Ling Qin. Zhang et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 31, 201914508264 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/508,264 10/07/2014 Ling Qin Zhang 31547-376 / LEN0055N2 1520 146524 7590 07/31/2019 Dinsmore & Shohl LLP 255 E. Fifth Street Suite 1900 Cincinnati, OH 45202 EXAMINER SHANMUGASUNDARAM, KANNAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2158 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/31/2019 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte LING QIN ZHANG and HARRY R. SILVER ________________ Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,2641 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ERIC S. FRAHM, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–18, which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants’ application relates to a system and method for ranking search results within citation-intensive document collections. In one embodiment, Appellants describe a computer-implemented method for calculating an activity score value to rank an identified document. Spec. ¶ 16. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 1. A computerized method for calculating a normalized activity score value to rank an identified document, the method comprising: determining a number of times an identified document was cited in a subject matter community of the identified document; determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community; calculating a probability function by performing a regression on the probability distribution; calculating the activity score value according to an activity score function formulated as an inverse of the probability function; storing in computer memory a ranking of the identified document based on the activity score value; and outputting on a display device, a report reflecting the ranking of the identified document. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 3 The Examiner’s Rejections2 Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 9–10. Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, and 9 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Barney (US 2007/0073748 A1; Mar. 29, 2007) in view of Middleton (US 2006/0241904 A1; Oct. 26, 2006). Final Act. 11–14. Claims 2 and 8 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, and Masters (US 2002/0198875 A1; Dec. 26, 2002). Final Act. 14–15. Claims 4, 5, and 10–12 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, Dehlinger (US 2009/0112859 A1; Apr. 30, 2009), and Masters. Final Act. 15–18. ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 2 Claims 1 and 7 were rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness- type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 6 of U.S. Patent No. 8,886,638. See Final Act. 2–9; Ans. 4. Appellants argue that by filing and receiving approval of an E-Terminal Disclaimer over the issued patent, the rejection has been overcome. See Reply Br. 2. However, because the Examiner has not yet withdrawn the rejection, we summarily affirm the Examiner’s double patenting rejection. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(2017). Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 4 ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice, 573 U. S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 5 mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“Revised Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 6 (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Revised Guidance. Revised Guidance Step 1 Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. See Revised Guidance. Claim 1 recites “[a] computerized method.” Appellants do not argue the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1 falls within the process category. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 7 Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1 Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). See Revised Guidance. The Examiner concludes claim 1 is directed to calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. Ans. 5. The Examiner concludes claim 1 is, therefore, directed to a mathematical formula, which is a mathematical concept identified as an abstract idea in the Revised Guidance. See id. Appellants argue the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. See App. Br. 11‒24; Reply Br. 2‒7. In particular, Appellants argue claim 1 is directed to specific computer-implemented methods and media for calculating a normalized activity score value to rank an identified document. App. Br. 11. Claim 1 recites “[a] computerized method for calculating a normalized activity score value to rank an identified document.” In particular, claim 1 recites: (1) “determining a number of times an identified document was cited in a subject matter community of the identified document;” (2) “determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community;” (3) “calculating a probability function by performing a regression on the probability distribution;” (4) “calculating the activity score value according Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 8 to an activity score function formulated as an inverse of the probability function;” (5) “storing in computer memory a ranking of the identified document based on the activity score value;” and (6) “outputting on a display device, a report reflecting the ranking of the identified document.” We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. For example, the “determining a number of times” step recited in limitation (1) characterizes obtaining data regarding the number of times a document is cited. The “determining a probability distribution” step recited in limitation (2) characterizes performing a mathematical calculation to determine a probability distribution using the result of the first determination. The “calculating” steps recited in limitations (3) and (4) characterize calculating an activity score using the calculated probability distribution. The “storing” and “outputting” steps recited in limitations (5) and (6) characterize storing the activity score and displaying it to a user. Appellants’ argument that claim 1 recites a specific computer- implemented method and media for calculating an activity score is unpersuasive of Examiner error with respect to Step 2A, Prong 1 because the use of a computer to implement the method does not change the nature of the calculation performed in the claim. Thus, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 recites calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. We, therefore, conclude claim 1 recites a mathematical formula, which falls Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 9 within the mathematical concepts category of abstract ideas identified in the Revised Guidance. Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2 Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include “computer memory” and “a display device.” None of these additional elements constitute “additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical application.” See id. To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See Revised Guidance. Appellants argue claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. See App. Br. 10‒24; Reply Br. 2‒7. In particular, Appellants argue claim 1 recites specific steps to accomplish a desired result, rather than merely claiming the result itself. See App. Br. 12 (citing Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Reply Br. 3‒4. Appellants argue claim 1 improves the efficiency of prior art electronic systems by calculating a normalized activity score value to rank an identified document to output a report reflecting the ranking of the identified document. See App. Br. 13 Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 10 (citing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Reply Br. 4. According to Appellants, the improvement is specifically related to a problem in the “database arts.” See App. Br. 14 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also Reply Br. 4‒5. Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error. In Finjan, the disputed claim “employs a new kind of file that enables a computer security system to do things it could not do before.” Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The Federal Circuit held the claim, therefore, is “directed to a non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract idea of computer security writ large.” Id. In Core Wireless, the disputed claim is directed to “an improved user interface for computing devices, not to the abstract idea of an index.” Core Wireless Licensing, 880 F.3d at 1362. The Federal Circuit noted that “[a]lthough the generic idea of summarizing information certainly existed prior to the invention, these claims are directed to a particular manner of summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices.” Id. The court held the claims are directed to a specific improvement in computer functionality, not an abstract idea implemented on computers. See id. at 1363. In Enfish, the Federal Circuit held “the claims are not simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to a self-referential table for a computer database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337. The court held that instead of being directed to an abstract idea, the claims “are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.” Id. at 1336. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 11 Appellants argue claim 1 is analogous to the claims in Finjan, Core Wireless, and Enfish because claim 1 is directed to specific steps to achieve specific results that improve the database arts. We disagree. Appellants’ claims are directed to calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. This constitutes an improvement to the calculations performed to rank search results in response to a query. See Spec. ¶ 13. Unlike the claims in Finjan, Core Wireless, and Enfish, this is an improvement to an abstract idea (a mathematical formula), not an improvement to computer functionality. Thus, the nature of claim 1 as a whole is not to define a specific technological improvement, which may constitute integrating the claims into a practical application. Instead, claim 1 merely recites the steps necessary to perform the abstract idea itself. Our reviewing court has “made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Like the claims in Credit Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the business practice of performing the claimed calculations, “and the recited generic computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id. (citing Enfish, 822 F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). Specifically, the claimed “computer memory” and “a display device,” used to achieve the claimed results and are not focused on “a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellants’ Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 12 Specification confirms the generic, conventional nature of the claimed processing device. See Spec. ¶¶ 31‒34. In particular, the Specification discloses the claimed software may be executed by a desktop computer, laptop computer, or mobile device. See id. ¶ 32. Thus, Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error with respect to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore, conclude the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application under the Revised Guidance. Revised Guidance Step 2B Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether the claims recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). Appellants argue claim 1 recites significantly more than merely describing and applying the abstract idea. App. Br. 24‒31; Reply Br. 7‒11. In particular, Appellants argue claim 1 does not recite conventional components and, even if they did, the specific combination of elements amounts to significantly more than an abstract idea. See App. Br. 25‒27 (citing Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350). According to Appellants, “[t]he features of claim 1 define an inventive concept for resolving technological citation Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 13 problems with a probability distribution function as determined by a regression performed upon the probability distribution.” App. Br. 29. Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error. As explained above, Appellants’ claims focus on calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score —an improvement to the abstract idea itself, not an improvement to a technological process. In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit found that claims drawn to “generating a composite web page that combines certain visual elements of a ‘host’ website with content of a third-party merchant” provided a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The claims addressed a problem in a manner that was “not merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1259. In particular, rather than the expected behavior of simply sending the website visitor to a third-party website, the claimed invention behaved in a manner different than expected by sending a website visitor to a hybrid web page presenting information from a third-party with the look and feel of the host website. Id. at 1258‒59. In contrast, Appellants’ invention solves a problem of calculating a probability function and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. This is not a problem particular to the Internet or any other technology, and Appellants’ solution does not override the routine or conventional use of the Internet or any other technology. Rather, Appellants’ claims use conventional computer components to perform conventional computer functions to perform a mathematical calculation. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 14 Appellants’ argument that the claims are directed to a combination of elements that amounts to significantly more is not persuasive. In Bascom, the disputed claims were directed to “installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350. The Federal Circuit held the claims recited “a technical improvement over [the] prior art ways of filtering such content” because the claimed arrangement achieves “both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server” and “to give users the ability to customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” Id. at 1350, 1352. In contrast to Bascom, however, Appellants’ claims are directed to an abstract idea of calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. No element or ordered combination of elements recited in claim 1 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly more” to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that added computer elements such as a computer memory and a display device do not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not recite an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claims from an abstract idea to a patent eligible application. We, therefore, sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of independent claim 7, which Appellants argue is patent-eligible for substantially the same reasons. See App. Br. 10‒31; Reply Br. 2‒11. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 15 We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2‒6 and 8‒18, for which Appellants rely on the same arguments. See id. Obviousness We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections in consideration of Appellants’ contentions and the evidence of record. Appellants persuade us the Examiner fails to establish that the claims are unpatentable over the cited references. The Examiner finds the combination of Barney and Middleton teaches or suggests “determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 11 (citing Barney ¶ 145); Ans. 13–15 (citing Barney ¶ 145). Appellants argue the Examiner erred because Barney does not teach or suggest “determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community.” See App. Br. 32; Reply Br. 12. In particular, Appellants argue Barney teaches predicting whether a citational relationship exists between documents, not a variable number of times a document is cited by other documents. App. Br. 32; Reply Br. 12. Appellants have persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds that [t]he probability described is the probability that documents P1 and P2 have a citation relationship. The existence or absence of a citation relationship is the same as determining if a citation Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 16 relationship exists a variable number of times since the probability is based on if a citation exists or not. Ans. 14. The Examiner further finds that [w]ithout further guidance from the claims or [S]pecification, it is reasonable to interpret “a variable number of times” to be “1 or more” or “0” citations. While the number may be changeable, the claim only requires that the probability be calculated “for a number.” Since Barney calculates the probability that a citation exists between two documents in [0145], the claim language is disclosed. Id. at 15. We disagree. Claim 1 recites “determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community.” Appellants’ Specification describes determining the probability that a particular document is cited a particular number of times. Spec. ¶ 86. The Specification further discloses determining a probability value for each of a variable number of citations. Id. ¶ 87. The Specification discloses a probability distribution curve that illustrates probability values for each of a variable number of citations, which is represented by a probability distribution equation. Id. ¶ 91. In light of the Specification and the other limitations recited in claim 1, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner’s interpretation of “variable number of times” is overly broad because the “variable number of times” must be more than zero or one time. We further agree with Appellants that the Examiner erred in finding Barney teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Barney describes formulating a regression model to predict the existence or absence of a citational relationship between documents, whether such relationship actually exists or not. See Barney ¶ 145 (“The regression model is Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 17 preferably formulated and optimally [a]djusted to predict the existence or absence of a first generation citational relationship between documents P1 and P2 (whether such relationship actually exists or not)”). The Examiner has not established, however, that Barney teaches or suggests “determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community,” as recited in claim 1. Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not sufficiently established Barney and Middleton teach or suggest, “determining a probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community.” We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 as unpatentable over Barney and Middleton.3 We also do not sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claim 7, which recites commensurate subject matter, and dependent claims 3, 6, and 9. The Examiner finds dependent claims 2 and 8 are unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, and Masters. See Final Act. 14–15. The Examiner does not find that Masters teaches or suggests the disputed limitation from the independent claims discussed above. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2 and 8. The Examiner finds dependent claims 4, 5, and 10–12 are unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, Masters and Dehlinger. See Final 3 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced by Appellants with respect to the obviousness rejections, we need not reach the merits of Appellants’ other arguments regarding claim 1. Appeal 2018-007871 Application 14/508,264 18 Act. 15–18. The Examiner does not find that Dehlinger teaches or suggests the disputed limitation from the independent claims discussed above. Accordingly, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 4, 5, and 10–12. DECISION We affirm the rejection of claims 1–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–12 under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1–18. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation