Linda Lindsey, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 20, 2012
0120121370 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 20, 2012)

0120121370

06-20-2012

Linda Lindsey, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Linda Lindsey,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120121370

Hearing No. 530-2010-00101X

Agency No. 200406132009100867

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's December 22, 2011 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Physician with the Domiciliary Service at the Agency's General Internal Medicine facility in Martinsburg, West Virginia. On March 19, 2009, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency subjected her to hostile workplace discrimination on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when: (1) she was purportedly assigned the most undesirable duty hours and more patients than other doctors in her service; (3) she was notified that she would be investigated by the Professional Standards Board (PSB); (4) she received a performance appraisal that she did not agree with; and (5) she was constructively discharged.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f).

On November 16, 2011, the AJ issued a decision after a hearing finding no discrimination. In reaching this decision, the AJ determined that even if Complainant could establish a prima facie case, the Agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The AJ determined that as a probationary employee, Complainant had patient complaints lodged against her starting in 2007. No comparable complaints were proffered which involved Complainant's cited male comparator. This comparator was a physician who had 15 years of professional experience at the Agency, unlike Complainant. Further, the AJ found that this comparator had more senior, management duties and was not a proper comparator to Complainant. The AJ noted that the facility at issue was understaffed and it was reasonable that Complainant would have a challenging workload, irrespective of her claimed bases. While Complainant takes issue with a lowered performance appraisal, notwithstanding patient/staff complaints of the summer of 2008, Complainant was given a fully satisfactory rating. The AJ noted that this is not evidence of someone being pushed out of the workplace. As noted by the Agency, this is due to the complaints by the patients and Complainant's apparent interpersonal difficulties with Agency staff. The record is clear that there were difficulties between Complainant and her supervisors; however, Complainant failed to maintain or improve on her work performance. As far as the PSB issue, the AJ found that there was no indication that the investigation was put into effect. To be sure, Complainant's resignation potentially stopped that, but there's no indication that Complainant would have been terminated based on this investigation occurring. That AJ assessed that Complainant simply acted rashly when she elected to resign from the Agency. In addition, with regard to constructive discharge, the AJ noted that a reasonable person would not have resigned based on the Agency's actions. In the year and a half that she was employed, Complainant received performance awards. It was not until she began to show insubordinate behavior to what appeared to be, a very supportive supervisor that she began to feel discomfort about her future employment with the Agency. Complainant was not the victim of a hostile work environment.

In conclusion, the AJ found that the events of which Complainant complains, either individually or collectively fail to rise to the level of unlawful harassment prohibited by Title VII. Most importantly, there is no evidence that any of the actions or decisions of Agency management were motivated by unlawful reasons. Complainant failed to establish that any of management's reasons for its actions were pretextual or unworthy of belief. Complainant failed to establish discrimination under either the theory of disparate treatment or unlawful harassment.

On appeal, Complainant asserts, inter alia, that the AJ improperly found discrimination in this matter. She further asserts that the AJ did not adequately address her claims of harassment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. Wibstad v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court has stated that: "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview." Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).

To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance at 6.

An employer is subject to vicarious liability for harassment when it is "created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998). When the harassment does not result in a tangible employment action being taken against the employee, the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability. The agency can meet this defense, which is subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, by demonstrating: (a) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (b) that appellant unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2270; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. at 2293; Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). This defense is not available when the harassment results in a tangible employment action (e.g., a discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment) being taken against the employee.

Here, Complainant asserted that based on her statutorily protected classes, management continuously subjected her to a hostile work environment. However, we find that Complainant has not shown that she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving her protected classes, or the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected classes. Further, Complainant has not shown that the purported harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. While Complainant has cited various incidents where Agency management took actions that were either adverse or disruptive to her, we find that Complainant fails to show that these incidents were as a result of unlawful discrimination. To the extent Complainant is alleging disparate treatment with respect to her claims, she has not shown that the Agency's reasons for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the final Agency order because the Administrative Judge's ultimate finding, that unlawful employment discrimination was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, is supported by the record.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 20, 2012

__________________

Date

2

0120121370

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120121370