that some were
missing. Again, suspicion focused upon the Ceballos
family. Respondent did not act at that time since it
lacked concrete evidence to link them with the thefts
and it was impossible at that time to verify that
additional sweaters had actually been stolen.
On May 31, a comparison of the cutting orders
with the shipping invoices confirmed Respondent's
suspicion that additional sweaters had, in fact, been
stolen.17 It was this verification which precipitated
the discharges. Mindful that an airtight case of theft
could not be established, Respondent told the
Ceballos family that their terminations were the
result of a lack of work. It is undisputed that the
discharges brought an end to the sweater shortages.
As already noted, the Administrative Law Judge
failed to discuss much of Respondent's defense.
Indeed, he gives no hint that two witnesses testified
17 It was not until the order was shipped and the comparison made that
Respondent could be certain that additional thefts had occurred. The
cutting orders indicate how many sweaters are to be cut from available
material , and thus how many are to be made . The shipping invoices indicate
how many completed sweaters are actually shipped . During the manufac-
turing process , the sweaters are in various stages of completion throughout
the plant and it is virtually impossible at that point to conduct an
accounting . When the order was finally shipped on May 31 , the loss was
confirmed.
is In the only exception , the Administrative Law Judge finds that Luz
Maria Villada and Eucans Ceballos never attempted to steal sweaters in
view of their testimony that "they did not use the restroom at night
inasmuch as they left their coats near their work benches ." This testimony is
completely wide of the mark . No claim has been made that the bag was left
in the restroom when they retrieved their coats to go home . The testimony
was that they were leaving the plant (presumably with their coats on) when
as to having seen Luz Maria Villada and Eucaris
Ceballos with a bag of Respondent's sweaters. He
summarily rejects Respondent 's defense as being
"contrived"; "a calculated plan to deceive the
Administrative Law Judge"; "an obvious contri-
vance I will not belabor"; "entirely without any
foundation from its very inception"; and, "unworthy
of the slightest credibility."
In my judgment, conclusionary generalizations
such as these are no substitute for reason. Indeed,
resort to such generalizations suggests the absence of
reason to support the conclusion reached . If this
Board is to discharge its responsibility to evaluate the
recommendations of its Administrative Law Judges,
we must be apprised of how they reach their
decisions , and why. We cannot operate in a vacuum.
I will not rubber stamp an Administrative Law
Judge's failure to particularize a party's claims and
then dismiss them as being "contrived." 18
To the extent that the Administrative Law Judge's
rejection of Respondent 's defense is based upon his
finding that the General Counsel 's witnesses were
credible while Respondent 's witnesses were not, his
decision is subject to the same criticism-broad
generalizations with no rationale stated to support
his conclusions. The Board expects Administrative
Law Judges to indicate carefully and specifically how
they arrive at their credibility resolutions, and failure
to do so requires their rejection.19 In my view, the
large body of mutually corroborative testimony
offered by Respondent's witnesses cannot be ignored
simply by characterizing the Ceballos family as
"simple people." 20
Having rejected the Administrative Law Judge's
credibility determinations, the record evidence con-
vinces me that Respondent did not discriminatorily
discharge the Ceballos family. It is undisputed (1)
that the sweater losses did in fact occur; 21 (2) that
the losses began at about the time Abelardo Ceballos
was assigned Friday evening cleanup duty; and (3)
that the losses ceased simultaneously with the
Ceballos family's discharge. The testimony of all of
Respondent's witnesses regarding the aborted at-
they saw Herskovitz inspecting packages and then went into the restroom in
order to dispose of the package.
Nor do I find it incredulous that the president of a sizeable corporation
might be called away from the plant by a telephone call in his office.
19 Allstate Insurance Company, 209 NLRB No. 68 ( 1974); cf. M Be S
Company, 108 NLRB 1193, 1194 , In. 3 (1954).
20 The unreliability of the credibility resolution is further highlighted by
the single instance in which the Administrative Law Judge discussed
testimonial content . Respondent's president , Gelbord, is discredited because
he testified that persons standing within 2 feet of the front steps could not
see anyone from window No. 6 even if the person in the window was
standing on a chair. As noted above, Respondent and the General Counsel
agree that such is actually the case , so that it is the Administrative Law
Judge-not Gelbord-who is in error.
21 See In. 14 of the Administrative Law Judge's recision.
LIZDALE KNITTING MILLS, INC.
tempt of Luz Maria Villada and Eucaris Ceballos to
steal sweaters was consistent throughout and mutual-
ly corroborative. In addition, two of these witnes-
ses-the two in the restroom who saw Villada and
Ceballos abandon the bag full of sweaters-are
totally disinterested, with no personal stake in the
outcome of these proceedings.
It is also undisputed that at least 15 other
employees who engaged in union activities were not
discharged. This fact, when combined with the
absence of company knowledge of the Ceballos
family's union activities, convinces me the evidence
fails to establish that Respondent's discharge of the
Ceballos family did violate Section 8(a)(3).
H. HERSKOVITZ' THREAT
The Administrative Law Judge further found that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) on May 30,
1973, when Forelady Herskovitz made an unlawful
threat to a gathering of employees, including the
Ceballos family, while they were eating lunch.
According to Abelardo Ceballos, Herskovitz stated,
"If somebody signed union cards, no more work,
fired." Abelardo also indicated that it was necessary
for him to translate Herskovitz' remark into Spanish
so that the other employees, who did not speak
English, would understand. According to the testi-
mony of Guerrero, a member of the Ceballos family,
Abelardo's translation was as follows: "If they signed
cards the factory would be closed and that everyone
would be fired one by one." Three employees who
regularly ate lunch with the Ceballos family denied
that Herskovitz made any threatening remarks or
that Abelardo ever made any such translation.
As before, the Administrative Law Judge's method
of resolving credibility is to ignore portions of the
record and to misquote others. Thus, Herskovitz is
discredited, in part, because she "did not make a
specific denial of this incident." The inaccuracy of
this finding is indicated by the following portion of
Herskovitz' testimony:
Now, there's been evidence here that on or about
May 30th you said to a group of workers,
composed of the Ceballos and two other workers,
that if anybody signed up for the union they'd be
fired.
Did you ever make such a statement?
A. No Never
Q. There's also evidence that when you made
this statement, Mr. Ceballos translated it into
Spanish for the benefit of his sisters?
A. Never. Never, I never spoke to him about
union.
22 Ceballos testified that Herskovitz threatened to fire all employees who
signed authorization cards, whereas Guerrero testified that the threat also
consisted of a promise to close the plant.
23 Cf. Allstate Insurance Co., supra.
24 Par . 8 charges Respondent with violating Sec . 8(a)(1) by threatening
971
Plainly the Administrative Law Judge misstates the
record when he says the incident was not denied. I
will not accept credibility resolutions based upon
misstatements of the record.
The Administrative Law Judge credits the inconsis-
tent testimony of Abelardo Ceballos and Guerrero,22
and ignores the mutually corroborative testimony of
the three employees (each of whom was a disinterest-
ed witness) who denied that any threats were made. I
am unwilling to accept the Administrative Law
Judge's method of resolving credibility by giving
Respondent's witnesses' testimony the "silent treat-
ment." 23 On the entire record, I credit the testimony
of the four witnesses who denied that any threat was
ever made, and would accordingly dismiss this
portion of the complaint.
III. THE JUNE 9 COMMOTION
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge found that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when Hersko-
vitz, in the presence of employees, asked certain
union officials to leave Respondent's premises. On
June 9, 1973, three union officials accompanied the
Ceballos family to the plant in an attempt to secure
the latter's reinstatement. It is undisputed that the
presence of the union officials caused approximately
15 employees to start yelling, pushing, throwing
objects, etc. As a result, Herskovitz asked the union
officials to leave and they did so.
The Administrative Law Judge found that Hersko-
vitz actually "spear-headed" the commotion, and her
request that the union officials leave, made in the
presence of other employees, constituted "coercive
conduct." These findings are unsupportable on
several grounds. First, as the Administrative Law
Judge himself concedes, such conduct is not specifi-
cally alleged in the complaint. He finds, however,
that the incident is nevertheless "sufficiently identi-
fied" by the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of
the complaint.24 I cannot comprehend how a request
that union officials leave Respondent's premises in
order to quell an employee commotion is "sufficient-
ly identified" by an allegation concerning threats of
employee discharge.
Second, while the fact that a June 9 commotion
involving several employees may have been "fully
litigated" (indeed, it was never disputed), Herskovitz'
leadership thereof was not. The Administrative Law
Judge's conclusion that Herskovitz "spear-headed"
the commotion is entirely without support in the
record.25
Finally, while the union representatives' efforts to
employees with "discharge and other reprisals if they become or remained
members of the Union and if they gave any assistance or support to it."
25 Union Agent Alex Quinones testified that Herskovitz asked him to
leave (a fact Herskovitz admitted) but made no claim that she in any way
started or led the commotion.
972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
secure the reinstatement of the Ceballos family may
have initially provided them with a legitimate reason
for going to Respondent's premises, their presence
clearly had a disruptive effect on business operations.
Under such circumstances, Herskovitz' request that
they leave was not an unfair labor practice.26
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision does not
accurately reflect the record in this case. In my
judgment, the evidence in this case does not
preponderate in favor of a violation. Accordingly, I
would dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
26 Cf. Stuart F. Cooper Co., 136 NLRB 142, 145 (1962). In Dayhn Inc.,
Discount Division, 198 NLRB No. 40 (1972), the Board held that respondent
did not violate Sec . 8(a)( I) when it caused the arrest of two union officials
who refused to accede to respondent's request that they leave the prenuses.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Respondent is a New York corporation maintaining its
principal office and place of business at 8000 Cooper
Avenue, Borough of Queens, city and State of New York,
where it is engaged in performing knitting contracting
services and other related services in the garment industry.
During the past year, Respondent manufactured, sold, and
distributed products valued in excess of $500,000 of which
in excess of $50,000 was supplied to enterprises located in
New York State which produce knitted goods valued in
excess of $50,000 which are shipped directly to points
outside the State of New York. The complaint alleged, the
answer admitted, and I find that Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID E. DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was tried before me at Brooklyn, New York, on October 23
and 24, 1973,1 upon the basis of a charge filed2 by
Knitgoods Workers Union, Local 155, International
Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, herein called
the Union or the Charging Party, against Lizdale Knitting
Mills, Inc., herein called Respondent or Company, and a
complaint, issued on August 2, on behalf of the General
Counsel by the Regional Director for Region 29 of the
National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board.
The complaint alleged in substance that on May 30, June
4, and other times thereafter, Respondent , through certain
supervisors , threatened its employees with discharge and
other reprisals if they joined or remained members of the
Union or assisted it; that on or about May 31, Respondent
laid off employees Abelardo Ceballos, Luz Maria Vallada,
Marta Guerrero, and Eucaris Ceballos; that since the
layoffs , Respondent has failed and refused to recall said
employees to their former or substantially equivalent
positions ; that Respondent caused the layoffs and failure
to recall because the above-named employees joined or
assisted the Union and engaged in other concerted activity
for the purpose of collective bargaining and mutual aid or
protection; and that thereby Respondent engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act.
Respondent in its answer, while admitting certain
allegations of the complaint , denied that it had engaged in
any unfair labor practices.
Upon careful consideration of the oral argument of
counsel for Respondent, the briefs submitted by the
General Counsel and counsel for Respondent, and the
entire record in the case, I make the following:
11 All dates hereafter refer to 1973 unless otherwise specified.
'Z The charge was filed on June 6 , and was served on Respondent on June 7
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleged , the answer admitted , and I find
that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issues
1. Did the Respondent's top officials, on May 29, 1973,
observe the four dischargees receive union authorization
cards from the union organizers?
2. Did Ella Herskovitz, an admitted supervisor, tell
employees on or about May 30, 1973, that those employees
who signed union cards would be discharged?
3. Were Abelardo Ceballos, Luz Maria Villada, Marta
Guerrero, and Eucaris Ceballos discharged on or about
May 31, 1973, because of their suspected union activity?
4. Did Respondent on May 30 and June 4, 1973, by its
officials threaten employees with discharge or other
reprisals if they became or remained members of the
Union or gave assistance or support to the Union?
B. Preliminary Findings
The evidence and my personal observation show that
Respondent's plant is located on the second floor of a
comer building ; and that there are seven or eight steps that
lead into the building. It is undisputed that on May 29,
1973, Willard Aldrich and Alex Quinones, union organiz-
ers, arrived at Respondent's plant about 4:30 p.m. and
distributed union authorization cards to Respondent's
employees as they were leaving the plant. Abelardo
Ceballos, hereafter referred to as Abelardo, testified that a
woman3 came down the stairs while he was talking with
the union organizers, took a union card from one of the
organizers , and, after she was told by Quinones that he was
3 He described her as an American lady.
LIZDALE KNITTING MILLS, INC. 973
trying to organize the employees, returned to the plant;
that shortly thereafter he saw Hyman Gelbord,4 Imre
Haas,5 and Ella Herskovitz,6 look out from a window on
the second floor of the building; that they observed
Villada, Guerrero, and Eucaris Ceballos, and himself,
while they were talking with the union organizers and while
they held union authorization cards in their hands.
According to Abelardo's testimony, he was 1 or 2 feet
away from the outside steps leading to the entrance of the
building so that he had a clear view of those in the window
and could recognize them.? Guerrero supported Abelardo's
testimony in this regard and it was stipulated that if
Eucaris and Villada were to testify that their testimony
would be similar to that of Abelardo's and Guerrero's.
Respondent's Exhibit 1, received in evidence, is a crude,
unscaled drawing of the building and stairs leading to the
entrance . Pursuant to the request of the undersigned, a
view of the premises was taken in the company of both
counsel . Each of us inspected the premises and entered the
plant and office. As counsel, contrary to my expectations,
could not agree on a stipulation, each of them made a
report to me as to their personal observations .8
Counsel for Respondent concedes that the "ground in
front of the outside stairway at Respondent's plant is
visible to an observer in window No. 6 to a point two feet
from the front of the stairway."9 Accordingly, it is plain
that Abelardo and the others could be seen on May 29 as
Abelardo testified. It is likewise obvious that Abelardo and
the others could plainly see Respondent's officials from the
point Abelardo placed himself in his testimonial account.
My own observation of the premises confirms the fact that
if one stands on a chair looking out of window No. 6, one
has a clear view of persons standing on the bottom two
steps of the outside stairway. On the other hand, observa-
tion from window No. 5 is cumbersome and a good deal
restricted because of a roof-like protrusion over the
entrance to the plant. I find, based upon the conclusions I
have drawn from both counsel's report of the view of the
premises as well as my own observations of the premises
and the demeanor of the witnesses, that Quinones,
Abelardo, and Guerrero are to be credited in their
testimony that the Ceballos group was observed by
Gelbord, Haas , and Herskovitz on May 29 about 4:30
p.m., when Aldrich and Quinones were talking to the
Ceballos group at the bottom of the outside staircase.
C. Events of May 30
Abelardo testified that while he and the other members
of his group 10 were eating their lunch on Respondent's
premises, Herskovitz came over to where they were eating
and said, "If somebody signed union cards, no more work,
fired."
According to Abelardo, he immediately translated what
4 Respondent 's president.
5 Respondent's secretary -treasurer.
6 Respondent 's forelady.
7 The undersigned stood in this same position and was able to clearly
recognize persons looking out of window No. 6.
8 Counsel for Respondent 's report is received into evidence as Adminis-
trative Law Judge 's (ALJ ) Exh. I and General Counsel's report is received
and designated as AU Exh. 2.
9 First enumerated statement in ALJ Exh. 1.
Herskovitz had said to the other members of the group
seated near him. Guerrero testified to the incident stating
that while she didn't understand what Herskovitz said,
Abelardo translated it saying that if they signed cards the
factory would be closed and that everyone who signed
would be fired one by one.11
Herskovitz in her testimonial account did not make a
specific denial of this incident. Moreover, as detailed
below, I consider Herskovitz an unreliable witness who
had little or no regard for the truth. I do not credit the
evidence adduced through Mona Lopez, Rosa Salazar, and
Morina Castillo to the extent that their testimonial account
contradicts the testimony of Abelardo with regard to the
threat of discharge made by Herskovitz on May 30.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent, on May 30, through
and by Herskovitz engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
D. The Discharge of the Ceballos Group
There is no dispute that about 4:30 p.m. on May 31,
Abelardo and the other members of the Ceballos group
were informed that they were being laid off for lack of
work. According to the credited testimony of Abelardo he
protested to Gelbord that Gelbord had hired a man on
May 30 for the same job he was doing and had hired other
personnel during the week. Abelardo then added that he
knew why they were being discharged. When Gelbord
asked what he thought the reason was, Abelardo replied
that he knew it was because they had signed union cards.12
After Gelbord said that he didn't understand. Abelardo
repeated his statement. Again Gelbord said that he didn't
understand. Abelardo, then taking a piece of paper and
pencil, wrote the word "Union" in English. Gelbord said
that that was not the reason and repeated that there was
"no more work." Gelbord at this point ended the
conversation by saying "Good-bye." Abelardo then asked
him when they should come back for their vacation checks
and Gelbord replied that there would be no vacation
checks but to come back the following Monday for their
paychecks.
Later that day, Abelardo informed Quinones of the
situation and arranged to meet with Quinones on Monday
morning, June 4. Gelbord conceded that he told Abelardo
and his group that they had been laid off because orders
were being cancelled and work was getting slow. He then
testified that this was not factually true and that the actual
reason for the discharge of the group was his suspicion that
the group had been stealing sweaters from Respondent. As
will be discussed, infra, I do not credit Respondent's stated
reasons for the discharge either to the effect that work was
slow or that the discharges resulted from his suspicion that
the group was stealing some of Respondent's merchandise.
10 Reference to the Ceballos group or family herein refers to those
alleged to have been discriminatorily discharged.
11 As noted above, it was stipulated that if Eucaris and Villada were to
testify, their account would be substantially the same as Abelardo's and
Guerrero 's with reference to this incident in that Abelardo told them in
Spanish that they would be fired if they signed cards.
12 Abelardo said that he made this statement to Abelardo, "in my
English."
974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. The Confrontation of June 4
On June 4 , Quinones , Aldrich, and the chief organizer,
Norman Lewis, accompanied the Ceballos group to the
plant in an attempt to secure the reinstatement of Ceballos
and his relatives . Upon entering the plant , Lewis handed
his business card to Gelbord and stated that as Gelbord
had discharged them because of union activity, he was
requesting their reinstatement . Gelbord, according to the
credited testimony of Quinones , refused to reinstate them
saying that he would never "accept the Union" and that he
would rather close the shop down ; he then refused to talk
further with Lewis and tore up Lewis' card.
Gelbord and Haas testified that employees in the plant
were quite excited when they saw the union representatives
accompany the Ceballos group. As a result there was much
shouting and a commotion created . Both Haas and
Gelbord denied that Herskovitz participated in this
"commotion" saying that she was not in the shop at the
time . Herskovitz, on the other hand, admitted that she
arrived in time to see "fifteen people from the plant,
fighting each other . . . then I realized they 're up, and I
tried to tell them, why don't you get out, I did tell them
why don't you go out, you have no business to be here."
Questioned further she added that she made the foregoing
statements to the union people.
Although Herskovitz testified she arrived near the end of
this incident, I find that she spear-headed this commotion.
I find that this incident is sufficiently identified in the
allegations of paragraph 8 of the complaint and find that it
was fully litigated. Accordingly, I find that Supervisor
Herskovitz , by telling the union representatives to get out
in the presence of other employees when the union
representatives were present on legitimate business, en-
gaged in coercive conduct . Moreover, I regard the entire
incident including Gelbord 's conduct as demonstrating
Respondent's animus toward the Union and its employees'
union activity.
F. The Defense
The defense rests on the theory that the Ceballos group
was suspected of thievery and that they were discharged
for that reason . I regard this defense as having been
contrived immediately after the discharges and that the
testimony in support of this defense is a complete
fabrication.
In my view , it is quite apparent that Respondent's
witnesses were participants in a calculated plan to deceive
the Administrative Law Judge assigned to adjudicate this
case . The witnesses enmeshed themselves in a morass of
untruths that cannot withstand scrutiny. At the very outset,
Gelbord insisted that the persons standing within 2 feet of
the outside stairway of the plant could not be seen from
window No . 6 even if one stood on a chair .13 My personal
observation and the admissions of counsel for the parties
disprove Gelbord's testimony in this regard. Gelbord's
testimony concerning his sponsorship of the "trapless" trap
that allegedly resulted in several dozen sweaters being
stolen from the plant is an obvious contrivance which I will
not belabor. Suffice it is to say that even if Gelbord's story
were true, no guilt could be placed on Abelardo or any
members of his group . Moreover , it taxes one 's credulity to
believe that after carefully planning the trap, Gelbord
would permit himself to be distracted by a telephone call
for the length of time it would take to complete the theft.
Haas, alerted to the alleged trap, also neglected to place
himself in a position to observe . These coincidences hardly
lend credence to the entire story. Finally, if, in fact, there
was merchandise being removed surreptitiously from the
plant over a period of time , the methods selected by
Respondent to discover the guilty person or persons reveal
an air of casualness and lack of concern that raises serious
doubts as to whether any merchandise was in fact ever
missing.14
The incident of the brown bag containing sweaters
strikes me as one entirely without any foundation from its
very inception as I credit the testimony of Vallada and
Eucaris Ceballos that they did not use the restroom at
night inasmuch as they left their coats near their work
benches . I believe the entire incident as developed by
Respondent 's witnesses is unworthy of the slightest
credibility.
I am led to this conclusion not only by my analysis of
the record and the inferences to be drawn therefrom but
also by my observation of the witnesses. I regard the
Ceballos family as simple people who are interested only in
seeking redress of their grievances by reciting the factual
account of the events to the best of their memories. A
completely opposite impression was created by Respon-
dent's witnesses . Accordingly , I am compelled to give little
or no weight to the main thrust of the testimony proffered
by Respondent's witnesses.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with Respondent's opera-
tions described in section I, above , have a close , intimate,
and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and com-
merce among the several states and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions, I
hereby make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in
Section 7 of the Act, as specified above, Respondent has
engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
13 Indeed Gelbord said only the opposite side of the street could be seen . substantial shortages. However , there may be other explanations for the
14 I have due regard for the fact that Respondent produced records at missing merchandise . At any rate , the thievery explanation proffered by
the hearing which , according to Gelbord 's and Haas' testimony, showed Respondent is rejected.
LIZDALE KNITTING MILLS, INC. 975
4. By discharging and discriminating with regard to the
hire and tenure of employment of Abelardo Ceballos, Luz
Maria Villada , Marta Guerrero , and Eucaris Ceballos,
Respondent discouraged membership in the Knitgoods
Workers Union Local 155 International Ladies Garment
Workers Union , AFL-CIO, and committed unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom and that it be required to take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
As Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Abelar-
do Ceballos, Luz Maria Villada, Marta Guerrero, and
Eucaris Ceballos by discharging them on May 31, 1973, it
will be recommended that Respondent offer the above-
named employees immediate and full reinstatement to
their former positions without prejudice to their seniority
and other rights and privileges , or if their jobs no longer
exist, to a substantially equivalent job, and to make them
whole for any loss of pay that they may have suffered by
reason of Respondent's discrimination against them, by
paying to each of them a sum of money equal to that which
each of them normally would have earned as wages from
May 31, 1972, to the date of Respondent's offer of
reinstatement , less their respective net earnings during that
period. The amount of backpay due them shall be
computed according to Board policy set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest on
backpay computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing
& Heating Company, 138 NLRB 716. Payroll and other
records in possession of Respondent are to be made
available to the Board or its agents, to assist in such
computations.
As the unfair labor practices found herein strike at the
very heart of the Act, I shall recommend a broad cease and
desist order.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record herein, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby
recommend that there be issued the following:
ORDER 15
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Abelardo Ceballos, Luz Maria Villada,
Marta Guerrero, and Eucaris Ceballos immediate and full
reinstatement to their former position without prejudice to
their seniority, and other rights and privileges or if their
jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position,
and make them whole in the manner set forth in the section
of this decision, entitled, "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to
analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of
this Order.
(c) Post at its place of business in Brooklyn, New York,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 16
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by an
authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
15 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Section 102 .48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and
become its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall
be deemed waived for all purposes.
16 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
Respondent , Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc ., its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Knitgoods Workers
Union Local 155 International Ladies Garment Workers
Union , AFL-CIO, or any organization of its employees by
discharging any of its employees because of their member-
ship in, sympathies for, or activities on behalf of the above-
named union or any other labor organization.
(b) Coercing its employees in order to restrain them from
engaging in union activities.
(c) Threatening employees with economic reprisal by
stating it would close the business , if its employees
supported the Union.
After a trial at which all sides had the chance to give
evidence, it has been decided that we, Lizdale Knitting
Mills, Inc., have violated the National Labor Relations Act
and we have been ordered to post this notice.
The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as
employees, certain rights, including the right to support
and join a labor union and to bargain through your
representative, without fear of discharge or other interfer-
ence, restraint, coercion, or discrimination.
Accordingly, we give you these assurances:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activity
on behalf of Knitgoods Workers Union Local 155,
International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by dis-
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
charging any of our employees , or by discriminating
against them in any like or related manner in regard of
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment , except as authorized in Section 8(aX3)
of the Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT coerce our employees in order to
restrain them for engaging in union activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with economic
reprisals by stating that we would close the plant if they
joined or supported the above -named labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with , restrain,
or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the Act , except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Abelardo Ceballos, Luz Maria
Villada , Marta Guerrero , and Eucaris Ceballos imme-
diate and full reinstatement to their former jobs
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges or, if any of the jobs no longer exist, to a
substantially equivalent job, and wo WILL make them
whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them.
Dated By
LIZDALE KNITTING MILLS,
INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board 's Office, 16
Court Street, Fourth Floor, Brooklyn, New York 11241,
Telephone 212-596-5386.