Ling Qin. Zhang et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2019

14508264 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/508,264 10/07/2014 Ling Qin Zhang 31547-376 / LEN0055N2 1520
146524 7590 07/31/2019
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
255 E. Fifth Street
Suite 1900
Cincinnati, OH 45202
EXAMINER
SHANMUGASUNDARAM, KANNAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2158
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte LING QIN ZHANG and HARRY R. SILVER
________________

Appeal 2018-007871
Application 14/508,2641
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–18, which are all the claims pending in this application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., as the real
party in interest. App. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ application relates to a system and method for ranking
search results within citation-intensive document collections. In one
embodiment, Appellants describe a computer-implemented method for
calculating an activity score value to rank an identified document. Spec.
¶ 16. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as
follows:
1. A computerized method for calculating a normalized
activity score value to rank an identified document, the method
comprising:
determining a number of times an identified document
was cited in a subject matter community of the identified
document;
determining a probability distribution that individual
documents within the subject matter community are cited a
variable number of times by other individual documents in the
subject matter community;
calculating a probability function by performing a
regression on the probability distribution;
calculating the activity score value according to an
activity score function formulated as an inverse of the
probability function;
storing in computer memory a ranking of the identified
document based on the activity score value; and
outputting on a display device, a report reflecting the
ranking of the identified document.

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The Examiner’s Rejections2
Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 9–10.
Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, and 9 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Barney (US 2007/0073748 A1; Mar. 29,
2007) in view of Middleton (US 2006/0241904 A1; Oct. 26, 2006). Final
Act. 11–14.
Claims 2 and 8 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, and Masters (US 2002/0198875
A1; Dec. 26, 2002). Final Act. 14–15.
Claims 4, 5, and 10–12 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, Dehlinger (US
2009/0112859 A1; Apr. 30, 2009), and Masters. Final Act. 15–18.

