Lin, Yung-Cheng

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 28, 2020

14864849 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/864,849 09/24/2015 Yung-Cheng Lin 54854-US-PA 3924
31561 7590 01/28/2020
JCIPRNET
8F-1, No. 100, Roosevelt Rd. Sec. 2,
Taipei, 10084
TAIWAN
EXAMINER
ZHONG, XIN Y
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2861
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/28/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Belinda@JCIPGROUP.COM
USA@JCIPGROUP.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte YUNG-CHENG LIN
____________________

Appeal 2019-001756
Application 14/864,849
Technology Center 2800
____________________
BEFORE DONNA M. PRAISS, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, and
MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., Administrative Patent Judges.
OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 7, and 9–11.3 We affirm.

1 e appeal record includes the following: Specification, Sept. 24, 2015
(“Spec.”); Final Office Action, Feb. 8, 2018 (“Final Action”); Appeal Brief,
July 5, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, Oct. 30, 2018 (“Answer”);
and Reply Brief, Dec. 24, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
2 Appellant is Wistron NeWeb Corp., which is the applicant as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant also identifies this entity and the named inventor
as the real parties in interest. See Appeal Br. 1.
3 e Examiner states that pending claim 8 would be allowable if rewritten
in independent form. Final Action 14.
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Application 14/864,849

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BACKGROUND
According to Appellant, the invention at issue “is directed to a
wireless sensing device.” Appeal Br. 2; see also Spec. ¶ 1. is device
includes an “energy harvesting circuit” that generates electrical energy in
response to vibration of a vibration plate. Id. ¶ 4. Representative of the
invention is claim 1, the sole independent claim:
1. A wireless sensing device, comprising:
a vibration plate;
an antenna, disposed on the vibration plate;
a sensor, disposed on the vibration plate and generating a
sensing data according to the vibration of the vibration plate;
an energy harvesting circuit, directly facing the vibration
plate, and generating an electrical energy in response to the
collision between the energy harvesting circuit and the
vibration plate caused by the vibration of the vibration plate;
and
a data processing circuit, coupled to the sensor and the
antenna, and comprising:
a transceiver, electrically connected to the antenna;
a switching element, receiving the electrical energy; and
a controller, wherein the wireless sensing device enables
the controller through the electrical energy, thereby allowing the
data processing circuit to be switched between a detection mode
and a transmission mode, wherein under the detection mode,
the controller drives the switching element to transmit the
electrical energy to the sensor, and the controller stores the
sensing data from the sensor, whereas under the transmission
mode, the controller drives the switching element to transmit
the electrical energy to the transceiver transmitting the sensing
data through the antenna.
Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis of key phrase added). Claims 2–4, 6, 7, and 9–11
depend from claim 1. Id. at 12–14.
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e Examiner rejects claims 1–3 and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Loomis4 in view of Belov,5 and rejects other dependent
claims in further combination with either Soma’6 (claim 4), Silva7 (claim 7),
Greetis8 (claim 9), Arms9 (claim 10), or Setiadi10 (claim 11). Final Action 5–
14.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the claims together. See Appeal Br. 4–11. erefore,
we focus our decision on independent claim 1. e remaining claims fall
with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

4 Loomis et al., US 2009/0259411 A1 (published Oct. 15, 2009) (“Loomis”).
5 Belov et al., US 2011/0248846 A1 (published Oct. 13, 2011) (“Belov”).
6 Soma’ et al., US 2014/0000373 A1 (published Jan. 2, 2014) (“Soma’”).
7 Silva et al., US 2006/0033616 A1 (published Feb. 16, 2006) (“Silva”).
8 Greetis et al., US 2015/0280311 A1 (published Oct. 1, 2015) (“Greetis”).
9 Arms et al., US 2005/0017602 A1 (published Jan. 27, 2005) (“Arms”).
10 Setiadi et al., US 2009/0303076 A1 (published Dec. 10, 2009) (“Setiadi”).
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Below is Figure 2 of Loomis:

Figure 2 is an exploded view of a sensor wafer (16) of a structural health
monitoring (SMH) system to be placed on aircraft parts such as wings.
Loomis ¶¶ 18–19; see also id. ¶ 18, Fig. 1. e wafer includes power source
32, which “may be a battery, a power generation source, or a power
harvesting source.” Id. ¶ 39. If 32 is a power-harvesting source, it may
“harvest electricity from physical stimulus, such as vibrations.” Id.
(emphasis added). In addition, wafer 16 may include isolation plies, such as
outer plies 42, “intermediate isolation plies 38, such as those isolating the
power source 32,” and “cutout plies 40 for components that may be coupled
to each other and only require portions of the component to be isolated from
an adjacent component.” Id. ¶ 49. Plies 48, 40, and 42 “may be composite
material or other types of non-conductive isolation layers operable to
separate various conductive components.” Id.
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e Examiner finds that Loomis discloses a sensing device as recited
in claim 1, except for the recited “switching element” (which, according to
the Examiner, Belov teaches). See Final Action 5–7. In particular, the
Examiner finds that Loomis discloses “generating an electrical energy in
response to the collision between the energy harvesting circuit and vibration
plate caused by the vibration of the vibration plate.” Id. at 5 (citing Loomis
¶ 39, Fig. 2). According to the Examiner, “in order for power source 32 to
generate electricity from vibrations, vibrations need to be transferred from
the outer plies 42 to power source 32.” Id. In other words, the Examiner
argues that in Loomis, “it is inherent that vibrations are transferred from the
outer ply 42 to the isolation ply 40 to the isolation ply 38, and finally to the
power harvesting source 32.” Answer 3–4. e Examiner also finds that “the
vibration[] transfer is a collision between the outer plies 42 and the power
source 32.” Final Action 5.
Appellant argues that it is physically impossible for plies 42 to collide
with power source 32, because “the power source 32 and the outer plies 42
are at least separated by . . . intermediate isolation plies 38 and . . . cutout
plies 40.” Appeal Br. 7 (citing Loomis ¶ 49). According to Appellant, a
“collision between the energy harvesting circuit and the vibration plate,” as
recited in claim 1, requires that the energy harvesting circuit “come together
with solid or direct impact,” or have an “encounter” with the vibration plate.
Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted). To support this interpretation, Appellant cites
dictionary definitions of collide: “to come together with solid or direct
impact,” id. (quoting https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collide),
and collision: “an encounter between particles (such as atoms or molecules)
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resulting in exchange or transformation of energy” (quoting
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/collision).
In response, the Examiner acknowledges that “power source 32 and
the outer plies 42 of Loomis . . . do not have a direct touch or a direct
collision.” Answer 4. However, the Examiner argues that, under the broadest
reasonable interpretation, claim 1 “does not require a direct collision . . .
between the energy harvesting circuit and the vibration plate”; the claim
merely requires “a collision between the energy harvesting circuit and the
vibration plate.” Id. According to the Examiner, a collision, even under the
dictionary definition that Appellant proposes, “is an encounter between
particles (such as atoms or molecules) resulting in exchange or
transformation of energy,” and such a transformation of vibrational energy
occurs between power harvesting source 32 and outer plies 42. Id. at 5.
We agree with the Examiner that in claim 1, the term collision does
not require a direct collision between the energy harvesting circuit and the
vibration plate. We apply to claim terms “the broadest reasonable meaning
of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way
of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description
contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). e Specification uses the terms directly colliding and
directly collides to describe an interaction between an energy converter
(210) and a stamped antenna (120) on a vibration plate (110). See Spec. 26–
27; see also Figs. 6, 7. A person of ordinary skill in the art would understand
from this that, according to terminology in the Specification, a collision with
the vibration plate can be “direct” or, by implication, “indirect” (e.g., a direct
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collision with one object that itself directly collides with another). us, the
Examiner’s interpretation of the term collision is consistent with the
Specification.
e Examiner’s interpretation of the term collision is also consistent
with the dictionary definitions that Appellant cites. e first definition states
that collide can mean “to come together with solid or direct impact,” Appeal
Br. 8 (emphasis added and omitted), implying that it could be a solid,
indirect impact. e second definition states that collision can mean “an
encounter between particles (such as atoms or molecules) resulting in
exchange or transformation of energy.” Id. (emphasis added and omitted).
is does not exclude an indirect encounter that results in an energy
exchange. Id. (emphasis added and omitted).
We also find that the Examiner has made a sufficient prima facie
showing that in Loomis, the vibrations will inherently result in a collision (as
we interpret the term above) between the energy harvesting circuit and the
vibration plate. When the Examiner shows a reasonable basis for why a prior
art reference inherently possesses an alleged inherent characteristic, the
Examiner can “require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown
to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on.” In re Best,
562 F.2d 1252, 1254–55 (CCPA 1977) (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d
210, 213 (CCPA 1971)). We find the Examiner’s position reasonable that
Loomis’s outer plies 42 act as vibration plates, and that their vibration
energy inherently results in an indirect collision with power harvesting
source 32.
Appellant’s arguments do not present any evidence sufficient to rebut
this prima facie showing of inherency. In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues
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as follows: “Loomis does not disclose that the vibration is from the outer
plies 42 to the power source 32.” Reply Br. 2. Rather, “only the power
source 32, which is compared as the energy harvest circuit, vibrates.” Id. at 3
(citing Loomis ¶ 39). Appellant also argues in the Reply Brief that “[e]ven if
the power source 32 can pass the vibration to the nearest isolation plies 38,
Loomis does not disclose that any one of the isolation plies 38, circuitry 34
and wireless antenna 36 can transfer the vibration.” Reply Br. 4. erefore,
according to Appellant, “it is impossible for the power source 32 and the
outer plies 42 of Loomis to have indirect collision through transfer [of] the
vibration.” Id.
We do not consider these arguments because Appellant first raised
them in the Reply Brief and Appellant has not shown good cause for the
delay. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2) (“Any argument raised in the reply brief
which was not raised in the appeal brief, or is not responsive to an argument
raised in the examiner’s answer . . . will not be considered by the Board for
purposes of the present appeal, unless good cause is shown.”). us,
Appellant has not raised sufficient arguments or evidence in this appeal to
rebut the Examiner’s prima facie showing of inherency.
For the above reasons, and based on the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions as a whole, which we find persuasive, the preponderance of the
evidence supports the Examiner’s rejection, and Appellant has not shown
reversible error. erefore, we affirm the Examiner’s decision as to all
claims.
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CONCLUSION
In summary,
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6 103 Loomis, Belov 1–3, 6
4 103 Loomis, Belov, Soma’ 4
7 103 Loomis, Belov, Silva 7
9 103 Loomis, Belov, Greetis 9
10 103 Loomis, Belov, Arms 10
11 103 Loomis, Belov, Setiadi 11
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6, 7, 9–11
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv), 41.50(f)
(2018).
AFFIRMED