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract

2 Claims 1 and 7 were rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-
type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1 and 6 of U.S.
Patent No. 8,886,638. See Final Act. 2–9; Ans. 4. Appellants argue that by
filing and receiving approval of an E-Terminal Disclaimer over the issued
patent, the rejection has been overcome. See Reply Br. 2. However,
because the Examiner has not yet withdrawn the rejection, we summarily
affirm the Examiner’s double patenting rejection. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(2017).
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ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U. S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
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mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id.
at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“Revised Guidance”).
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 1
Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject
matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. See Revised Guidance. Claim 1 recites “[a]
computerized method.” Appellants do not argue the Examiner erred in
concluding claim 1 falls within the four statutory categories of patentable
subject matter. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1
falls within the process category.
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Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine
whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). See Revised Guidance.
The Examiner concludes claim 1 is directed to calculating a
probability function using data regarding the number of times a document is
cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score. Ans. 5. The
Examiner concludes claim 1 is, therefore, directed to a mathematical
formula, which is a mathematical concept identified as an abstract idea in the
Revised Guidance. See id.
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed
to an abstract idea. See App. Br. 11‒24; Reply Br. 2‒7. In particular,
Appellants argue claim 1 is directed to specific computer-implemented
methods and media for calculating a normalized activity score value to rank
an identified document. App. Br. 11.
Claim 1 recites “[a] computerized method for calculating a
normalized activity score value to rank an identified document.” In
particular, claim 1 recites: (1) “determining a number of times an identified
document was cited in a subject matter community of the identified
document;” (2) “determining a probability distribution that individual
documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number
of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community;”
(3) “calculating a probability function by performing a regression on the
probability distribution;” (4) “calculating the activity score value according
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to an activity score function formulated as an inverse of the probability
function;” (5) “storing in computer memory a ranking of the identified
document based on the activity score value;” and (6) “outputting on a
display device, a report reflecting the ranking of the identified document.”
We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, under their
broadest reasonable interpretation, recite calculating a probability function
using data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that
calculation to calculate an activity score. For example, the “determining a
number of times” step recited in limitation (1) characterizes obtaining data
regarding the number of times a document is cited. The “determining a
probability distribution” step recited in limitation (2) characterizes
performing a mathematical calculation to determine a probability
distribution using the result of the first determination. The “calculating”
steps recited in limitations (3) and (4) characterize calculating an activity
score using the calculated probability distribution. The “storing” and
“outputting” steps recited in limitations (5) and (6) characterize storing the
activity score and displaying it to a user.
Appellants’ argument that claim 1 recites a specific computer-
implemented method and media for calculating an activity score is
unpersuasive of Examiner error with respect to Step 2A, Prong 1 because the
use of a computer to implement the method does not change the nature of
the calculation performed in the claim.
Thus, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, claim 1 recites
calculating a probability function using data regarding the number of times a
document is cited and using that calculation to calculate an activity score.
We, therefore, conclude claim 1 recites a mathematical formula, which falls
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within the mathematical concepts category of abstract ideas identified in the
Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine
whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include “computer
memory” and “a display device.” None of these additional elements
constitute “additional elements that integrate the exception into a practical
application.” See id. To integrate the exception into a practical application,
the additional claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of
a computer or any other technology or technical field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)), apply the judicial exception with a particular machine (see
MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect a transformation or reduction of a particular
article to a different state or thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use
the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally
linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See Revised Guidance.
Appellants argue claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea. See App.
Br. 10‒24; Reply Br. 2‒7. In particular, Appellants argue claim 1 recites
specific steps to accomplish a desired result, rather than merely claiming the
result itself. See App. Br. 12 (citing Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879
F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Reply Br. 3‒4. Appellants argue claim
1 improves the efficiency of prior art electronic systems by calculating a
normalized activity score value to rank an identified document to output a
report reflecting the ranking of the identified document. See App. Br. 13
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(citing Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018)); see also Reply Br. 4. According to Appellants, the
improvement is specifically related to a problem in the “database arts.” See
App. Br. 14 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2016)); see also Reply Br. 4‒5.
Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error. In Finjan, the
disputed claim “employs a new kind of file that enables a computer security
system to do things it could not do before.” Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). The Federal Circuit held the claim, therefore, is “directed to a
non-abstract improvement in computer functionality, rather than the abstract
idea of computer security writ large.” Id.
In Core Wireless, the disputed claim is directed to “an improved user
interface for computing devices, not to the abstract idea of an index.” Core
Wireless Licensing, 880 F.3d at 1362. The Federal Circuit noted that
“[a]lthough the generic idea of summarizing information certainly existed
prior to the invention, these claims are directed to a particular manner of
summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices.” Id. The
court held the claims are directed to a specific improvement in computer
functionality, not an abstract idea implemented on computers. See id. at
1363.
In Enfish, the Federal Circuit held “the claims are not simply directed
to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to
a self-referential table for a computer database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337.
The court held that instead of being directed to an abstract idea, the claims
“are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate,
embodied in the self-referential table.” Id. at 1336.
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Appellants argue claim 1 is analogous to the claims in Finjan, Core
Wireless, and Enfish because claim 1 is directed to specific steps to achieve
specific results that improve the database arts. We disagree. Appellants’
claims are directed to calculating a probability function using data regarding
the number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to
calculate an activity score. This constitutes an improvement to the
calculations performed to rank search results in response to a query. See
Spec. ¶ 13. Unlike the claims in Finjan, Core Wireless, and Enfish, this is
an improvement to an abstract idea (a mathematical formula), not an
improvement to computer functionality.
Thus, the nature of claim 1 as a whole is not to define a specific
technological improvement, which may constitute integrating the claims into
a practical application. Instead, claim 1 merely recites the steps necessary to
perform the abstract idea itself. Our reviewing court has “made clear that
mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.” Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Like the claims in Credit Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the business
practice of performing the claimed calculations, “and the recited generic
computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id. (citing Enfish, 822
F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
Specifically, the claimed “computer memory” and “a display device,”
used to achieve the claimed results and are not focused on “a specific means
or method that improves the relevant technology.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appellants’
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Specification confirms the generic, conventional nature of the claimed
processing device. See Spec. ¶¶ 31‒34. In particular, the Specification
discloses the claimed software may be executed by a desktop computer,
laptop computer, or mobile device. See id. ¶ 32.
Thus, Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error with
respect to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore,
conclude the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application
under the Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 2B
Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether
the claims recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more
than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” Bascom Glob. Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well-understood,
routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at
73).
Appellants argue claim 1 recites significantly more than merely
describing and applying the abstract idea. App. Br. 24‒31; Reply Br. 7‒11.
In particular, Appellants argue claim 1 does not recite conventional
components and, even if they did, the specific combination of elements
amounts to significantly more than an abstract idea. See App. Br. 25‒27
(citing Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350). According to Appellants, “[t]he features
of claim 1 define an inventive concept for resolving technological citation
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problems with a probability distribution function as determined by a
regression performed upon the probability distribution.” App. Br. 29.
Appellants have not persuaded us of Examiner error. As explained
above, Appellants’ claims focus on calculating a probability function using
data regarding the number of times a document is cited and using that
calculation to calculate an activity score —an improvement to the abstract
idea itself, not an improvement to a technological process.
In DDR Holdings, the Federal Circuit found that claims drawn to
“generating a composite web page that combines certain visual elements of a
‘host’ website with content of a third-party merchant” provided a solution
“necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1248, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The
claims addressed a problem in a manner that was “not merely the routine or
conventional use of the Internet.” Id. at 1259. In particular, rather than the
expected behavior of simply sending the website visitor to a third-party
website, the claimed invention behaved in a manner different than expected
by sending a website visitor to a hybrid web page presenting information
from a third-party with the look and feel of the host website. Id. at 1258‒59.
In contrast, Appellants’ invention solves a problem of calculating a
probability function and using that calculation to calculate an activity score.
This is not a problem particular to the Internet or any other technology, and
Appellants’ solution does not override the routine or conventional use of the
Internet or any other technology. Rather, Appellants’ claims use
conventional computer components to perform conventional computer
functions to perform a mathematical calculation.
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Appellants’ argument that the claims are directed to a combination of
elements that amounts to significantly more is not persuasive. In Bascom,
the disputed claims were directed to “installation of a filtering tool at a
specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering
features specific to each end user.” Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1350. The Federal
Circuit held the claims recited “a technical improvement over [the] prior art
ways of filtering such content” because the claimed arrangement achieves
“both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a filter
on the ISP server” and “to give users the ability to customize filtering for
their individual network accounts.” Id. at 1350, 1352.
In contrast to Bascom, however, Appellants’ claims are directed to an
abstract idea of calculating a probability function using data regarding the
number of times a document is cited and using that calculation to calculate
an activity score. No element or ordered combination of elements recited in
claim 1 contains any “inventive concept” or adds anything “significantly
more” to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
application. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that added computer
elements such as a computer memory and a display device do not transform
the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not
recite an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claims from an
abstract idea to a patent eligible application. We, therefore, sustain the
patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the
rejection of independent claim 7, which Appellants argue is patent-eligible
for substantially the same reasons. See App. Br. 10‒31; Reply Br. 2‒11.
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We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2‒6 and 8‒18, for which
Appellants rely on the same arguments. See id.
Obviousness
We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections in
consideration of Appellants’ contentions and the evidence of record.
Appellants persuade us the Examiner fails to establish that the claims are
unpatentable over the cited references.
The Examiner finds the combination of Barney and Middleton teaches
or suggests “determining a probability distribution that individual documents
within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by
other individual documents in the subject matter community,” as recited in
claim 1. Final Act. 11 (citing Barney ¶ 145); Ans. 13–15 (citing Barney
¶ 145).
Appellants argue the Examiner erred because Barney does not teach
or suggest “determining a probability distribution that individual documents
within the subject matter community are cited a variable number of times by
other individual documents in the subject matter community.” See App. Br.
32; Reply Br. 12. In particular, Appellants argue Barney teaches predicting
whether a citational relationship exists between documents, not a variable
number of times a document is cited by other documents. App. Br. 32;
Reply Br. 12.
Appellants have persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner finds
that
[t]he probability described is the probability that documents P1
and P2 have a citation relationship. The existence or absence of
a citation relationship is the same as determining if a citation
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relationship exists a variable number of times since the
probability is based on if a citation exists or not.
Ans. 14. The Examiner further finds that
[w]ithout further guidance from the claims or [S]pecification, it
is reasonable to interpret “a variable number of times” to be “1
or more” or “0” citations. While the number may be
changeable, the claim only requires that the probability be
calculated “for a number.” Since Barney calculates the
probability that a citation exists between two documents in
[0145], the claim language is disclosed.
Id. at 15. We disagree.
Claim 1 recites “determining a probability distribution that individual
documents within the subject matter community are cited a variable number
of times by other individual documents in the subject matter community.”
Appellants’ Specification describes determining the probability that a
particular document is cited a particular number of times. Spec. ¶ 86. The
Specification further discloses determining a probability value for each of a
variable number of citations. Id. ¶ 87. The Specification discloses a
probability distribution curve that illustrates probability values for each of a
variable number of citations, which is represented by a probability
distribution equation. Id. ¶ 91. In light of the Specification and the other
limitations recited in claim 1, we agree with Appellants that the Examiner’s
interpretation of “variable number of times” is overly broad because the
“variable number of times” must be more than zero or one time.
We further agree with Appellants that the Examiner erred in finding
Barney teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Barney describes
formulating a regression model to predict the existence or absence of a
citational relationship between documents, whether such relationship
actually exists or not. See Barney ¶ 145 (“The regression model is
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preferably formulated and optimally [a]djusted to predict the existence or
absence of a first generation citational relationship between documents P1
and P2 (whether such relationship actually exists or not)”). The Examiner
has not established, however, that Barney teaches or suggests “determining a
probability distribution that individual documents within the subject matter
community are cited a variable number of times by other individual
documents in the subject matter community,” as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we are constrained by the record to agree with
Appellants that the Examiner has not sufficiently established Barney and
Middleton teach or suggest, “determining a probability distribution that
individual documents within the subject matter community are cited a
variable number of times by other individual documents in the subject matter
community.” We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 1 as unpatentable over Barney and Middleton.3 We also
do not sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claim 7, which
recites commensurate subject matter, and dependent claims 3, 6, and 9.
The Examiner finds dependent claims 2 and 8 are unpatentable over
Barney, Middleton, and Masters. See Final Act. 14–15. The Examiner does
not find that Masters teaches or suggests the disputed limitation from the
independent claims discussed above. Accordingly, we also do not sustain
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2 and 8.
The Examiner finds dependent claims 4, 5, and 10–12 are
unpatentable over Barney, Middleton, Masters and Dehlinger. See Final

3 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced
by Appellants with respect to the obviousness rejections, we need not reach
the merits of Appellants’ other arguments regarding claim 1.
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Act. 15–18. The Examiner does not find that Dehlinger teaches or suggests
the disputed limitation from the independent claims discussed above.
Accordingly, we also do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claims 4, 5, and 10–12.

DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–12 under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the decision of the Examiner
rejecting claims 1–18. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED